

CONTENTS

ADAPTING TO AN EVER-CHANGING WORLD

- ILEANA SORA DIMITRIU “LIVING IN A FRONTIERLESS LAND”: NADINE GORDIMER AND CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION
- DANIELA ROGOBETE THE (POST-) APOCALYPSE OF DAVE: LONDON BETWEEN THE DEATH OF THE METROPOLIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE POSTMETROPOLIS IN WILL SELF’S *THE BOOK OF DAVE*
- LUIZA CARAIVAN POST-APARTHEID JOHANNESBURG: AN URBAN PALIMPSEST
- ANDRZEJ DOROBEK “TO FATHOM HELL OR SOAR ANGELIC...” – CONTRADICTIONS AND DILEMMAS OF THE BEAT GENERATION
- BOJANA VUJIN THE ROAD TO HELL IS PAVED WITH YELLOW BRICK: EMERALD CITY AS POP-CULTURE’S METAPHOR FOR DISILLUSIONMENT
- SINEM YAZICIOGLU “PASSION FOR THE REAL” THROUGH SNUFF FILM IN BRET EASTON ELLIS’S *AMERICAN PSYCHO*
- ADINA CIUGUREANU ICONIC AND SYMBOLIC CODES IN AMERICAN AND ROMANIAN ELECTORAL POSTERS
- ABA-CARINA PÂRLOG POSTMODERNISM REVISITED: IDENTITY ISSUES IN JOHN FOWLES’ *THE FRENCH LIEUTENANT’S WOMAN*
- PIA BRÎNZEU “ALL OVER THE COUNTRY”: CLONED SPACES IN KAZUO ISHIGURO’S *NEVER LET ME GO*
- CRISTINA-GEORGIANA VOICU FROM THE MIRROR TO THE SEA: THE MODERN SEMIOTIC NATURE OF IDENTITY IN JEAN RHYS’S *WIDE SARGASSO SEA*

THEN AND NOW

- IOANA ZIRRA THE HISTORY HOUSE IN THE (POST-)COLONIAL PERSPECTIVE – A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF

	ANGLO-INDIAN AND ANGLO-IRISH HOMELAND REPRESENTATIONS AND REPRESSIONS
MÁRTA PINTÉR	“NATIONAL PARALLELS”: IDEOLOGIES OF CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC NATIONALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY IRELAND AND HUNGARY
RUXANDRA VIȘAN	REMAKE AND ADAPTATION IN KENNETH BRANAGH’S FILM <i>SLEUTH</i>
TED BAILEY	SOCIAL DARWINISMS: THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION INFLUENCED BOTH THOSE IN FAVOUR AND THOSE AGAINST SOCIAL DARWINISM
FRÉDÉRIC DUMAS	“HA–!HA! HA!”: THE POINT OF DOTS IN MARK TWAIN’S <i>INNOCENTS ABROAD</i>
ALEXANDRU DRAGOȘ IVANA	UNPRINCIPLED SENTIMENT AND THE NOVEL
ELISABETTA MARINO	VISIONS OF ITALY IN MARY SHELLEY’S SHORT STORIES

CREATIVITY AND VERB CONSTRUCTIONS

FRANCISCO RUIZ DE MENDOZA IBÁÑEZ and FRANCISCO GONZÁLVEZ-GARCÍA	CONSTRUCTIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE LEXICAL CONSTRUCTIONAL MODEL
MARIANA NEAGU	FIGURATIVE USES OF THE CAUSED-MOTION CONSTRUCTION
IMOLA-ÁGNES FARKAS	VERBS IN RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS
NATAŠA MILIVOJEVIĆ	LEXICAL SPECIFICATION AND ARGUMENT STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH AND SERBIAN SOUND EMISSION VERBS
PÉTER PELYVÁS	EPISTEMIC MODALITY: A CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE COGNITIVE MODELS
ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES	METAPHOR, DISCOURSE, CREATIVITY
ADINA OANA NICOLAE	CROSS-DISCURSIVE PATTERNS: CAREER METAPHORS IN ENGLISH
ANNAMARIA KILYENI	THE GRAMMAR OF SKIN IN PRINT ADS

CLAUDIA ELENA STOIAN

POWER RELATIONS IN ADVERTISING
DISCOURSE: 'POLITENESS' ACROSS CULTURES

ÉVA KOVÁCS

ON THE DIMINUTIVE IN ENGLISH

RENÁTA GREGOVÁ

EVALUATIVE MORPHOLOGY AND
(MOR)PHONOLOGICAL CHANGES IN
DIMINUTIVES OF INDO-EUROPEAN
LANGUAGES

*Adapting
to an ever-changing world*

“LIVING IN A FRONTIERLESS LAND”
NADINE GORDIMER AND CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION

ILEANA ȘORA DIMITRIU

University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban

***Abstract:** Nobel laureate, Nadine Gordimer, was for over four decades overdetermined by the South African context of apartheid. However, in recent years, she has started to take a more involved interest in cultural globalization, in what she refers to as “living on a frontierless land” (1999: 207). Starting with Gordimer’s own rhetorical question – “How, in national specificity, does each country go about moving beyond itself to procreate a culture that benefits self and others?” (1999: 212) – in this paper, I shall analyse new tendencies in Gordimer’s more recent fiction.*

***Keywords:** cultural globalization, Gordimer, recent fiction, post-ideological*

1. Introduction: Whither Gordimer?

Under apartheid, Nadine Gordimer was generally perceived to be an *anti-apartheid spokesperson*: the voice of reason and conscience against a tyrannical dispensation. However, with the demise of the old regime, new tendencies are becoming apparent in her writing: her excursions beyond the national question, the aspiration to step out of cultural isolation and plunge into the whirlpool of the larger, post-ideological world scene. Along with other critics, I have noted Gordimer’s post-1990 engagement with less dramatic social issues, as well as her new focus on global concerns. Without deserting the local, Gordimer’s understanding of globalisation – what Robbins calls “localised cosmopolitanism” (1998: 246) – informs her intellectual position as “locally inflected and globally mobile” (Cooppan 2001: 15). Starting with her novel, *The Pick Up* (2001), and the short story collection, *Loot* (2003), Gordimer deliberately looks beyond the local, in pursuit of cognate socio-cultural paradigms – *significant peripheries* and *cultural sounding-boards* – elsewhere. By drawing on recent postcolonial theories, I shall seek answers to the questions: Is Gordimer primarily a world writer? A postcolonial writer? A postcolonialising world writer? I suggest the last of these categories: a writer of

neither Centre, nor Periphery, but one inhabiting *significant peripheries* of becoming: processes of new adjustments between the old formulations of North and South. Gordimer seeks to show that there are no clear boundaries between Centres and Peripheries, and that it is important to adjust global interests to a series of intersecting margins. As Loomba said:

it is important to forge links between the differently positioned subjects of the new empire [world order] ... reconciling the demands of local conditions with broader paradigms of colonial and postcolonial history. (2005: 14; 18)

In the early 1990s, after the demise of institutional apartheid and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, there was some uncertainty as to what Gordimer's position – as a writer and public intellectual – would be under the new dispensation. Would her preoccupations in her fiction retain interest and significance? Would her work be of less relevance to a more normalised society? Gordimer did not disappoint her readers: in her first two post-apartheid novels – *None to Accompany Me* (1994) and *The House Gun* (1998) – she was still mainly preoccupied with the South African scene. Critics noticed her liberation from the burden of excessive social responsibility and the shift from large historical events to reconstitutions of the *civil imaginary* (see also Dimitriu 2001).

The two works of fiction that followed – the novel, *The Pickup* (2001), and the short-story collection, *Loot* (2003) – signal a more radical shift of emphasis in her writerly preoccupations. Gordimer seems to have renounced her exclusive focus on South Africa, which she considers in the past to have been “*the* example, the epitome of cultural isolation” (1999: 212). Now that writers feel less morally pressurised to engage with a dramatic social context, she is keen to offer literary answers to an important question: “How, in national specificity, does each country go about moving *beyond* itself to procreate a culture that will benefit self and others?” (1999: 212). In this article, I shall present a new facet of Gordimer's writerly profile: a tendency that can be detected in her more recent works of fiction and essays. What are new are her excursions beyond the national question and into the whirlpool of the larger post-ideological world scene.

2. Gordimer and Cultural Globalization

I shall start my investigation by pointing out new tendencies in her critical thinking as reflected in her collection of essays, *Living in Hope and History: Notes from Our Century* (1999). As compared with the tone of the previous collections of essays, which focused on the stringencies of the South African social scene, her new preoccupations with the need culturally to rejoin the world are explicitly foregrounded in some of her more recent essays. In the essay, "Our Century," for example, she reflects on humanity's achievements over the last hundred years, the focus being on the complex networks of cultures. Rather than emphasise the uniqueness of her locality, she explores the dimensions of "living on a frontierless land" (1999: 207), and how this inescapable condition relativises one's relationship with the home base. She is a proponent of what Nederveen Pieterse calls "critical globalism" (1995: 5), which takes a neutral view of the process, neither blocking nor celebrating it, but rather blending the merits of 'global' and 'local' to focus on "*global localization*" (Gordimer 1999: 207).

In the essay, "The Frontierless Land: Cultural Globalization", Gordimer talks of "the ethic of mutual enrichment" (1999: 209) in the expansion of ideas. She is aware of the danger of various new orthodoxies in the artistic expression world-wide, the new straightjackets of "universal blandness" and "market-realism" (209); Gordimer, therefore, suggests that a writer's "aim [is] to value the differences and bring them into play across aesthetic frontiers" (209). Gordimer pursues her idea of cultural globalization in the critical essay, "The Status of the Writer in the World Today: Which World? Whose World?". Here she insists on the need for writers' vigilance against any political intimidation meant to corrupt their 'search for truth': "Let our chosen status in the world be that of writers who *seek exchanges of the creative imagination ... and a vital mixture of peoples re-creating themselves.*" (1999: 28; emphases mine). This bold post-apartheid/ post-Cold War Gordimer voice was also heard on another occasion, when she asked:

So we have lost that status of what one might call national engagement. ... And I ask myself and you: Do we writers seek that status, the writer as politician, statesperson? (1999: 22).

Gordimer stresses the need for writers to resist any political agendas that might infringe upon their freedom of expression. She suggests there is no need

to fear the various cultural intersections, exchanges and networks; no need to fear mixing with foreign cultures, as “all civilisations – including China and Japan – have been the result of clashes” (28). And referring to the Congolese writer, Henri Lopes, she foregrounds “the interchange of ideas, of solutions to a common existence [for] every civilisation is born of a forgotten mixture, every race is a variety of mixtures that is ignored” (28). Gordimer has always been preoccupied with the concept of world literature. A change of emphasis is apparent, however, in the last decade. Inspired by Said’s work in the early nineties, Gordimer confesses to her new tendency of

placing a new concept of ‘world literature’ alongside the one I had posited with my eyes fixed on Euro-North America as the literary navel-of-the-world. In the all-encompassing sense of the term ‘world’, can any of our literatures be claimed definitively as ‘world’ literature? Which world? Whose world? (18)

Interestingly, Gordimer’s renewed sense of literary globalisation is validated by recent critical engagements with the concept of world literature. There is a drastic literary move world-wide – i.e. beyond the, by now, well-established postcolonial studies – a move away from the great canon of Western literature towards peripheral voices, and not necessarily postcolonial. The new yardstick is not so much a set of works, as a network-cum-intersection of ideas, of literary themes and patterns between and across any fixed boundaries. Summarising important current debates in the field of comparative literature, the American critic, Damrosch, says: “My claim is that world literature is not an infinite, ungraspable canon, but rather a mode of circulation and of reading ... a detached engagement with a world beyond our own” (2003: 4).

The link between local and global is essential: a work of world literature has to be seen, to borrow a phrase from Dharwadker, as “a montage of overlapping maps in motion” (2001: 5). In other words, world literature, like genuine cosmopolitanism, is never a bland, sanitised concept; rather it is one anchored in complex ‘localised’ circumstances. As mentioned before, Robbins’s notion of *localised cosmopolitanism* (1998: 246) is a useful conceptual tool for our discussion: “No one is, or ever can be, a cosmopolitan in the sense of belonging nowhere ... Cosmopolitanism is not a paranoid fantasy of ubiquity and omniscience; it is rooted in its local applications” (260).

Far from being a rootless cosmopolitan, Gordimer, for all her global aspirations and achievements – she, is after all, a Nobel prize winner – has been

linked to events both at home and abroad. She has continued to do so, while in her more recent works, for example, in *The Pickup* (2001) and *Loot* (2003) – as well as is manifest in her anthology of international short stories, *Telling Tales* (2004) – she has occupied increasingly multiple relations to the very terms ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, as I will show in the course of this article.

3. Globalization: Literary Reflections in the Recent Fiction

There is no doubt that Gordimer is a well-established figure in world literature, but on her own terms. Just as she remains vigilant against new post-independence impositions locally, so she refuses to subscribe to a totalising cultural globalism. Hers is an aspiration to hold a ‘membership card’ of world literature, ‘postcolonialising style’. This apparently paradoxical tendency has become increasingly pronounced in the last few years. Once the moral pressure for an exclusivist focus on South African issues has been lifted, Gordimer does not simply escape into de-contextualised meditations on love/ sex and power, her favourite themes; neither does she continue to do ‘navel-gazing’ at South Africa. Instead, she uses her new artistic freedom to enter more fully into the circuit of significant postcolonial Peripheries beyond her locality. The subtitle of this article, “Gordimer and Cultural Globalisation”, points the way towards new directions. On the one hand, as already mentioned, there are new emphases in Gordimer’s literary preoccupations: Gordimer looks ‘beyond’ the local, in pursuit of cognate socio-cultural paradigms elsewhere. On the other hand, the subtitle suggests the critic’s attempt to analyse Gordimer as seen via globalising/ postcolonial interpretative lenses. Let me start with the latter.

It is difficult to talk about Gordimer and postcolonial literature in the same breath; in the past, she used to be seen as either a *localised* literary activist (anti-apartheid spokesperson) or as a *world writer* (Nobel prize winner) in the tradition of European realism. The difficulty of seeing Gordimer as a postcolonial writer lies partly in the configuration of the term ‘postcolonialism’ itself, which continues to be based on an eclectic critical practice. It is a general sense of undecidability that prompts in critics like Quayson (2000) the need to go beyond the binaries of *theory* and *practice*, and perceive postcolonialism as *process*. The term *postcolonialising discourse* (as process) has the advantage of removing ‘post-colonialism’ from its assumed chronological implication (of ‘after colonialism’). As Quayson said:

a 'postcolonialising discourse' is meant to suggest creative ways of viewing a variety of cultural, political and social realities, both in the West and elsewhere, via a postcolonial prism of interpretation. (2000: 11)

To see postcolonialism as a process of 'coming-into-being,' rather than as a fixed social reality, implies the critic's willingness to explore the phenomenon in its complex intertwining with global tendencies. Attempts to theorise postcolonialism as a continuing process characterise recent debates. Childs and Williams, for example, having gone so far as to point to a reality beyond current postcolonialism, have coined the term "*post-postcolonialism*" as "anticipatory discourse" (1997: 7). A utopian condition of the future is embedded, accordingly, in contemporary postcolonialising processes of struggle against the current legacy of colonialism. Seeing postcolonialism as process means engaging with it epistemologically: that is, by focusing on the significant issues integral to the formation of the global world order after colonialism. This send me back to the subtitle of the current project. As already mentioned, my subtitle indicates not only the critic's attempt to analyse Gordimer via a globalising/ postcolonial prism of interpretation; it suggests, concomitantly, a new emphasis in Gordimer's literary preoccupations: her "looking awry" (to echo the title of Slavoj Žižek's landmark book, 1991), beyond the local, in pursuit of cognate social paradigms and new edges elsewhere.

4. *The Pick Up* (2001)

This shift is particularly noticeable in Gordimer's *The Pickup* (2001), her first novel to embrace the locality in a globally significant way. The novel unfolds in two locations, one South African, the other North African. Gordimer presents South Africa (after the demise of apartheid) as both a microcosm of world forces and as a country collectively seeking a better understanding of self by connecting with significant margins of the world, rather than by either imitating or resisting the Centre. By placing part of the action in North Africa, Gordimer offers a skilful way of exploring new post-apartheid issues at home, through a 'distant reading' of the local, particularly of its politics of identity and belonging.

This short novel could have been two separate short stories: one dealing with the dreams and realities of illegal immigration to South Africa; the other dealing with the dreams and realities of escape (emigration to the United States)

against the background of an unnamed desert country, indeed the desert itself. Having been expelled from his first mecca (South Africa), Abdu seeks another destination, whereas Julie, his South African wife, finds contentment in the unnamed North African state. There is no apparent reason why Gordimer feels the need to remove the protagonists from the familiar South African setting. Is the novel perhaps a parable meant to hide the author's unease in dealing with painful issues of belonging to a new, post-1990 domestic reality?

The second part of the novel deals with the two protagonists' emigration from South Africa to Abdu's unnamed home village, somewhere in North Africa. Here, Gordimer uses the novelistic technique of shifting the perspective to another plane of reality (another locality), so as to help the reader gain a better sense of the central story. Significantly, the couple emigrate from one Periphery to another, and not to the metropolis; in this way, by seeking familiar patterns elsewhere, Gordimer offers a 'defamiliarisation' of the local, a 'distant' reading of it. She presents the reader with the impact of exile on one's sense of identity and belonging, and more specifically, with the phenomenon of illegal immigration and accompanying reactions of xenophobia. Gordimer reveals Abdu's psychological turmoil, the continual internal contestation and interchange between different mind-states and hypostases of the self, or what Bhabha refers to as *liminality*, "this interstitial passage between fixed identities" (1994: 4).

Julie needs to leave home (South Africa) and emigrate to a place similar to the one she has left behind – a world of severe discrepancies – in order 'to see' the real nature of her place of origin. An important aspect of postcolonial reality that Julie did not perceive at home, and now does, is the hybrid nature of everyday practices in the Third World. When Abdu takes her to the local market, she finds that, alongside traditional merchandise, are sold kitschy plastic utensils "decorated with flower patterns of organic ostentation that seemed tactless in a desert village" (2001: 126), all wares that the First World – through its multinational sweatshops – has dumped here, and which the locals are eager to buy because "they don't break so soon" (126). As she learns more and more about the younger generation's mentality in the face of westernisation, Julie realises that Abdu and his companions, who are all university graduates, are critically aware of global interactions and exchanges in the Third World, of what Raymond Williams would refer to as the dialectic of "residuality" and "emergence" (1977: 5) between global tradition and modernization, Centres and Peripheries. The generation that cherishes "Nike

boots, cellphones, TV consoles, hi-fi and video equipment” (203) is, at the same time, aware that important changes have to be made for these status symbols to be truly affordable and integrated in everyday life. This generation understands that the Third World is constantly shaped by western images, by “the ethnoscares, technoscares, financescares, mediascares” (Appadurai 1994: 305) that are brought back by the returning migrants from the West.

While Julie becomes a keen observer of these collective identities, she also feels a sense of profound alienation from them. She is thus forced to consider another type of dislocation, another significant Periphery: that of the internal exile in solitary communion with the North African desert. The desert is an echo of, and companion to, Julie as she challenges her old secure white South African experience. Apart from its being offered as support for spiritual pursuit, the desert may also be interpreted as embodiment of Julie’s scepticism about the meta-narratives of socio-political totalities, whether South African, North American, Australian (or North African, for that matter). The desert is outside of any social space, including that of the North African village itself: “The desert. No seasons of bloom and decay. Just the endless turn of night and day. Out of time” (172). This is an indirect authorial way of expressing doubt about the ultimate validity of any one social system of reference, whether local or global. It may also suggest Gordimer’s own sense of exhaustion with political overdetermination, or her disenchantment with recent social configurations, both locally and internationally.

5. *Loot* (2003)

Gordimer has continued, since *The Pickup* (2001), to show an interest in the dynamics of the global beyond the local. Her collection of short stories, *Loot* (2003), is an explicit engagement with the new tendency in her artistic vision, her new focus on (dis)location, place and displacement in the world today. What strikes the reader at a first glance is the multiplicity of locales – more stories are set outside South Africa than inside the country – and the fact that eight of the ten stories relate to issues of post-liberation and global politics. The main thrust of the 2003 collection is identity and belonging in conditions of post-apartheid and post-Cold War indeterminacy and liminality, especially as applied to exile and dislocation in the world today. It is quite significant that “Loot”, the title story, is situated outside of South Africa. The story refers to a real incident that took place in Chile, a tsunami, which Gordimer makes use of in order to reflect on the consequences of extreme situations on the human

psyche. Human greed – that is, the looting of the objects revealed by the receding sea – is shown to have no boundaries as it ‘contaminates’ people across all social barriers and everywhere in the world. Gordimer reveals the frailty of all human convictions in extra-ordinary circumstances: she even manages to introduce an allusion to the time of political uprisings under apartheid, when “the ordinary opportunity of looting shops was routine to people” (2003: 4). This short story is a reminder of Gordimer’s long-standing preoccupations with identity and betrayal in human interaction, but with a new touch: her opening to the world, to global perspectives, to ‘the ethics of beyond’.

“Visiting George” is situated in London and looks at the phenomenon of South African exile and dislocation under apartheid. It is a meditation on an old comrade of the struggle years, who lives in England, where he reflects on his profound disappointment with communism in the ex-Soviet Union. However, it is in her non-fiction that Gordimer fully analyses “the tragedy of the Russian attempt to improve our human lot” and “*this sense of abandonment* that the collapse of the Soviet Union brings to our century” (1999: 226-227). Gordimer pursues the saga of the corrupt Soviet Union, referred to as “the fallen star, the red star” in the last, untitled story in the novella, “Karma” (2003: 153-173), which is part of *Loot*. The story unfolds against the background of the general collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. We look at this sinister social scene through the eyes of a young woman, Elena, whose young adulthood was marred by a social system that was unable to translate its own ‘grand narrative’ into lived experience. Caught up in a schizoid routine – that included endless food queues, as well as regular State ballet shows – Elena grows up hoping to be free one day. The disintegration of the Soviet Union brings with it the collapse of most social structures: “Old people [were] begging in the streets ... old women with the bewildered faces of former housewives, looked shamed under shawls” (220). When her own grandmother also starts begging at street corners, Elena starts an affair with a foreigner who helps her out of the country and “saves her from the chaos in Russia” (224). Trapped in a marriage of convenience, Elena has an illuminating insight into the new kind of unfreedom of the post-communist aftermath, which forces people to leave the country. While watching and then psychologically identifying with industrially managed cows in a model Italian farm, Elena has an epiphanic experience: she then and there decides to leave her marriage and abort her unwanted child – even if this means her becoming an illegal immigrant again.

Another aspect of illegal immigration – as global phenomenon – is presented in “Homage”, which takes place in an unnamed metropolis, and whose protagonist is nameless too: “*I am nobody*; no country counts me in its census, the name they gave me doesn’t exist; nobody did what was done” (136). This person has assassinated a politician, a crime for which he was paid good money that helps him stay on in the West. The protagonist calls to mind Abdu, “the *nobody* Abdu” of *The Pickup* (discussed above), who too has to put up with an underground existence, in South Africa. Whether in Johannesburg or in any other big city of the world, the pain of clandestine existence is the same: it involves an annihilation of identity and a painful silencing of self. The *nobody* alien, although alive, has no life: he is socially invisible and has no rights: his name and life are buried, symbolically, next to the lifeless body of the man whom he has assassinated:

All the time I was being pushed out of one country into another, I was afraid of having no papers, afraid of being questioned, afraid of being hungry, but now I had nothing to be afraid of. I still have nothing to fear. I don’t speak. (2003: 137)

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, let me pose the question: Do we perceive – in *The Pickup* and *Loot*, as discussed in this article – Gordimer as a world writer? A postcolonial writer? A postcolonialising world writer? I suggest the last of these categories: a writer of neither Centre nor Periphery, but one inhabiting ‘significant peripheries’ of becoming: ‘*post-postcolonial*’ processes of new adjustments between the old formulations of North and South. These complex, new relationships among the various edges of the world have been reinforced by Gordimer in an unexpected project: she edited an activist-inspired collection of short stories, *Telling Tales* (2004), for which she approached twenty-one well-known contemporary world writers from both North and South, including five Nobel prize-winners. She asked them each to offer a short story without receiving royalty, so that the profits from the sale of *Telling Tales* could be donated to the HIV/ AIDS global fund. As Gordimer states in her Introduction: “We decided that we too should wish to give something of our ability, as imaginative writers, to contribute in our way to the fight against this disease from which no country, no individual, is safely isolated” (2004: 1). The artist literally steps out of the ivory tower into the world market place: the imaginative contribution is sold, then donated, as words become a material

object, a book. Is this a further hint of Gordimer, the artist and activist, seeking a new stance in the postcolonialising process: that of an affirmative project without surrendering artistic integrity?

References

- Appadurai, A. 1994. 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy. In: P. Williams and L. Chrisman (eds). *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 305-23.
- Bhabha, H. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Childs, P. and P. Williams. 1997. *An Introductory Guide to Postcolonial Literature*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Cooppan, V. 2001. 'World Literature and Global Theory: Comparative Literature for the New Millennium.' *Symplokē* 9(1), pp. 15-43.
- Damrosch, D. 2003. *What is World Literature?* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Dharwadkar, V. (ed). 2001. *Cosmopolitan Geographies: New Locations in Literature and Culture*. New York: Routledge.
- Dimitriu, I. 2001. 'A New Sense of Social Space: Gordimer's Civil Imaginary.' In: R. Wilson and C. van Maltzan (eds). *Spaces and Crossings: Essays on Literature and Culture in Africa and Beyond*. Frankfurt am Main/ New York/ Oxford: Peter Lang, pp. 335-48.
- Gordimer, N. 1994. *None to Accompany Me*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Gordimer, N. 1998. *The House Gun*. Cape Town: David Philip.
- Gordimer, N. 1999. *Living in Hope and History: Notes from our Century*. Cape Town: David Philip.
- Gordimer, N. 2001. *The Pickup*. Cape Town: David Philip.
- Gordimer, N. 2003. *Loot*. Cape Town: David Philip.
- Gordimer, N. 2004. *Telling Tales*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Loomba, A. et al. (eds). 2005. 'Beyond What? An Introduction'. In: *Postcolonial Studies and Beyond*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, pp. 1-38.
- Nederveen Pieterse, J. 1995. *The Development of Development Theory: Towards Critical Globalism*. The Hague: Institute of Social Science.
- Quayson, A. 2000. *Postcolonialism: Theory, Practice or Process?* Cambridge: Polity.
- Robbins, B. 1998. 'Comparative Cosmopolitanisms.' In: P. Cheah and B. Robbins (eds). *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 246-64.
- Williams, R. 1977. *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Žižek, S. 1991. *Looking Awry. An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Notes on the author

Ileana Sora Dimitriu is professor of English and intercultural studies at UKZN-Durban, South Africa. She has published widely on postcolonial English literature from a comparative perspective, as well as on issues of cultural translation. Apart from journal articles and chapters in specialist books, her publications also include *Art of Conscience: Nadine Gordimer after Apartheid* and *Translation, Diversity and Power*.

POST-APARTHEID JOHANNESBURG: AN URBAN PALIMPSEST

LUIZA CARAIVAN

“Dimitrie Cantemir” University, Timișoara

***Abstract:** The paper analyses the transformations of the city of Johannesburg as it is presented in some of Nadine Gordimer’s post-Apartheid novels, in Achmat Dangor’s *Bitter Fruit* and in the 2009 film *District 9*. The aspects of home, relocation and violence are also examined as they are closely related to this multiracial and multicultural South African city.*

***Key words:** globalization, home, Johannesburg, post-Apartheid, relocation, violence*

1. Introduction

The contemporary city as an urban palimpsest is a composite environment, the product of overlapping forms that have emerged over centuries of growth and distinguish themselves in the different layers that are still visible at present. The present paper considers some texts that have acknowledged Johannesburg’s post-Apartheid transformation: Nadine Gordimer’s *Get a Life*, *The Pickup*, *The House Gun*, *None to Accompany Me*, Achmat Dangor’s *Bitter Fruit*, and Neill Blomkamp’s film *District 9*.

In earlier narratives, the city of Johannesburg used to be the representation of the Apartheid nation and violence whereas after 1990, Johannesburg became a link in a series of portraits of the increasingly globalized world. Although urban renewal has often involved destruction of businesses, demolition of historic structures, relocation of people and private property becoming public, it has also had positive aspects, such as multiculturalism and multiracialism. The concept of home is also fundamental and it is examined from the point of view of the returnee from exile and of the immigrant. Thus, the city reveals its hidden layers: smelly crowded places, labyrinths, places for relocations and violent manifestations and finally, a place including residential areas, slums and glimpses of the veld.

Michael Chapman (2008:11) observes that the new South African literature “portrays a multiracial, multicultural society rather than a society

marked by cultural isolation or political ideologies". Nadine Gordimer's post-Apartheid writings present "metropolitan centres" that are neither "African nor Asian nor Latin-American, nor indeed East European peripheries, but multiple margins and centres that are imbued with different degrees of significance".

Gordimer's novels depict a Johannesburg of equal opportunities for Africans, Indians, coloured or white people, with violence being the major issue for everybody irrespective of their skin colour. Dangor looks at black people's relocation from the slums to the new Suburbs, which are, in fact, another kind of slum. *District 9* offers an alternate Johannesburg with images from real-life slums inhabited by aliens who are threatened by forced evictions.

The redefinition of the city's identity in the globalized world was affirmed the moment when South Africa won the right to host the 2010 Soccer World Cup. It is difficult to consider Johannesburg a city where Apartheid has been substituted by globalization. It is in fact a city whose identity is established by migrants from rural areas or from different South African countries, by the large number of people who moved from the black townships into formerly white areas. As Emma Hunt (2006:104) underlines

Rural migrants and immigrants from the rest of Africa cannot compete with multinational corporations for control of the city. Yet the city has been altered as much by street culture, by Ethiopian and Senegalese immigrants, by hawkers, beggars, and buskers as by new forms of surveillance, by gated communities that emulate Tuscan villages and by air-conditioned shopping malls and casinos. The result is a city of paradoxical spaces, where the formal and the informal coexist in a proximity that would have dismayed apartheid urban planners.

Nadine Gordimer warns that the city has become increasingly divided as it joins a network of global cities, whereas the director of *District 9* goes further and underlines the separation of the white and black Suburbs from the black areas situated on the outskirts of the city. There is also a clear division between South Africans and African immigrants, the latter being presented as tribal, savage (cannibals, even) and completely ignorant of the fact that Johannesburg is the site of an ideal of cultural globalization.

Gordimer's understanding of what she calls "the ethic of mutual enrichment" of cultural globalization is represented by the 'rate of exchange' for writers all over the world, that is "the expansion of ideas [...] as coming from the life and spirit of the Other, the unknown country and society". She is interested in exploring "what the aim of globalization of culture is or [...] could be" in order to determine if it is related to "emphasizing the unity, the *oneness*

of cultural expression” and, thus, it could be used as a means to diminish the manifestations of xenophobia. The second aim of globalization (the one that Gordimer reinforces) is “to *value the differences*, [...] across aesthetic frontiers” and refute the arguments provided by governments that divide the world according to political and national criteria (2000: 209).

2. Accommodation: between private and public spaces

A typical characteristic that can be traced through Gordimer’s novels and short stories is her examination of rural and urban space “as an index of repression and as a focus of political resistance” (Head 1995: 47). She describes township life in order to discover community values in the new black collectivity, to expose the secrets of people’s daily life in public, without being forbidden to do it. The squatter camps contrast with the glass and steel of modern Johannesburg or the old-fashioned houses from the suburbs that were built during the nineteenth and twentieth century, with “broken – pillared stoep and dust-dried pot-plants, battered relic of real bricks and mortar” that are home for scavenging dogs (Gordimer 1995:50).

For Gordimer, place (as well as home) is not predetermined, but depends on the role assumed by her characters and their choice of action. This is the main reason why Sibongile Maqoma, the successful black woman in *None to Accompany Me*, cannot match her definition of ‘home’ to its actual location. Home is different from the place where she belongs ethnologically, rather it is “the place you were born to, the faces you first saw around you, and the elements of the situation among your fellow men in which you found yourself and with which you have been struggling, politically, personally or artistically, all your life” (Gordimer 1988:34). The personal, political or artistic endeavours that the South African writer has undertaken have defined her status and she has used this definition to situate her characters in the context of her novels. Sibongile’s search for home is one of the best examples in this respect.

On her return from exile, the black woman refuses to go back to the little house in the township of Chiawelo, where she and her husband spent their youth, in fact a slum “with the crush of people doubling- and tripling-up for somewhere to live” (Gordimer 1995:43). They prefer to spend the first night of their interim in a black leader’s house “in what used to be a forbidden white suburb” (44). Their return is not as promising as they had expected: their status of exiles always on the run does not change immediately. After they move out

of their first transient home, their next living quarters provided by government are in a hotel that seems to be another “wonderful concession” to what post-Apartheid government calls desegregation: “a filthy dump, a whore house” that smells like cockroaches (45). She feels she does not belong to the slum atmosphere, even though she openly admits that all those living there are her own people. In spite of the fact that her husband is grateful for having shelter and sharing the same situation as thousands of returnees, Sibongile is not prepared to share the intimacy of exile and return with anyone. The issue of accommodation defines her new identity of returnee, as she is not ready to name any part of South Africa ‘home’ yet. She looks back to ‘the grey days’ of Stockholm and London that appear shinier now than ever before in comparison to what South Africa has to offer. A traditional definition of home seems suitable for all the other returnees, but not for Sibongile Maqoma:

Home: that quiet word: a spectacle, a theatre, a pyrotechnic display of emotion for those who come from wars, banishment, exile, who have forgotten what home was, or suffered not being able to forget. (Gordimer 1995:44)

The black woman’s private emotions are conditioned by her sense of home. Sibongile cannot afford to waste her emotions on her return to South Africa and the word *home* is replaced by *accommodation*. Privacy is no longer an issue: her life must be public and comfortable, as she detests the privacy and distress of exile.

Her refusal to recognize ‘home’ is part of her alienation process from the values of the traditional black society, as she sees herself as the image of the future South African democracy. Unlike her husband, who is captive in the past and is “in there, at home in [his] country” (99), Sibongile fights against any memories or relationships that could trap her.

The Maqomas move in with the Starks and Sibongile is content to live in a white only neighborhood. The final accommodation is in the same building where she has her office. Her working place becomes her home not only because they are situated in the same building but also because her working life takes over her personal life. She becomes the absent wife/mother but she has a sense of fulfillment, especially when she apparently reconnects with her black community: she is in charge of a programme that reintegrates exiles into the new South African environment. She considers herself as an example, particularly when she admits that she has arrived *home*: she meets one of her cousins and she feels drawn to “her other self”, “wakened [..], shaken alive into

another light, another existence” (52); the blood ties revive her spirit and determine her to find the answer to the questions about her home and identity:

The feel of the house, that was home, at last, changed. The dimension of rooms stood back, fragile. [...] The locks on the doors – nothing, to a force that had the keys to everything in everyone’s life, that had sent them into exile and let them in again. They carried on with routine lives during the day and at night sat on the furniture Sibongile had bought, as in a waiting- room. (265)

In *The Pickup*, the city of Johannesburg is easily recognizable, although never named. The global city has not completely taken over the Apartheid city, as the disparities caused by wealth and education are still preserved. The novel shows a divided community: there are people who are able to move freely from country to country and those who enter illegally to work at the edge of global cities.

Julie, the rich white daughter of a well-known businessman, despises the suburbs of her childhood and, above all, the privileges offered to their inhabitants. She moves into a “series of backyard cottages adapted from servants’ quarters” (Gordimer 2001:8), which she sees as a radical departure from her father’s house, but which, in fact, is not because leaving the Suburbs to live in a black neighbourhood and going to clubs in Soweto (the black township where bloody Johannesburg riots started on several occasions during the Apartheid years) on Saturday nights has become a norm in the new South Africa. Julie considers that her ‘place’ is sufficiently remote from the Suburbs’ ostentation and is accepted by the black community “as the kind of place they themselves moved to from the old segregation” (18).

South Africa, like any other country, shelters its illegal immigrants underground, the dark place that “is the only freedom” (87) for people with different identities, like Abdu. The Arab immigrant’s inability to “conform to what others call the world” (58) throws him to the underground spaces where immigrants are hidden, to a “labyrinth to get lost in” (86), rather than into a global network. The illegal immigrant is forced to live in disguise, borrowing different names, perhaps eventually becoming a legal migrant who is still “a stray dog, a rat finding its hole as a way to get in” (227).

In *The Pickup*, the quest for belonging demands a return to the concept of place, but not necessarily to the bordered space. Gordimer presents numerous alternative spaces including the multicultural and multiracial city. Her protagonists’ attempts to locate the self are examined in each of these spaces by

using a sexual, racial, familial, spiritual, and cultural approach. Johannesburg is a mere example of the global city and it is left unnamed because it corresponds to any cosmopolitan city in any developing country.

3. The legacy of violence

With the decline of the rigorous and despotic Afrikaner government, crime in South Africa rose rapidly. In the 1990s, Johannesburg was constantly on top of the list of cities with the highest crime rate in the world. Although Apartheid is no longer the law, blacks and whites still live largely separate and unequal. Johannesburg is divided into the expensive (and mainly white) northern suburbs and separate poor districts, which are almost entirely black. The so-called 'black on black violence' – thus underlining its tribal side – has become colour-blind and one can speak of generalized violence. In 2002, there were bombings in black Soweto – and a right-wing organization has claimed to have organized them. In response, there were bomb attacks on the white suburbs of Johannesburg:

The habit of violence has been instilled, and this is a problem we know will be inherited by a new South Africa. The vocabulary of violence has become the common speech of both black and white. (Gordimer 2000:142)

Gordimer criticizes the fact that violence is repeating itself and is a form of communication in the city of Johannesburg. Violence must be understood on a social level, beyond individual experiences, affecting not only the perpetrators and their victims, but also everyone who “gathers against it [...] in some sort of mutually constructed shelter, the cellar of the other kind of war, from the bombshells of existence” (1998:86).

The city's beggars looking for their daily bread, its boys with “glue-sniffer's plastic bottle half-stuffed under the neck of his garment” (180), its smell of “urine and street-stall flowers” (278) are traits that make it similar with other metropolises around the world. What makes it different is the way its people have learnt to reconcile with the past and deal with the present. This “jagged end of a continent” (278) has offered plenty of positive examples that are worthwhile following.

The presence of the city of Johannesburg in Gordimer's writings is a contributing factor in the remaking of culture and identity beyond racial conflicts and random violence. This is the place where the juxtaposition of

racism, nations and cultures leads to the exploration of intraracial and interracial violence. In the former city of Johannesburg – that belonged to the spatial geography Apartheid – people were confined, segregated, monitored and “rendered violently invisible to others” who were not part of their group (Nuttal, 2004:748). The post-Apartheid city has no limits, and order is established with difficulty as the newly acquired freedom makes South African citizens believe that they can take justice into their own hands. Violence in Johannesburg is a legacy of Apartheid and only confronting the fears implemented by that regime can bring peace of mind and end all hostilities.

Harald and Claudia Lingard, the passively liberal white couple placed at the center of the story in *The House Gun*, do not consider that much has changed in the political transition to the post-Apartheid rule, from F.W. de Klerk to Nelson Mandela. Harald, a business executive, and Claudia, a medical doctor, are living in relative security, in a small and comfortable house in the Suburbs of Johannesburg, watching evening news of disasters elsewhere, when they are faced with a piece of news about violence that will affect their lives. The Lindgards have moved to “this townhouse complex with security-monitored entrance” (Gordimer 1998:3) with the specific purpose to escape the outside world and its violence. The moment when “the intercom buzzes” (3), they enter into a state of alert. Any visitor ringing at that time of night cannot be a bearer of good news.

Initially, at the beginning of the 1990s, the formerly white Suburbs of the post-Apartheid city were deserted by most of their inhabitants at the moment when black people had the right to become their neighbours. Some of the “white civil servants, mainly Afrikaners” who “lived neatly around their Apostolic and Dutch Reformed churches” could not accept the fact that the traditional city has become “a place where all that had been clandestine, the mixing of blacks and whites” is now accessible (Gordimer 2005:44). In her post-Apartheid writings, Gordimer has opted for the next stage in the development of the Suburbs; she presents them as lively, colourful and cosmopolitan instead of desolate and dismal. The 21st century inhabitants of the inner city area of Johannesburg are no longer exclusively the political activists of the 1990s, for there are also migrants from various parts of the world, who introduce “an alternative to corporate chic” (44). Rap and jazz bars, late-night bookshops and arts and crafts shops are frequented by former ‘minorities’, such as gay or black people, vegetarians or formerly illegal residents, mixed race couples and the black upper class doing business with their white partners.

In the heart of Johannesburg, there are bookshops that offer a glimpse of nature, of the veld, vague indications that the urban space concealed “scuffed and rat-nibbled early accounts of pre-white-settled terrain, river courses, and information on pre-industrial climate” (45). Nature reveals itself in the Suburbs, sending some of its species from the swamps or from the bush to feed in the gardens of the well-off citizens. “The creatures ignore you”, they “have nothing to do with you”. They reclaim their habitat and, “unless they are hunted, expelled from their places in the universe [...] by logging, burning off, urban, industrial and rural pollution”, wild creatures will survive any “radiant nuclear fallout” as they demonstrated in millions of years of existence (49) and, thus, nature has reconstructed the pre-urbanisation environmental conditions.

Achmat Dangor’s *Bitter Fruit* follows a black family from their fight against Apartheid to their apparent success when they move into the houses they had longed for. Black people are relocated to the white suburbs. Yet, the houses in the middle-class black suburbs are economical, the walls breathe “the wrong way, they suck air out of the house, then clog up like the lining of some diseased lung that can’t suck any air back in” (2004:81). The former slums were transformed into black suburbs by relocating people to houses with additional rooms and swimming pools, gardens and water, “a cheap dream house” (82) impossible to sell and move out of the new real-life slums. The residents are “Apartheid astronauts, trapped in this damn twilight world [...] between black and white, trying to be both and ending up as neither” (82). The tenants considered it “a wonderful place, just after Mandela was released, mixed of race and free in spirit” (204). The main characters, Silas, and his son, Michael, realize that they can write their own history of South Africa by following their family’s movement from one slum to another, from “one ruined neighborhood to the next”, witnessing their home destroyed by Government Acts only because an area is predominantly Indian, coloured or African, “filled with noise, loud music, people congregate in the street, it is squalid, it is a slum and therefore qualifies for clearance under the Slums Clearance Act” (186). Racism and xenophobia are still present in the newly established Suburbs:

‘We don’t have rats and cockroaches in the suburbs.’

‘Like hell. What do you have?’

‘Nigerians, Pakistanis, Taiwanese...’ (212).

The film I have chosen to illustrate the multiple layers of Johannesburg was released in 2009 and it was named after the divisions of some South

African cities: *District 9*. The script was based on real-life events that took place in District Six, Cape Town, during the Apartheid era (1966), when the government declared this area as the property of whites only, and thus, started the forced removals. By 1982, more than 60,000 people had been relocated 25 kilometers away from their homes, which were destroyed in order to build a University and its campus, but eventually, most of the whites-only territory remained undeveloped land.

Director Neill Blomkamp presents a quarantined neighborhood where aliens are hosted until the government decides that there are too many of them and they have to be moved as inner city residential areas must be kept clean. The movie is more than science fiction as it was filmed on location in the slums of Chiawelo, Soweto, and it uses fictional interviews, news footage, and videos from surveillance cameras in a documentary-style format. The themes of xenophobia and social segregation are at the center of the script: the aliens, some kind of 'prawns' as the officials name them, are confined to District 9, a military camp set up by the South African government inside Johannesburg, a camp which immediately transforms into a slum. The governmental decision is to relocate the fast-breeding aliens to an internment camp outside the city, ironically called District 10. The attempt to evacuate the aliens to another camp leads to violence and slaughter by South African security forces.

Another significant theme in *District 9* is the support offered by multinational corporations to government funds for military equipment and training. As Salman Rushdie (2003:296-7) underlines, globalization and its military-political sidekick are impossible to avoid if we reject the idea "of pure cultures, in urgent need of being kept free from alien contamination" that led to Apartheid and ethnic cleansing. Unfortunately, one of the downsides of globalization is the presence of multinationals that are involved not only in the economy of a country but also in its politics. The obvious advantage is represented by the jobs available to people who otherwise, would relocate.

4. Conclusion

The new space, between global and local, needs to be further explored and defined. The multitude of centres and margins provides the opportunity for the post-Apartheid city of Johannesburg to rediscover its buried layers of history and contemporaneity and to redefine its identity. The three different views of this South African city complete the image of the urban palimpsest, as

they bring to attention the transformations of public space into private, of slums into suburbs due to forced removals from African settlements and the rise of other slums when the first are dismantled. As Scott Johnson (2009) accentuated in his analysis of *District 9*, “the city should not be alien to foreigners” and, I might add, it should encourage diversity and bring the best in its people by multiculturalism and multiracialism.

References

- Chapman, M. 2008. *Postcolonialism: South African Perspectives*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Dangor, A. 2004 (2001). *Bitter Fruit*. London: Atlantic Books.
- District 9*. 2009. Directed by Neill Blomkamp. Written by Neill Blomkamp and Terri Tatchell.
- Gordimer, N. 2005. *Get a Life*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York.
- Gordimer, N. 2000 (1999). *Living in Hope and History*. Bloomsbury: London.
- Gordimer, N. 1995. *None to Accompany Me*. London: Penguin Books.
- Gordimer, N. 1988. *The Essential Gesture. Writing, Politics & Places*. London: Penguin Books.
- Gordimer, N. 1998. *The House Gun*. London: Bloomsbury
- Gordimer, N. 2001. *The Pickup*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Head, D. 1995. “Gordimer’s *None to Accompany Me*: Revisionism and Interregnum” *Research in African Literatures*, 26(4), 46-57.
- Hunt, E. 2006. “Post-apartheid Johannesburg and global mobility in Nadine Gordimer's *The Pickup* and Phaswane Mpe's *Welcome to our Hillbrow* Publication: *ARIEL* 37(4) pp. 103-123.
- Johnson, S. 2009. “Alien Nation”. *Newsweek*. 27th August 2009. Available <http://www.newsweek.com/id/213805/page/1> [2010, January 10]
- Nuttal, S. 2004. “City Forms and Writing the 'Now' in South Africa”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Volume 30, Number 4, December 2004, pp. 731- 748
- Rushdie, S. 2003 (2002) *Step Across This Line*. London: Vintage.

Notes on the author

Luiza Maria Caraivan is a lecturer in English at “Dimitrie Cantemir” University, Timișoara. She holds a PhD in English Literature at the University of the West in Timisoara, with the thesis *Nadine Gordimer and the Rhetoric of Otherness: Multiracialism in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, supervised by Professor Pia Brînzeu. Her latest book published is *First Steps in Business English* (2009).

**THE (POST-) APOCALYPSE OF DAVE:
LONDON BETWEEN THE DEATH OF THE METROPOLIS
AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE POSTMETROPOLIS
IN WILL SELF'S *THE BOOK OF DAVE***

DANIELA ROGOBETE

University of Craiova

***Abstract:** Relying upon Soja's theories regarding the production of space, this paper aims at analysing the particular place London occupies at the intersections of postmodern theories of urban spaces and imaginary geographies, using Will Self's novel *The Book of Dave* (2006) as an illustration. London itself becomes here a character whereas Dave, the main hero, acts as a guide inside this physical and cultural labyrinth.*

***Keywords:** death of Postmetropolis, imaginary geographies, Knowledge, sites of memory*

1. Introduction

Like any other metropolis of the world, London has gathered in time a multitude of artistic representations so that almost all street corners and buildings find their echo in a piece of art. Despite the numerous representations of the metropolis, be it colonial or postcolonial, poetic or pictorial, fictional or geographical, the real image of London is impossible to be defined for it presents itself as a huge palimpsest relying upon the superposition of a plurality of maps and the conjoined results of a plurality of readings.

Will Self's novel *The Book of Dave: A Revelation of the Recent Past and the Distant Future* (2006) captures a glimpse of the present day metropolis anchored in a trite, automatic daily routine that restructures the texture of the city as seen through the eyes of a postmodern city observer – a taxi driver. Following Roland Barthes's model of a semiological analysis of the urban space, Self resumes the same endeavour of looking for signs, signifiers and signifieds in the streets, buildings and monuments of London, focusing instead

upon the empty signifiers of the Metropolis, upon the lost significances and the traces of a culturally meaningful past.

2. Towards the Death of the Metropolis

Due to the excessive economic growth and capitalization visible during the last decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, the traditional centre of the metropolis was challenged so that postmodernity brought an inherent decentralisation that, instead of changing and challenging the position of the centre, multiplied it into a diversity of sub-centres (economical, commercial, cultural, ancient, new etc). The parallel processes of de-/re-centering the metropolis and redefining its boundaries by the continuous addition of suburb areas that threaten to pulverize it into a multitude of sub-metropolises, are equated by the obliteration of the metropolis under the burden of representations. Most of the time this “burden of representation” is engendered by the domination of informatics and of its new means of communication and, some other times, by the relativisation of distances. The preponderance of the image over the written word sometimes leads to the proliferation of a fabricated representation of the metropolis present in brochures, illustrated guides, leaflets, tourist maps and websites; most frequently all these provide the viewer with a glossy, beautified though neuter image of a particular space. At the same time they seem to deprive the postmodern traveler of curiosity and of the ensuing pleasure of discovery. This is precisely what Will Self wants to avoid and, to this purpose, he finds – as always in his case – highly unconventional means of activating the perception of the Metropolis.

The *sites of memory*, as imagined by Nora, become mere material absences, traces of some forgotten signifieds that have to be revived. The habit and the fact that we are constantly assaulted by trivial representations of the urban space we inhabit, transform the representative landmarks of a city into empty recipients of people’s indifference and oblivion. By gradually losing the significance that shaped their existence and due to an excessive emphasis placed upon consumerism and profit, metropolises, too, seem to fall into the trap already theorised by Baudrillard, of the originals replaced by simulacra.

The erasure of the past, the metamorphosis of the cultural into commercial and of these sites of memory into empty spaces, the proliferation of centres, of beautifully neutral, impersonal metropolitan representations and the

emergence of an ever increasing post-suburbia, made urban theorists declare the end of the Metropolis era, the Death of the Metropolis and the birth of the *Exopolis* and of fractal cities. This new postmodern nostalgia is directed towards that traditional type of city where “time becomes visible”, according to Lewis Mumford’s words, where traces of history, cultural tradition and social involvement combine into a complex urban space. The danger that postmodern metropolises might become pseudo-cities (celebrating the commercial simulacrum of a space of forgetfulness and erasure of memory, to which London makes no exception), was prophesized by such theorists as Norman Klein, Edward Soja, Lewis Mumford, and Thomas Bender. Such a pseudo-city “reveals no passage of time, no history. The City Lite does not age; it is consumed and replaced. It is any time and any place – it no longer holds culture nor provides an orientation to the past and present for its residents” (Bender in Soja 2000: 247).

Will Self offers a disturbing reading of London which rises against this type of involuntary erasure of memory and transmutation of the metropolis into a depersonalized *metroplex*. Using his fictional representation of the city and superimposing several possible maps of the metropolis, though in a very unorthodox manner, Self attempts a revival of Soja’s theorization of the metropolis, based on a slightly reversed “trialectics” of spatiality. What Soja (1997) theorised as the three components of the social production of space (the perceived, conceived and lived space), reworking upon Lefebvre’s ideas, seems to have collapsed in Self’s urban landscape and mingled under the conjoint influences of consumerism and mercantilism.

The former experience of inhabiting, creating and representing the City has been transformed into a superficial experience marked by indifference, oblivion and superficiality. Rushing between places without actually seeing them or being aware of their influence has become the common denominator of all the manners of experiencing the Metropolis. The traditional space-time chronotope seems to have been equally transformed – with the temporal dimension ever shorter and compressed, and the spatial dimension of the Metropolis ever larger, decentralized and apparently invisible to its inhabitants. All the reference marks of the City seem now to be devoid of their significance. This is, at least, what Self thinks and confesses through the voice of his lunatic taxi driver:

The cabbie’s furious thoughts shot through the windscreen and ricocheted off the unfeeling world. Achilles was up on his plinth *with his tiny bronze cock*, his black

shield fending off the hair-styling wand of the Hilton, *where all my heartache began*. Solid clouds hung overhead *lunging up fresh blood*. The gates to Hyde Park, erected for the Queen Mother, looked *like bent paperclips* in the gloom, the lion and unicorn on their Warner Brothers escutcheon were prancing cartoon characters. Evil be to him who thinks of it, said the Unicorn, and the Lion replied, *Eeee, whassup, Doc?* (Self 27)

3. Driving in the City: Postmodern pilgrimages

When placed among different observers of the urban space, Dave, the dejected London taxi driver, shattered by the recent divorce from his wife and the loss of his son's custody, seems not to fall into one definite category but to gather specific features pertaining to several. An "Ambassador of the City" as he defines himself, he sees a cabbie's profession as that of a "part driver, part tour guide" (Self 33) who measures the City, assesses its distances in terms of cab tariffs so that "time, distance and money" become "the three dimensions of Dave Rudman's universe" (31).

When distinguishing between travellers and flâneurs, between those who simply go from one place to the other and the ones who "botanise the asphalt" (Benjamin in Leach 2002:2), in search of its hidden signs and significances but never truly getting emotionally involved in its deciphering, between observers and voyeurs, theorists were mainly interested in the act of traversing the city on foot. Going on foot, feeling the pulse of the city, absorbing its flavors and embracing its rhythm, were considered to be the main methods of reading the city.

Will Self suggests another type of "reading" the city by making his main character a taxi driver in love with London and an expert in anything related to its Knowledge (all the runs and points that any London taxi driver has to know) and to the statues and monuments in London. Dave's experience in the metropolis is disturbing as he gradually loses his grip on reality – due to his personal problems and the history of mental illness running in his family – but reinforces his attachment to London. When his entire universe collapses, his love for the city and for his job is what "keeps his wheels on the ground". Reciting the runs and points and taking refuge into the solid stability of the city and the closed, insulated universe of his car help him focus upon the only certain reality in his life – the streets of London – and prevent him from completely losing his sanity. These drives back and forth into the heart and suburbs of the metropolis are turned into almost mystical pilgrimages along the

labyrinthine streets of London, a sacred rite of passage from mere dweller of the city to the rank of an all-knowing high priest of its avenues.

I fucking know. I know it all – I hold it all. If all of this were swamped, taken out by a huge fucking flood, who'd be able to tell you what it was like? Not the fucking Mayor or the Prime Minister – that's for sure. But me, an 'umble cabbie. (Self 33)

In this shattering universe and distorted reality, as seen by Dave's troubled mind, which gradually disintegrates under the burden of psychological traumas and pressures of economic considerations, Self finds a particular pleasure in having Dave state his "points" and thus reaffirm the stability of space and redefine places of reference. While constantly counteracting the dissolution of his reality by recording names of streets and of buildings, by enumerating monuments and relating their history, Dave not only attempts to exorcise the demons of his mind but also to recreate the City and make people aware of its "spatiality".

The ghost drove on up the Broadway past the uglified slab of the Connaught Business Centre and on through Colindale, turning right down Colindale Avenue by the Newspaper Library, where ageing amateur genealogists sifted the dusty old doings of their ancestors between their arthritic fingers. The cooper roof of the National Institute for Medical Research at Mill Hill shone in a single faint beam from the setting sun. (39) [...] Forward Regent's Park Road. Forward Finchley Road. Left Temple Fortune Lane. Bear left Meadway Crescent. Bear left Meadway. Right Hampstead Way... (44)

Under the tyres of Dave's cab the streets of London come to life and through his windscreen, its edifices and monuments can be seen from a new perspective which shatters the layer of dust and indifference that has rendered them almost invisible, and makes them regain their significance. This idea finds its best illustration in a very suggestive episode when all the statues in London, heroes and saints, lions and dragons, poets and kings, all its forgotten emblems come to life and leave their niches, go down from their plinths and pediments in order to reassert their presence in the city.

Achilles was getting off his plinth; first one big foot then the other tore from its base with a tortured screech. He cut at the rags of mist with his short sword and brandished his shield at the Hilton Hotel. [...]

Achilles stood by beneath Constitution Arch and beat shield with sword. With a bang, then a spatter of stony fragments, the four horses atop the arch came alive, tossing their leaden heads. The boy holding the traces struggled to control them. Peace, erect in her

chariot, her robe coming off her shoulder in rigid folds, flicked the reins and the whole, mighty quadriga rose, banked sharply and came crunching down. [...]

The other statues on the traffic island were animated: the Iron Duke spurred down his horse, Copenhagen; the bronze figures that attended him – Guard, Dragoon, Fusilier and Highlander – wrenched themselves free from the polished granite and fell in behind their commander-in-chief. [...] (321)

Since they are no more than huge petrified effigies emptied of their history and symbolism, the only thing they manage to provoke is to unleash chaos among the sleepy pedestrians and disoriented drivers. Dave's endeavour is that of reinvesting the city he loves more than he himself is aware, "craving London as an identity", with its lost strength, reviving the forgotten histories of each significant locus and reactivating people's memory. The writer achieves this by deliberately overlapping different types of spaces and for each of the spaces he creates Self imagines as many types of maps and ways of mapping London. These spaces might be *physical* (recognizable in Dave's various runs in London which recreate parts of the city in a huge urban puzzle), *emotional* (as individual or collective, historic or social memory is activated through anecdotes or incidents related to a particular place), *mental* (Dave's gloomy projections of London into an apocalyptic future), *imaginative* (schizophrenic urban delusions offering alternative realities of the city), *religious* (as Dave founds a new religion – Dävinanity – a parody of modern Christianity) and finally, *discursive spaces* (as Self uses an idiosyncratic combination of Standard English, Cockney dialect, the drivers' jargon and, in the episodes related to Ham, the post-apocalyptic remains of London, a special language, a sort of mock Cockney called Mokni). In imagining this language of the future Self achieves a very interesting combination of discourses and language registers, a mixture of pronunciations and voices that he tries to accurately record. Invented words and literal or phonetic transpositions, acronyms, abbreviations and blends besides the intertextual references and satirical hints make *The Book of Dave* one of the most original books of contemporary British literature.

4. London and its post-apocalyptic revisitations

Self's illustration of the concept of the Death of the Metropolis appears in the episodes allegedly inspired by Dave's books, discovered 500 years later, after a flood has already destroyed London. Inspired by the fact that in case of a deluge, the only part of London uncovered by waters would be Hampstead, Self

imagines a dystopian, post-deluge ex-London, now reduced to the island of Ham, populated by people and motos and living according to the laws of Dave. He introduces these post-apocalyptic visions of a flooded London, by using as an epigraph a quotation taken from Edward Thomas's *The South Country*:

I like to think how easily Nature will absorb London as she absorbed the mastodon, setting her spiders to spin the winding sheet and her worms to fill in the graves, and her grass to cover it pitifully up, adding flowers – as an unknown hand added them to the grave of Nero. (1993: 77).

In an interview by John O'Connell, Will Self comments upon the way in which he imagines London in this novel and upon the parts ascribed to his main character: "Dave has two main roles in the book. One is to be this repository of knowledge about London. You know, if it was destroyed, who would rebuild it? So it's about his cognitive life, about the fact that he's a unique beast who knows so much. But he's also this other modern and emblematic figure, the "loser dad", as the redtops would coin it; an angry, emotionally deracinated man. There seemed to me to be a productive synergy between those two aspects of his character".

While he knows almost everything about London, he is ignorant about the tricky ways of life: he raises a child he thinks is his, he marries a woman he thinks is the mother of his beloved son, he finally dies being accidentally shot in a process of money recuperation but his violent death is generally taken as a suicide. His entire life is a series of failures, discontentments, disappointments and nervous breakdowns. During his delusional bouts he writes, following Moses' example, two diaries on metallic plates. The first one represents the basis of Dävinanity and records the principles of this new religion and the prescriptions according to which the society on Ham should be organized. The arrangements following Dave's divorce from Michelle and the loss of his son Carl become the governing social and theological principles on an island of the future where men and women live separately and children have to spend their childhood commuting between parents until they remain with their fathers. A very misogynistic, authoritarian, violent and unjust religion bitterly satirises Christianity in its fundamentalist views, in what Self considered to be "a theoretization of bad-ass patriarchy" (interviews with Self: Vincent, "Abuse of Self", on-line). The second book is a correction made to the first one, containing the core of Dave's wisdom, the attenuation of his lifelong bitterness and the final self acceptance.

All the oddities he imagines on the island of the future represent strange literalisations of metaphorical analogies present in the alternating episodes placed in contemporary London. The general oblivion that plagues the Metropolis almost placing it outside time is translated in the Ham sections in the deep layers of sand covering the former city; the proliferation of centres is illustrated by the multitude of islands that form the archipelago of Ing. The grotesque realities in contemporary London find an even more grotesque correspondence on Ham promoting Self as one of the best satirists of the 21st century.

Self's tricky part is that he practically forces his reader to do a lot of detective work that simultaneously covers several plans: on a geographical level the reader is permanently challenged to juxtapose the real map of London and the one provided by Self, and discover the real correspondents of the places on Ham; on a fictional level the reader is asked to make his way in a labyrinth of allusions, stories, metaphorical episodes and their literalisation, and on a linguistic level, to decipher a strange language. Self provides a map even for this linguistic journey as he gives a glossary at the end of the novel that translates the Mokni words.

All these maps create a vivid image of a complex metropolis, otherwise too difficult to be described if using only one method of cartography, and place London at the intersections of theoretical coordinates of postmodern urban studies. Self's London is faced with the Apocalypse at two different levels: a real one, emerging from the most pessimistic prophecies of urban theorists related to the general dissolution of the traditional metropolis and the emergence of a Postmetropolis, seen as a "carceral archipelago" (Mike Davis 1990) obsessed with an "ecology of fear" and perpetuating a "security-obsessed urbanism" (Soja 2000: 312). The metaphorical apocalypse translates on a fictional level the general process of reconfiguring the cognitive maps of our urban imaginary spaces. The metropolis becomes a non-existent, computer-generated space that Soja calls *Simcity*, short-circuiting our representation of the self in relation to the inhabited space.

5. Conclusions

Highly interested in anything pertaining to psychogeography and the way in which space and mind intersect and engender psychological experience, Self dwells upon the many ways in which the contemporary human being may

still experience the City/Metropolis. Even if he has recently declared himself an adept of the “solitary walker” whom he sees as “an insurgent against the contemporary world, an ambulatory time traveler” (see Will Self: On “Psychogeography and the Places That Choose You”) he prefers a taxi driver as the main agent of rediscovering London in *The Book of Dave*. Self’s novel warns about all these dangers lying at the core of postmodern representations and reconfigurations of urban spaces in a highly disturbing novel giving rise to conflicting interpretations and critical appreciations. The British writer concludes his novel in an open way that does not offer solutions for any of these problems except perhaps for an unbridled and unconditioned love for one’s city that succeeds in creating a healing space of resistance against the apocalyptic consequences of oblivion, indifference and cultural erasure.

References

- Barthes, R. 1994 (1973). *The Semiotic Challenge*. Translated by Richard Howard, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Baudrillard, J. 2000. *Simulacra and Simulations in Modern Criticism and Theory*, David Lodge & Nigel Wood (ed.), Longman, p. 404 – 413
- Davis, M. 1990. *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles*. London and New York: Verso.
- Leach, N. 2002. *The Hieroglyphics of Space : Reading and Experiencing the Modern Metropolis*, London and New York : Routledge.
- Lefebvre, H. 2002 (1992). *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Mumford, L. 1961. *The City in History*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Nora, P. 1997. *Les Lieux de memoire*, Gallimard
- O’Connell, J. *Will Self’s London*. [Online]. Available:
(<http://www.timeout.com/london/books/features/1565/2.html>) ([2010, August 22])
- Self, W. 2006. *The Book of Dave*. London: Penguin Books, Vikings.
- Self, W.: On Psychogeography and the Places That Choose You, in “Travel Interviews” [Online] Available: (http://www.worldhum.com/features/travel-interviews/will_self_on_psychogeography_and_the_places_that_choose_you_20071217/) ([2010, September 12])
- Soja, E. 1997. *Postmodern Geographies, The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*. Jaipur and New Delhi: Rawat Publications.
- Soja, E. 2000. *Postmetropolis, Critical Studies of Cities and Regions*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Thomas, E. 1993. *The South Country*. London: Everyman.
- Vincent, S. “The Stop Smiling Interview with Will Self” – Abuse of Self. [Online] Available:
(http://www.stopsmilingonline.com/story_detail.php?id=748) ([2010, September 12])

Notes on the author

Daniela Rogobete is a senior lecturer at the English and American Studies Department, Faculty of Letters, University of Craiova, and holds a PhD in Postcolonial Studies. A particular focus of her research is placed upon issues of diaspora and exile, as major factors in shaping and redefining national identities, and the authenticity and legitimacy of diasporic writings in English, based on an analysis and redefinition of Indianness in the light of the new remappings of political, geographical and cultural spaces.

“TO FATHOM HELL OR SOAR ANGELIC...”
CONTRADICTIONS AND DILEMMAS OF THE BEAT GENERATION

ANDRZEJ DOROBEK

State School of Higher Education, Płock

***Abstract:** Osmond's statement of the psychedelic ambivalence opens the discussion of the contradictions of American Beat literature: spiritual illumination vs. bohemian lusts, freedom vs. political oppression, artistic integrity vs. "selling out." Examples come from Ginsberg's, Kerouac's, Burroughs's and Broyard's works, with references to Hawthorne, Thoreau or Sukenick. Finally, a brief assessment of the historical importance of Beat contradictions is attempted.*

***Keywords:** alternative, beat, consumerism, in, out, psychedelia*

1. Introduction: Heaven vs. Hell?

The second line of the couplet quoted in the title of this paper reads: “just take a pinch of psychedelic”: together, they constitute the classic definition of the mind-expanding experience, framed in 1956 by the English psychiatrist Humphry Osmond on the basis of the two-line poem by his famous literary friend Aldous Huxley, “To make this trivial world sublime/ Take half a gramme of phanerothyme,” the latter standing for “mescaline” (Ruck, Bigwood Staples, Ott, Wasson 1979: 146). Osmond’s improved version, instead of stressing only the positive aspect of the aforementioned experience, presented it as intrinsically torn between the extremes of “heavenly” bliss (“unio mystica”) and “hellish” suffering, usually resulting from inappropriate “set” and “setting,” the former denoting the mental disposition of the subject of an mind-expanding adventure, the latter – the actual conditions of its being undertaken (Grof 2000: 31). Moreover, it introduced the term “psychedelic,” which, since that time, has become the most widely accepted and most frequently used name of any chemical or natural substance (primarily marijuana, hashish, psilocybin, mescaline and LSD, occasionally – narcotics form the opiates “family” or even alcohol) that may almost immediately change the human perception towards

mystical illumination, traditionally available through time-consuming transcendental meditation practices.

Given the time when the term was introduced, it would be impossible to label any earlier instances of mind-expansion, e. g. for artistic purposes, as “psychedelic.” And yet, such instances have occurred since the ancient times of Homer, probably initiated to opium (De Quincey 1982: 139). With the advent of Romanticism, along with its principal idea of spiritual transcendence towards the pantheistic communion with God as well as the rejection of social and moral conventions of the time, drugs or psychoactive substances (as psychedelics are sometimes called, to be distinguished from their habit-forming “associates”) seemed a welcome aid – testifying to the considerably later statement by a well-known representative of the early 20th century French avant-garde that opium equals rebellion (Cocteau 1990: 34). And, indeed, numerous works by Romantics (e. g. Poe’s short stories from the so called “Ligeia” cycle), their fin-de-siecle followers (Rimbaud’s “The Drunken Boat” or *Illuminations*) or surrealists (Michaux’s *Paix dans les brisements*) were inspired by the authors’ drug and mind-expanding experiences, sometimes almost exclusively (Baudelaire’s *Artificial Paradise*, De Quincey’s *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*).

American Beat writers may be comfortably located in this line of “rebellious generations” (Fischer 1965: 31-32) as legitimate successors of the European modernist bohemia – see Ronald Sukenick’s *Down and In*, a story of the post-WWII New York artistic cafes and their patrons (mainly its second chapter, “Bohemia is a country in Europe,” with a remarkable stress upon the Beats). The role of mind-expanding/ narcotic references in their works is definitely more significant than ever before and the evidence of the fundamental antinomy of the psychedelic experience in Osmond’s understanding – undeniably impressive. Thus “fathoming Hell” versus “soaring angelic” may be legitimately considered as the statement of one of the basic contradictions within the Beat movement itself – as well as a convenient starting point for the discussion of its other, closely related antinomies.

2. Contradictions and dilemmas

2.1. Holy beats or holy goofs?

At this point, two meanings of the word “beat” must be briefly elucidated. The first referred to the beat in music, especially in be bop jazz,

which, generally disregarded by the American “square” middle class of the late 1940’s and 1950’s, was immediately welcomed by the beatnik bohemia as a legitimate attribute of their “alternative” image. The other, even more important for this image – and the present part of our discourse – concerned their spiritual condition of “beatitude” or “holiness,” attained by Zen Buddhist meditation (Allen Ginsberg, undeniably the most prominent poetic voice of the movement, being an outstanding member of the famous Naropa Institute in Boulder). A shorter, more convenient way to the same end was paved by appropriate mind-expanding substances, mainly marijuana and peyote, also in its synthesized form of mescaline (LSD being hardly known in the USA at the time).

The loudest Beat spokesman for the “holiness” was, arguably, Ginsberg in the “Footnote to *Howl*,” in which even parts of the human body considered most unholy are claimed to be exactly the opposite – the text basically consisting of the word “holy” repeated continuously, as if in a shamanic trance (shamen or “holy men” in the North or Central America being also known for regular mind-expanding practices – see Carlos Casteneda’s books on Don Juan). It was, however, Jack Kerouac, the most widely recognized fiction writer of this generation, who, having introduced the term “beat,” allegedly endowed it with the meaning of “beatitude.” At the same time, he was probably the first to observe how this highly desirable spiritual condition corresponded with the Beats’ bohemian lifestyle.

Thus his most famous novel *On the Road* (1957), along with Ginsberg’s *Howl* frequently mentioned as the Beat manifesto, brings, in fact, a rather equivocal image of this generation. On the one hand, the characters of this *roman à clef*, such as Carlo Marx (Allen Ginsberg), Old Bull Lee (William S. Burroughs) or Sal Paradise (Kerouac himself), are portrayed as unrelenting seekers of even momentary “paradise” in their lives, accordingly filled with “digging” be bop jazz (e. g. of the pianist George Shearing) or indulging in narcotic/ mind-expanding adventures. These pursuits, from the perspective of the bohemian ethos considered “holy,” quite soon, however, reveal their “hellish” side. Dean Moriarty (Neal Cassady), arguably the central character of the novel, revered by his colleagues as a “Beat Master,” i. e. the living symbol of the whole generation’s lifestyle, towards the end is portrayed as a victim of uncontrolled erotic, alcoholic and narcotic consumption. In fact, Cassady became ultimately undone by his dissolute hedonism only some ten years later – having participated, in the meantime, in the psychedelic adventures of Ken Kesey and his Merry Pranksters, fundamentally important for the Hippie

counter culture – it is, nevertheless, already in *On the Road* that he is perceptively identified as “HOLY GOOF” (Kerouac 1957: 236).

The same contradiction between the “heaven” of spiritual illumination and the “hell” of straightforward consumption is even more clearly presented in *The Dharma Bums* (1958), also conceived as *roman a clef* (like all essential works by Kerouac). Two main heroes, Ray Smith (the author himself) and Japhy Ryder (Gary Snyder, a talented poet, appreciated by the Beats as an authority on Zen), attempt to follow the path of Siddhartha Gautama, later known as Buddha, leading from the indulgence in carnal pleasures to the ascetic discipline of meditation. Still, walking along this path, they obviously lack their model’s consistency: instead of abandoning the pleasures in favour of discipline, they constantly hesitate between the two. Moreover, detailed descriptions of their consumption activities – as far as alcohol, drugs and sex are concerned – provoke close associations with the “Lost Generation” novels, such as Hemingway’s *The Sun Also Rises* (1926), where regular indulging in such activities clearly implies spiritual emptiness and moral blindness. Whether these associations were intended or not, the relevance of Smith’s final spell of meditation on the Desolation Peak in the Cascade Mountains in the state of Washington seems, under the aforementioned circumstances, highly debatable (even more so in *Desolation Angels*, published in 1965 as the sequel to *The Dharma Bums*).

The contradiction in question received, arguably, the strongest articulation in *Big Sur* (1962), a rather obvious attempt at reassessing Thoreau’s Walden experiment. This time Jack Dulouz (another fictional name of Kerouac) finds himself, after a long period of excessive drinking, in the cabin of his friend, Lorenzo Monsanto (Lawrence Ferlinghetti, a poet and efficient publisher of Beat literature), on the rocky Californian coast of the Pacific, trying to come to terms with himself through the solitary contemplation of nature. This transcendentalist adventure proves, however, surprisingly ephemeral: while Thoreau spent more than two years on the Walden Pond, Kerouac/ Dulouz leaves the cabin to resume his bohemian habits after only a few days, quickly reaching the state of protracted delirium tremens. His final illumination – becoming reconciled to reality in the Buddhist manner of “tathata” – arouses, therefore, even more doubts than the effectiveness of Kerouac/ Smith’s meditation on the Desolation Peak.

In the light of the above remarks, it becomes relatively clear that experiencing “beatitude,” i. e. the core value of the Beat ethos, basically

remained a fleeting mirage – just like the psychedelic “heaven” that can hardly stand the confrontation with the “hell,” or, in Rimbaud’s words, “dirty pool” of everyday reality, to which one must inevitably return after a mind-expanding “trip.” As shall be seen later, other essential points of the Beat ideology bred similar contradictions or illusions.

2.2. “Being in” or “staying (selling) out”?

“To be in” was, perhaps, the ultimate statement of the Beat sociocultural identity: being among the “hip,” i. e. those initiated into “the thing” that was necessarily alien to conventional “squares.” “The thing” meant, as has already been mentioned, modern jazz in its be bop version, Zen Buddhist contemplation, mind-expansion and leftist political inclinations. It also embraced homosexuality, or, on the literary level, Kerouac’s “freely improvised” syntax or Ginsberg’s Whitman-inspired *verse libre*, punctuated by visionary outbursts, reminiscent either of Blake, or of the author’s psychedelic adventures (as in the second part of *Howl*, written under the influence of a peyote vision). In short: anything that went against the unsophisticated middle class taste and, consequently, needed protection from being accepted or even commercialized by the “unhip.”

As long as be bop musicians played in small clubs for “the happy few” (in Stendhal’s words) and the Beat writers promoted their texts either via jazz/poetry readings for even more elitist audiences, or by low circulation books of independent publishing houses, such as, first of all, Ferlinghetti’s *City Lights*, the integrity of their “alternative” ethos remained unspoiled. Still, when, *Howl* started being widely praised as one of the definitive statements of American post-WWII poetry and *On the Road* received extensive media coverage soon after its publication (Suknick 1995: 129), the situation was no longer so clear. The key figures of the movement became, at least to an extent, media celebrities, which meant discarding the “heavenly” purity of alternative ethos by “selling out” to the general, “square” public and, eventually, descending into the “hell” of mass media promotion and manipulation.

The beginning of this process was perceptively registered by Anatole Broyard, a renowned literary critic, closely associated with the Beats. In his classic essay “A Portrait of the Hipster” (1948), published at the initial stage of the movement (“hipster,” derived from being “hip,” i. e. initiated into the “real thing,” being basically synonymous with “beatnik”), he observed early signs of the progressive loss of its alternative cultural validity – and possible

commercialization – analyzing the evolution of jive, i. e. the hipster's sociocultural code: "Jive, which had originally been a critical system, a kind of Surrealism... became a boring routine. The hipster – once an unregenerate individualist, an underground poet, a guerilla – had become a pretentious poet laureate" (Broyard 1958: 203).

It should be observed, at this point, that in the history of "alternative" sociocultural movements in America similar tendencies were hardly a novelty. More or less one hundred years earlier, in the novel *The Blithedale Romance* (1852), Nathaniel Hawthorne – inspired by a longer stay in the famous Brook Farm commune, a living symbol of the transcendentalists' opposition to the American middle class – showed their projected Arcadia as endangered by the "show-biz" trickery practised by the character named Westervelt. In the post-WWII postindustrial American society, increasingly reliant on mass media and advertising, commercial pressures were incomparably stronger – for example, at the turn of the 1950's, in the New York metro, there appeared the advertisements for the widely read magazine *Evergreen Review* featuring Allen Ginsberg in Uncle Sam's hat, with the caption: "Join the underground." Such facts meant that the Beat "alternative" movement started using the promotional strategies of the mainstream commercial culture for its own ends, or even that the traditional bohemian need to stay apart from the establishment – as well as from its ideological premises – had meanwhile become almost irrelevant (Sukenick 1995: 197-198).

This might have spelled the death of the Beat "alternative" ethos, which, however, was hardly the case – considering that this ethos was effectively continued in the times of the 1960's counter cultural revaluations. At the same time, the aforementioned commercialization did not undermine the ideological credentials of the Beats on the worldwide scale – see Ginsberg being removed from Prague in May 1965 for "subversive" propaganda – which is, of course, another vital contradiction to be observed here.

2.3. "Beatific" or "beaten"?

As has been shown above, the condition of "beatitude" or "holiness" found its opposite in the dissolute hedonism, extensively featured in Jack Kerouac's novels. It should be remembered, though, that it was in the fictional works of William S. Burroughs that this lifestyle received its strongest exemplifications.

Burroughs, together with Ginsberg and Kerouac forming the original “Beat Trinity” (having moved from New York to California in the early 1950s, they became integrated into the San Francisco Renaissance movement, which encompassed e. g. Ferlinghetti or Snyder), was, unlike his friends, far removed from *any* idea of “beatitude.” While the quest of yage, “a unique narcotic” (Burroughs 1982: 253), in *The Yage Letters* (1963), co-authored with Ginsberg, and in *Queer* (written in 1951-53, published only in 1985) may invite vague associations with an idea of “heavenly” bliss, detailed, matter-of-fact descriptions of the “technicalities” of drug transactions, injections and symptoms – see at least *Junky* (1953), his first published novel – read like nihilistic “Lost Generation” narratives taken to the extreme. Thus “I can feel the heat closing in...” (Burroughs 1982: 1), the famous opening sentence of *Naked Lunch* (1959), his best known fictional work, is actually more than just a statement of the police oppression of drug dealers and drug users: in the context of the whole book, it definitely sounds like a cry from the “hell” of addiction.

In this way, Burroughs’ writings come to portray his generation as “beaten” (another relevant meaning of the word “beat”), i. e. marginalized and oppressed – not only by their own weaknesses or the conservative American establishment of the Eisenhower era, but also by the more universal and sinister “System,” controlling humanity by means of centrally administered narcotics. This idea, apparently borrowed from Huxley’s *Brave New World* (1932), was ingeniously developed in the so called “Nova trilogy”, arguably Burroughs’ most ambitious work, consisting of three novels: *The Soft Machine* (1961), *The Ticket That Exploded* (1962) and *Nova Express* (1964). Here, the drugs dispensed by the Nova Conspiracy denote any kind of mental intoxication (mass media information, popular culture); consequently, William Lee, the author’s *porte-parole*, changes from a hopeless case of “junk” dependence to Inspector J. Lee of the Nova Police, confronting the manipulative “System” in the manner defined by the tradition of American non-conformism (at least to an extent).

In other words, what was meant to open the gates of “paradise,” even “artificial,” finally became transformed into a means of universal oppression. And the “beaten” ones were both the “hip” and the “square.”

3. Conclusion: inspirational power of contradictions?

Kenneth Rexroth, a leading figure of the San Francisco Renaissance, attempting to sum up the Beat phenomenon, stated that: “The end result must be the... despair, the orgies... I believe that most of an entire generation will go to ruin... What will happen afterwards, I don’t know...” (Rexroth 1957).

Indeed, the contradictions that have been considered above seemed sufficient to undermine the ideological credibility of any artistic or sociocultural movement. Still, approaching the problem from the contemporary perspective, one finds it to be more complex.

In the long run, the movement as such may not have retained its “alternative” integrity – in the still longer run, however, it appeared that at least Burroughs and Ginsberg managed to survive as important literary and intellectual voices of the present. Until the end of their lives in 1997, they kept producing important works, such as Burroughs’ *Ghost of Chance* (1995), and enjoying the status of “alternative” cultural heroes. The latter may seem surprising, if we consider Allen Ginsberg’s frequent acts of “selling out” to the establishment – the same was even truer, though, about Bob Dylan, his friend and literary *protege* from the new “rebellious generation,” which apparently inherited most of dilemmas and contradictions of the Beats.

In sociocultural terms, the Hippie sequel to the Beat movement proved equally short-lived – but, again, in the longer run, its leading artistic voices, such as the author of “Mr. Tambourine Man,” managed to preserve their credibility, despite any ideological inconsistencies. And it may well be argued that, without the necessity of confronting the contradictions inherent in various “alternative” programs or in American reality itself, the Beats’ or the Hippies’ artistic legacy would have lost a considerable amount of creative impetus. Under such circumstances, we probably would not have the possibility of enjoying *Howl*, *On the Road* or *Naked Lunch* – which definitely would be a loss.

References

- Broyard, A. 1958 (1948). “A Portrait of the Hipster” in *Jam Session: an Anthology of Jazz*. R. J. Gleason (ed.). New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons.
- Burroughs, W. S. 1982 (1959) *Naked Lunch*. New York: Grove Press.

- Cocteau, J. 1990 (1931). *Opium. Dziennik kuracji odwykowej*. Trans. R and A. Nowak. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie (originally published as *Opium. Journal d'une desintoxication*).
- De Quincey, Th. 1982 (1821). *Wyznania angielskiego opiumisty i inne pisma*. Trans. M. Bielewicz. Warszawa: Czytelnik (originally published as *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*).
- Fischer, E. 1965 (1963). *Młode pokolenie Zachodu*. Trans. R. Werfel. Warszawa: Iskry. (originally published as *Probleme der Jungen Generation. Ohnmacht oder Verantwortung?*).
- Grof, S. 2000 (1975). *Obszary nieświadomości. Raport z badań nad LSD*. Trans. A. Szyjewski. Kraków: Wydawnictwo A (originally published as *Realms of the Human Unconscious. Observations from LSD Research*).
- Kerouac, J. 1957. *On the Road*. New York: Viking Press.
- Rexroth, K. 1957. "Disengagement: the Art of the Beat Generation" [Online]. Available: (<http://www.bopsecrets.org/rexroth/essays/index.htm>) [2010, May 10]
- Ruck, C.A.P., J. Bigwood, D. Staples, J. Ott and R. G. Wasson. 1979. "Entheogens" in *Journal of Psychedelic Drugs*. Vol. 11, No. 1-2, pp. 145-146.
- Sukenick, R. 1995 (1987). *Nowojorska bohema*. Trans. A. Dorobek. Warszawa: PIW (originally published as *Down and In – Life in the Underground: Bohemian to Hip to Beat to Rock and Punk – Mutiny in American Culture*).

Notes on the author

Andrzej Dorobek is a senior lecturer of American literature and translatology at the State School of Higher Education in Płock, Poland, completing his Ph.D thesis, "Psychedelia in Anglo-American Literature/Popular Culture after WW II", for the English Department of the University of Warsaw. He has delivered thematically related lectures at university seminars in Poland, Spain, Romania and the Czech Republic, published seven volumes of poetry, a collection of essays on rock culture, many articles on literary, musical and cultural topics and some book translations from English (R. Sukenick's "Down and In").

THE ROAD TO HELL IS PAVED WITH YELLOW BRICK: EMERALD CITY AS POP-CULTURE'S METAPHOR FOR DISILLUSIONMENT

BOJANA VUJIN

Faculty of Philosophy, Novi Sad

***Abstract:** Baum's Oz has both thrilled and puzzled generations since the publication of The Wonderful Wizard of Oz in 1900. The paper will explore the utopian/ dystopian connotations of Emerald City and Oz in connection with rock poetry, with Elton John's 'Goodbye Yellow Brick Road' and Scissor Sisters' 'Return to Oz' chosen as examples of pop-culture's continuing fascination with Baum's flawed paradise.*

***Key words:** children's literature, pop-culture, postmodernism, rock poetry*

1. Introduction: On Pop-Culture and Rock Poetry

Once upon a time, the world of academia was a proverbial tweed-wearing killjoy waxing lyrical on the beauties of Tennysonian metre, never to be tricked into lowering itself to the levels of the exploration of popular culture. Some decades later, enter Postmodernism and *voilà!* – *Buffy the Vampire Slayer* becomes a legitimate focus of many an academic study and Bob Dylan is lauded as the ultimate poet. 'Postmodernism', as Angela McRobbie (1995:13) points out,

has entered into a more diverse number of vocabularies more quickly than most other intellectual categories. It has spread outwards from the realms of art history into political theory and on the pages of youth culture magazines, record sleeves and the fashion spreads of *Vogue*.

Trying to shake off the fuddy-duddy image of yore, criticism turned to the 'things of the moment' as props for serious intellectual analyses. Granted, much of this incentive lies behind the fact that popular culture slowly became the default, relegating its highbrow counterpart to the realms of something 'old' and 'boring' that newer generations couldn't connect with. One of the best examples of this situation is the late 20th century prevalence of rock and pop

poetry in public consciousness over the traditional forms that had dominated the hearts and minds of audiences in the old salad days.

2. Why Lyrics Matter

Continuing in the tradition of troubadours and other such artists-entertainers, pop musicians took advantage of the fact that, in the mid-20th century era of affordable records and new technologies, traditional, written poetry started to lose its mass appeal. The poet-superstar of earlier epochs (epitomised in Romanticism's Lord Byron) was no longer there, having been supplanted by a microphone-wielding showman, while words, previously filling the pages of books meant to be read in silence or enjoyed at recitals found their new home in songs, as lyrical accompaniment to the primary – melodic – content. Producer Gus Dudgeon says that “people don't listen to songs for the lyrics” (*Classic Albums*: 2001), which is partially true – otherwise no one would ever listen to anything sung in a language they don't understand – however, it must be said that, once people *do* pay attention to lyrics, they cannot *not* think about their meaning, or at least their emotional resonance. Once this process starts for the casual listener, it is only a matter of time before professionals start appropriating song lyrics for various research-related purposes. In the words of Simon Frith (1988:123),

In a culture in which few people make music but everyone makes conversation, access to songs is primarily through their words. If music gives lyrics their linguistic vitality, lyrics give songs their social *use*.

Thus, music and lyrics become part of wider socio-cultural study, not least in terms of being interpreted as indicative to or expressive of the plurality of meanings, contexts and truths. Once again, Frith (1988:107) points out that

[t]he most sophisticated content analysts have /.../ used lyrics as evidence not of popular culture as such, but of popular cultural confusion.

3. Children's Literature and Popular Culture

Academic study of song lyrics is, therefore, usually (though by no means exclusively) seen as appropriation of pop-culture for literary or sociological purposes. When it comes to the world of literature proper, there are some creative forms similar to lyrics, in that they encompass both art and

entertainment, and can be described as more ‘popular’ than ‘highbrow’. One of these is the ever-so-evasive (in terms of definition, at least) children’s literature. “Children’s books”, according to Peter Hunt (2007:1),

have been largely beneath the notice of intellectual and cultural gurus. /.../ They are overtly important educationally and commercially – with consequences across the culture, from language to politics: most adults, and almost certainly the vast majority of those in positions of power and influence, read children’s books as children, and it is inconceivable that the ideologies permeating those books had no influence on their development. The books have, none the less, been marginalised.

Just like song lyrics, children’s literature is a ripe playground for all sorts of scholarly pursuits – it has been the research focus of studies in fields ranging from sociology and psychology to literature and therapy. Both are often seen as pure entertainment, and although there are examples of both where such a view is justified (neither ‘Love Me Do’ nor the *Goosebumps* series have ever pretended to be particularly ‘deep’), the view that neither can ever be anything more than easy pastime is short-sighted and condescending. And, of course, there have been numerous instances of the two bouncing off and taking inspiration from each other – from Lewis Carroll’s presence in John Lennon’s work to Led Zeppelin’s take on Tolkien’s world. If one was to look for an example of a children’s book that has been so large a presence in public conscious that people have almost forgotten that there *was* a book in the first place, and not a folk tale carved in stone, they need not look any further than L. Frank Baum’s world of Oz.

3.1. The World of Oz

The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (1900), the first in the series of many books about the magical land of Oz that Baum would eventually write, has had generations in its thrall from the moment it saw the light of day. Is there anyone not familiar with the story of the little farm girl from Kansas who gets whisked away by a tornado to the fairyland of Oz, where she meets three new friends lacking in self-confidence, and together they set on a journey along the yellow brick road to the Emerald City in search of the omnipotent Wizard of Oz? The rub – for there is always a rub – lies in the fact that the said wizard is not powerful at all, but, as he himself says, a ‘humbug’ (Baum 1993:103), and the magical greenness of Emerald City is all mirrors and smokescreen, for its existence depends on green-coloured lenses everybody is made to wear. And of course, both Dorothy and her friends do not really need the wizard to get the

things they desire, for they possess them already and he merely provides them with a placebo. The tale of pretty fantasy and ultimate self-reliance has struck a chord in the hearts of many; the case, however, can be made for the Emerald City as a nasty little dystopia, even if not deliberately created as such by its author.

Although at first glance a timeless tale of fantasy, *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz* (1900) expresses more about the age, as a period of disruption and uncertainty, than its author, who claimed himself to be non-political, probably intended. (Cogan Thacker, Webb 2002:85) This falseness [of the Emerald City and the Wizard himself] suggests a comment on American consumerism and the uneasy relationship between appearance and 'truth'. (Cogan Thacker, Webb 2002:89)

This uneasy relationship gets even rockier when Dorothy, who for a while settled for trusting even 'The Great and Terrible Humbug' (Baum 1993:107) loses what hope she had of ever returning home. Disappointment, sadness and loss all conflate and it is unclear if either appearance or 'truth' has got the slightest chance of resolving her situation. It comes as no surprise then that the wonderful, dazzling place comes across as a metaphor for disillusionment.

4. Rockers, Poets and Oz

Finally merging all of the previously mentioned concepts together, we can see how exactly Emerald City came to signify disillusionment to pop-culture artists. Since *The Wizard of Oz* is part of children's fiction canon, and given Hunt's idea that children's fiction informs the development and ideological construct of all individuals who read it, it is not much of a stretch to posit that for the individuals who are familiar with Baum's work and who, as creative artists, are looking for an apt representation of the double-edged sword that any seemingly perfect place or state is, Emerald City and Oz itself might serve as a particularly convenient metaphor. Add to that the fact that the presence of Oz was forever cemented in minds of audiences round the globe by the famous 1939 film adaptation, starring Judy Garland, and this metaphor is more or less a given for any pop-culture observer, connoisseur or aficionado. Two such examples from rock poetry are to be examined more closely in the remainder of the paper.

4.1. Goodbye Yellow Brick Road

The first of these is the titular song from Elton John's seminal 1973 album, *Goodbye Yellow Brick Road*. Often lauded as John's *Sgt. Pepper*, the album boasts such hits as 'Candle in the Wind', 'Saturday Night's Alright for Fighting' and 'Bennie and the Jets', but the most memorable track in it is easily 'Goodbye Yellow Brick Road' itself. Music critic Stewart Mason calls the song "a small masterpiece of '70s soft rock", claiming that "lyrically, the song is evocative of faded Hollywood glamour in the manner of *Sunset Boulevard*." (Mason *web*) The song consists of a series of what seem to be rhetorical questions demanded of an unnamed person; and complaints about the kind of existence the lyrical subject feels is not right for him. Throughout the song, there is a distinct feel of nostalgia – in

I should have stayed on the farm
I should have listened to my old man

we can see that the lyrical subject is regretting his decision to, presumably, come to the big city and that he is a young person, probably wide-eyed and filled with great expectations at the beginning, but now disillusioned and bitter. The 'farm' is an interesting choice of words, for it points to the connections between Dorothy Gale, the simple farm-girl protagonist of *The Wizard of Oz*, and our disappointed hero. When speaking of the book, Cogan Thacker, Webb (2002:88) state that

[c]ompared to the colour of the Emerald City and the liveliness of the characters encountered in Oz, a desire to return to the prairie is difficult to understand.

However, the protagonist of 'Goodbye Yellow Brick Road' offers his experience in the city in a much more negative light, when he says

I'm not a present for your friends to open
This boy is too young to be singing the blues

thus giving us a possible context of someone being in a relationship with an older person where he is regarded as a trophy, or perhaps referring to the high society in general, or both. The second verse reinforces the idea of an older, powerful lover who is not really in love with the lyrical subject, for, when he leaves as he is apparently threatening/deciding to do, said lover won't lose much sleep over it:

It'll take you a couple of vodka and tonics
To set you on your feet again
Maybe you'll get a replacement
There's plenty like me to be found

The disillusionment with this kind of life can best be seen in the chorus:

So goodbye yellow brick road
Where the dogs of society howl
You can't plant me in your penthouse
I'm going back to my plough
Back to the howling old owl in the woods
Hunting the horny back toad
Oh I've finally decided my future lies
Beyond the yellow brick road

The motif of farm is again mentioned ('plough'), and another one is reinforced – the one of returning to the sphere, if not the world of, childhood ('hunting the horny back toad' as a pastime activity ties in nicely with the regret of not having listened to 'my old man' and 'this boy' being 'too young to be singing the blues'). Another connection with *The Wizard of Oz* is present in the decision that the 'future lies beyond the yellow brick road' – this is in keeping with Dorothy's realisation that the solution to her problems and the road to her happiness are actually not 'somewhere over the rainbow', but, on the contrary, that 'there's no place like home'.

While talking about the song, journalist Robert Sandall said that
The strength of 'Yellow Brick Road' or certainly something that contributes to its
lasting appeal is the fact that it does actually reflect on the dark side of life and the
dark side of celebrity. (Classic Albums:2001)

While it is certainly possible to interpret the content this way, and this interpretation *does* tie in rather nicely with the *Sunset Boulevard* theme, the actual author of the lyrics, Bernie Taupin, states that

I don't think it was about disillusionment of fame, I think it was more about the battle I
had of being a country kid coming to town, being originally a little out of my depth.
But at the same time I think it could have been about the all-encompassing world of
fame and rock and roll. Is it all that it's cracked up to be? Possibly not. (Classic
Albums: 2001)

Or, in the words of one of the most respected British lyricists, Sir Tim Rice,

Often the fulfilment of the ambition can be worse than not fulfilling it. (Classic Albums: 2001)

4.2. Return to Oz

‘Return to Oz’ is the closing number on Scissor Sisters’ 2004 debut album, entitled simply *Scissor Sisters*, and penned by the band’s frontman Jake Shears. The song takes its title from the 1985 film sequel to *The Wizard of Oz*, based on two subsequent novels in Oz lore, *The Land of Oz* and *Ozma of Oz*. In the film, Dorothy returns to Oz and finds it in a horrible state – everything is destroyed, the yellow brick road is desecrated and the people have been turned to crystal. This introduction itself is enough to show us that, no matter how cruel the world in Elton John’s ‘Goodbye Yellow Brick Road’, it cannot compare to the utter devastation that is present in ‘Return to Oz’. Shears himself said that the song was about the abuse of crystal meth in the American gay community.

The first line of the lyrics – ‘once there was a man’ – starts off as a fairy tale; this, together with the title, may lead us to believe that the song may be fantasy-themed, like the ones brought forth in the ‘70s by Led Zeppelin and early Queen. However, the next few lines shatter this illusion, and establish the theme of real suffering instead:

But when his night came to an end
He tried to grasp for his last friend
And pretend that he could wish himself health on a four-leaf clover

The last line also introduces the theme of terminal illness, something that will be mentioned again, in the middle eight:

Deep inside their sunken faces and their wild rolling eyes,
But their callous words reveal
That they can no longer feel
Love or sex appeal
The patchwork girl has come to cinch the deal

If ‘sunken faces’ and ‘wild eyes’ aren’t enough to create an image of illness, the loss of any possibility to feel (presumably physical) ‘love or sex appeal’ points to an incurable STD, and the idea is driven further home with the introduction of ‘the patchwork girl’ who has come to ‘cinch the deal’. The

patchwork girl may refer to *The Patchwork Girl of Oz*, another one in the series of Oz novels, but it could also be a reference to the AIDS Memorial Quilt, made of many patches, serving as a memorial and celebration of the lives of those who died of the disease. Given that the theme of the song is the abuse of crystal methamphetamine, which has, in recent years, been the number one cause behind the rising number of HIV infections among young gay people; it is not too much of a stretch to interpret this verse as referring to AIDS.

The chorus is, again, a sorrowful lament over the state of things:

Is this the return to Oz?
The grass is dead, the gold is brown
And the sky has claws.
There's a wind-up man walking round and round
What once was emerald city's now a crystal town.

The yellow brick road has turned from gold to brown, and the sky with claws indicates something threatening. The 'wind-up man', on the surface level, refers to Tic-Toc, a mechanical man Dorothy finds upon her return to Oz, but, on a metaphorical level, it might refer to people who can no longer function without external help ('winding-up') of drugs. Finally, the last line which describes the literal state of Emerald City filled with crystallised figures of its enchanted denizens is, underneath the surface, a metaphor for the big city of one's dreams turning into a threatening place filled with drugs, pain and death. When asked about the meaning of the song, *Scissor Sisters* member Baby Daddy said

You'd have to ask Jake about it. I think he wrote it with Seattle in mind, with all the crystal meth tragedy over there. To me it's a song about San Francisco and to a lot of others it's about New York but it can be about anywhere. I wouldn't say that it was one specific incident, but I think everyone in the band and in our group of friends has been touched in some way by the problems it's talking about. (The Crystal Prison: *web*)

Elton John's world, while undoubtedly harsh and disillusioning, seems quite warm in comparison with the world of Scissor Sisters. The reasons for this may lie in the fact that John's song deals with the personal, giving the listener hope that the lyrical subject will make it, having decided to seek his future 'beyond the yellow brick road'; while Shears' lyrics describe a communal problem that is slowly destroying many lives, leaving the listener with little indication that things will improve. The world of 2004 is certainly a

lot different from the world of 1973. Still, the metaphor of Oz seems to work just fine for both of them. And Baum would probably be thrilled about it.

5. Conclusion

Our boring old tweed-wearer from the beginning may not be too happy with pop-culture's forms of expression being used together with 'real' literature (though he probably wouldn't consider children's literature to be 'real' anyway) in a single research paper, but he would soon be proven wrong. In a world where everything can be – and indeed is – a text worthy of exploration, one cannot simply choose to ignore the connections that are there for the taking and playing with. When it comes to both music and children's literature, entertainment and play are absolutely necessary for the proper enjoyment and understanding of the work in question. And after all, is there anything wrong with being entertained?

References

- Anon. 'The Crystal Prison'. 2004. Available:
<http://www.cosmomovieawards.com/ig/20041018.htm> [2010, May 18]
- Baum, F. L. 1993 (1900). *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz*. Ware: Wordsworth Classics.
- Classic Albums: Goodbye Yellow Brick Road*. Dir. Bob Smeaton. Eagle Rock Entertainment, 2001. DVD
- Cogan Thacker, D. and J. Webb. 2002. *Introducing Children's Literature: From Romanticism to Postmodernism*. London-New York: Routledge.
- Frith, S. 1988. *Music for Pleasure: Essays in the Sociology of Pop*. New York: Routledge.
- Hunt, P. (ed.). 2007 (1999). *Understanding Children's Literature*. Oxon: Routledge.
- John, E. 1973. *Goodbye Yellow Brick Road*. DJM Records.
- Mason, S. 'Goodbye Yellow Brick Road': Song Review. Available:
<http://www.allmusic.com/cg/amg.dll?p=amg&sql=33:uyapqo7qojda> [2010, May 15]
- McRobbie, A. 1995 (1994). *Postmodernism and Popular Culture*. London-New York: Routledge.
- Scissor Sisters. *Scissor Sisters*. Polydor. 2004.

Notes on the author

Bojana Vujin teaches English and American Literature at the Faculty of Philosophy, Novi Sad, Serbia. She wrote her Master's thesis on Nabokov's

dramas and is currently writing her doctoral thesis on British rock poetry. She has published one collection of short stories (*Theseus*, 2001).

**“PASSION FOR THE REAL” THROUGH SNUFF FILM IN
BRET EASTON ELLIS’S *AMERICAN PSYCHO***

SINEM YAZICIOGLU

Istanbul University

***Abstract:** Alain Badiou defines the 20th century in terms of “the passion for the real”. The aim of this paper is to discuss how the term is materialized through the use of snuff film in Bret Easton Ellis’s *American Psycho*, and how snuff film functions as a narrative apparatus in the novel.*

***Keywords:** blank fiction, narrative, passion for the real, snuff, violence, virtual reality*

1. Introduction

In his work entitled *The Century*, Alain Badiou explains the 20th century with “the passion for the real”. The blind drive to demystify the latent and to face with the authentic has been emphasized by Badiou as the key to the age. According to Slavoj Žižek, this drive has intensified in the 21st century through virtual reality. Referring to diverse examples such as decaffeinated coffee or warfare without casualties, Žižek points out to the fact that we are living in an age of illusions that stand for reality, therefore our need to face with reality has become more and more desirable. The consequence of this experience is, in Žižek’s words, “the Real in its extreme violence as the price to be paid for peeling off the deceptive layers of reality” (Žižek 2002:5-6). Illustrating and explaining this condition in late capitalist societies, Žižek deems that “snuff movies which deliver the ‘real thing’ are perhaps the ultimate truth of Virtual Reality” (Žižek 2002:12). That is, snuff film is the extreme example of “the passion for the real”, because it is a medium through which the spectator witnesses “real” torture and death without the physical presence of the victim.

2. *American Psycho* and snuff film

Depicting the same social conditions, a specific genre of literature called “blank fiction” in the American literary scene has merged and mirrored the

language, narrative and themes of the subject's experience in late capitalist societies. The genre is specifically preoccupied with, in James Annesley's words, "violence, indulgence, sexual excess, decadence, consumerism and commerce" (Annesley 1998:1), all of which not coincidentally define the practice of snuff films. In this sense, "the passion for the real" apparently finds its echo in literary works of transgression: Authors such as Bret Easton Ellis, Chuck Palahniuk and Dennis Cooper have shown in detail how, in snuff film, spectators are mesmerized and satisfied with the atrocities they witness and how actors become preys for enjoyment. The subject of this study, Bret Easton Ellis's *American Psycho* shows why and how Patrick Bateman, the narrator, builds up his violence firstly by discrimination, then by murder and finally by recording the deaths of his victims as the ultimate gruesome act he can do.

American Psycho is a novel that partially deals with snuff film, not only as a motif, but also as a narrative apparatus. The novel is the narration of Patrick Bateman, a 27-year-old investment specialist who works in Wall Street. As a typical example of blank fiction, the novel is preoccupied with consumerism and excess in contemporary American society. In accordance with this social context, Bateman's narration heavily relies on the physical appearances of other characters, their clothes, the objects they use and the quality food they eat. Patrick Bateman spends his daytime at his office and nighttime at clubs and fancy restaurants; yet although he is rich, good-looking and in a social circle (which are supposedly the ultimate forms of satisfaction and recognition for an upper-middle class subject in capitalist ideology) he can hardly be recognized and addressed by other characters. People who meet him in social gatherings greet him with false names, and usually they do not even see him. This is the key point of the novel because the whole narrative functions as Bateman's proof of existence in society. About this Mark Storey writes:

The question is not whether the "action" really takes place – a careful reading reveals that was never the point – but what the "action" tells us about the person who recounts it. The narrative is life through the prism of Patrick Bateman's psyche, but closer inspection reveals his psyche is nonexistent. Instead, Ellis gives us a central identity created by external forces, a fictional world encased in the language of the society that created it and told through the voice of a man who in real terms is not actually there. (Storey 2005:58)

Therefore only through his narration can Bateman manifest "himself", and to overcome his ambiguous reality in the narrative he gets involved in various

types of violence. He talks about violence, he kills homeless people, women, men, or animals indifferently, and he records his murders, all of which are part of his narration. All the more ironic, Bateman is a completely unreliable narrator; therefore his building of violence to the extremity of snuff film is again a narrative device to document in language how he can establish his presence. In other words, Bateman's "passion for the real" is the need to confirm his own reality, his physical and mental integrity through narrative.

In spite of Bateman's atrocities throughout the novel, the first reference to fear and violence occurs when Bateman and his friend Timothy Price are on the way to a dinner invitation by Evelyn, Bateman's girlfriend. This reference is a quotation from Dante's *Inferno*: The opening sentence of the novel is "ABANDON ALL HOPE YE WHO ENTER HERE is scrawled in blood red lettering on the side of the Chemical Bank [...]" (Ellis 2000:3). In the very first sentence, the notion of violence is introduced, but with a fictional reference. The quotation is emphasized with capital letters, not in quotation marks, and thus naturally adapted to the New York scene. It is identified with the blood-red colour, which is neither real blood nor an ordinary red, but an imitation of the colour of blood. In addition, the writing is located "on the side of Chemical Bank" which was a "real" bank in New York City until 1996, and thus further implies the relationship between investment and virtual reality. The language of violence and the language of commerce have been merged in this opening statement to foreshadow what is yet to come. In her article titled "Right Here Nowheres", Naomi Mandel deems that the narrative complexity of the first sentence shows that "the extent to which much of the violence in the novel actually happens or is merely hallucinated is never entirely clear" (Mandel 2006: 9). Although Bateman strives for his own reality throughout the novel, the combination of the real and fictional references in the setting in which he is situated hampers a resolution. This is the reason why Bateman is gradually drawn to the "passion for the real": unable to tell the difference between fiction and reality, he is trapped forever in this ambiguity, which further indicates that he is himself the product of such language. And, ironically, only through this language can Bateman try to understand the real, the reality that he is the product of a fictional world.

Bateman's indecisiveness towards this ambiguity matches the way he narrates Timothy Price's monologue on life in New York. While Price mentions his disgust towards violence, diseases, poverty, ethnic diversity and so on, Bateman almost records his action and words with expressions indicating

camera movements. In this section of the novel, Bateman says “just as Timothy Price notices the words a bus pulls up, the advertisement for *Les Misérables* on its side blocking his view” (Ellis 2000:3) as if he is using the POV technique; he says “like in a movie another bus appears” (Ellis 2000:3-4) as if his whole narrative were lines from a script; when Price is reading the newspaper Bateman says “Panning down to the *Post*” (Ellis 2000:5) and then “panning down to the sidewalk there’s an ugly old homeless bag lady” (Ellis 2000:5) as if he has exchanged his eyes with that of a camera. The same narrative device can be traced when Bateman describes Price’s outlook: “Price is wearing a six-button wool and silk suit by Ermenegildo Zegna, a cotton shirt with French cuffs by Ike Behar, a Ralph Lauren silk tie and leather wing tips by Fratelli Rosetti” (Ellis 2000:4-5).

Used like a trademark of Bateman’s narration throughout the novel, this camera-like documentation marks his confusion of reality and fiction on a narrative scale. James Annesley writes:

Bateman is, in a very literal sense, screened off from reality: he gets his economic data from the computer screen; his understanding of life in New York from the glimpses he sees of the world through his limousine’s smoked-glass windscreen; his cultural information from the media (Annesley 1998:18).

Serving as “the deceptive layers of reality”, the media and computers work just the same as Bateman’s vision, offering him a gradually unfolding narrative pattern to “peel them off” to the extremity of thinking and acting like a snuff film.

In *American Psycho*, the subject’s blurred sense of reality is also foregrounded with the exaggerated mimicry of political discourse on violence. During Evelyn’s dinner invitation, Vanden (one of the characters invited by Evelyn) mistakes Sri Lanka for The Tonka (the name of a club). At that point Timothy Price gets furious at her ignorance and says “I mean don’t you know anything about Sri Lanka? About how the Sikhs are killing like tons of Israelis there?” (Ellis 2000:14). This apparently confused remark, merging the Kashmir conflict with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which were both important political issues during the 80’s, is followed by Bateman’s mock-political address: “There are more important problems than Sri Lanka to worry about [...] we have to end apartheid for one. And slow down the nuclear arms race, stop terrorism and world hunger [...]” (Ellis 2000:14-5). Here, Bateman’s childish and ignorant views on world politics emphasize his absence in history

as an individual. Also, mimicking the typical discourse of a U.S. president, Bateman doubly lacks an individual presence. Living in an environment surrounded by fictional references, only recording and not at all participating life, and finally repeating the political clichés of the 80's, Bateman experiences the same virtual reality as his own narration. Yet however hard he tries to "peel them off" he faces with another "deceptive layer" that he considers real, just like his imitation of 80's political discourse for solving the Sri Lanka issue. In this way, he is even lost in the social context of his own narration and thus drawn into further illusions.

These examples show that Bateman's non-existence and his verbal expression of violence correspond. Yet this relationship is not sufficient for Bateman. Gradually he is drawn into his indifferent murders in order to prove his existence, to feel that he is alive by taking lives of others. The first account of his murders is his killing of a homeless black man with the dog. Bateman comes across this man while he was walking along Broadway after a party. The homeless man is black and is surrounded by shopping carts on which a cardboard sign says "I AM HUNGRY AND HOMELESS PLEASE HELP ME" (Ellis 2000:128); like Dante's quotation this sign is written in capital letters. The sign, like the previous quotation, marks the novel's ambiguity about the social context: Bateman is doomed to be indifferent to the homeless man's misery because his social condition is only to be inscribed with letters, and not contextualized. Furthermore, the shopping carts around the man show how Bateman's daily routine of consumption imprisons the poor in a hellish life in New York.

Indifferent to the man's misery, Bateman comfortably kneels down to offer money to him; and after talking to him for a while about his unemployment, he tricks the homeless man by searching for something in his pocket and eventually taking out a knife. Bateman does not kill him in an instant; he first takes out one of his eyes and then stabs him numerous times on his stomach. Then he turns his attention to the dog and breaks his front legs, and as Bateman says, "it falls on its side squealing in pain, front paws sticking up in the air at an obscene, satisfying angle" (Ellis 2000:132). Here, Bateman's narrative is nothing more than a snuff film. His eyes function as a camera, his narration works as its film script, and Bateman is more interested in the spectacle of violence than in his act of murder. Because of this, he adds: "I can't help but start laughing and I linger at the scene, amused by this tableau" (Ellis 2000:132). Still confused by the reality of what happened, Bateman's

eyes consider this act as a picture, which can only be perfected by finding the right angle. And it is the satisfaction of the perfect spectacle that satisfies Bateman: after the murder he remarks: “I feel hardy, ravenous, pumped up, as if I’d just worked out and endorphins are flooding my nervous system, or just embraced that first line of cocaine, inhaled the first puff of a fine cigar, sipped that first glass of Cristal” (Ellis 2000:132). Yet shortly after that his joy decreases and he complains: “my high slowly dissolves, its intensity diminishing. I grow bored, tired; the evening seems horribly anticlimatic and I start cursing myself for not going to that Salvadorian bistro with Reed Thompson and the guys” (Ellis 2000:132).

The narrative of Bateman’s first murder, like all the others, shows that he is satisfied with the narration of the snuff film in his mind. The narrative of Bateman’s first murder offers some clues about his existence and his narration of violence. From the Dante quotation to the homeless man’s murder, Bateman’s narration moves from the cultural production of violence to his actual murders. The intense satisfaction that he derives from violence is temporary and he immediately desires that it should be compensated with the language of consumption and commodification. This is the reason why the scale of violence is never enough for Bateman: he reads, he talks and he acts; but he desperately wishes to document what he does. This aspect of Bateman’s narration can be supported with Žižek’s proposition about “the fundamental paradox of the passion for the real”. For Žižek, this paradox manifests itself in the spectacle of its complete opposite: the goal of finding one’s existence and integrity is replaced with the crude violence one exerts to achieve it, because, in Žižek’s words, “the ‘postmodern’ passion for the semblance ends up in a violent return to the passion for the real” (Žižek 2002:10).

Similarly, Bateman exaggerates the spectacle of his violent acts as he returns more assertively to the passion for the real, yet he finds even more deceptive layers of reality. The chapter titled “Girls” shows how extreme Bateman’s violence has become. In an obscene narration of sex, which Bateman calls “hard-core montage” (Ellis 2000:303), he says that “[...] in an attempt to understand these girls I’m filming their deaths” (Ellis 2000:304). Here, the word “understand” is decisively important: what Bateman tries to understand is not the mind of the victim. It is also impossible for a character like Bateman to try to empathize with people. Bateman’s word choice here indicates both the way he thinks and the thing he needs to understand; in other words, he needs to understand the reality of man’s physical integrity in a

fictional world that only tolerates its commodified version. What Bateman means by the word “understand” is “peeling off the deceptive layers of reality” as Žižek remarks: even the human body is materialized and commodified, and to go beyond what is seen in this world is to mutilate it (as it is ultimately material). However, it is not only mutilation that counts; Bateman needs to document and share this so-called reality. Deceived by his “fictional” eyes, he needs to prove that everything is real by depending on another fictional device, the camera. In this endless loop of fictions, Bateman’s passion for the real violently returns repeatedly, because it is never satisfied.

Interestingly enough, Bateman adds another piece of information about the filming process. Referring to the prostitutes, he explains that “With Torri and Tiffany I use a Minox LX ultra-miniature camera that takes 9.5mm film, has a 15mm f/3.5 lens, an exposure meter and a built-in neutral density filter and sits on a tripod.” (Ellis 2000: 304). This detailed description of the technical devices used for snuff film is directly related to the experience of commodification in late capitalist societies. Commenting on the apathy in Bateman’s narration, James Annesley writes:

The tone he uses mimics the register of a commercial brochure and he appears to have lost the ability to differentiate between his casual and abusive treatment of human life and jargon-studded analysis of his electronic toys (Annesley 1998:13-4).

By focusing on Bateman’s mimicry of the language of commerce, Annesley not only explains the destructive effect of commodification on Bateman’s character and narration, but also his hopeless fictionality and the endless loop of overcoming this with further fictive devices. Yet sharing these technical details may offer another perspective: Bateman may be sharing these details with the thought that those who are the witnesses of his narration would be interested in such information. It is as if Bateman is having a technical talk, thinking that he is not alone.

3. Conclusion

And when you think about it he is not: from the inscription of “ABANDON ALL HOPE YE WHO ENTER HERE” (Ellis 2000:3) to the last statement of the novel, which is “THIS IS NOT AN EXIT” (Ellis 2000:399), Bateman has integrated the reader as a company to his narration. In her

interpretation of *American Psycho*, Elizabeth Young draws attention on this and argues that

the imprisoning, claustrophobic qualities [in the novel] are deftly manipulated in order, not only to force us to live as close to Patrick as is possible in a fictional sense, but to imprint the reader with such a force that we cannot ever go out (Young 1992:93).

Young's argument not only marks the endless loop throughout the novel, but also reminds us of the function of the narrative: to witness Bateman through his narration. Furthermore, to be a part of his communication, the narrative would require someone who speaks the same language as Bateman, as the snuff film requires someone to watch it with certain generic expectancies. Thus, Bateman's narration echoes not only his own passion for the real, but also the reader's. Surrounded by the spectacle of images from stories that envelope the real, the reader experiences the same multilayered fiction in his or her social context.

References

- Annesley, J. 1998. *Blank Fictions: Consumerism, Culture and the Contemporary American Novel*. London: Pluto Press.
- Badiou, A. 2007 (2005). *The Century*. Alberto Toscano (trans.). Cambridge: Polity.
- Ellis, B. E. 2000 (1991). *American Psycho*. London: Picador.
- Mandel, N. 2006. ' 'Right Here Nowheres': *American Psycho* and Violence's Critique' in *Novels of the Contemporary Extreme*. A-Ph. Durand and N. Mandel (eds.). London and New York: Continuum.
- Storey, M. 2005. ' 'And as things fell apart': The Crisis of Postmodern Masculinity in B. E. Ellis's *American Psycho* and Dennis Cooper's *Frisk*' in *Critique*, 47/1, pp. 57-72.
- Young, E. 1992. 'The Beast in the Jungle, The Figure in the Carpet' in *Shopping in Space: Essays on American 'Blank Generation' Fiction*. Elizabeth Young and Graham Caveney (eds.). London: Serpent's Tail.
- Žižek, S. 2002. *Welcome to the Desert of the Real!* London and New York: Verso.

Notes on the author

Sinem Yazicioglu is a research assistant at Istanbul University, Department of American Culture and Literature. She received her PhD in 2008 with her dissertation on the aspects of ideology and narration in Chuck Palahniuk's early works. Her research interests are contemporary American fiction, film studies, ideology, and violence.

**ICONIC AND SYMBOLIC CODES
IN AMERICAN AND ROMANIAN ELECTORAL POSTERS***

ADINA CIUGUREANU

Ovidius University, Constanța

***Abstract:** This presentation will focus on two (out of the four) codes of visual language, namely the symbolic and the iconic (Fledges, 2008), which will be applied to a few American and Romanian electoral posters of the 2008 and 2009 elections, respectively. The analysis of the posters will be related to cultural myths and beliefs on both sides of the world and will also underline the American influence in the creation of Romanian electoral posters.*

***Keywords:** visual language, iconic codes, myth, American influence, popular culture*

1. Introduction

An analysis of visual images is basically grounded, like any analysis of signs, on the signifier/ signified syntagmatic schema identified by Saussure, but also, and more importantly, on the semiological model developed by Roland Barthes in his 1973 seminal study: *Mythologies*. Starting from Saussure's model of the linguistic sign, Roland Barthes identifies, in "Myth today," a model for reading popular culture. The novelty lies in the adding of a second level of signification to the structural model already offered by Saussure. In doing so, Barthes does not only create a structural reading of myth, but he also envisages a mechanism of myth production *and* consumption. According to Barthes (1973: 301), myth production "is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things". If things (i.e. reality) are emptied of history, they offer a different kind of reality, a reality focused on essences, timelessness, and the natural. In Barthes's view, therefore, myth is "depoliticized speech" (301), because it describes "the whole of human relations in their real, social structure, in their power of making the world." Yet, Barthes himself sees that the fixing of new connotations in the production of myth leads to the production of ideology.

* This work was supported by the CNCIS-UEFISCSU, Project PNII-IDEI No. 802/2009 [code: 1223]

Therefore, if myth can be used for ideological (i.e. political) purposes, myth consumption may have an important politicized dimension. The use of myth for ideological and political purposes is one of the basic characteristics of popular culture in general and visual culture in particular.

Umberto Eco's semiotic research on the visual image also tackled the question of reality in its connection with the picture that represents it. Eco (1979: 191-218) proposes to exclude the factor of reality reference from the communicative logic of pictures. He argues that, due to the two-dimensional characteristic of the picture, any resemblance, or "iconicity" of the picture with the three-dimensional model existing in reality is never complete. Therefore, the relation between the visual representation and the object represented is arbitrary and fragmented. In order to reach the full meaning of the visual representation our consciousness completes the representation of the object in the picture by adding to it its missing component: the third dimension. The missing component in a visual image, the third dimension, is crucial in the formation and reception of meaning, even though it is identified by absence and not by presence. Yet, to unveil its message(s), one needs a set of codes, comparable, to a certain extent, to language rules in linguistics.

A first conclusion can be drawn so far: that any visual representation is a sign and therefore functions like one. Reading a picture is similar to reading a linguistic sign: it reveals only the connotations that *we* can decipher, that are grounded on *our* culture, beliefs and general understanding of the world. Image creation and production is not equal to image reading and comprehension. Images speak specific visual languages encrypted in codes of visual perception and visual literacy.

2. Iconic codes and visual representation

Combining Barthes's and Eco's approaches to the visual image (to which we can add Pierce's as well), Benedikt Feldges (2008: 232-237) identifies two categories of codes behind visual perception: empirical and historical. The former category counts two codes: the dialectic and the conceptual. The dialectic code is concerned with "the demarcation of visual shapes within contrast lines" (Feldges 2008:232), which allows for a sign-based structure of pictorial significance. The dialectic code offers a logic of communication based on the use of color, spatial alignment, lightness, pattern, frame, which are interconnected and project a dialectic syntax of the sign. The

dialectic code would stand for what Saussure calls 'the signifier,' the written form of the word. The conceptual code stands for the perception of the visual patterns and recognition of their generic significance (a house, man, tree, crowd, a forest and so forth). The conceptual code creates "a grid of signifiers through chaining visual signs according to their respective generic concept" (Feldges 2008: 233). In this way, the generic concepts not only interrelate dialectically, but also activate a third concept which has the function of "visual verb" (e.g. "belongs to," "pertains to," "is standing in front/ behind of") (Feldges 2008: 233). While the dialectic code makes the reader distinguish lines and patterns, the conceptual one connects them into a syntagmatic reading by focusing on the arrangement economy of the visual signs. Translated in to linguistics, the dialectical and the conceptual codes would be similar to the printed form of phrases or full sentences in language.

The latter category, labeled as "historical codes," also counts two codes: the symbolic and the iconic. According to Feldges, the symbolic code "combines the formal structure of visual signs with the cultural and historical plane of visual literacy" (2008:234). Objects are thus endowed with significance, which may be transferred or negotiated between groups of objects or among objects within a certain group. What Feldges means by the symbolic code is the importance which individual or collective history attaches to decoding the significance of an image by a certain receiver or by a group of receivers. For instance, a colonial house could be symbolical of the American South with receivers with historical knowledge of the American South (2008:210). Otherwise, a colonial house could be perceived only as an example of architectural style. The symbolic code endows the image with significance, whose arbitrariness and power depend on the viewer's knowledge background.

The iconic code draws on the historical plane of visual language "through differentiating icons and emblems from general categories or types of visual symbol" (Feldges 2008:236). Symbols are thus classified according to established categories, while recurrent types of symbols could turn into icons. For example, while a colonial house may be symbolical for the American South, the White House transcends the symbolical level, being charged with a more complex individual field of meaning, and becomes an icon of both architectural style in America and American presidency. Another example could be the image of a suspension bridge which could be read as a symbol of communication or connection among people. The image of the Golden Gate Bridge, however, recognizable in any picture, assumes an iconic status,

referring to San Francisco in particular, and providing a whole range of additional meanings besides the one concerning general communication and connection among people (Feldges 2008:213).

It is in the interplay of the symbolic and iconic codes that myth may lie. A myth (which implies a narrative dimension) is both *symbol* and *icon* producer. The myth of the cowboy, for instance, has produced both the symbolical image of the cowboy (the typical outfits, hat, boots, pistol or rifle) and the iconic image that the cowboy represents (a handsome, honest, hard working, and justice seeking young man), the icon of the American west.

3. Electoral posters and popular myths

In what follows, I will attempt to discuss a few American and Romanian electoral posters by combining the analysis of the symbolic and iconic codes used in their conception with specific reference to myth. The posters chosen for analyses were made to promote Barack Obama's democratic ideas in his 2008 campaign; they will be compared with those made for Traian Băsescu in his 2009 campaign. My argument is that the visual reading of the posters reveals the use of mythical patterns and, as far as the Romanian posters are concerned, an influence of popular American myths, a transfer of American icons to Romanian visual culture.



The 2008 posters of Barack Obama are a wonderful example of how symbolic and iconic codes function and how they intermingle with myth. In *Poster 1*, the colors of the US flag: red and white form the background against which Obama's blue image both completes the three-color flag and stands out as unusual for a candidate's visual representation. It is unusual as the former candidates had a different skin color. However, the choice of the poster creator was very inspiring: he/she transferred the blue color of the flag, representing freedom of choice and thought, to the candidate's pictorial representation. The picture becomes even

more suggestive with even stronger symbolic dimensions. Moreover, the caption “Yes, we can” placed close to the right-hand side corner, the catchword of the entire presidential campaign, is a direct reference to American exceptionalism, the myth that is featured in most American pictorial representations about itself. The myth concerns the special mission which America as the “city on the hill” is supposed to have had since its first settlers. Their vision was to build “the best democratic system and to give the world the best example of a perfectly happy prosperous people whose life is rooted in strong religious values” (Ciugureanu 2002:16). In other words, to create a terrestrial Eden which is actually represented in the next poster featuring a second catchword: “progress.”



The symbolic and iconic codes are most visible in *Poster 2*: the tree, an iconic representation of the tree of life, the pigeons, symbol of liberty and peace, the walking of the people from right to left, signifying change and progress from an old life of poverty, injustice, insecurity to a new life of happiness, justice, and freedom. It is interesting how the eye movement is used to read the picture. Contrary to the reading of the catchword “progress” (left to right), the direction of the birds’ flight and the people’s walking, from right to left, are a symbolical representation of the envisaged, yet radical, change from the Republicans to the Democrats.

Obama’s political advisers were not the only ones to have used the myth to their candidate’s advantage. Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign had been based on the same mythical narrative of American exceptionalism, which proved to be a good choice and helped him to win the elections in 1980.

The Obama “Yes we can” poster stresses both the deep implications of the *city-on-the-hill* myth and the candidate’s ability to make it work. The poster sends back to the similar highly successful visual representation of Rosie the Riveter, another iconic figure of American culture. Created in 1940, Rosie the Riveter’s poster became emblematic of women’s patriotic work to boost the



war effort, while in the 1960s it was successfully used again in the women’s liberation movement. “Yes we can” resonates well with “We can do it!”

The implication of this similarity runs much deeper. Just as the “We can do it” poster proved highly influential and managed to talk women into doing men’s jobs during the war, which eventually helped America to be victorious alongside the allied troops, so would (and did) the “Yes, we can” poster convince the American people that the Democrat candidate could make a difference and produce the long-expected change. The Rosie-Obama poster transcends the symbolical signification of “Yes we can” and reveals the iconic codes that Rosie highlights: change set in motion by the underprivileged and the marginalized (women and people of color). While the reference of the “yes we can” poster to Rosie the Riveter was only implicit and, possibly, obvious mainly to the Americans in whose popular culture the Rosie figure has long been celebrated, in the Rosie-Obama poster (*Poster 4*) the reference is made purposeful and explicit. In this way, the picture of Obama, superimposed on

Rosie's, acquires symbolical and iconic dimensions: it symbolizes the rebirth of the people's belief in American exceptionalism and it becomes an iconic representation of the unprivileged in the country. Thus, through symbolical and iconic codes and through reference to popular myths, the Obama posters manage to extend the message and address the categories that were usually left unrepresented (African-Americans, Latin-Americans and other immigrant communities).

The 2009 posters for the electoral campaign in Romania reveal different symbolic and iconic codes in the two official posters created for the occasion: the one representing Băsescu and the other one, representing the Democrat-Liberal Party's support for the nominated candidate. Both posters foreground the major colors of the party: orange, green, and blue against a white background. The poster containing Băsescu's photo (*Poster 5*) uses orange and green for the catch-phrases while also hinting at the controversial color purple (used for the candidate's tie). Like in Obama's poster, the use of the colors is



Poster 5



Poster 6

tightly connected with the word caption. Orange is the color of energy, warmth, and involvement in action, while green means change and growth as well as protection from fears and anxieties. The choice of colors goes very well with

the slogan: “De ce le e frică, nu scapă” (“what they fear, they won’t escape”) spelt in orange, juxtaposed to “Hai la referendum!” (“Come to the referendum!”), spelt in green. The color symbolism intensifies the message of the slogans, by revealing both the idea that real action is to be taken and the soothing feeling that things will change for the better if the electorate cast their votes, as suggested by the poster, in the referendum. As anyone can notice, the call does not imply a choice (voting for or against the issue stated by the poster); it is a call to follow the suggestion expressed by the slogan: to vote for the reduction in the number of parliament members and the joining of the two houses into one.

Unlike Obama’s poster, whose address covers everybody, including the underprivileged and the marginalized, Băsescu’s call for a referendum addresses a fraction of the electorate. It is more than obvious that the poster aims at dividing the people into two opposing groups: a larger majority, whose living standards are moderate and low, on the one hand, and a smaller minority, who is supposedly filthy rich and represented in/ by the Parliament, on the other. Though rather aggressive and somewhat vindictive, the poster seems to draw on the Romanian myth of the “outlaw,” the brave peasant who robbed the rich to help the poor. Yet, the poster reveals much more than the well-known Romanian myth; it interrelates the autochthonous “outlaw” with the American western sheriff, whose popular image is the brave guy who catches the bad boys and brings them to justice. Băsescu’s whole campaign was actually based on flagging the very rich and influential people, supposedly the cause of all evils.

WANTED

Traian Basescu



The influence of American popular culture on Băsescu’s electoral poster is supported by the creation of an alternative poster that circulated at the time and is now to be found on the Internet. Dwelling on the American myth of the sheriff in his fight against crime and corruption, the poster re-writes the symbolism of the popular American prints of the nineteenth century (the bad guy

Poster 7

is wanted to be brought to justice) and creates a new image which aims to represent the redeemer, not the criminal. In the absence of reward money, the picture offers at least a double reading: (1) the person in the picture is wanted to do the job and (2) the person in the picture is wanted because he is doing the job. The double reading could not be possible without the allusion to the American myth, which, in this way, has been appropriated and adapted to the Romanian context. Through symbolic and iconic codes (the use of the colors and the allusion to myth), both posters create a well-targeted message whose strength lies in cultural and cross-cultural references.

Băsescu's referendum poster is completed by the one representing the Liberal Democrats' candidate for presidency (*Poster 6*). As colors, it uses orange, blue and white, but it targets at the whole Romanian electorate through the slogan "Băsescu pentru România" (Băsescu for Romania!). Beneath the slogan, there is the catch-phrase: "for better and for worse." It actually alludes both to the former catch-phrase used in the 2005 campaign ("Live in prosperity" – "Sa trăiți bine!"), which had actually proved successful, and to the wedding vows uttered during the religious ceremony in the Catholic and Protestant churches ("for better *or* for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health"). The poster recollects, therefore, the myth of happy marriage, in which the spouses agree to share the ups and downs of life. Yet, the wedding vows are slightly changed as the conjunction "or" in the original text was replaced by the conjunction "and" ("for better *and* for worse"). Thus, what the party's candidate proposes is a political matrimonial contract with the country "for better *and* for worse" ("la Bine și la Greu"). While *Poster 5* alludes to the myth of the redeemer, *Poster 6* refers to one of the fundamental institutions of a sane and solid community: the institution of marriage. However, the slogan suggests that the better and the worse living standards of 'the other half' (= the people, the country) during the contract are not the result of the chance (a suggestion inferred by the 'or' conjunction, if it had been used); they are living conditions on which the elected president may decide as he pleases. The poster suggests that the key to Romania's future is one man, thus creating a patriarchal relationship with the country and strongly diminishing the free will of 'the other half' (= the people). The candidate is introduced as an all-knowing, problem-solving leader who possesses all the answers to the country's future and the only thing he needs is empowerment through elections.

Unlike the American Democrats' posters which foreground their candidate as both the initiator of a new era and the guarantee for change and

progress (in other words, for the accomplishment of the American dream of freedom and democracy), the Romanian Liberal Democrats' posters present their candidate both as a redeeming sheriff of the wild west and as a patriarchal would-be partner in a political marriage contract. In this way, the American popular myths which were appropriated in the conception of the Romanian posters have not only been dislocated, but also misread.

4. Conclusion

Visual symbols create semantic fields decoded by individual perception based on individual experience and education. Visual literacy depends, therefore, on individual knowledge. Yet, the semantic fields created by political posters have as point of reference collective knowledge and experience, the purpose being to reach as many categories and communities of people as possible. This may be one of the reasons why popular myths and institutions are used as symbol providers. If multiple symbolic vectors standing for general categories meet, then icons are contoured. They could be either explicit (as in the Rosie-Obama poster) or implicit (as in the sheriff poster). Their role is to create a stronger message by antithesis, controlling the eye and the mind to see and believe the exact message which the creator of the pictorial representation intends to convey.

References

- Barthes, R. 2006. 'Myth today' in *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture*. John Storey (ed.). London: Pearson.
- Ciugureanu, A. 2002. *The Boomerang Effect*. Constanta: Ex Ponto.
- Eco, U. 1979. *A Theory of Semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Feldges, B. (2008) *American Icons (The Genesis of a National Visual Language)*. New York. London: Routledge.

Notes on the author

Adina Ciugureanu is Professor of English and American Literature at Ovidius University, Constanța, Romania. She currently serves as Dean of the Faculty of Letters. She is the author of *High Modernist Poetic Discourse* (1997); following a Fulbright research grant in the USA, she published *The Boomerang Effect* (2002), a study on American popular culture seen as a

remodeling of European cultural patterns, of *Modernism and the Idea of Modernity*, *Victorian Selves* (2004), and *Post-War Anxieties* (2006).

**POSTMODERNISM REVISITED: IDENTITY ISSUES IN
JOHN FOWLES'S *THE FRENCH LIEUTENANT'S WOMAN***

ABA-CARINA PÂRLOG

University of Timișoara

***Abstract:** The paper focuses on the issue of identity projected on a postmodern background in the novel mentioned above. Several identity types are analysed: Ernestina's questionable linear identity, Sarah's shifting identity and the multiple identity of the writer who moves on different levels in order to play with his characters.*

***Keywords:** ekphrasis, identity, postmodernism, simulacrum, Victorian*

1. Introduction

The postmodern trend is one of the literary directions whose features are most difficult to pinpoint because of their striking resemblance to features belonging to modernism, realism or even 18th century (enlightenment) literature. Many a theorist has tried to define postmodernism and could only yield an eclectic nucleus. Its lack of originality emphasizes the literary crisis that one has been facing for more than half a century and that has resulted in turning books into a commodity, thus blurring the value of culture and creation.

Nevertheless, despite the apparently uncertain situation of postmodern literature, there are several representatives who succeeded in adding an original vein to the seemingly undistinguishable body of the trend and thus managed to consolidate its status. Writers, such as James Joyce, Samuel Beckett or Salman Rushdie, to name just a few, have formulated and made use of new literary concepts and techniques that later became an inspiration for other artistic figures and helped them create their own distinctive literary realms.

John Fowles is stated to have played a great part in the development of postmodernism and to have created intricate microcosms which did not readily give away their secrets to the reader's inquisitive mind. Among his complex imaginary worlds, *The French Lieutenant's Woman* has been considered a milestone of postmodernity and, as a consequence, it has been much debated and analysed. The dialectic revolves around the opposition between modernism

and postmodernism and their presence under various forms in the pages of the book.

Malcolm Bradbury (1973: 257) points out that the book may be labelled a “very Whig novel, a novel about emancipation through history, with Victorian hypocrisy and ignorance yielding up to modern truth and authenticity, to good faith and freedom, the whole enterprise aided by appropriately sympathetic techniques in which the characters are set free from the formal containments of traditional Victorian fiction”. He does not fail to note the postmodern features of the novel later in his text, although he does not explicitly mention their belonging to the trend. The novel, in his opinion, is “baffling to criticism” (Bradbury 1973: 258), as it is a mixture of realist and modernist elements.

The whole concept of the novel is based on pastiche and thus belongs to postmodernity, as Fowles set out to criticise Victorianism and, to this end, constructed a work of art in which he combined the styles of Henry James’ *The Turn of the Screw*, Alain Fournier’s *Le Grand Meaulnes* and Charles Dickens’ *Great expectations* (Brînzeu 2001: 55). This is not, however, the only postmodern element characterising the novel. As William Stephenson (2007: 9-10) explains, there are a series of postmodern features which define the novel and which have made it become a part of the postmodern curricula:

... critics have read *The French Lieutenant’s Woman* as a postmodernist text since the 1980s (...). It conforms to the stereotype of postmodernist writing in that it blurs the boundary between literature and popular fiction: it uses an extensive vocabulary, engages with philosophy and literary theory, and yet relies on popular conventions, such as dealing with separate plots in alternating chapters to increase suspense, and the gradual heightening of erotic tension until the obligatory sex scene. Moreover, like a typical postmodernist novel, it does not pretend to have made a radical break with the past (as modernist literature tried to do).

Although the critic grasped and listed most of the book’s postmodern traits, he failed to notice the simulacrum creation process that determined the enterprise of writing. In order to create his female main character, Fowles (1977: 136) drew his inspiration from an image that came back to his mind, of a woman with her back turned towards the viewer, while standing at the far end of a pier and presumably gazing into the far horizon. He could not tell whether that image had been inspired by a real person, an object – a picture or a painting – or was just a figment of his imagination.

He provided this mental image, whose source he could not remember, with a larger contextual reference, a controversial plot and an innovative

ending, which leaves the reader in the lurch as to the characters' evolution. This process of turning the image into a part of a literary work is called an "ekphrastic transposition".

The distinction between an imaginary and a real work of art as the object of ekphrasis is of high relevance. While the former has to be fancied, obliging the readers to undertake an active operation of reverse ekphrasis, similar to that performed by theatre of film directors when transposing a literary text into a show, the latter can be seen and interpreted by the readers themselves (Pârlog et al. 2009: 109).

The source object need not be a work of art at all, it can be a simple imaginary element which gains artistic connotations, once a literary work is built, based on its implications. A process of reverse ekphrasis thus takes place in which the original object is recreated in order to give imagination a real referent. In Fowles's case, the source object is lost and this results in a "notional ekphrasis", as John Hollander calls it (cf. Pârlog et al 2009: 109). The notional ekphrasis has the effect of blurring the boundaries between reality and imagination, thus providing the reader with a postmodern illusion of reality.

In *Simulacra and Simulations*, Baudrillard (1988) explains how this postmodern phenomenon of offering an illusion of reality through the medium of a literary work can be engendered by generating, with the help of models, "a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal". He gives the example of a map, which no longer mirrors a real territory, but creates it. He further focuses on explanations concerning our "age of simulation" which begins, according to his theory, by "a liquidation of all referentials".

It is quite interesting to see the lack of importance we, as readers, attach to the identity of the woman in the mental picture mentioned by Fowles. She has originally no identity, as the writer does not remember who she is or where she comes from. She is nobody in particular. The postmodern process, through which the writer recreates her identity, only to toy with it throughout the story and to modify it yet again at the end of the novel, can serve to define the main steps Fowles took in shaping his protagonist's identity.

Sarah, together with the rest of the characters, is placed in the setting of Lyme Regis, in the beginning of the story. Although a real referent, the town is also recreated, as it is given a Victorian identity, it is filled with people acting according to the precepts of the time and, as a result, endowing the various parts of the setting with new meanings which they lack in reality. "Fowles was then [i.e. while writing the book] living in the Underhill Farm, an old building

in the woods to the west of Lyme Regis” (Stephenson 2007: 6). Consequently, he knew the place quite well and still he does not describe it in a realistic manner, creating a written copy, but rather produces an illusion of reality, employing a postmodern technique in order to recreate the locus of action.

The issue of the simulacrum can be discussed again, as Fowles’s town plays the same part that Baudrillard’s map does. It is the process of recreation that draws the readers’ attention, as Fowles’s imaginary Victorian society leaves an indelible mark on the real town. Thus, the simulacrum somehow manages to take over, leaving the impression that it is the imaginary setting which describes the real one and not the other way around, especially in this case, in which Fowles’s imaginary Lyme Regis is much more popular than the real referent.

2. Linear Identity

The characters populating the Victorian environment seem to have no qualms about living and acting according to the requirements of the time. *Ernestina Freeman*, Charles Smithson’s fiancée, is the perfect exponent of that society. She has no job, is interested in supervising household issues, in obtaining a husband, does not dare walk unaccompanied, and succeeds in maintaining a formal and artificial behaviour through the best part of the story. She is a predictable character, whose ups and downs do not impress the reader. Her linear identity or predictable and conformist evolution describes an apparently uninteresting character who complies with the conventions of the society.

Ernestina can be seen as a personage who is to live an easy life, as all the women of the time who belonged or were to belong to a higher social stratum did, i.e. to enter marriage, be housewives, have children, busy themselves with their education and concern themselves with their husbands’ happiness. Then, women did not really matter when it came to taking decisions, only heads of families did, i.e. men.

At the time of the novel, 1867, “John Stuart Mill tried (but failed) to persuade his Parliamentary colleagues to grant women the vote” (Acheson 1998: 33). This rather feminist streak introduced by Fowles is meant also to establish a difference between the types of women in the story – those who contend themselves with the part they play in the Victorian society, the truly Victorian women, such as Ernestina, Mrs Talbot, Mrs Poulteney and, the

modern ones, who are more open-minded and favour free choice / change, such as Sarah Woodruff and partly, Miss Tranter, Ernestina's aunt.

Ernestina is, as stated above, not among the modern women and as a result she is not concerned with the transformation of the role that women play in that society. She apparently enjoys the rules of the Victorian society and seems to have a linear identity; as a result, the reader can expect to be offered no surprise as far as her evolution is concerned: she will live happily and formally ever after and never complain about the constraints imposed on her freedom. Together with her father, a rich industrialist, she can also be viewed as an *arriviste*, seeking to improve her social status by marrying Charles, who belongs to the nobility. Their union is an arranged transaction.

Nevertheless, even such characters might prove to be exciting, if analysed in depth. The formality, artificiality and coldness in fashion at the time influence Ernestina's character, who, in order to reach her end, behaves according to the Victorian rules, thus *playing a role*. She can be viewed as carrying the Victorian mask that in time deforms character.

Ernestina had exactly the right face for her age; that is, small-chinned, oval, delicate as a violet. (...) At the first meetings she could cast down her eyes very prettily, as if she might faint should any gentleman dare to address her. But there was a minute tilt at the corner of her eyelids, and a corresponding tilt at the corner of her lips – to extend the same comparison, as faint as the fragrance of February violets – that denied, very subtly but quite unmistakably, her apparent total obeisance to the great god Man (Fowles 1996: 31).

Psychologist Erving Goffman analyses the degree to which a person identifies himself/ herself with the part that s/he plays in a certain situation and the identity modification that this brings along. There are two cases: (1) “the performer can be fully taken in by his own act; he can be sincerely convinced that the impression of reality which he stages is the real reality” or (2) “we may find that the performer may not be taken in at all by his own routine” (Goffman 2007: 53). Ernestina may be identified with the former case, as she feels compelled to act according to the societal requirements which contradict any spontaneous response to inputs produced during daily interactions. Responses are established beforehand, and consequently people hide under the convened etiquette. She thus cannot express her true self, as that society disregards persons who do that, and that is not her pursuit.

Her linear identity is not existentialist in nature, because “existentialism necessitates a choice independent of any sustaining community” (Lynch 2008),

whereas she never thinks of recreating her person according to an original set of values and beliefs. All in all, Ernestina chooses social freedom avoiding to form an objective opinion regarding her role in the community and refusing to understand that continuing to do her Victorian duty can only serve to further falsify her character.

3. Shifting Identity

Victorianism is defied by *Sarah Woodruff*, through whom the reader becomes acquainted with the authorial voice. She feels oppressed by the close-knit Victorian community and more akin to the Edwardian age to come at the turn of the century. Her existentialist streak is rather common to the postmodern age, whose writing is characterised by an interest in ontology (McHale 2002: 283-284).

Fowles set out to prove that among other things, Victorianism and postmodernism share the issue of existentialism (Fowles 1977: 140). This common feature surfaced as a result of the shallowness characterising both centuries, even though this stems from radically different reasons. Sarah changes from a Victorian character into a modern one, as she proves indifferent to societal limitations. At a time when women depended on men for a living, she earns her own money; despite customs, she moves about the town unaccompanied and claims to have slept with a French lieutenant, although this makes her fall into disrepute.

The diligent governess at the beginning of the novel turns into a rebel, as she leaves Lyme Regis to have a one-night stand with Charles, and then becomes a modern artist, part of the Rossetti house, this time enjoying a whole new identity, that of Sarah Roughwood. Her shifting identity, which makes the reader perceive her as an unstable character, subject to the personality changes that that society squeezes out of her, places her on a postmodern literary axis. She is unable to adapt to the Victorian society and breaks away in order to find a more friendly environment.

Her authenticity has been questioned by critics (for example, Acheson 1998), as sometimes her choices are not the expected ones – nevertheless postmodern writing is meant to be puzzling and unpredictable, which is to say that the character can sometimes be evolving in a different manner than we thought she would. No society has enjoyed absolute conformity and her

network of personal relations and her personal interests at times cause her to act illogically.

The playfulness with which Fowles constructs and deconstructs Sarah's identity seems not only postmodern, but also Freudian, as according to *The Merriam-Webster Encyclopaedia of Literature 1993-2000*, Freud was the one who "torpedoed the idea of a stable ego". The protagonist's shifting identity is also associated with a psychologically disturbed person by Dr. Grogan, who tells Charles that she suffers from "obscure melancholia" (Fowles 1996: 151).

He mentions similar cases of women who seem to have fallen under the spell of melancholia – such as the young widow Weimar, whose husband, a cavalry officer, died during some field exercises. She keeps mourning for a long period of time, somehow relishing her misfortune. Nevertheless, here, Fowles, the manipulator, sends the reader on a wild goose chase, as the real problem is not the existence of a character with a disturbed psychology, but rather that of one who has a habit that was fashionable during the epoch – maintaining long mourning.

Following the example set by Queen Victoria herself, going through elaborate rituals to commemorate the dead became customary for the families of the time. The rules that people had to obey were outlined in popular journals or household manuals such as *The Queen* and *Cassell's*, which were Victorian books addressing housewives. According to them, widows were required to wear full mourning for a period of two years (Chevalier 2010).

Thus, the explanations given earlier by Fowles's Dr. Grogan are to be ignored as they do not describe the isolated case of a sick woman, but point to a national custom, instituted by Queen Victoria herself. The attempt to expose Sarah's true identity by giving the widow as an example is unsuccessful as a result. Sarah is still the riddle that one must solve, as implied by Fowles from the very beginning of the novel:

Stretching eyes west
Over the sea,
Wind foul or fair,
Always stood she
Prospect-impressed;
Solely out there
Did she gaze rest,
Never elsewhere
Seemed charm to be.
Hardy, 'The Riddle' (Fowles 1996: 9).

The lines above, by Hardy, indicate a narrative gambit with which Fowles starts his game. The central place is occupied by Sarah, who is the riddle that the reader, together with Charles; has to solve. If one wishes to understand the female protagonist, one needs to play the game, i.e. read the book.

Postmodernism is once more present in the narrative technique used, as one can notice. A case in point is Roy Ascott's statement regarding art. In his opinion, the manner in which postmodernism operates is by involving the reader, who becomes part of the literary work, as s/he is the one who will rearrange events, giving meaning to the apparently ambiguous story through his/her interaction with it.

Art does not reside in the artwork alone, nor in the activity of the artist alone, but is understood as a field of psychic probability, highly entropic, in which the viewer is actively involved, not in an act of closure in the sense of completing a discrete message from the artist (a passive process) but by interrogating and interacting with the system "artwork" to generate meaning. This field provides for transactions to take place between the psychic system "artist" and the psychic system "viewer, " where both are, to use Umberto Eco's phrase, "gambling on the possibility of semiosis" [Eco 1976].

Thus the viewer/ observer must be a participator and is of operational importance in the total behaviour of the system (Ascott 2003: 179).

4. Multiple Identity

As a result, not only does the reader become involved in the act of retracing the main story line, but the author, as well, takes part in his own plot, appearing at various moments in order to finish the postmodern construction. Thus, *Fowles* enjoys a multiple identity, as he plays the parts of author, writer, narrator and character at the same time.

According to Lodge (1992: 10), around the turn of the century, the idea of intrusive authorial voice lost its fashionable status, "partly because it detracts from realistic illusion and reduces the emotional intensity of the experience being represented, by calling attention to the act of narrating." He further explains that in modern fiction, this intrusive authorial voice is used with an ironic self-consciousness.

Fowles is ironic and playful in the novel, and interferes with the story in order to explain how he created it, thus producing meta-texts which leave the impression that the book is a collage made up of literature, literary theory and

criticism. As one can notice by reading his theoretical remarks, he sides with the postmodern approach to story telling, which allows the characters to be authentic and thus, behave in a life-like manner (Fowles 1996: 97).

The writer is also present behind the narrator, who at times acts as the God of the story and at other times as the unreliable modern observer. The writer can also be seen as being mirrored by Sarah herself, who plays the role of an outcast, just as Fowles does in real life. He allows his character to seep into that of his female protagonist and as a result, manages to attach a new type of identity to his own person who is in and out of the narrative at the same time.

The multiple identity he enjoys is due to the overlapping of all the roles mentioned above, culminating with Fowles's active part in the novel, as a character. He appears three times in the literary realm - as a bearded character, then flipping a coin and, in the end, turning his watch a quarter of an hour, in order to adjust the plot versions (another postmodern device used in order to give the reader the freedom of choosing the ending which seems the most appropriate). He, as a character, always scrutinises his own creation in an attempt at glimpsing its flaws.

Under the guise of the character, there hides a writer who continuously criticises, though jocularly or covertly, the idea of an omniscient narrator, such as used by himself, as artificial, arrogant and inauthentic. One cannot take this as a form of pure self-criticism, but as a mere reminder that the writer dislikes the attitude of superiority implied by the traditional type of a narrator: "He [i.e. the writer playing the part of a character] looks very much as if he has given up preaching and gone in for grand opera; and done much better at the latter than the former" (Fowles 1996: 441).

Fowles's multiple identity can be best explained by Madan Sarup's view, according to which, identity can be seen as a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings blend and clash (1996: 25). Each of these dimensions is filled by a role that Fowles chooses to play. The multi-dimensional space is inhabited by the author, writer, narrator and character, each with his own particular story. The layers that form his identity create a complex figure who, while jesting can still tactfully maintain control over his miniature world.

5. Conclusion

The issue of identity is quite intricate and there are those who consider

that it cannot be dealt with objectively, as it implies one's absolute knowledge of a person's life. Sarup argues that "identity is not self-sufficient; it is necessarily accomplished by a certain absence, without which it would not exist" (1996: 24). Discovering the meaning that absence is to be filled with helps one draw a clearer contour of one's identity.

Postmodernism is defined by an overall interest in this topic, thus proving that psychology still plays a major role in our understanding of the world. The way people think and act is mirrored by the literary realms which help the reader encounter unusual situations that one rarely deals with in one's real life (especially if the novel focuses on a different century than the one which one lives in).

Postmodern writers have developed this literary direction with an eye to the details of character interactions and to protagonists' general evolution. It is a subtrend that stems, on the one hand, from the feminist current, whose women writers are concerned with the female self and feminine experience, and, on the other hand, from the internationalist current, whose writers of non-British origin try to illustrate their struggle to preserve their identity. They wish to make the reader acquainted with the themes above in order to prove that what we thought of as an isolated case is in fact a recurrent situation and that, although this might seem to be a *cul-de-sac*, it always points to a door that leads one to a new way of life. In order to find it and go beyond it, one must change and accept the identity transformation that this passage brings along.

References

- Acheson, J. 1998. *John Fowles*. New York: St Martin's Press.
- Ascott, R. 2003. *Telematic Embrace: Visionary Theories of Art, Technology, and Consciousness*. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.
- Baudrillard, J. 1988. 'Simulacra and Simulations' in *Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings*. M. Poster (ed.). Stanford: Stanford University Press. [Online] Available:http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html [2009, May 30]. pp. 166-184.
- Bradbury, M. 1973. *Possibilities. Essays on the State of the Novel*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brinzeu, P. 2001. *The British Postmodernism*. Timișoara: Hestia.
- Chevalier, T. *Historical Background*. [Online] Available: <http://www.tchevalier.com/fallingangels/bckgrnd/index.html> [2010, May 10].
- Fowles, J. 1977. 'Notes on an Unfinished Novel' in *The Novel Today: Contemporary Writers on Modern Fiction*. M. Bradbury (ed.). Manchester: Fontana Manchester University Press.

- Fowles, J. 1996 (1969). *The French Lieutenant's Woman*. London: Vintage.
- Goffman, E. 2007. 'The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life (1959)' in *Contemporary Sociological Theory*. C. J. Calhoun, J. Gerteis, J. Moody et al (eds.). Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing.
- Lodge, D. 1992. *The Art of Fiction*. London: Penguin Books.
- Lynch, R. P. 'Freedoms in *The French Lieutenant's Woman*' in *Twentieth Century Literature*. Spring 2002. Vol. 48. Issue 1. [Online] Available: <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost> [2008, July 07]. pp. 50-77.
- McHale, B. 2002 (1986). 'Change of Dominant from Modernist to Postmodernist Writing'. in *Postmodernism and the Contemporary Novel*. B. Nicol (ed.). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Pârlog, H., P. Brînzeu and A.-C. Pârlog. 2009. *Translating the Body*. Iași: Institutul European.
- Sarup, M. 1996. *Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Stephenson, W. 2007 (1965). *Fowles's The French Lieutenant's Woman*. London: Continuum.

Notes on the author

Aba-Carina Pârlog is a lecturer at the Department of English, University of Timișoara. Her fields of interest are literature and translation. She has published numerous papers at home and abroad, as well as the books *The Clash between Body and Mind: Orwell, Beckett and Durrell*, Timișoara, University Press (2006) and *Translating the Body*, (co-authored), München, Lincom (2007).

**“ALL OVER THE COUNTRY”: CLONED SPACES IN
KAZUO ISHIGURO’S *NEVER LET ME GO***

PIA BRÎNZEU

University of Timișoara

Abstract: The experiments related to cloning are not only physically dangerous for the human species as they imply transhuman mutations which might ultimately be destructive, but also threatening in the way in which they change the perception of space from an exterior, objective, well-determined territory to a subjective, prohibitive place of trauma and conflict. In Ishiguro’s novel “Never Let Me Go” memories of various spaces are repeated over and over until they all become the same.

Keywords: cloning, failing memory, Ishiguro, narratology, spatial coordinates

1. Introduction

In this essay I wish to examine Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel *Never Let me Go* from the point of view of the spaces described by the main heroine, Kathy H., a clone who lives in a world where the apocalypse of physical proliferation has become sickeningly possible. Ishiguro pushes the problem of fictional spatiality to a vivid extreme, guiding us to contemplate seriously the implications of cloning for the surrounding world and for the way in which this world is rendered in literature.

It is true that when the novel was published, its reviewers ignored the inciting way in which Ishiguro had developed its chronotope. *Never Let me Go* was seen as an “oblique and elegiac meditation on mortality and lost innocence” (Kakutani 2005), a novel about “genetic engineering and associated technologies” (Menand 2005), about “friendship, love and loss” (Eek 2005), about humanity and “how it can be honored or denied” (Yardley 2005), and about the “[i]nescapable death, loss, the destruction or dissipation of what once was valued, love and life reduced over time to detritus cast on the wind” (Scurr 2005). Neither has later criticism dealt with the landscapes described in *Never Let me Go* (Britzman 2006; Seaman 2007; Griffin 2009). Only Shaleem Black (2009: 789) considers that

Never Let Me Go can be read as a meditation on a world shaped by the eugenic fantasies of Nazi-era incarceration. Hailsham, the English boarding school-like institution where Ishiguro's characters grow up, provides precisely such a shadowy territory beyond the admissible political life of the realm it inhabits and enables. Such a space strips its inhabitants of their claims to any forms of political identity; denuded of citizenship and culture, they represent a form of life that challenges traditional definitions of what it means to be human.

It also seems that Ishiguro wanted to insist more on the way in which space was affected by cloning than on the other problems generated by the possibility of an infinite materialization of selves – called by Baudrillard (2006: 97) “the delirious apotheosis of a productive technology” –, such as the disturbing dilemmas related to the clones’ families, their gender rights, the relationship with their models, etc. Ishiguro is more interested in the way in which Kathy undertakes a journey of discovery, trying through nostalgic meanderings in interior spaces to understand the details of her clone condition, only gradually revealed to her as she is growing into adulthood.

Such retreats in some form of fictional second-world are not new in literature. They are undertaken by at least three characters in Shakespeare’s *Twelfth Night*, to take one of the most obvious examples. The three distinct second worlds in the play are created by Sir Toby, through all rejections of responsibility, by Olivia, through ritual actions of mourning, and by Orsino, through imposing his will on his environment and transforming it into a mere object for his contemplation and commentary. Elliot Krieger (1996: 45) comments:

Each of these three private, inward retreats of *Twelfth Night* extends and expands the protagonist’s ego, not by projecting the self into nature but by making the world smaller than, or an aspect of, the self. In each of the second worlds in *Twelfth Night* the protagonist – Sir Toby, Olivia, Orsino – diminishes the time, conditions, and people in the primary world so that the desires and emotions of the self can predominate in, or over, the world.

Ishiguro’s Kathy does not want to enlarge her ego through repeated retreats to her inner memories. It is true that in this way she feels she can control the outer environment better and can – at least partially - solve the dilemmas of her clone identity. What she does not realize is that through recollections, repeated over and over in the same way, she clones her past and remains the prisoner of multiplied identical spaces. This is the novelty of Ishiguro’s technique: Kathy’s fantasies as well as those of the other characters

are a form of spatial cloning, confusing the reader and making him feel uncanny, alienated, and lost in a labyrinthine world.

2. Places, memories, journeys of discovery

Kathy's process of self discovery covers three distinct periods, intricately connected to the three different environments which mark her life: the *Hailsham boarding school*, where Kathy and her two friends, Ruth and Tommy, live until they are sixteen; the "*Cottages*", a residential complex for young adult clones, where they are prepared to become donors or "carers" for the donors who provide organs; and the different *recovery centres* organized for the clones chosen to undergo surgery, where Kathy works as a carer. These are the distinct "realistic" frames of a science-fiction story, situated in an after-war period when great breakthroughs in science are described as "following one after the other" and when "suddenly there were all these new possibilities laid before us, all these ways to cure so many previously incurable conditions. This was what the world noticed the most, wanted the most" (257). This statement is an explanation offered by Miss Emily, one of the Hailsham teacher-guardians, contacted by Kathy and Tommy when the two decide to learn more about their condition of clones. Miss Emily tells them that Hailsham was one of the first places organized for bringing up clones. Due to her efforts to demonstrate that the clones were close to normality, since they had a soul and remarkable creative potentialities, the living conditions offered by the school were considerably ameliorated. Therefore Hailsham had become a place of reputation, a privileged estate in comparison to other centres such as Glenmorgan House or Saunders Trust.

However, in spite of Emily's efforts to improve Hailsham, the clones who live there grow up deprived of relatives and parental love, imprisoned within the bounds of the boarding school, and isolated from the rest of the world: "any place beyond Hailsham was like a fantasy land; we had only the haziest notions of the world outside and about what was and wasn't possible there" (66). Crawling with students, the place lacks intimacy. If she wants to be alone, Kathy can either take her favourite footpath, going round the back of the main house to reach a place hidden behind shrubs, almost out of the bounds, or, when looking out of the window, she can notice when there is nobody in the playing field, and prolong the moment as much as she wants in a dream which shuts off all the noises and gives her the illusion of solitude. Moreover, the

children are frightened by the dark woods at the top of the hill that rises behind Hailsham House. The fringe of trees casts a ghostly shadow over the school and looms in the distance, nourishing horrible stories of violence and cruelty in the inflamed minds of sadistic guardians and hysterical children. Hailsham appears thus in Kathy's recollections as a limited, imprisoning, sinister place, outside whose walls normality threatens with death.

When Kathy and her two friends, Ruth and Tommy, who in the meantime have fallen in love, move to what is called the "Cottages", they have to adjust to a damp, cold, shabbily furnished place. They have already discovered that they are clones, but they fight to understand other important issues, such as love and sex, how they are related to their models, and when organ donations will follow. Interestingly enough, although the clones are free to leave the place, they have no contact to outsiders. Instead, they seem to be even more frightened by their condition, to lose all illusions, and to accept without any opposition the donation programmes, although they know that they will inevitably die after the fourth donation. Kathy's condition becomes even more dramatic in the final part of the novel, when she becomes a carer for both Ruth and Tommy, the latter having become her lover after Ruth's death. In Kathy's descriptions, the recovery centres she visits are reduced to a single room, where, alienated and unhappy, she spends the time with dying clones. When she rushes from one centre to another, commuting between Dover, Kingsfield or Norfolk, as her presence is required by different donors, she has only "the roads, the big grey sky and my daydreams for company" (204). Exhausted, facing pain and death, Kathy can no longer establish a harmonious relationship with the surrounding environment. Although she travels a lot now, she remains completely cut off from the "normal" world. She knows that the cruel, violent, inhuman environment in which she is forced to live can only bring about death. Accordingly, she is given no chance to integrate.

Rejected by her "normal" fellows, Kathy also rejects their world, which is synonymous with the world of the reader. She turns inside, preferring to reminisce about her past instead of fighting with the present. She is more and more pleased to evade from reality into her inner territories, where Hailsham plays the greatest part. Hailsham becomes in her thoughts a sheltering place of unaware peacefulness, offering, in spite of all its grim aspects, a happiness that is otherwise refused to clones. This is the reason why all the other landscapes remind her of the first place she inhabited:

Driving around the country, I still see things that will remind me of Hailsham. I might pass the corner of a misty field, or see part of a large house in the distance as I come down the side of a valley, even a particular arrangement of poplar trees up on a hillside, and I'll think: 'Maybe that's it! I've found it! This actually is Hailsham!'/.../ Not long ago I was driving through an empty stretch of Worcestershire and saw one [a pavilion] beside a cricket ground so like ours at Hailsham I actually turned the car and went back for a second look. (6)

Kathy has repeatedly tried to leave Hailsham behind, to stop contemplating it as an inviting landscape and, instead, to reject it as a useless image of the past. But there was a point, she confesses, when she stopped resisting, not so much under the pressure of a future which would bring her nothing else but pain, depression, and death, but under the influence of one of the donors she had in her care, who had just come through his third donation and was not feeling well. Although he grew up in a different place, he asked Kathy to remember Hailsham and allow him to join her recollections so that their memories might overlap:

He knew he was close to completing and so that's what he was doing: getting me to describe things to him, so they'd really sink in, so that maybe during those sleepless nights, with the drugs and the pain and the exhaustion, the line would blur between what were my memories and what were his. (5)

The donor makes Kathy understand that the places the clones come from are the only link that unites them into a family. Under his influence, Kathy comes to speak about "*us*, all the students who'd grown up with me and were now spread across the country, carers and donors, all separated now but still somehow linked by the place we'd come from" (208). That is why Kathy does not want to forget anything, although at the Cottages the Hailsham students had a period when forgetting helped them gain a serene condition:

Maybe once Hailsham was behind us, it was possible, just for that half year or so, before all the talk of becoming carers, before the driving lessons, all those other things, it was possible to forget for whole stretches of time who we really were; to forget what the guardians had told us; to forget Miss Lucy's outburst that rainy afternoon at the pavilion, as well as all those theories we'd developed amongst ourselves over the years. It couldn't last, of course, but like I say, just for those few months, we somehow managed to live in this cosy state of suspension in which we could ponder our lives without the usual boundaries. Looking back now, it feels like we spent ages in that steamed-up kitchen after breakfast, or huddled around half-dead fires in the small hours, lost in conversation about our plans for the future. (140)

By contrast, Ruth practises the strategy of forgetting, and when Kathy reminds her twice that the short-cut to the Hailsham pond leading through a rhubarb patch was out of bounds, she answers with the same words: “What does it matter anyway? What’s the rhubarb patch got to do with any of this? Just get on with what you were saying” (187, 198). The repetition of the same words, like the donors desire to embrace Kathy’s memories as his own, made Shallem Black (2009: 800) see Kathy’s rereading of her past as a symbolic cloning of experience. She comments: “Kathy thus creates memories as a repetition, or clone, of experience, and then copies them for others who have even less than she to fall back on during the agonies of donation. The clone comes to supplant the original through the gesture of memory.”

Past landscapes and events are presented as real, apparently subconsciously censored by Kathy in order to offer an objective description of her life. When she announces in the first paragraph of the novel that she is thirty-one years old and is going to recollect her past (because, as we find out later, she will soon become a donor herself and approach the end of her life), the reader has the impression that her memories will follow a straightforward rendering of the incidents that make up her life. In fact Kathy’s efforts of remembering and understanding her condition are nothing else but the result of an introvert projection which helps her cope with the otherwise traumatic restrictions imposed by a cruel environment. This procedure situates the narrator on the level of improvisation, where she filters reality and offers untrue revelations, deformed under the pressure of secrets, lies, and a constantly failing memory. The readers can never be sure of what Kathy tells them, since the heroine herself insists on her faulty memory with such statements as “I’ve never been sure” (26,32), “I suppose” (100), “I don’t know” (94), “my guess is”(95), “I can’t even say for certain” (189), “[t]his was all a long time ago so I might have some of it wrong” (13), etc. The confusion is amplified by *mise en abyme*, the commentaries on a recollected scene being embedded within another recollected scene, creating the impression of a narrator lost in an internal labyrinth, where the reader is also hopelessly entrapped. That the persons addressed might be clones is suggested by the repeated statement „I don’t know how it was where you were, but at Hailsham...” (13, 67, 94). Britzman (2006:307) comments on Kathy’s narrative strategy:

Retroactive time collapses from memory’s weight; she is never sure if the events she recalls match any meaning, then or now. Her story is affected. Everything feels mismatched and unclear. Early events register, leaving vague impressions. Later,

accidental occurrences lift into terrible significance what is felt before it can be known. Meaning is deferred and her theories cannot help that. Her memories as fragments of life are addressed to us readers and she always asks, 'do you know what I mean?'

When they acknowledge the potential inaccuracy of the heroine's recollections, the readers can judge the information related by Kathy; the more the reader learns about Kathy, the more we are able to interpret the sub-textual intention of the fragments of memory presented by her. Repeated several times, even to the point of narrative tedium, the same recollections and verbal formulations come to resemble the act of cloning. Ishiguro himself calls Kathy's oblique narratorial device "tangential meandering" (qtd. in Eek 2005), considering the heroine's journey of discovery as a travel in the ambiguous territories of her past life; "tangentially" touching similar trajectories, her excursion in time determines Kathy to clone the same memories, dreams, and illusions.

3. Narratological overlappings

It is also interesting to approach Ishiguro's chronotope from the viewpoint of narratology. Obviously, it cannot be categorized according to the classifications offered so far for the spaces of fiction. Thus, if we want to define the space described in *Never Let me Go* using Marie-Laure Ryan's (2009) classification, we have to take into consideration the categories of *spatial frames* (the immediate surroundings of actual events), *setting* (the general socio-historico-geographical environment in which the action takes place), *story space* (the space relevant to the plot, as mapped by the actions and thoughts of the characters), *story world* (the story space completed by the reader's imagination on the basis of cultural knowledge and real world experience) and *narrative universe* (the world presented as actual by the text, plus all the counterfactual worlds constructed by characters as beliefs, wishes, fears, speculations, hypothetical thinking, dreams, and fantasies). In *Never Let Me Go* the setting belongs to a past period but is situated within a science-fiction context of the future, the story space, spatial frames and narrative universe overlap in a confusing way, while the story world created in the reader's mind is a shadowy, ambiguous domain.

Neither can my classification of fictional spaces be of any help. As I have shown elsewhere (Brînzeu 2010), the fictional space in a novel can be seen as a *real space*, where the events take place (one variant of it being the *hyperspace* of science-fiction novels), *setting* (the general socio-historico-

geographical environment in which the action takes place), *imagined* space (all the worlds constructed by characters as beliefs, wishes, fears, speculations, hypothetical thinking, dreams, and fantasies) and *heterotopic* space (which includes both the ambiguous, non-totalisable, contradictory places, defined by Foucault (1991: xvff) as unusual, and the contested, inversed, or deceiving spaces). This classification highlights once more the way in which the places of otherness described by Kathy in Ishiguro's novel make the real, imagined, and heterotopic spaces overlap in an unsettling illusion of juxtaposition, destabilizing the traditional categories of space and challenging the conventional ways of thinking about them. It also brings us to the conclusion that the experiments related to cloning are not only physically dangerous for the human species, as they imply transhuman mutations which might ultimately be destructive, but they are also threatening in the way in which they change the perception of space from an exterior, objective notion to a subjective, prohibitive place of trauma and conflict.

Kathy's final imaginary picture, created after having lost Tommy, is a last proof of how skillfully Ishiguro can deal with the ambiguity of real and recollected spaces. While driving to Norfolk, Kathy recognizes the same flat fields and huge grey skies she was familiar with at Hailsham. She stops on a side road to admire the landscape, but is shocked by all sorts of rubbish clustered along a barbed wire fence. She cannot refrain from thinking about

the flapping plastic in the branches, the shore-line of odd stuff caught along the fencing, and I half-closed my eyes and imagined this was the spot where everything I'd ever lost since my childhood had washed up, and I was standing here in front of it, and if I waited long enough, a tiny figure would appear on the horizon across the field, and gradually get larger until I'd see it was Tommy, and he'd wave, maybe even call. The fantasy never got beyond that – I didn't let it – and though the tears rolled down my face, I wasn't sobbing or out of control. I just waited a bit, then turned back to the car, to drive off to wherever it was I was supposed to be. (282)

It is worth noticing that this image of Norfolk is similar to a dream Ruth had before dying, in which she saw Hailsham flooded with rubbish. The littered landscapes of Norfolk and Hailsham, symbols of loss and disturbance, are remarkably different from the places visited by Stevens, Ishiguro's butler in *The Remains of the Day*, when he takes a tour to visit a former acquaintance of his, Miss Kenton. Stevens notices in the Salisbury fields the fundamental attributes of Englishness – a sense of restraint, discretion, calmness, distinction, and, especially, dignity –, attributes which a butler should also develop to be a

great servant. They are best summed up by the term 'greatness', Stevens says, not to be found in other countries, even if their landscape is more dramatic. Neither of the characteristics noticed by Stevens can be applied to the regions described by the two clones.

4. Conclusion

The supposed "healthy" life fabricated with the help of organ donors pollutes the entire world of Ishiguro's heroines. Both Kathy and Ruth face the same littered landscape beyond which nothing else but death is in store: whether in reality, in a fantasy, or in a nightmare, the landscape makes the heroines understand that the future of the "normal" world depends on whether or not genetic engineering will preserve both land and bodies unlittered, as sacred territories given by God to be kept in natural beauty and harmony.

References

- Baudrillard, J. 2006. 'Clone Story' in *Simulacra and Simulation*, transl. by Sheila Faria Glaser, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Black, Sh. 2009. 'Ishiguro's Inhuman Aesthetics' in *Modern Fiction Studies*. 55/4, pp. 785-807.
- Britzman, D. P. 2006. 'On being a slow reader: psychoanalytic reading problems in Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go*' in *Changing English*. 13/3, pp. 307 — 318.
- Brînzeu, P. 2010. 'Apres Bahtin: Spațiul ficțional și naratologia' ('Apres Bahtin: Fictional Space and Narratology') in *Heterocosmosuri, heterotopii: Spațiul în romanul anglo-saxon contemporan (Heterocosms, Heterotopia: The Space in Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Novel)*, București: Editura Art (under print).
- Eek, T. S. 2005. 'A story you can't let go' in *The Star*, March 20. Available: <http://thestar.com.my/lifestyle/story.asp?file=/2005/3/20/features/10382949&sec=features> [2010, September 15].
- Foucault, M. 1991. *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. London: Routledge.
- Griffin, G. 2009. 'Science and the cultural imaginary: the case of Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go*' in *Textual Practice*. 23/4, pp. 645-663.
- Ishiguro, K. 2005. *Never Let Me Go*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Kakutani, M. 2005. 'Sealed in a World That's Not as It Seems' in *New York Times*, March 8. Available: <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage> [2010, September 15].
- Krieger, E. 1996. "Twelfth Night: 'The Morality of Indulgence'" in *Twelfth Night. Contemporary Critical Essays*. R. S. White (ed.). London: Macmillan, pp. 37-71.
- Menand, L. 2005. 'Something about Kathy. Ishiguro's Quasi-science-fiction Novel', *The New Yorker*, March 28,

2005. http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/03/28/050328crbo_books1 [2010, September 15].
- Ryan, M.-L. 2009. *Space and Narrative*. Available: <http://users.frii.com/mlryan/spaceentry.htm> [2010, September 15].
- Seaman, M. J. 2007. 'Becoming More (than) Human: Affective Posthumanisms, Past and Future' in *Journal of Narrative Theory*. 37/2, pp. 246-275.
- Scurr, R. 2005. 'The facts of life', *Times Literary Supplement*, March 13. Available: http://www.powells.com/review/2005_03_13.html [2010, September 15].
- Yardley, J. 2005. 'Never Let Me Go', *Washington Post*, April 17. Available: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54996-2005Apr14.html> [2010, September 15].

Notes on the author

Pia Brînzeu is full professor of English Literature, Vice-Rector of the University of Timișoara, Romania, and former Chair of the Romanian Society for English and American Studies. She has published books on literary and semiotic issues, among which *Corridors of Mirrors: Postwall British and Romanian Fiction* (University Press of America, 2000), and articles on narratology in *Semiotica*, *Degres*, and *Poetics*. She is co-author of *Translating the Body* (Munich, Lincom, 2007), has edited an anthology of studies *Heterotopia/Heterocosms: Spaces in Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Fiction* (2010), and is currently working on a book about the Renaissance drama.

FROM THE MIRROR TO THE SEA: THE MODERN SEMIOTIC NATURE OF IDENTITY IN JEAN RHYS'S *WIDE SARGASSO SEA*

CRISTINA-GEORGIANA VOICU

“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iași

Abstract: This paper attempts to show the way in which Rhys's metaphors reach a new pitch of vividness and power through imagistic detail, but also draw on the natural dimensions of intellectual and sense experiences, including colour, shape and texture. Such focused patterning and reworking of her own metaphors creates a sense of fatalistic inevitability, generating a hypnotic, spellbinding effect.

Keywords: doubled identity, intertextual metaphors, loss of selfhood, periphery of consciousness

1. Introduction

In this paper particular levels of meaning will be discussed with respect to the theory of metaphors and symbols (archetypal criticism, Bakhtin's chronotopes, Paul de Man's *Lyric and Modernity*) and attention will be paid to the ambiguity of imagination, which represents an important harmonizing as well as disruptive element in Jean Rhys's *Wide Sargasso Sea*. The text has an entirely successful, transformative, intertextual relationship, both with *Jane Eyre* and with other texts. The looking-glass metaphor comprises a striking example of Rhys's intertextual writing strategy. Rhys's white Creole heroine, Antoinette Cosway, realises that her black friend Tia serves as her own mirror image: “Blood on my face, tears on hers. It was as if I saw myself. Like in a looking-glass.” (Rhys 27). However, Antoinette's reference to blood, tears, a face and a looking-glass equally evokes Brontë's bleeding child Jane's incarceration in the red-room, where her own face appears as “half fairy, half imp' in the mirror's visionary hollow.” (Brontë 1992: 78).

2. Reading intertextual metaphors

Rhys's intertextual reference reflects Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar's

(1984) theories in *The Madwoman in the Attic*. They demonstrate how the mad wife functions as Jane Eyre's truest and darkest double or repressed selfhood, often through Brontë's use of the looking-glass motif. By alluding to the precursor text in this way, Rhys's metaphor also suggests a re-interpretation of the Lacanian 'Stade du Miroir' in which the writer discovers herself as a being both apart from, but also allied to, the mother/ precursor author.

Lacan argues that subjectivity arises when an infant catches a glimpse of herself in the mirror and takes that image to be herself. However, Rhys subverts the search for selfhood exemplified by Lacan's 'Stade du Miroir' when she re-configures her use of the intertextual looking-glass metaphor. Instead of experiencing an epiphany of Lacanian self-discovery, Antoinette seems unable to recognise herself in the mirror: "The girl I saw was myself yet not quite myself." (Rhys147). Incarcerated in Thornfield Hall, she becomes the quintessential alienated subject, unable to trust the validity of her own reflection: "It was then I saw her, the ghost, the woman with streaming hair. She was surrounded by a gilt frame, but I knew her." (Rhys 89). Moreover, Antoinette's description of the ghost echoes Brontë's description of Bertha in *Jane Eyre*: "She was a big woman, and had long black hair, we could see it streaming against the flames as she stood".

Therefore, in these examples, Rhys's use of the looking glass metaphor serves to emphasise Antoinette's loss of selfhood as she is moved progressively through the novel's three sections, into contact with Brontë's precursor text. Rhys's intertextual allusions to other writers' ghost metaphors also display her ability to draw on, and destabilise, their original significance. In *Jane Eyre*, Bertha Mason is the mysterious ghostly presence feared by the inhabitants of Thornfield Hall. However, in *Wide Sargasso Sea*, Antoinette thinks that Jane Eyre, a pale girl in a white dress humming to herself as she walks past, might be a ghost. Their roles are reversed through the use of intertextual metaphor: the ghost Jane Eyre hovers on the periphery of Antoinette's consciousness, haunting the ever-tenuous boundaries of her selfhood. Jane Eyre is also the ghost of Antoinette's lost youth, since the white dress she wears features in Antoinette's favourite childhood painting of the Miller's Daughter. Antoinette, like her mother, also wears a ghostly white dress on her honeymoon, which her husband notes slips untidily from her shoulder, as in the painting.

One of Rhys's original choices of title for her novel was *Le Revenant*, meaning *The Ghost*. This ghost, who always uncannily returns without ever having been properly present in the first place, is a central motif of her novel,

expressed repeatedly through intertextual metaphors. Thus, when the husband is lost on a mysterious paved road in the woods, a little girl mistakes him for a zombie reincarnation of the cruel, slave-owning priest, Pere Lilièvre. The metaphor of the reincarnated zombie, signifying loss of soul or selfhood, is in fact an intertextual allusion to stories about the ghost of Pere Jean-Baptiste Labat, told in order to frighten children into good behaviour. The husband's own character and destiny, as a soulless being neither fully dead nor truly emotionally alive, are also subtly evoked. This section of the novel also seems an intertextual allusion to the opening of Dante's *Inferno*: "Midway in the journey of our life I found myself in a dark wood, For the straight way was lost".

Rhys thus skilfully draws on Dante's re-interpretation of the conventional metaphor, 'life is a journey' which may indeed pass through a dark wood: an example of unconventional language that is conceptually based on an unused element of the source field. By using Dante's metaphor intertextually, Rhys also suggests that no life, no narrative ever really begins: all have in some sense already begun before they began. In this way, she evokes the plight of Antoinette and her husband, doomed to their own particular circles of hell by Brontë's precursor text. For any reader, but especially for a reader who is also a writer, ghosts inhabit all literary texts. Rhys's prevalent, intertextual ghost imagery alerts us to Harold Bloom's concept of *apophrades*, that is, the dismal or unlucky days when the dead return to inhabit their former houses. Bloom suggests that the strong intertextual writer is able to make it seem as though the latter had written the precursor's characteristic work.

That Rhys persistently generates the impression that she is being copied by her ancestors is the result of her skilful deployment of intertextual metaphors. For example, the moth who blunders into the candle flame carries obvious metaphorical associations of danger and attraction. However, it is the husband who chiefly identifies with that gay gentleman more stunned than hurt. His words not only suggest his own character and situation, but are also an intertextual allusion to a similar speech by Brontë's Mr Rochester: "Look at his wings,' said he, 'he reminds me rather of a West Indian insect; one does not often see so large and gay a night-rover in England; there he is flown away.'" (Brontë 1992: 89).

In *Jane Eyre*, the moth reminds Mr Rochester of "a West Indian insect." Rhys's use of the moth as an intertextual metaphor therefore suggests that

Brontë's Mr. Rochester remembers a moment which occurs in *Wide Sargasso Sea*.

Rhys generates a similar uncanny effect when Antoinette describes how as a child, she slept "too long in the moonlight." (Rhys 67). Her words refer to the belief that sleeping under the full moon will cause madness, so that she is later described as "blank, hating, moonstruck." Similarly, in *Jane Eyre*, Bertha's periods of insanity seem to occur when the moon is full. Mr Rochester relates how one fiery West Indian night "he is awakened by her mad yells, while the moon was setting on the waves, broad and red, like a hot cannonball." His description of the moon's "bloody glance" clearly evokes Jane's description of Bertha's "savage face" and "roll of the red eyes." Thus, Brontë makes the moon a metaphor for the mad wife. Through her intertextual use of the same metaphor, Jean Rhys is made to seem like the precursor of Charlotte Brontë, a chronological impossibility.

Rhys's use of intertextual metaphors thus demonstrates her ability to adopt Harold Bloom's strategy of clinamen or misprision, that is, to swerve away, to transform the meaning, of the precursor text. Rhys's intelligent, subversive use of intertextual metaphor results in her novel's entirely successful image world. For example, Daniel Cosway, in his First letter to Antoinette's husband, writes: "Richard Mason is a sly man and he will tell you a lot of nancy stories, which is what we call lies here, about what happen at Coulibri and this and that." (Rhys109). The word 'nancy' is an intertextual allusion to West Indian and Caribbean tales about Anancy, a cunning and greedy spider which can take on different forms and which succeeds not by strength but by trickery. The metaphorical linguistic expression 'nancy' therefore evokes the husband's attempts to discover who the deceptive spider is, and to unravel a web of lies. However, the fact that the spider reference appears in a letter from one male to another suggests that it is Antoinette who is trapped in patriarchy's collusive web.

In fact, Antoinette's side of the story is ultimately disregarded, so that her plight is reminiscent of the female writer, discounted by such male theorists of intertextuality as Barthes and Bloom. Barthes's *The Death of the Author* and Bloom's *The Anxiety of Influence* significantly ignore or underplay the female writer's efforts to break into art, to demarcate her own creative spaces. The dangers of failing to recognise the female writer within theories of intertextuality are exemplified by some of the images within Rhys's novel. In *Wide Sargasso Sea*, Antoinette recalls a patchwork counterpane her Aunt Cora

is making when she tells her she is leaving: “The diamond-shaped pieces of silk melted one into the other, red, blue, purple, green, yellow, all one shimmering colour. Hours and hours she had spent on it and it was nearly finished. Would I be lonely? she asked and I said, No, looking at the colours. Hours and hours and hours I thought.” (Rhys 123).

The patchwork can be read as a metaphor for intertextuality, in accordance with Barthes’s appealing trope in *The Death of the Author* that the textual is textile. However, it also signifies a growing sense of the inevitability of fate: the pattern of Antoinette’s destiny, like the pattern of the counterpane, is nearly finished. Moreover, “hours and hours” have been spent in making it, rather than in expending energy in altering the course of her life. Nancy Miller similarly suggests that theories of intertextuality such as Barthes’s have employed a whole mythology of weaving and making webs whilst, at the same time, underplaying or even erasing those myths’ connection to women’s efforts to break into art.

3. Dreams of Reality

As the following discussion attempts to show, it is the concern with the power of metaphors that allows Jean Rhys’s *Wide Sargasso Sea* to revive the disturbing potential of particular themes and motifs in Charlotte Brontë’s *Jane Eyre*, to question the suggested interpretations, to search for other and different points of view. The genre or romance, moreover, opens space for both authors to intensify the relativity of meaning by employing dream and nightmare visions and mingling the rational with the irrational.

Accordingly, Jean Rhys’s story of alienation is centred on two crucial metaphors: the *sea* and the *island*. The sea as an image of separation and an increasing distance suggests the split in both space and time: the conflict between different civilisations, between the past and the present (e.g., the destructive effects of slavery) as well as between the inner world of the individual and the surrounding reality. Both Antoinette (Brontë’s Bertha) and her husband (Brontë’s Rochester) are trapped in an imposed and painful isolation. The heroine is introduced as an orphaned daughter of a Jamaican plantation owner, whose family sank into destitution after the liberation of slaves. Her widowed Creole mother belongs neither to the black community nor to the dominant class, and is despised by both groups. As a white Creole, Antoinette becomes a double outsider: “white nigger” for the Europeans and

“white cockroach” for the Blacks. Jean Rhys herself was a white Creole and Antoinette’s story reflects the author’s own “sense of displacement”: her feeling of being “dispossessed at home” and “living as an exile in England” (Howells 1991:106).

In the constant atmosphere of hostility, imagination (or, in Kantian terms, the ability to consider the absent, the invisible or even the unrepresentable) becomes a device of escape from an unbearable reality. The appealing charm of the unknown is reflected in Antoinette’s dreams of England as well as in Rochester’s obsession with the hidden secrets of the Caribbean islands and of his wife’s personality: “What I see is nothing – I want what it *hides*” (Rhys 73). These dreams correspond with another symbolic level of the title image: the notion of mystery and infinity, the desire for transcending boundaries and limitations, or, in other words, for the experience of the sublime.

An interesting discussion of this subject can be found in Levinas’s philosophy. The idea of infinity inspires a real desire, the desire in its deepest and absolute sense, and the desire for the ‘other’: for the “land where we were not born” and which “we can never reach” (Levinas 1997:20), for the ‘other’ person, whose otherness, however, does not mean contradiction. According to Levinas, to characterise someone as one’s opposite is to derive his identity from one’s experience, that is to say, to deprive him of his individuality.

A hidden threat connected with the voyage is implied by the reference to the sargassoes, mentioned only in the title of Rhys’s novel and suggesting the windless space of the ocean with a great quantity of seaweed. In other words, the difficulty or even impossibility of movement is hinted at, the empty space of the split widens and the desire for infinity turns into a horror of nothingness. It is this anxiety that is reflected in the Gothic and Romantic images of lost or cursed ships.

Nevertheless, the more rational he attempts to be, the more incomplete his view of the reality is: “everything I had imagined to be truth was false [...] Only the magic and the dream are true – all the rest’s a lie” (Rhys 138). The confusing mixture of reality and illusion recalls, in fact, Northrop Frye’s analysis of romance. In connecting the real with dreaming and the unreal with a waking world, *Wide Sargasso Sea* gets closer to the tradition of this genre than Charlotte Brontë’s *Jane Eyre*. The notion of uncertainty and ambiguity permeating through *Wide Sargasso Sea* is further supported by the use of

intertextual allusions. For instance, there is no explicit reference to feelings of guilt.

Without any attention to gender issues, theories of intertextuality threaten to consign the women writer to figures in the position of Aunt Cora, “who ends up passively turning her face to the wall” (Rhys 89). However, as Rhys claims her literary kinship with Brontë, the counterpane ceases to evoke the exclusion of the female writer from the intertextual web. Like books in which readers and writers search for their literary foremothers, the counterpane becomes instead a repository of collective memory, of the relationship between aunt and niece: “I saw the grandfather clock and Aunt Cora’s patchwork, all colours. I saw the orchids and the stephanotis and the jasmine and the tree of life in flames.” (Rhys 109).

This re-configuration of the counterpane’s metaphorical significance is similar to the way in which Gilbert and Gubar substitute a female affiliation complex, in which female writers seek affiliation with literary foremothers they admire, in the place of Bloom’s distinctly male, patriarchal model of the anxiety of influence. The desire for, rather than the anxiety concerning, a precursor of tradition for the woman writer makes influence and/or intertextuality, when established, a matter of legitimation rather than of emasculating belatedness. Gilbert and Gubar (1984:159) write:

The son of too many fathers, today’s male writer feels hopelessly belated; the daughter of too few mothers, today’s female writer feels that she is helping to create a viable tradition which is at last definitively emerging.

Similarly, when Antoinette looks at the tapestry she recognises her mother inscribed inside it. It is as if the figure of the female has finally been re-instated in the intertextual web. Thus attention to the gender issues inscribed mythically and metaphorically within the notions of text and textuality can, Kate Miller and Rhys imply, return us to the figure of the strong female artist, Arachne, the spider woman, to use an example from Miller’s theories. This female affiliation complex’ suggests it is helpful to think of the creative, intertextual space as a kind of metaphoric, amniotic sea, or Julia Kristeva’s semiotic chora. In *Revolution in Poetic Language*, Kristeva finds intertextuality functions within the semiotic chora, that is the womb or receptacle of becoming, a space of pre-linguistic, prelapsarian plenitude initially totally identified with the maternal body. For Antoinette, this lost paradise or chora is likewise located within her mother’s body, before their disastrous fall into patriarchy: “Once I made

excuses to be near her when she brushed her hair, a soft black cloak to cover me, hide me, keep me safe.” (Rhys 19). It is similarly located within the songs of her substitute mother and nurse, Christophine: “I couldn’t always understand [Christophine’s] patois songs she also came from Martinique but she taught me the one that meant, The little ones grow old, the children leave us, will they come back? and the one about the cedar tree flowers which only last for a day” (Rhys 23)..

Christophine’s songs provide examples of complex metaphors because they make use of culturally based conceptual frames. Antoinette defines her reality in terms of the metaphors of her nurse’s songs, and then proceeds to act on the basis of that reality. She also sings them back to her husband on their honeymoon, so that he too comes to think of her metaphorically, a golden-brown flower “which he later tramples into the mud.” (Rhys 26). Thus, for Antoinette and her husband, as for Rhys, and for Kristeva, storytellers are influenced by other storytellers. The images found in songs and texts are intertextual. The title of Rhys’s own novel therefore seems an appropriate metaphor for an interpretation of intertextuality in which the literary work is viewed not as a fixed container of meanings, but as a shifting sea, in which a potentially vast number of relations coalesce. Lethal and fertile, the Sargasso Sea is a place of renewal and stagnation, of creation within repetition, of intertextuality in fact.

By adopting a title which evokes intertextuality, Rhys suggests that, for her, repetition is by no means a fruitless, plagiaristic imitation. Within the metaphorical, intertextual sea of stories, there are as many different interpretations of stories as there are people to read them. For Antoinette, the sea of her own story changes its meaning as it flows into the unreal cities of the famous Victorian novel: “When I woke it was a different sea. Colder. It was that night, I think, that we changed course and lost our way to England.” (Rhys 148).

In the words of Carole Angier (1990: 163), Rhys’s metaphors reach a “new pitch of vividness and power”. This is because her image-based metaphors of, for example, moths, clothes and flowers, are rich in imagistic detail, but also draw on the natural dimensions of intellectual and sense experiences, including colour, shape and texture. Moreover, they take on a mirror-like, self-reflexive quality, becoming intertextual, not only with other texts but with their own cohesive image world, developed throughout the three parts of the novel. Such focussed patterning and reworking of her own

metaphors creates a sense of fatalistic inevitability, also generating a hypnotic, spellbinding effect, and a structural intensity/more frequently found in poetry rather than prose. The intensity of these re-worked images is exemplified at the end of the novel when Antoinette dreams of the patchwork which is also the sky, and it becomes the pool at Coulibri where she used to swim with her childhood friend Tia. In it, she sees her whole life flash by, like a drowning person about to be re-born.

In the concluding scene of *Wide Sargasso Sea*, the flame of a candle, a symbol of dreams and imagination, is related to the experience of waking up and to the theme of a passage. In accordance with Bachelard's psychoanalytical approach to the motif, the final image does not suggest the heroine's suicidal death but rather her "waking to being" (Bachelard 1997:18), her new awareness of herself and of her particular ties to the past (Rhys's description of her childhood) as well as the future (the intertextual links to Charlotte Brontë's novel).

4. Conclusion

In terms of contemporary literary theory, the repeated motifs of deserted houses and ruins in *Wide Sargasso Sea* correspond with the repeated displacement of the story's centre. Such a pattern involves the idea of a decline as well as regeneration and this ambiguity is also suggested by the recurring image of the *Sargasso Sea*. According to Sylvie Maurei, it may symbolise stagnation; as a place where eels return every year to lay their eggs, however, it can also evoke the feeling of a "cyclical renewal" (Maurel 1998:129). With respect to Levinas's concept of infinity, the idea of a renewal can arise also from the notion of a boundless space created by the metaphorical image of the sea: the space for a dialogical relationship between Rhys's novel and Brontë's *Jane Eyre*, for the possibility to consider and to tell the story from the point of view of the 'other side' (Rhys 106).

References

- Angier, C. 1990. *Jean Rhys*. London: Andre Deutsch Limited.
Bachelard, G. 1997. *The Flame of a Candle*. Dallas: The *Bachelard* Translations.
Bakhtin, M.M. 2004. *The Dialogic Imagination*, Michael Holquist (ed.), trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, Austin: University of Texas Press.

- Barthes, R. "The Death of the Author" from Athenaeum Library of Philosophy. Available: <http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/barthes06.htm>.
- Bloom, H. 1973. *The Anxiety of Influence. A Theory of Poetry*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Brontë, Ch. 1992. *Jane Eyre*, Mary Ibbett (ed.), London: Wordsworth edition.
- De Man, P. 1983. *Blindness and Insight*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Frye, N. 1976. *The Secular Scripture: A Study of the Structure of Romance*. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press.
- Gilbert, S. M. and S. Gubar. 1984. *The Madwoman In The Attic The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth Century Imagination*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press
- Howells, C.A. 1991. *Jean Rhys*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kant, I. 1914. *Critique of Judgement*, trans. J.II. Bernard, London: Macmillan.
- Kristeva, J. 1984. *Revolution In Poetic Language*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lacan, J. 2003. "The Mirror Function as Formative of the Function of the I" in *Art In Theory, 1900-2000 An Anthology of Changing Ideas*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Levinas, E. 1969. *Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
- Maurel, S. 1998. *Jean Rhys*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Miller, N. K. 1988. *Subject to Change. Reading Feminist Writing*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rhys, J. 1999. *Wide Sargasso Sea*. Middlesex: Penguin.

Notes on the author

Cristina-Georgiana Voicu is a PhD student in English at The Doctoral School of Philological Studies, Faculty of Letters, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iași, Romania. Her field of specialization is Caribbean Literature. Her doctoral thesis is about the exploration of cultural identities in Jean Rhys's writings. Her research interests include colonial and post-colonial literature, women's writing, Caribbean diaspora, and colonial identity.

Then and Now

**THE HISTORY HOUSE IN THE (POST-)COLONIAL PERSPECTIVE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANGLO-INDIAN AND ANGLO-IRISH
HOMELAND REPRESENTATIONS AND REPRESSIONS**

IOANA ZIRRA

University of Bucharest

***Abstract:** The history house, a recurrent image and a developing symbol which occurs in post-colonial poems and novels (by W.B. Yeats, Seamus Heaney, Derek Mahon and Arundhaty Roy, respectively), allows us to discriminate between lyrical rehearsing and satirical hushing of historical trauma in nationalistic versus Anglophile (Anglo-Irish/Anglo-Indian) decolonization scores/texts/contexts..*

***Keywords:** Anglophile, decolonization, history house, lyrical, nationalistic, post-colonial trauma, satirical*

1. Introduction: the Texts

At first glance, the textual construction of the history house as a post-colonial literary motif is characterized by poetic fragmentariness. It is a fragmentariness that resists easy reconstruction because it reduplicates itself, proliferates and recurs at several levels. Fragmentariness is in the order of things in poetry, but when it is carried into shorter or longer fictional narratives, then it is worth observing more closely.

Our (archaeological?) incursion into fragmentariness began from an abbreviated historical and poetic narrative, in W. B. Yeats's late poem "The Curse of Cromwell", included in the 1937 volume of "New Poems". After several ballad stanzas, towards the end of the poem, the history house appears accompanied by an epiphoric indefinite pronoun, as a momentarily haunting image, a dilapidated homeland of invasions, open to the existence of the lower natural orders and to the elements. Imported, as it were, forty-five years later in Seamus Heaney's poem "Bogland", the history-house or homeland has become porous, and as vestigial as to allow its shards to be ultimately invaded by the

ocean itself, from a bottomless planetary centre. Its invaded being and fragmentariness have extended to planetary dimensions:

I came on a great house in the middle of the night,
Its open lighted doorway and its windows all alight,
And all my friends were there and made me welcome too;
But I woke in an old ruin that the winds howled through;
And when I pay attention I must out and walk
Among the dogs and horses that understand my talk. (Yeats 201)

The bitter denial of reality/history that terminates the vision of Yeats's ghostly house seems continued in Seamus Heaney's poem, which heaps self-deprecating denial upon denial in the first tercets that complain "We have *no* prairies/ To slice the eye of the sun....Our *unfenced* country is bog/ Crusting between two [*mere*] sights of the sun....They *never dug* coal here...." Restrictive determiners and oscillations between extremes make the poem move towards the paradoxical, highly poetic, wet centre of a bottomless world called Ireland. It is a land that both refuses itself to pioneers who would come here to disturb the soil, digging for coal, and offers itself as solace to the people who speak the vernacular existential language.. In this last oblatory quality (that resembles the river and branch invoked by Mircea cel Bătrân's address to the proud Sultan in Mihai Eminescu's *Third Epistle*), the land is a house which proffers the objects of its miraculous geology naturally, as gifts. There is a history of the home inscribed on finds such as the great Irish elk as a saintly relic, recovered "salty and white" from the matrix of black butter in the earth that surrounds, in order to preserve, it. The earth itself is a protective, sacred home. And only afterwards in the poem is there a ground which opens itself insidiously to engulf the pace of the colonizing foot that treads it down.

There is ambivalence here, too, just as in Yeats's poem, because decolonization involves both reverence and denunciation. One can and should reach down to the fertile soil which cooperates with man, poetically dwelling, to find the sacred home among the shards of the invaded historic land. This means moving backwards, as it were, into the sacred vision of Yeats's poem, when recalling the cursed pioneers who came here to dig for coal. The post-colonial poem by Heaney invites its readers to sort shards, because it aligns both the colonizers and the Irish denizens on the poetic start-line.

The interaction with the history house is made more explicit in the longer narrative of Arundhati Roy's novel, *The God of Small Things*. Firstly, it is called by its own full name and described in all its implications in the sermon

delivered by Chako, the uncle, to the twin children, the protagonist(s) of the book, in chapter two, as shall be seen in the quotation. The entire book will subsequently do no more than convey in a fully dramatic and poetic manner the competition between the various meanings accommodated within the (post-) colonial history house. The headings of the lucid sermon addressed to innocents are given life in the plot development. We meet in action and feel the powers of the crumbling, whispering house in its interaction with the rising generations of people who must repeat the history house fate.

Chacko told the twins that though he hated to admit it, they were all Anglophiles. They were a *family* of Anglophiles. Pointed in the wrong direction, *trapped outside their own history*, and unable to retrace their steps because their *footprints had been swept away*. He explained to them that *history was like an old house at night. With all the lamps lit. And ancestors whispering inside.* (Roy 1997: 52)

So far the image seems a narrative remake of the poetically radiant house in *The Curse of Cromwell*, the last stanza. It can be seen to radiate, of course, an ambivalent, disquieting energy, rather than the usual soothing welcome of a home.

‘To understand history’, Chacko said, ‘we have to go inside and listen to what they’re saying. And look at the books and the pictures on the wall. And smell the smells.’

Estha and Rahel had no doubt that the house Chacko meant was the house on the other side of the river, in the middle of the abandoned rubber estate where they had never been. Kari Saipu’s house. The Black Sahib. The Englishman who had ‘gone native’. Who spoke Malayalam and wore mundus. Ayemenem’s own Kurtz. Ayemenem his private Heart of Darkness. He had shot himself through the head ten years ago when his young lover’s parents had taken the boy away from him and sent him to school. After the suicide, the property had become the subject of extensive litigation between Kari Saipu’s cook and his secretary. The house had lain empty for years. Very few people had seen it. But the twins could picture it.

The History House.

With cool stone floors and dim walls and billowing ship-shaped shadows. Plump, translucent lizards lived behind old pictures, and waxy, crumbling ancestors with tough toe-nails and breath that smelled of yellow maps inside gossiped in sibilant, papery whispers.

‘We can’t go in,’ Chacko explained, ‘because we’ve been locked out. And when we look in through the windows, all we see are shadows. And when we try and listen, all we hear is a whispering. And we cannot understand the whispering, because our minds have been invaded by a war. A war that we have won and lost. The very worst sort of war. A war that captures dreams and re-dreams them. A war that has made us adore our conquerors and despise ourselves.’ (Roy 1997: 52-53)

The underlined words in the quoted passage are stages of experience and details of the figural picture that conveys the history house. Interestingly, they rehearse with variations the tighter, poetic words and phrases in Yeats's or Heaney's poems. At the same time, they are more akin to the festering, deserted history house which is allegorically presented in another explicit post-colonial poem by Derek Mahon's "A Disused Shed in Co. Wexford". There is a similarly adult voice which draws a convincing picture of the burnt out hotel that has become a plantation of fungi. They reminisce about the "departed mycologist", the former colonial ruler, with his light-meter – a possible miniature image of the Enlightenment culture in a culture of fungi. By comparison to Heaney's piety that cures the shards, the voice in Mahon's poem is scathing, wishing to undercut the plaintive score of the lament of the inmates, reduced to mere fungi. Quite explicitly, Mahon's poem looks through a lens, from a lucid distance, both at the deserted Indian compounds and at the disused shed of the Irish colonial hotel and at the vestigial culture (in both senses) of the Anglophiles; they are a hybrid race, neither just denizens, nor too different from the colonizers, and are caught together in this urbanite, decayed avatar of the history house. We are invited/compelled to contemplate and judge the history house through the lens of *Mythistorema* (which is the equivalent of "history lesson" in modern Greek, just as in the title of Seferis' poem from which Mahon's Motto is lifted; in the mythographers' Greek, it points to the conglomerate of myths and history which people are compelled to live with). Also, we are confined to the perspective of the fungi, as lower order history house inhabitants. They are like living shards of past identities because they are spawned by disorder. But the lament of the powdery prisoners and moonmen who lead a pseudo-life, like ghosts among the asphodels in the decolonized or burnt-out hotel of Mahon's poem, is turned into a satirical target. And this makes it differ from Heaney's lyrical poem, which means its own emotions and images infinitely and literally. Just as it differs from Yeats's revivalist lament that underwrites the merely fleeting vision of the history house.

2. Ghostliness, Fragmentariness, Ambivalence: Trauma. The Post-Colonial Context.

After looking at the literary implications of the ways the history house image is delivered by lyrical emotion investments and satirical distancing, we

shall trace back the common features of the history house, i.e., ghostliness, fragmentariness and ambivalence, to their respective contexts.

As just mentioned, the indirect, fleeting occurrence of the history house as a ghostly vision in Yeats's *Curse of Cromwell* is connected to the Irish literary revival. Yeats's poem is torn between a modern, angry lucidity (that prompts the poem's cursing title) and a sense of indebtedness to a ghostly, grandiose past (poetically incorporated in the splendid history house image, which haunted eighteenth-century poetry in visions that were in keeping with the Irish word *fis*, or dream). In addition, the poem binds us, readers, to the chilling realization that people who dream splendidly awaken to a tough reality. If the first investment of emotion makes the poem a curse and the second a lament, the third one makes it a more complex kind of ritual poem for whose interpretation we need further data. If we peer intently enough through the Celtic twilight motifs, we can reach to the inherent plea for decolonization that this poem makes. The house-splendid is a spectre and is lost in a palimpsest of history-bits that fragment the continuities of emotion. The feelings expressed vacillate between hatred, self-pity and yearning. Because the vehicle/channel of literary communication is steeped in ambivalence and fragmentariness, which makes the tenor hard to decipher, we must disengage the shards of significance from the layers in which they lie buried and work as archaeologists cleaning their shards before interpretation becomes possible.

The first shard of the history-house image is the old Irish form of the *caoineadh* (keening), a species of dirge that places the history house in the realm of the dead, and does so ritually. The lines quoted in the first section of our paper come framed by the following burden:

*O what of that, O what of that
What is there left to say? (Yeats 201)*

The function of the burden is to embed the local lament into a public discourse, to retrieve its solitary meditation and appropriate it into a wider meditative space. In the double vision of the poem, the curse is uttered as a pre-requisite to meditation. The theme in the title and the first stanza take us to a house of hatred while the vision proffers a house full of yearning. The poem announces itself as a vehicle for venting Gaelic/Catholic Ireland's hatred of this Protestant father-figure: Cromwell, the military-founding-father of Irish Protestantism. He is one figure from the "pantheon" of fiends who surface in the nationalist subtext of Yeats's poetry as targets of embittered emotion:

Cromwell the explicit fiend in the title stands side by side with “the drunken soldiery” who are “abed” in “Byzantium and occupying the home like some suitors, wooing the married Penelope; in “Lapis Lazuli” we hear of King Billy (alias William III of Orange) as an insidious circus puppet figure ready to pitch its bomb from a First World War Zeppelin. Yeats’s later poetry adds angry accents to the earlier, allusive dreaminess of the Celtic Twilight, and as such it faithfully preserves the whispers of the ancestors heard in the history house, shredded to pieces in reality and reconstructed only in dreams. The dream of the house rehearses the Romantic titanic, otherworldly power(s) of poetry. It facilitates the contact with the archetypal netherworld and cosmic forces. The history house is enveloped in the dark aura of the nocturnal regime in poetry, *apud* Gilbert Durand, since it “dawns at midnight” and is richly inhabited, dense with life – or is it dense with the afterlife? For it feels, rather, like the heavenly father’s mansion in which there is room for all men-elect once they have been summoned to set foot on the path that leads into heaven. (the poem’s reading as a revivalist *caoineadh* points in this direction). Moreover, in *The Curse of Cromwell*, the poetic intensity is bardic because it re-enacts the performative powers of the poet who “calls down a curse” on most people in the neighbourhood but “calls down a blessing on the blossom of the May/ Because it comes in beauty and in beauty blows away”, in *The poet, Owen Hanrahan, under a bush of May*.

Shifting from the literary to the psychoanalytical hermeneutics, Cathy Caruth’s *Unclaimed Experience* offers very useful insights for the interpretive ordering and cleaning of the cultural shards inherent in the post-colonial experience. It relegates to trauma the ghostly fragmentariness and ambivalent feelings that we have encountered so far. Caruth speaks of “stories of trauma”, whose textual itinerary consists of insistently recurring words or key figures of “departure”, “falling”, “burning” or “awakening”, which are components of “trauma narratives”, and their fragmentariness “convey[s] the impact of [the traumatic event’s] incomprehensibility”(Caruth 1996: 6)

Once we can equate history with trauma in the post-colonial house of words that literature administers, we can “set our lands/shards in order”. Observing the disarray, we can assess the degree of incomprehensibility and fragmentariness; also, we can place the vectors of ambivalence on the graph that approximates the order of the discourse.

First, there are poems/literary texts whose fragmentariness is assumed and constitutive, in a way which is quite normal for modern lyricism. This is

the case of both Seamus Heaney's poem *Bogland*, which dwells in the fragmentary world in order to pierce to its core, as far as the wet, bottomless centre, and of Arundhati Roy's narrative, which represents a typically discontinuous story of trauma. Stories of trauma grow (stunted) from the fascination with the history house, in a fatalistic way. Fragmentariness is their substance, modelled by trauma. By contrast, the linear, coherent, categorical statements characteristic for Derek Mahon's vein in poetry show impatience instead of fascination with the history house, its shards and its whispers. Ambivalence is refused, fragmentariness is left behind. "A Disused Shed in Co. Wexford" reads like Uncle Chako's history lesson – it may be unsettling in its (in)sights, but it is a crystal-clear discourse. Even, as we can read explicitly in another poem by the same author, "The Last of the Fire Kings", this kind of discourse is craving to see the last of the angry, (vain)glorious fire creatures ready to claim others with the whispers of history.

We can analyze the announcements in the poems' titles. "The Curse of Cromwell" is clear in its announcement of hatred but its hazy revivalist intertextualities are ambivalent since they encourage both angry curses and pious yearning to co-exist in the intensely radiant spectre of the history house. In "A Disused Shed in Co. Wexford", Mahon chooses a place of ambivalent memory which sends us to two different *loci* of Irish history. On the one hand, Wexford is a county that recalls the beginnings of Anglicization, since it was here that Henry II set foot in Ireland in Anglo-Norman times; but it also speaks of the resistance to Anglicization in the military decolonization rebellion led by Theobald Wolfe Tone in 1798. By comparison to Yeats and as a poet writing at two removes from the T. S. Eliot's pronouncement about the dissociation of sensibility, Mahon writes a poem that continues its title after the Motto by offering an exemplary, programmatic and hard line palimpsest of cultural framings that would keep the trauma at a distance. Mahon creates a decisively intellectual, satirical distance from raw emotion in sending us to Seferis through the Motto, which resembles T. S. Eliot's references to Dante and to myth-histories lifted from the cultural pantheon in his own mottos or in the Notes to *The Waste Land*. This poet follows T. S. Eliot's high modernist advice to poets to shun the direct expression of emotion. His urbanite framing elevates thinking before it allows emotion to burst forth. In post-colonial theory terms, this means that the settler-culture voice encourages the reader to become ironically detached from the torturing homeliness and havoc of the history house and to repudiate the dreams re-dreamt. The ambivalence of the poem's allegories

(since we are encouraged to have mixed feelings towards the Irish population of fungi) induces mixed feelings of pity and self-deprecation and recalls the self-love, self-hatred and impotent dreaming that keeps in thrall the (Anglophile) people who live in the Indian history house. Hence the characteristic accents in “A Disused Shed in Co.Wexford” and “The Last of the Fire Kings” of “verseful-wishing” (wishful thinking, wistful thinking) about the need to sweep the history house clean of parasites that threaten to colonize ever more recent hosts.

Having made a case for the similarities between the Anglo-Irish context and the Indian one (which also allows us to claim the Irish cultural space for post-colonial theory, although it is explicitly absent from the relevant entry in, for example, Irena Makarik’s *Encyclopaedia of Contemporary Literary Theory*, 1995: 155-158), we must ask a more general question about the possibility of escaping from the traumatic emotion in the history house. The sceptical preaching of the Anglophile uncle in Arundhati Roy’s novel and the fatal fulfilment of his dire prophecy in the novel’s plot suggest the impossibility of actually escaping from trauma and the nightmare of the history house. Reading the history house imagery in the light of Cathy Caruth’s text, we can notice that there is actually no complete escape from the history house even for poets who work in the metropolitan, high-modernist vein, like Derek Mahon. For they inevitably handle some of the same images of Caruth’s above-mentioned series, but “forbid mourning” and sulking when they stop short at others. There is “departure” and “falling” but no “burning” or “awakening”. In the urbanite home-world, both addressing and silencing the violent voices cooperate as a pre-condition for equilibrium.

Imagologically and aesthetically speaking, we can read the syllogistic and poetic associations delivered in an adult, categorical, declarative and sad tonality by the speaking voice in Mahon’s allegory of Ireland in the age of decolonization. But we can also read in wonderment the series of revelations in various keys occasioned by Seamus Heaney’s “Bogland”.

3. Conclusion

To approach a conclusion, we should look at the formal and existential implications of constructing a declarative and a mystery-weaving expression of trauma in the history house. Heaney’s poem brings up from the peat a relic that dates back to the pre-history vernacular world: “the miraculous Great Irish Elk

– an astounding crate full of air”; consequently, the whole soil is hallowed, “butter sunk under – recovered salty and white”, “the ground itself is kind, black butter” (a gift offering itself to a people starving in the years of the mid 19th century famine). Though the merciless – and useless – advance of the colonists, as pioneers on Irish soil are mentioned, the poem lends itself to a reading that gives precedence to the treasure trove of nationalist memories over the declarative resistance to invasions in the past, just as in the present. The sense of wonder prevails in the multiple-layer reminiscences of the poem. The paradoxical figure of the wet centre bespeaks the need to transcend ambivalence in a world of fragmentariness, while trauma would wrap itself in wonder. There is more piety for the history house, which still feels like home in Heaney’s astounding lyrical verse. In Mahon’s poem, lucidity prevails and there is a pressing need to sweep the house clean in the deliberation underwriting the slightly cynical bravado of trauma. On the other hand, Arundhati Roy’s fiction begins in the lucidity of experience but allows itself to be claimed by innocence and remains in the realm of unclaimed experience. The innocent children are fated to rehearse the trauma as a first-hand experience in the plot and they are compelled to return to the scenario outlined by the adult in the first pages of the book. Wrapped in fatefulness, the plot performs again what the initial sermon states.

It was to be expected that the most complete and enlightening presentation of our motif should be found in the novel which explicitly and figurally posits the terms of the unclaimed experience in the history house, foregrounding the voices/points of view that take up the theme. This allows us to discriminate the narrators from the actors, whose fate is entwined in/with the history house. Consequently, we can recognize and balance against each other the voice of first-hand experiencers of trauma and the voice of its commentators. Yeats deliberately foregrounds the experiencers’ voice but copiously resorts to the intertextual techniques of the commentator. Heaney’s lyrical text gives precedence to the voice of experience and lyrically captures its unclaimed experience. Mahon, just as the uncle preaching to the innocent, excels in the flat, categorical sermonic voice of lucidity, and the result is an excessively ornamental, manneristic, allegorical and florid style. In addition, Derek Mahon’s voice speaks on behalf of the silenced and regressive fungi. The same happens in Arundhati Roy’s book where the uncle not only opens the eyes of the children but also gives them a more articulate voice than their unclaimed, first-hand experience would allow of. The history house contains both the

innocent and the experienced in their attempt to move the grindstones of good and evil. The fragmentary, dramatic, mysterious and ambivalent whispers of direct and unclaimed experience, always inscribed in the history house walls, can be blown up, as it were, to become sermonic and collective voice messages. The twins' voice, as transcribed by Rahel while Estha remains sworn to silence, is puzzling. Its rhythmical fragments and compulsive repetitions, translated by literary and experiential reminiscences, makes a poetic counterpoint to the linear, clear narrative of Chako's sermon. Its progress through accents, rhyming and allusions (such as the allusion to Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*) resemble the burden in *The Curse of Cromwell: Oh What of that, Oh what of that/ What is there left to say?* We are invited to listen to experience appropriating innocence while the latter gets the better of experience – in turns. This is the most authentic score to be obtained when trauma narrates itself inescapably from within the house. We understand that the commentator narrates trauma in the past tense, while innocence is discovering it progressively, in the present. Hence the dialectic movement between what one voice tries to articulate and what the other hushes. This points to two species of narrative and two species of trauma. The narrative of unclaimed and first-hand experience is fragmentary, ambivalent, tortuous, emergent and in progress. Caruth refers to the “plea by an other who is asking to be seen and heard” and to “listening to an address that remains enigmatic yet demands a listening and a response” (Caruth 1996: 9). The past participle experienced narrative contains experience, claimed and classified, no matter how dissatisfied it may be. In it speaks the settler culture, capable of controlling emotion in ascertained ways. This self-assured voice does not suffer from being spurned or perceived mistakenly when it is downtrodden by the invading pioneers, as in Heaney's *Bogland*. The point of insertion of the nationalist trauma in the history house is the arrival and the subsequent stay of the invader. In Derek Mahon's settler culture poem, the mycologist's departure and traumatic parting, dreaming and re-dreaming, which inhere in an assimilation that hurts the experienced Anglophile, recurs, forbidding mourning.

References

- Caruth, C. 1996. *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Heaney, S. 1988. *New Selected Poems*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Mahon, D. 1991. *Selected Poems*, London: Penguin & Oldcastle: Gallery.

- Makarik, I. R. (ed). 1995. *The Encyclopaedia of Contemporary Literary Theory*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Roy, A. 1997. *The God of Small Things*. New Delhi: IndiaInk.
- Yeats, W. B. 1991. *Selected Poetry*. T. Webb, (ed.). London: Penguin.

Notes on the author

Ioana Zirra is a Reader in English and Irish literature and British cultural studies and theory at the Faculty of Foreign Letters, University of Bucharest. She is especially interested in the theory of modernity. Since 2000, she has published academic materials connected with her lecturing (the Victorian Age, the History of Literature and Ideas and British Culture and Civilization Themes) and her PhD Dissertation on modernity after 1945 in its theoretical narratives (*An Attempt to Establish an Architext of (Post-)Modernity*). Other main interests: Irish contemporary poetry and cultural translation – from and into, through and thanks to, English. She also wishes to contribute to promoting Romania's artistic/cultural values and voice in today's world.

**“NATIONAL PARALLELS”: IDEOLOGIES OF CULTURAL AND
LINGUISTIC NATIONALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
IRELAND AND HUNGARY**

MÁRTA PINTÉR

University of Pannonia, Veszprém

***Abstract:** In some of his essays, Anglo-Irish intellectual Thomas Davis sets the Hungarian language movement as a model for Irish language revivalists of the 19th century. Davis's ideas have been a foundation for my study of cultural and linguistic nationalism in 19th-century Ireland and Hungary, and of a mental link that existed between the two countries at the time.*

***Keywords:** Hungarian, Irish, national parallels, nineteenth century*

1. Introduction

Although documented cultural and social contacts between Hungary and Ireland extend back to the Middle Ages, it is through a series of nineteenth-century writings that mutual interest by leading figures of Hungarian and Irish public life in the contemporaneous events of their countries is first revealed. The mental connection that is observable between Hungary and Ireland at the time must have drawn its inspiration from a shared sense of national subordination.

Political as well as cultural-linguistic sovereignty was central to the Hungarian concept of independence in the first half of the 19th century, and the success of the language movement was proved by the official recognition of Hungarian as a state language in 1844. In the same period, the Irish language experienced a dramatic decline, threatening the complete extinction of the native tongue of Ireland in a generation or two.

Thomas Davis, the intellectual leader of the fledgeling Young Ireland Movement, was the first to propose a coherent programme for the revival of what he called Ireland's national language. In some of his essays, Davis makes references to the status of Hungarian and uses the achievements of the Hungarian language movement as an example which could be used by Irish

language revivalists. In what follows I shall rely on Davis's ideas as a foundation for comparing tendencies and ideologies of cultural and linguistic nationalism in Ireland and Hungary within the context of nineteenth-century Europe.

2. Hungarian-Irish Parallels

The first extant references to a Hungarian in Ireland are to Lőrinc Tar, a Hungarian cleric living in the time of Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387-1473), King of Hungary and Holy Roman Emperor. Tar paid a visit to St Patrick's Purgatory in Lough Derg and wrote a medieval account of his journey in Latin, mixing legend with travelogue, real with religious and imaginary experiences (Fügedi 1974: 156-157, Glatz 2000: 155, see also Kabdebo 2001: 19). Religion was also the background of an Irishman fleeing Oliver Cromwell's troops to Hungary. Walter Lynch, Bishop of Clonfert, stayed in the northwestern Hungarian city of Győr from 1655 to 1663, and donated an image of the Holy Virgin to the local cathedral, which was in subsequent centuries revered as the 'Virgin that shed tears' on St Patrick's Day in 1697 (Kabdebo 2001: 19-20). Religious orientation also permeates 17th-century Hungarian chronicles referring to contemporaneous Irish events and commenting upon them in harmony with their own protestant or catholic loyalties (see e.g. Cserei 1983, Rosner 1677). This, on the other hand, also reflected religious divisions in contemporary Hungary itself.

The Hungarian idea of drawing a national parallel between the two countries originates from Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II, leader of a prolonged military campaign (1703-11) to gain independence from the Habsburgs. Although the fight for freedom eventually failed in 1711, at the height of his success in 1707 Prince Rákóczi dethroned the Habsburg House in Hungary, and compared this act to Stuart James II's attempt in 1690 to regain the English crown via Ireland (*Universis orbis Christiani* 1707 in Kabdebó 2001: 21). Rákóczi argued that Hungary's connection with Austria was constitutionally similar to that of Scotland and England, yet Austria handled Hungary as England treated Ireland, that is as a "conquered country" without "ever having conquered it" (Hengelmüller 1913: 111-200).

Yet, it is through a series of nineteenth-century writings that mutual and genuine interest by leaders of Hungarian and Irish public life in the events of their countries is first revealed. Written reflections upon the major, sometimes

cataclysmic experiences by the two populations inform us about the existence of a certain mental link between Hungary and Ireland, a connection which drew its inspiration from a sense of belonging to politically dependent European nations.

Irish Catholic emancipator and constitutional nationalist Daniel O’Connell’s figure and mass movements attracted remarkable attention among Hungarian intellectuals with a political orientation. The development of Hungarian as a printed language in the first half of the 19th century gave rise to a number of periodicals, some of which, like *Rajzolatok* (“Sketches”) in 1835 and *Atheneum* in 1837, informed the Hungarian reading public about O’Connell’s achievements (in Kókay 1979: 458, 509).

Also in the latter half of the 1830s two of Hungary’s leading nationalist politicians, Bertalan Szemere and Ferenc Pulszky, visited Ireland, and in their separately published travelogues they both write about the economic backwardness of the rural Irish and the growing strength of political agitation in Ireland. As his book *Utazás külföldön*, or “A journey abroad” (1840) proves, Szemere, also Prime Minister of Hungary’s short-lived sovereign responsible government in 1849, became especially appalled by the poverty and hunger of the Irish countryside, and identified the causes as follows: Ireland’s political and economic ‘slavery’ in relation to Britain, the resultant lack of native industry and commerce, the feudal system of land tenure, payment of tithes to the Church of Ireland, potato being the nearly exclusive food crop for the poor, and rapid population growth among them (1983: 352-365). In his social essay *Szegénység Irlandban* or “Poverty in Ireland” (1840) Baron József Eötvös relied upon the experiences of Szemere and Pulszky, both being friends to him, for his own study of the causes and effects of poverty.

The year 1848 was witness to a revolutionary upsurge in Europe, and the Hungarian social upheaval was transformed into a prolonged fight for the country’s liberation from the Habsburg Empire. Lajos Kossuth, leader of the 1848-49 Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, had shown great admiration for Daniel O’Connell in the previous years, and the 1843 issues of his *Pesti Hírlap* (“Pest News”) include multiple references to the “Liberator’s” Repeal Movement (in Kókay 1979: 675).

Hungary’s War of Independence was crushed by the overwhelming military might of the combined Russian Tzarist and Habsburg forces, and the defeat was followed by cruel revenge and years of severe oppression on the part of the Austrian government. Hungary’s failure to liberate their country and the

ensuing execution, exile and sufferings of those involved in the heroic struggle evoked sympathy in some of those who had played a leading role in the abortive Young Ireland Insurrection of 1848. Michael Doherty in his *The Felon's Track* (1914), John Mitchel in his *Jail Journal* (1913) and William Smith O'Brien in his unpublished travel journals, often referred to as his "Diaries" made references to the Hungarian War of Independence (in Kabdebó 2001: 23-25). Mitchel's reflection upon the suppression of the Hungarian freedom fight during his stay in the Cape of Good Hope in 1850, expresses feelings of shock as well as a clear awareness of events going on in this Central-European "fellow/comrade-nation":

The Austrians are hanging and shooting general officers. Kossuth, the immortal governor, and Bem, the fine old general, are refugees in Turkey, other Hungarians and Poles flying to the US. Justice and right everywhere buried in blood (Mitchel 1913: 205).

Each of these former Young Irelanders appear to have discovered parallels between the Hungarian and the Irish cause of independence. This, however, was not without precedent. Thomas Osborne Davis (1814-45), the leading intellectual of the fledgeling Young Ireland Movement, who, because of his early death in 1845, could not be witness to the European revolutionary wave of 1848, had already compared the position of O'Connell's Ireland to that of other subordinate nations, including Hungary, in the early 1840s: "And Austria on Italy, the Roman eagle chained, Bohemia, Servia, Hungary, within her clutches gasp; And Ireland struggles gallantly in England's loosening gasp" (in Griffith 1914: 73). The very fact that this quotation comes from the volume *Thomas Davis*, edited by Arthur Griffith in 1914, gives credit to Thomas Kabdebó's (2001: 24) supposition that the Young Irelanders were among those inspiring and instructing Arthur Griffith's *The resurrection of Hungary* (1904), a national parallel of historic importance between Ireland and Hungary.

4. Hungarian and Irish in Davis's *Our National Language*

Throughout the 19th century non-sovereign nations and nationalities increasingly began to underscore their demand and right for political autonomy or separate statehood by emphasizing their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness. While loosening political dependence on the Habsburgs was the main constitutional objective, campaigning for cultural and linguistic

sovereignty was also of outstanding importance in the so called Hungarian Reform Age, a determining phase in the process of our national awakening preceding the 1848 Revolution. The success of the language movement was proved by the official recognition of Hungarian as a state language in 1844.

Whereas the revival of the Irish language became a central theme of Irish nationalist ideology at the turn of the 20th century, the recovery of the grossly endangered native tongue had not been an issue of real weight to either Daniel O'Connell or to most of the Young Irelanders in mid-19th century Ireland (Pintér 2008: 189-192). As an exception to his contemporaries, Thomas Davis expressed deep concern over the loss of language and proposed a programme for the revival of what he called "Ireland's national language." In some of his essays, Davis makes references to the status of Hungarian and uses the achievements of the Hungarian language movement as an example which could be used by Irish language revivalists. In his *Our National Language* Davis contrasts a country which through experiencing language change becomes a real colony with countries which despite the loss of political freedom have preserved their native vernacular. "To lose your native tongue, and learn that of an alien, is the worst badge of conquest – it is the chain on the soul" (Davis 1998: 175), says Davis with reference to Ireland's advanced Irish-English language-shift. Then he continues with regard to Hungary, where there is "sure hope" because the "speech of the alien is nearly expelled" (Davis 1998: 176). In the case of Hungary this observation held true of Latin, which, for long centuries, had functioned as Hungary's official *lingua franca*, as well as to German, the language of our Austrian oppressors.

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), the theoretician of *Sturm und Drang*, had a great impact on both his contemporaries and on the coming romantic generations. As John Kelly (1998: 5-7) observes, Thomas Davis fits into a pattern of cultural nationalism first articulated by the German philosophers Kant and Herder. Some of Herder's famous statements, like "Has a nation anything more precious than the language of its forefathers?" or "Even the smallest of nations [...] cherishes in and through its language the history, the poetry and songs about the great deeds of its forefathers" (in Edwards 1985: 24) find an echo in Davis's conviction that the language reinforces the distinct existence of a nation: "A people without a language of its own is only half a nation. A nation should guard its language more than its territories – 'tis a surer barrier, and more important frontier, than fortress or river" (Davis 1998: 174-75).

Herder's plebeian democracy also influenced some of the most outstanding Hungarian poets of the 19th century, János Arany and Sándor Petőfi, both contemporaries of Thomas Davis. A paradox provoking thought is that whereas Herder in his late-18th century work *Thoughts on the Philosophy of Human History* (1784-91) envisages the short-term extinction of some European nations such as Hungary, a few decades later Davis, who relied on the German philosopher as one of his major theoretical sources, sets Hungary's success in their linguistic revival as an example for the Irish.

Benedict Anderson in his *Imagined Communities* (1991) makes the observation that print language is what invents nationalism, and not a particular language *per se*. Following this line of thought Declan Kiberd (1996: 137) claims that "Irish, being largely part of an oral culture, was supplanted by English, the logical medium of newspapers, and of those tracts and literary texts in which Ireland would be invented and imagined." Thus, in Ireland English became the language of printed books, newspapers and modern journalism, which, on the other hand, were essential channels to disseminate political ideas and influence public opinion (Pintér 2008: 205). In fact, the importance of the printed version of a national language in shaping national consciousness was already realized by Thomas Davis, who in his *Our National Language* emphasises that the absence of at least bilingual, Irish-English newspapers excludes Ireland from the international and European context and makes the country a "backwater of England." Among countries set as examples for Ireland in this respect, Davis refers to Hungary as a multi-ethnic country where "Magyar, Slavonic and German" all appear in print despite the very fact that Hungarian is the vernacular language of the majority of the population (Davis 1998: 182).

Considering the remarkably different positions of Hungarian, which was the language of everyday communication for people born Hungarian – with the exception of those aristocrats who primarily lived in Vienna – and that of Irish, which by 1842 had approximately 2.700.000 monoglot speakers (in Pintér 2008: 169), that is less than half of the native population, with the upper and urban middle classes almost thoroughly Anglicized, Thomas Davis's parallel between the two "national languages" appears striking. The question arises whether this national parallel regarding Hungarian and Irish is valid or just influenced by ideas of romantic nationalism. Kabdebo (2001: 29) holds the following view on the theme of "national parallels":

Historical veracity of parallels [...] does not depend on the minutiae of chronological, social or institutional or even economic details but on the similarity of situations. Parallels are drawn by active agents of the historical process who discover similar agents acting in a similar historical process. In that sense parallels are always discovered against not dissimilar backgrounds, in situations fairly akin, such as: 'method of rule', dependency, 'empire building', 'colonizing' or 'being colonized.' But, perhaps, the most relevant is the correlation of contexts: emerging nationalism, nationalism in its assertive phase, [...] could bring two geographically distant countries into a valid parallel.

For Davis, whose mother tongue was English, Irish was the national language, because of its unique way to express Irish thought and imagination:

The language, which grows up with a people is [...] mingled inseparably with their history and their soil, fitted beyond any other language to express their prevalent thoughts in the most natural and efficient way (Davis 1998: 173).

Davis's ideas on the importance of linguistic awakening in the formation of a nation's character appear to be reinforced in the words of Laszlo Hadrovics, a Hungarian linguist living and working more than a century later:

Nations which have started from different stations of linguistic consciousness; the levels they have reached in political fragmentation or unity; the extent to which they have been influenced by alien impact; and the effort they have taken to shake off foreign influences show great diversity. However, each national movement shares the ambition of creating a literary language which meets all the requirements of European civilization, a standardised norm, which stands above national dialects. These national movements have at the same time a great importance in shaping national identity (in Nádor 2002: 58, my translation).

5. Conclusion

Thomas Davis was the first Irish linguistic ideologist, who beyond antiquarian interest, and preceding the nation-wide Irish-language movement of the late-19th-century, the Gaelic League, gave a programme for the revival of Irish as a language of everyday communication. In this respect he was not just contemporaneous with the Hungarian language movement but shared with Hungarians what Anthony Smith (1991: 11-13) says about the ethnic as opposed to the civic conception of a nation: genealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions play an

important role in the formation of a nation even if the ancient language and language revival has failed, as in the case of the Irish.

References

- Anderson, B. 1991. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso.
- Cserei, M. 1983 (1661-1711). *Erdély históriája*. Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó.
- Davis, Th. 1998 [1846]. 'Our National Language' in Davis, Th. *Literary and Historical Essays*. Poole-Washington D. C.: Woodstock Books. 173-182.
- Doheny, M. 1914. *The Felon's Track*. Dublin.
- Edwards, J. 1985. *Language, Society and Identity*. Oxford: Blackwell-Deutsch.
- Eötvös, J. 1902 (1840). 'Szegénység Irlandban' in Eötvös, J. *Tanulmányok*. Budapest: Révai Testvérek. 38-108.
- Fügedi, E. 1974. *Uram, királyom ... A XV. századi Magyarország hatalmasai*. Budapest: Gondolat.
- Glatz, F. (ed.) 2000. *A magyarok krónikája*. Budapest: Magyar Könyvklub. Officina Nova.
- Griffith, A. 1904. *The resurrection of Hungary: a parallel for Ireland*. Dublin: James Duffy; M.H. Gill & Son; Sealy, Bryers & Walker.
- Griffith, A. (ed.) 1914. *Thomas Davis*. Dublin.
- Hengermüller, L. 1913. *Hungary's first for national existence*. London.
- Kabdebó, Th. 2001. *Ireland and Hungary. A study in Parallels*. Dublin: Four Courts Press.
- Kelly, J. 1998. 'Introduction' in Davis, Th. *Literary and Historical Essays*. Poole-Washington D. C.: Woodstock Books. 1-34.
- Kiberd, D. 1996. *Inventing Ireland. The Literature of the Modern Nation*. London: Vintage.
- Kókay, Gy. (ed.) 1979. *A magyar sajtó története I. 1705-1848*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Mitchel, J. 1913 *Jail Journal*. Dublin.
- Nádor, O. 2002. *Nyelvpolitika. A magyar nyelv politikai státuszváltozásai és oktatása a kezdetektől napjainkig*. Budapest: BIP.
- Pintér, M. 2008. *Nyelv és politika Írország történetében*. Veszprém: Pannon Egyetemi Kiadó.
- Rosner, P.F. A. M. 1677. *Servitus Mariana Albpiciis Austriacis in Germaniae, Hungariae et Boemiae regne reparata*. Vienna.
- Smith, A. D. 1991. *National Identity*. London: Penguin.
- Szemere, B. 1983. (1840). *Utazás külföldön*. Budapest: Helikon Kiadó.

Notes on the author

Márta Pintér, Ph.D., is a lecturer at the Institute of English and American Studies, University of Pannonia in Veszprém, Hungary. Her doctoral research was on the history of language policy in Ireland, and she is author of a monography on this topic. Her essays, concerned with language policy and Irish Studies, have appeared in various Hungarian and international academic

publications. She teaches British History, Modern British Society and Irish Studies. She has developed course materials and published textbooks in these areas. At the moment she is doing research on Irish-Hungarian political and cultural relations in the 19th and early 20th century.

REMAKE AND ADAPTATION IN KENNETH BRANAGH'S FILM SLEUTH

RUXANDRA VIȘAN

University of Bucharest

***Abstract:** The present paper centres upon a discussion of Kenneth Branagh's 2007 remake of *Sleuth* in comparison to the 1972 adaptation of Anthony Shaffer's play. The paper discusses the main strategies which contribute to the creation of the remake, such as celebrity intertextuality or update. It also focuses on the way in which the remake replays the *mise-en-abîme* dimension of the play on the level of filmic strategies.*

***Keywords:** adaptation, déjà-vu, intertextuality, remake, update*

1. Introduction

Part of the cinema of allusion, the remake is born out of “a desire to link filmmaker and viewer with the cinema's past” (Kolker 1998:36) and often ends up broadening the base of the original film, “adding resonance to its narrative and a sense of play, and, through all of this, increasing narrative pleasure” (Kolker 1998:36). The present paper proposes a comparative analysis of a 1972 film and its remake, attempting to discuss the way in which the remake attempts to add extra depth or extra meaning, as an acknowledged comment on the original. At the same time, the aim of this paper is to analyse in more detail the mechanisms that help the 2007 movie function as an acknowledged remake of the 1972 film and in this manner give insight into the nature of an intriguing category such as the remake. “The remake is intriguing because it intensifies basic critical conflicts between the intertextuality of film meaning and its contextuality, between the uses of taxonomy in grouping films and the renewed look at the individual text, between artistic intention as a gesture of originality and artistic intention as a gesture of mediation” (Braudy 1998:331).

The films chosen for discussion are *Sleuth* (1972), a film adaptation of the Tony Award-winning play of the same title by British playwright Anthony Shaffer and the 2007 remake by British director Kenneth Branagh. The

screenplay of the 1972 film was adapted by Shaffer himself, directed by Joseph L. Mankiewicz and starred Laurence Olivier and Michael Caine. The 2007 remake is based on a screenplay by Harold Pinter and stars Michael Caine and Jude Law.

The 1972 film is an adaptation of a play. However, the second film does not function as yet another adaptation of the same play, but, as will be shown, as an updated remake and finally as a remake that “acknowledges” or playfully emphasises its remake quality and, as such, its dependence on a previous film.

2. Movie Synopsis

For a better understanding of the comparative analysis of the 1972 film and its 2007 remake, a movie synopsis has been offered, which emphasises, through the use of italics, the parts of the original film that do not appear in the remake. By examining the synopsis, one can perceive that, while there are significant areas of conformity between the two films, the remake functions as an abridged version of the original. The reduced length of the remake emphasises once again the close kinship between adaptation and remake. One of the devices lying at the basis of adaptation of literature to screen is compression, a strategy that has been employed here in the creation of a remake. The movie synopsis indicates the elements present in both productions, highlighting (in italics) those which are absent in the 2007 remake:

Milo Tindle, the owner of a chain of hair salons, is invited to the impressive home of Andrew Wyke, a well-known detective novelist with a passion for elaborate games. Wyke reveals that he is aware that Tindle has been having an affair with his estranged wife and seems delighted, *since this affair offers him as well the opportunity to start a new life with his own mistress, Teja*. Wyke proposes a scheme that will profit both men: Tindle is supposed to steal the wife’s jewels in order to fence the gems, allowing Wyke to collect the insurance money. The advantage of the scheme is, as Wyke explains, that Tindle will be able to support his new lover in the style to which she has become accustomed as Wyke’s wife. Tindle readily agrees to the scheme and breaks into the manor, only to find himself in a trap set by Wyke. After ridiculing Tindle for his Italian origins and *humble working class background*, Wyke gleefully announces to him that he has the legal right to shoot him as an intruder and actually fires his gun. The scene leads the viewer to believe that Wyke has indeed shot Tindle. When, sometime later, eccentric police inspector

Doppler arrives at Wyke's door, imperatively inquiring about Tindle's whereabouts, Wyke is forced to reveal that his meeting with Tindle was nothing but an elaborate game meant to humiliate his wife's lover. Wyke protests his innocence, explaining that the shots he fired at Tindle were just blanks and that, after recovering from shock, his wife's lover left his house very much alive. However, Inspector Doppler does not seem to believe Wyke's story and produces evidence incriminating Wyke, who panics and tries to get away. At the height of Wyke's panic, Doppler dramatically reveals that he is none other than Milo Tindle in disguise, who has adopted the costume only to pay Wyke back. Wyke shows himself impressed by Tindle's set-up and seems ready to acknowledge him as an equal, *however Tindle, who feels insulted by Wyke's former remarks about his background, requires further satisfaction. He calmly announces that he has murdered Wyke's lover, Teja and that he intends to pin the murder he has committed on Wyke. Incredulous at first, since this could be just another game, Wyke is finally persuaded that Tindle has framed him for murder. Now master of the game, Tindle announces to Wyke that, until the police's arrival, he has only thirteen minutes to dispose of the planted evidence that will incriminate him as a murderer and proceeds to give Wyke riddle-clues to the location of the hidden evidence. A distraught Wyke manages to locate all the clues in time only to be informed by a smug Tindle that everything has been just another game. Humiliated, Wyke decides to kill Tindle for real and, in spite of the fact that Tindle tells him that he did go to the police, informing them about the writer's strange games, he no longer believes the story. Wyke shoots Tindle in the torso, but soon realizes that the police has actually been called, as a police car reaches Wyke's front door and somebody begins to knock.*

The synopsis serves to emphasise the "syntactic/semantic" areas where the remake deviates from its original. If the two films share the first part: the trick Andrew Wyke plays on Milo Tindle and Tindle's subsequent revenge, namely the symmetric structure in which both men prove that they are worthy opponents in the game of wits they have started to play, *Sleuth 2007* is considerably trimmed down concerning the second part of the game. The first *Sleuth* is literally longer than the compressed remake, which is shorter by a full hour.

In terms of missing elements, the remake no longer concentrates on the part where Michael Caine's character stages yet another elaborate game, which places Olivier's character in the position of a "sleuth" desperately working against the clock in order to find and destroy the clues, previously planted by

Tindle, that might get him framed for murder. Instead, *Sleuth 2007* chooses to concentrate on the homoerotic game between Wyke and Tindle and the alternative power positions that the two men assume in the game. In spite of the differences, the two films end, in a similar manner, with Wyke killing Tindle, although, as will be shown, the ending of the remake is much more open to interpretation.

3. Remake taxonomies

In order to be able to discuss the relation between the original film and its remake, I will present a couple of useful taxonomies that have been attempted concerning remakes in general, while taking into account the difficulty characterising categorisation in general and also the tension, regarding remakes, between “sharable terms” (shareability) and “accurate designation” (accuracy) (Verevis 2006:11).

According to a classification such as that of Greenberg, *Sleuth 2007* qualifies as an “acknowledged, transformed” remake. Greenberg’s tripartite classification opposes the “acknowledged, close remake”, which involves a replication of the original film with little or no change of the narrative, to the “unacknowledged, disguised remake” and the “acknowledged, transformed remake”, which is based on significant transformations of characters, time and setting, but which nevertheless acknowledges the original to a greater or lesser extent (Greenberg 1991:164-171). According to Leitch’s taxonomy, which relies on the tripartite distinction readaptation/update/true remake (Leitch 1990:138-149), *Sleuth 2007* could be considered a “true remake”, a film which attempts to make the original relevant by means of updating it, and by no means an independent “readaptation” of Shaffer’s play, since it heavily relies on the previous cinematic adaptation.

While the taxonomies above underline key-traits of the remaking process, such as acknowledgment or the tension between remake and readaptation, their generality excludes significant strategies present in the 2007 remake. In this respect, a more detailed classification, such as that of Robert Eberwien, allows us to highlight these strategies. While necessarily qualifying as a true or acknowledged, transformed remake, *Sleuth 2007* functions at the same time as “a remake that reworks more explicitly the sexual relations in a film” (Eberwien 1998:30), since it focuses on the homoerotic relation between Wyke and Tindle, which was absent in the 1972 film. Simultaneously, *Sleuth*

2007 may also qualify as a “remake that updates the temporal setting of a film” (Eberwien 1998:29). The reworking from a sexual point of view of the relation between the two protagonists is undoubtedly connected with the update component, since it may be viewed as part of the process of making the text of the film relevant for contemporary target audiences.

4. Shaffer/Mankiewicz versus Branagh/Pinter

As Constantine Verevis underlines, remaking does not depend “only on prior knowledge of previous texts” (Verevis 2006:2) and should be seen as a “by-product” of broader discursive activity. As part of this broader discursive activity, many of the remakes address the cult status of the *auteurs*, star directors and make that a central point of their marketing strategies. *Sleuth 2007*’s functioning as a remake is thus dependent not only on its connection to the previous text, but also to its *auteur*. Here I use a broader notion of the term *auteur*, since we deal not only with star director Kenneth Branagh, but also with acclaimed writer Harold Pinter.

As previous scholars underline, in the case of contemporary remakes it is the “re-writing” dimension that is emphasised, since *auteur* remakes function due to the individual vision of a film maker. Terms such as re-imagining (Verevis 2006:10) or re-envisioning (Verevis 2006:10) have been used to describe such contemporary remakes. By examining some of the texts referring to *Sleuth 2007*, we notice that this remake is presented by employing keywords such as “re-working” (in order to use Branagh’s own words) or “different” or “fresh”. As shown by the excerpts below, the director and cast insist upon the fact that Pinter has made major alterations in his script, literally rewriting the original:

Sleuth with Pinter, Branagh, Law and Caine

“Then I read the screenplay and I couldn't put it down. What I thought was already an excellent marriage now had *Pinter's* darker, more blackly comic sensibility behind it. It still had this page-turning, what-will-happen-next quality from the original, *but the script seemed very confidently to be so different as to be altogether another film*. It shares a central part of the idea and the characters have the same names but so much was changed from the word go "visually and in terms of mood, in relation to the characters and then as one went on, in relation to the plot (Kenneth Branagh quoted in 2008 on <http://www.emanuellevy.com>)”.

Now Caine is returning to the Sleuth world, but in a very different form. (...) In Kenneth Branagh's new movie, a *fresh* take on the Tony Award winning play by

Anthony Shaffer, rather than a *reworking* of the previous film. ("Exclusive: First Look at *Sleuth*: Michael Caine and Jude Law Star", *Empire*. EMap Consumer Media. <http://www.empireonline.com>)

Pinter's rewriting in the 2007 remake can be seen as an instance of superimposition, which is a term Thomas Leitch uses in his classification of screen adaptations. According to Leitch, superimposition refers to the influence of well-known authors, actors or even literary sources on the cinematic material which is adapted or, in the case of the remake, re-worked. (Leitch 2007:103). In the same manner as the 1995 *Sense and Sensibility* functions as Emma Thompson's adaptation of the novel or as the 1963 *Cleopatra* revolves around the persona of Elizabeth Taylor, the 2007 film becomes a Pinter text.

5. Olivier/Caine versus Caine/Law

While *Sleuth 2007* "legitimizes" itself by emphasising the elements of novelty and by stating its independent status as "another film", the connection to the original *Sleuth* is reinforced by an instance of what Robert Stam refers to as "celebrity intertextuality" (seen as a sub-category in Genette's highly suggestive definition of intertextuality) in order to define "those situations in which the presence of a film or television star or celebrity evokes an earlier version of a film property" (Verevis 2006:20).

Celebrity intertextuality refers in this case to Michael Caine's presence in both films – as young Milo Tindle in the first *Sleuth* and in the remake, as the elderly writer Andrew Wyke, who in the original film was played by Sir Lawrence Olivier. The presence of an actor from the original cast is by no means a new strategy to be used in a remake. As underlined by previous scholars, other directors have made use of it, such as Martin Scorsese, who rotates Paul Newman from the younger to the older role in the *The Colour of Money*, which is a remake of *The Hustler* (Braudy 1998:332). Other examples include the presence of former Maverick star, James Garner as Mel Gibson's father in the big screen remake. As Leo Braudy notes, the generational change and the passage of authority through castings is a significant aspect of the process of rereading launched by the remake (Braudy 1998:332).

I will attempt to show how Caine's presence in both films, first as young challenger and finally as old lion, helps to construct the film as an acknowledged, transformed remake, which explicitly underlines its status as a remake. Let us not forget that the very existence of the remake depends on film

literacy and that Caine's presence in the second film clearly builds the general expectations of an audience and for an audience that is supposed to have seen or at least to have heard of the original. Moreover, the presence of Caine in the role of his former opponent is a significant emphasis on the role reversal strategy that lies at the core of Shaffer's play. Last but not least, from the point of view of film literacy, the presence of Caine and Law in a remake playfully reminds us of yet another remake, namely *Alfie*, where Law played Caine's former role. This is yet another instance of *mise-en-abîme*.

As many of the texts of presentation for *Sleuth* emphasise, Caine's presence is both a connection to the original (an instance of "déjà-vu") and an indication that this original has been updated or re-worked (the actor is the same, but the part of different). In the following sections, I will attempt to discuss the part played by what I consider to be two significant axes, update on the one hand and déjà-vu on the other. I look upon these two axes as essential elements that help *Sleuth 2007* to function as a remake.

6. *Sleuth* with no sleuth

It is interesting to note that, faithful to Shaffer's play, who was responsible himself for the adaptation, *Sleuth 1972* emerges as a crime film or as the filmic adaptation of a modern comedy thriller, in order to mention one of the labels given to Shaffer's play. Like the play it was based on, the original film emerges as comment on the British whodunit and, implicitly, as a broader comment on the British class system.

The first film presents Andrew Wyke, a representative and defender of an already antiquated social order and, as such, a writer of detective stories in the vein of Agatha Christie or Dorothy L. Sayers. The creator of a private detective called St. John Lord Merridew reminiscent of characters such as Lord Peter Wimsey, Wyke becomes the opponent of Milo Tindle, a self-made man coming from a family of Italian immigrants.

Like many crime narratives, the 1972 film, which is faithful to the play, is based on a confrontation and on typological archetypes, in spite of the continual reversal of roles (victor/victim) that take place as the plot progresses. Although the detective writer is outsmarted at his own game, Olivier's character ends up as the real murderer and young Caine as his victim. All this takes place in a clockwork, baroque setting, filled with contraptions that remind of the setting of British classical detective stories and filled with the

memorabilia of a pre-war Golden Age. In spite of making an open comment on the conventions of the detective subgenre, *Sleuth* 1972 still qualifies as a crime film, a detective film, where the two opponents take turns in outsmarting one another, playing sleuth, uncovering clues and setting traps.

Sleuth 2007 emerges as an updated version of the original and, under Pinter's pen, as a broader comment on the nature of power relations, on fiction or on the self. From this point of view, the remake manages to transcend the boundaries of the crime film. Shaffer's clockwork world is replaced by an absurd universe, supported by a type of dialogue which is known as the trademark of Pinter's work

Other significant elements contribute to the update. Olivier's baroque mansion, crammed with works of art and curiosities is updated to a high-tech, claustrophobic, voyeuristic building, which nevertheless preserves the same feeling of control, artificiality and oppressiveness that the former mansion conveyed. The Machine Age makes way here for the high-tech era, but with similar connotation of the loneliness and isolation of the author/self. Gone are the contraptions and mechanisms present in the 1972 film, and in the same manner gone is the "sleuth" or "detective" part of the story.

In a new script that justifies its connection to the title *Sleuth* only by professing that this is a remake of the 1972 original, the roles are no longer those of killer/ victim/ avenger. Interestingly, as the open ending shows, in Pinter's there seems to be no higher moral code in Pinter's re-worked universe, no punishment and as such no moral of the story.

In *Sleuth* 1972, in the grotesque end scene, which is an ironic rendering of "he who laughs last laughs best", Olivier's character is waiting for the police cars after having finally killed his young adversary, Milo Tindle. The 2007 remake ends with a scene that is very similar to the illusion created by the first fake shooting of Milo Tindle (Jude Law). The shot leaves the audience wondering if this new killing is fake as well and the imminent arrival is not that of police cars, but of Caine's wife's car. There seems to be no retribution for the killer here and the film ends with the arrival of the wife, the third member of the game, which suggests a new film or a new game about to begin.

The emphasis in the remake is not laid on the outcome, but on repetition. The open-ending suggests a never-ending cycle which brings us back to the very dimension of the déjà-vu that the remake relies upon. There is, after all, no better way to reinforce the feeling of open-endedness, than the comeback, in the character/actor game of illusions, of *Sleuth* star Michael

Caine. Caine's presence in the second film suggests that the death of a character is not a closed ending. At the same time, the open-ending emphasises once again the fact that *Sleuth 2007* is in itself a second film, a link in the open-ended chain of signifiers.

7. Double, déjà-vu and “intratextuality”

Caine's presence in the second film, in the role of his former co-star, emphasises the dimension of role-reversal, which was one of the premises of the first film. The first *Sleuth* was, in itself, a film based on the strategy of mise-en-abîme, built as a comment upon play-acting, duality and the game of illusions. While in the first film the role-reversal was emphasised by the presence of “spectres”, namely mirrors, photographs, dummies, the second film has even more key-scenes which place both Caine and Law in symmetrical positions, playing with the tension between opposition and identity. In a similar manner in which *Sleuth 1972* functioned as a metatextual comment on fiction in general, *Sleuth 2007* is also based on intratextuality, while broadening the metatextual comment present in the original film. Robert Stam's category, intratextuality, might be employed here, since it is used to describe the way in which a remake refers to the process of remaking through strategies of mirroring or mise-en-abîme structures (Stam in Verevis 2006:21). The fact that *Sleuth 2007* playfully acknowledges its status as a remake becomes very apparent if we compare two key-scenes in the film.

The 1972 film is famous for the scene where Tindle disguises himself as a police inspector in order to pay Wyke back for his earlier trick. Wyke stands accused of having murdered Tindle and he becomes terrified when the police inspector produces evidence incriminating him for a murder he did not actually commit. In the 1972 version, the revelation that the police inspector (Inspector Doppler, with obvious associations to the term “double”) is none other than Tindle in disguise comes as an unexpected revelation, as a clever trick meant to be anticipated only by the sharpest members of the audience. What is significant is that the 2007 remake does not attempt to make Tindle's impersonation of a police inspector a credible one. On the contrary, Law's extravagant acting and outré mannerisms together with the lingering close-ups, make the revelation of the real identity of the police inspector quite predicable and leave the impression that the disguise is part of an old game between the two protagonists.

Critics have made a predictably unfavourable comparison between the original and the remake, stating that the remade scene lacks the cleverness of the disguise present in the former film. However, a legitimate point to make is that Tindle's disguise as a policeman could after all be nothing but predictable, since the whole disguise is just a repetition of the original scene, a déjà-vu. In my opinion, Branagh constructs the scene, conspicuously, as something unsubtle, predictable, giving the impression of a game that has been played and re-played.

8. Conclusion

Sleuth 2007 emerges as an acknowledged, updated remake, heavily relying upon and consciously highlighting the mechanisms of intertextuality. Helped by Caine's presence as an instance of celebrity intertextuality, Branagh's remake of a Mankiewicz film emerges as a broad comment on the nature of cinema, fiction and finally identity. It is a Pinter re-working of a Shaffer play, which attempts to replicate, on the meta-level of the remake, the play-within-a-play motif that lay at the core of the original plot.

By placing the remake within the broader theory of adaptation, I conclude that *Sleuth 2007* functions as an adaptation of the first film, as an intertextual/intra-textual comment of the original, which was, in its turn, an adaptation.

References

- Braudy, L. 1998. "Rethinking Remakes" in *Play it again, Sam: retakes on remakes*. Horton, A. and S.Y. McDougal (eds.). Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Druxman, M. B. 1975. *Make It Again, Sam: A Survey of Movie Remakes*. Cranbury, NJ: A. S Barnes.
- Eberwein, R. 1998. "Remakes and Cultural Studies" in *Play it again, Sam: retakes on remakes*. Horton, A. and S.Y. McDougal (eds.). Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Genette, G. 1982. *Palimpsestes*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- Greenberg, H. R. 1991. "Raiders of the Lost Text: Remaking as Contested Homage in Always". in *Journal of Popular Film and Television*, 18/4, pp 164-71.
- Horton, A. and S.Y. McDougal (eds.). 1998. *Play it again, Sam: retakes on remakes*. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Kolker, R.P. 1998. "Algebraic Figures: Recalculating the Hitchcock Formula" in *Play it again, Sam: retakes on remakes*. Horton, A. and S.Y. McDougal (eds.). Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

- Leitch, T. M. 1990. "Twice-Told. The Rhetoric of the Remake". in *Literature/Film Quarterly*.18/3. pp 138-49.
- Leitch, T. M. 2007. *Film Adaptation and Its Discontents. From Gone with the Wind to The Passion of the Christ*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Stam Robert. 2000. *Film Theory. An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Verevis, C. 2006. *Film Remakes*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Notes on the author

Ruxandra Vişan's current research interests are: Historical Linguistics, Cultural Studies (British Cultural Studies - 18th century), Applied Linguistics, and, more recently, Film Studies. Her PhD centred upon Samuel Johnson's Dictionary 1755 and attempted to promote an interdisciplinary approach, emphasizing the connection between the dimensions of "language" and "culture" in the shaping of modern discourse.

**FROM SOCIAL DARWINISM TO PROGRESSIVISM:
EVOLUTIONARY THINKING IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT**

TED BAILEY

University of Miskolc

***Abstract:** This paper examines the influence of Darwin's ideas on American political thinking in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It is argued that, while evolution clearly played a major role in Social Darwinism, it also influenced the arguments of those who rejected Social Darwinist thinking, such as Lester Ward.*

***Key words:** Henry George, Lester Ward, Social Darwinism, Supreme Court decisions*

1. Introduction

Popular political debates in the United States often end up being framed in terms of the Constitution and the Founding Fathers. Be it the separation of church and state, gun control, or issues of race, the concept of original intent is invoked to ask what the framers of one of America's foundational documents, the Constitution, meant when they wrote it in the late eighteenth century. Indeed, one supposition almost seems to be that they had all the answers to the problems of the coming centuries. What is often misunderstood, however, is the influence of contemporary thinking on how any particular era interprets any document. A case in point is the influence of science in general, and Darwin in particular, on American thinking during the Gilded Age.

In this paper I will examine how Darwin's ideas influenced American political thinking in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I will look first at how Social Darwinism developed and then discuss how some of its opponents looked at the same phenomena and reached totally different conclusions. What is particularly interesting here is that both sides – Herbert Spencer and William Sumner, America's leading proponent of Social Darwinism, as well as opponents such as Lester Ward and Henry George – framed their arguments in terms of Darwin and the theory of evolution.

Reference to major Supreme Court cases will help demonstrate the impact of Darwinist thinking on political life.

2. Background

The stated intent of the Founding Fathers “to form a more perfect union” reveals – both in the implied comparison and the somewhat illogical phrasing – that these men were building upon past experience as they tried to form a framework for the future. Specifically, it was the events of the Revolutionary era, the experiences with the Articles of Confederation, and the legacy of English political thought that they were building upon in their attempt to create a system that could promote individual and communal welfare with a minimum of conflict between the two.

The legacy of conflict with the crown had taught them to view government and the unchecked use of power as a major source of tyranny. An aristocratic heritage, on the other hand, as well as an awareness of how a majority could easily impose on a minority, led them to be wary of pure democracy and the rule of the mob. The result was a tripartite system of government in which no one branch at the federal level could easily dominate the others.

From English political thought they brought with them the idea of society as a social compact and the notion that liberty is inextricably bound with the unimpeded exercise of property rights. Underlying these ideas is the concept of Natural Rights, the belief that the individual is not given rights but is born with them. The duty of the state was both to act as a referee between individuals exercising their property rights and to create the conditions necessary to freely exercise these rights while at the same time promoting the common good. The concept of property rights was even extended so far at the time as to sanction slavery; the idea of promoting the common good was carried in Massachusetts to the point where the state was made responsible for uplifting the morals of the individual. Ultimately, here as elsewhere, matters of conscience were left to the individual and the state was left to balance concerns in the material world between individual rights and the common good.

A central issue at the time was also reflected in the discarding of the Articles of Confederation, namely the balancing of power between the states and the central government. If power comes from the bottom up – as the Founding Fathers believed – then powers not specifically listed were retained

by the people and the lower parties, in this case the states. However, since this had proved ineffective in regulating interstate affairs, the supremacy clause was adopted into the new Constitution. At the level of the individual and the state, the Bill of Rights was enacted in order to prevent abuses by the government against the Natural Rights of individuals. The language was kept broad enough to allow the principles to be adapted to changing historical circumstances.

3. Social Darwinist Thinking

Inevitably, of course, society and the economy did change, and by the middle of the nineteenth century industrialization had swept through Britain and was emerging in the United States to replace the largely agrarian society that the framers of the Constitution had known. Fueled as industrialization was by technological developments and the scientific methodology that brought these about, it was no wonder that scientific principles found their way into philosophy and the newly emerging social sciences. From Britain came the doctrines of Social Darwinism, developed by Herbert Spencer as a comprehensive philosophy that applied theories and observations from biology and the natural world to the social world of man. Although he published his views on society a few years before Charles Darwin published *The Origin of Species* (1859), Spencer's philosophy borrowed from ideas about evolution already prominent in the world of natural science and profited from the later association with the biologist's theories. Darwin's name lent the weight of scientific theory and evolution to make Spencer's ideas appear to be inevitable, much as Spencer himself thought they were.

Spencer saw the individual's struggle for survival in society as analogous to the struggle of plants and animals to survive in nature. The strongest survived in both, and this was as it should be. The most capable thrived, while the plants, animals, and people least suited to their environment did not – all of which led to overall improvement in the species. The idea of progress – which was not a feature in the theories of Darwin, who held that not the best but the best suited to a particular environment survived, and thus saw no grand design or inherent overall betterment behind the process – was a central feature of Social Darwinism. Spencer believed that societies moved through stages: after going through a militant phase in which society organizes itself to survive in competition by forcing the individual to submit to the needs of the group, society then grows in size until it enters a more peaceful and

industrial phase. At that point society emerges into “a regime of contract rather than status” (Hofstadter 1992:42), where militancy is no longer required and human nature improves towards a general condition which would “solve all other problems” (Hofstadter 1992:43).

The key element propelling man and society with machine-like inevitability towards this goal was competition. Spencer viewed society simply as the arena or garden in which competition was held and considered any intervention in the contest not only needless but subversive of natural processes. The role of government, therefore, was simply to ensure that the “equal freedom” of each person should not be infringed upon in any way. The best method for promoting public good was to not give help in any form to anyone, and so his doctrines came out against a governmental role in education, public health, and enacting tariffs or trade regulations.

Although advocacy of such public policies may appear to be simply a smokescreen for greed to some, Spencer believed this to be the only way to achieve a better man and a better society. Intervention could only lead to the weaker party winning and this ultimately would be bad for society. Values such as altruism could only prevail if they won in a fair fight, and so to enforce philanthropy through taxation or governmental policy would not only give unfair help to the weaker members of society, it would also inhibit the development of giving for giving’s sake. If Natural Rights were to be realized – and Spencer firmly believed in the concept – then nature had to be given the right to produce them in the struggle for survival of the fittest.

One of the chief proponents of Social Darwinism in America, William Sumner, argued along the same lines in dismissing all attempts at government intervention in the economy. One could not, he believed, apply the same interpretations of society that the Founding Fathers had had to the situation of America in the latter half of the nineteenth century, for the contemporary society and economy were now an entirely different animal and had to be treated as such. The economy had evolved and changed society along with it; this process had entailed different forms of social control and organization – much more impersonal and inhumane ones, he admitted – but had also produced amazing wealth. Everyone profited from this development, and if a few profited much more than the rest, then they deserved it because this was a result of natural laws. Social and economic changes were part of a natural dynamic that had occurred precisely because the most talented were allowed to rise to the top, and interventions such as establishing an income tax would only

hinder these natural processes. Indeed, Sumner believed that great wealth in the hands of a few “is [not], as a rule, in the ordinary course of social affairs, put to a mischievous use. This cannot be shown beyond the slightest degree, if at all” (1919).

The same dispassionate scientific methodology that Sumner advocated for the newly developing field of sociology was to be applied in the field of politics. If one person were rich and the other poor, then this was simply nature’s way of separating the wheat from the chaff; sentimentality that led to intervention was not only bad policy, it was a useless undertaking. “[O]ur efforts are like those of a man trying to deflect a river, and these forces will have changed the whole problem before our interferences have time to make themselves felt” (1919).

That Social Darwinism as advocated by Spencer and Sumner was not a strict interpretation of Darwin’s theories is borne out by their attitude towards the transmission of acquired wealth from generation to generation. Allowing this to happen is actually more analogous to the Lamarckian idea that acquired traits can be passed on to succeeding generations than to Darwin’s concept of the most useful random genes being passed on. Andrew Carnegie, who himself believed in the inevitability of a few obtaining great wealth for the benefit of all and codified this belief as the Law of Accumulation of Wealth, came to a different conclusion regarding large inheritances. Carnegie generally approved of inheritance taxes, but felt that philanthropy was an even higher good. His ideas were generally in line with Spencer’s belief that giving improves the giver not the receiver, and the objects of Carnegie’s largess – libraries, universities, and other institutions of self-improvement – were an expression of Sumner’s belief in encouraging a meritocracy instead of a condition of material equality. Carnegie’s concern was with using wealth in order to improve society, and he believed that “[n]either the individual nor the race is improved by alms-giving” (1889).

Carnegie’s example demonstrates some of the attractions of Social Darwinism for nineteenth-century Americans. The concept of continual material progress may not have been completely Darwinian but it was – along with a belief in the power of self-improvement – completely in line with traditional American beliefs as well as America’s historical experience. Calvinism had already planted the idea of material reward as an expression of God’s grace, and now this idea appeared to be sanctioned as well by the new secular religion, science. Additionally, in this form it allowed Darwin and God

to be brought under one roof. All in all, Social Darwinism gave a comprehensive explanation for the development and present condition of American society and its economy, and did so with an analogy to nature that seemed to echo the language of Natural Rights used a century before during the founding of the nation.

It is no wonder then that a majority of Supreme Court judges could be found to interpret the Constitution in a Social Darwinian light. In *Lochner v. New York* (1905), for example, the Court interpreted the due process clause of the XIVth Amendment along the lines of Spencer's "equal freedom" and refused to intervene in a contract between employer and employee. Due process became synonymous with natural process, and just as Spencer rejected the idea of government dictating health policy or the terms under which a patient could buy medicine, the Court rejected New York's authority to limit the number of hours a baker could work.

Similarly, *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) extended Spencer's equal freedom to the realm of race. The Court rejected the notion that the government could legislate equality between the races as this could occur only under the "voluntary consent of individuals." As long as equality of opportunity existed – as the Court pretended it did – then it was no business of the government to intervene. The Court cemented the nineteenth-century notion of race – itself a derivation of Darwin's idea of species – under the guise of freedom of contract, thus allowing individuals to form contracts only with those they desired and denying that any common good was being served with racial mixing.

4. Reactions to Social Darwinism

But just as the Supreme Court decisions were not unanimous, neither was the entire country under the sway of Social Darwinism. Many looked at society and saw the same inequality, and they believed as well that society and the economy were evolving. Many agreed with Sumner that the American political system had developed into a plutocracy and believed as well that "[e]very one of us is a child of his age and cannot get out of it" (1919). But they disagreed about the direction this evolution was taking and they had different ideas about how people, and especially the government, should respond.

The primary disagreement centered on the role of evolution in man's social development. Though people such as Henry George agreed that "[b]etween the development of society and the development of species there is

a close analogy” (George 2005:1), they did not believe that society was purely the result of natural forces. Evolution had produced and developed the human intellect, and with this faculty man was capable of not only influencing the direction of social development but also of actually controlling it. William James used the examples of Bismarck and Napoleon to demonstrate that individuals could be at least as influential as any historical forces shaping the direction of national destinies. The human mind, they argued, puts man outside the natural forces that Spencer saw at work everywhere; to adopt a fatalistic attitude in the face of Spencer’s deterministic philosophy was not good policy. Ultimately man, not nature, controlled society.

In this vein, they viewed material inequality not as a natural state, as Carnegie claimed with his laws, but as a result of inefficient social organization. Critics such as Lester Ward argued that outdated forms of social thinking were “still taught in the higher institutions of learning” (1893:Ch.38), although economic conditions had completely changed. The Malthusian idea of scarcity as man’s economic reality had been replaced by technological developments with a new era of plenty. It was therefore man’s obligation to replace old notions of political economy with new systems of thinking that would allow for a more efficient production and distribution of the wealth humans were capable of creating. The doctrine of evolution applied as well to man’s thinking, and this was leading towards a social consciousness based upon solidarity rather than individualism.

Both Social Darwinists and those who opposed them saw competition as a fact of the world around them, but had differing notions about where this was all heading. The former saw competition as the key to progress that should not be interfered with, while the latter believed that it was leading to a change in social thinking that would render competition itself obsolete. If people were allowed to develop within the bounds of their own “equal freedoms,” Spencer believed, virtue would develop automatically and not have to be coerced from people. In the course of competition, the weaker, less productive individuals were simply winnowed out. Opponents such as Henry George, on the other hand, believed that this was not nor ever could be the case because competition itself simply bred selfishness, nothing more. What developed were “habits of greed” that the individual would abandon only at death (2005:68). The system would eventually produce such inequality that it could be overthrown only by a radical change in man’s social thinking. Edward Bellamy believed that when such a mystical state arrived it would take little argument to convince the entire

nation to think differently. After a short while, man's social thinking would be so drastically altered that people would be unable to comprehend how the old system could ever have existed.

Plutocracy, which all viewed as the reality of the late nineteenth century, was accordingly evaluated differently. Social Darwinists considered it natural that the wealthy, since their material success had proved them the ablest in this environment, should dominate the political system; Carnegie's concept of the duty of the rich to improve society expressed the Social Darwinist sense that all would turn out well. If the right to private property were ensured, noblesse oblige would be the safeguard against tyranny. To their opponents, such as Lester Ward, democracy was but an adaptation in man's social development that had evolved into plutocracy. The next stop for Ward was what he called sociocracy, where technocrats would control the economic machinery for the benefit of all. Edward Bellamy's vision, as he described it in *Looking Backward* (1887), foresaw a similar development he called Nationalism, which was much like a Marxian withering away of the state. In both systems – and in George Herron's Christian Socialism – group solidarity would emerge as the natural outcome of the tremendous growth in size and complexity of the economy and society. The fusion of the individual into group consciousness took on a spiritual aspect, for like Social Darwinists, these critics envisioned a synthesis of Darwin's evolutionary principles and God. As children of nineteenth-century America, they all felt compelled to fuse science and religion.

All this points towards differing interpretations of the emphasis to be placed on the language of the Constitution. For the Social Darwinists, it meant promoting a strict interpretation of individual rights as the road to achieving progress in public welfare. Just as it was to the Founding Fathers, liberty meant to them the free exercise of private property rights, and 'free' was to be interpreted along the lines of Spencer's equal freedom. For George and Bellamy, on the other hand, promoting the public good did not mean leaving everything to natural forces and doing nothing. On the contrary, it required an aggressive intervention on the government's part, since through the emergence of social solidarity the government would become the true expression of the will of the people. In the most radical assessment, the changes in the economy and social organization since the Revolution demanded a reinterpretation of how liberty was to be secured, namely through the abolishment of private property as it had been known before. Only through evolutionary change in the

social organization to meet the conditions created by the new economy could efficiency be realized and happiness freely pursued.

Bellamy's and George's visions were, of course, never realized; abolishing private property proved to be too radical a step for most Americans' sense of social consciousness. Instead, the mood of the country moved the government to take the opposite course: trusts were busted as America moved to restore competition as a key element in society. But the ideas espoused by those opposed to Spencer and his philosophy foreshadowed a shift in thinking about government's role in promoting the common good. This thinking paved the way for Progressivism, which resulted in such anti-Spencerian legislation as the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, the institution of the income tax that both bolstered the financial resources of the government and was a first small step in leveling wealth, and the direct election of the Senate as a step towards a popular democracy and away from plutocracy.

5. Conclusion

In its first hundred and twenty years the nation had seen tremendous changes. The economy had developed away from Jefferson's vision of yeomen farmers and, especially in the wake of the Civil War, had become an industrialized, urban nation. Its material wealth had increased greatly, though power and wealth were becoming ever more concentrated in the hands of a few. In the course of all this, however, the debates about the political life of the country remained in the context of the language used by the framers of the Constitution. Despite suggestions that the economy be nationalized in reaction to the tremendous growth and centralization that was occurring in economic life, the idea that private property was the key to securing the liberty of the individual remained firmly entrenched.

In the Supreme Court, the debate over balancing the rights of the individual with the desire to promote the common good swung back and forth, usually centered on the concepts of commerce and contract. In *Dartmouth v. Woodward* (1819) the Court asserted the inviolability of the contract against state interference, while a little bit later the Court affirmed the right of the state to promote the common good when it did not expressly violate a private contract in *Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge* (1837). With the emergence of Social Darwinism in the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, the Court increasingly interpreted the public good to be a by-product of the

individual's right to enter into contracts and refused to allow the state to dictate too many conditions to private contracts, such as in *Lochner v. New York* (1905).

The pendulum started swinging back, however, as the executive and legislative branches of government slowly began leaning to the view that there was a need for society to work collectively rather than individually for the public good. They never went so far as to nationalize large industries in the name of the common good, but they were obviously of an opinion similar to William James's. Man did have the natural right to assume some form of control over social organization, although the steps taken were never radical and – at least until the Depression of the 1930s – always slow and incremental.

It is noteworthy that the background to all these seemingly contradictory views in the late nineteenth century was no longer the strong influence of earlier English philosophers. Instead, all relied on the new religion of science as an authority to back them up. Be it Sumner's disinterested study of science in order to observe but not intervene, or Ward's professional technocrats who could produce greater efficiency, all sides called upon the scientific methodology to support their views. Natural laws of the animal world or of the human mind were all employed to justify Natural Rights.

References

- Bellamy, E. 2000 (1887). *Looking Backward*. Carlisle, MA: Applewood Books.
- Carnegie, A. 1889. "Wealth." *North American Review*, CCCXCI (June 1889), 653-64 [online]. Available: <http://history.furman.edu/~benenson/docs/carnegie.htm> [2010, August 30].
- Darwin, Ch.. 2003 (1859). *The Origin of Species*. New York: Signet Classics.
- George, H.. 2005 (1884). *Social Problems*. New York: Elibron Classics.
- Hofstadter, R. 1992. (1944) *Social Darwinism in American Thought*. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon Press.
- James, W.. 1880. "Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment." *Atlantic Monthly* (October 1880) [online]. Available: <http://www.des.emory.edu/mfp/jgreatmen.html> [2010, August 30].
- Spencer, H. 1995 (1851). *Social Statics*. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific.
- Sumner, W. 1919 (1894). "The Absurd Effort to Make over the World" in *War and Other Essays*. Albert Galloway Keller (ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press [online]. Available: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/345/166233> [2010, August 30].
- Ward, L 1893. *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*. Boston: Ginn & Co. [online]. Available: <http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3113/ward/psychicfactors.pdf> [2010, August 30].

Notes on the author

Ted Bailey has been teaching courses in writing and American literature and culture at the University of Miskolc, Hungary since 1994. He completed a PhD in American Studies at the University of Debrecen with a dissertation on nineteenth century African American literature.

**“HA–!HA! HA!”: THE POINT OF DOTS IN MARK TWAIN’S
*INNOCENTS ABROAD***

FRÉDÉRIC DUMAS

University of Grenoble

Abstract: This paper analyzes the iconic representation of a notebook in Twain’s *Innocents Abroad* to demonstrate that the *mise en abyme*, supposed to express the author’s experience of an echo, is actually part of a lowbrow aesthetic scheme that builds within the persona’s famed travelogues.

Keywords: art, irony, persona, travel, Twain

1. Introduction

The Innocents Abroad (1869), “the best-selling book of the century,” (Melton 2002: 1) is the first of Mark Twain’s five travel books. Its sales “reached 100,000 even before the second anniversary of its publication. [and] launched Mark Twain’s national career” (Obenzinger 1999: 164). All of Twain’s travelogues turned out to be great commercial successes and contributed to establishing their author at home and abroad as a leading travel writer: “half a million copies [of *The Innocents Abroad*] had been sold by Twain’s death in 1910” (Obenzinger 1999: 165); “*Roughing It* [1872] sold over 76,000 copies in its first two years and 96,000 by 1879, and *A Tramp Abroad* [1880] sold 62,000 in its first year” (Melton 2002: 1). His last two travel books were *Life on the Mississippi* (1883) and *Following the Equator* (1897).

2. *The Innocents Abroad*

The Innocents Abroad relates the adventures of the author’s peregrinations in Europe, the Holy Land and Egypt in 1867, as he had embarked on what is viewed as one of the very first transatlantic cruises. Still a journalist, his expenses were paid for by his major employer, the *Alta California*, which published the letters he sent from around the globe. The stories are told by his anti-intellectual persona, who must be distinguished from

the empirical author and will thus be referred to in the present study as “Twain.” He fits the definition by Genette (1996: 256) of the metadiegetic character, who is simultaneously the hero, the narrator and the author.

As a tourist, “Twain” visits the most picturesque places and the renowned landmarks of high art, providing his own comments. He particularly denounces the amateurs of classical painting who rave over the works they contemplate, though the latter have now become mere ruins. In Milan, crowds of such critics—or would be critics—shower praise over Da Vinci’s “Last Supper,” though “The colors are dimmed with age; the countenances are scaled and marred, and nearly all expression is gone from them; the hair is a dead blur upon the wall, and there is no life in the eyes. Only the attitudes are certain.” (Twain 2003:191-192) “Twain” mocks their seemingly spontaneous response to the encounter with the masterpiece, which they tend to express in pseudo-critical fashion:

They stand entranced before it with bated breath and parted lips, and when they speak, it is only in the catchy ejaculations of rapture:

“O, wonderful!”

“Such expression!”

“Such grace of attitude!”

[...]

“Such faultless drawing!”

“Such matchless coloring!”

[...]

“What delicacy of touch!”

“What sublimity of conception!” (192)

Despite his own original enthusiasm at the prospect of discovering the European masterpieces, “Twain”’s candid innocence precludes any pretense. His disappointment at the decrepit state of the painting leads him to reflect upon the nature of the invariably stereotyped attitude that surrounds it:


I only envy these people; I envy them their honest admiration, if it be honest—their delight, if they feel delight. I harbor no animosity toward any of them. But at the same time the thought will intrude itself upon me, How can they see what is not visible? (192)

To him, the damage of time prevents any contemporary assessment of the painting and only critical discourse keeps the memory of *The Last Supper*’s former glory: “After reading so much about it, I am satisfied that the Last

Supper was a very miracle of art once. But it was three hundred years ago.” (193)

Laudatory discourse contributes to compensating the failings of a work of art which has virtually disappeared, and threatens to obliterate the object of its analysis. It is a mythologizing enterprise in which “Twain” refuses to participate. His aesthetic assessment is mostly of a creative nature; lampooning the critics prompts him to demonstrate an alternative attitude to representing the experience of the confrontation with the ineffable.

The Last Supper is one of the masterpieces sought after by any self-respecting art lover on his Grand Tour. As such, “Twain”’s ruthless, sketchy description of the painting and ridiculing the travelers’ ecstatic response make up a provocative statement, which he carries further by relating his confrontation with another ineffable experience. Far from the cathedrals and palaces housing the productions of high art, “Twain” then visits a “tumble-down old rookery” (196), which boasts an exceptional echo. Seemingly following the example of the art admirers’ bent for substituting their preposterous ekphrasis for a totally faded work of art, “Twain” says he endeavored to represent a marvel that he could not see either, but that he was able to perceive by ear: the echo itself. His approach is minimalistic: he jotted down dots on a page of his notebook, each corresponding to a repetition of the original sound (“Ha!”) uttered by a local country girl (196). He states he managed fifty-two before giving up on his attempt, as the echo was still running its course. His evidence is the reproduction within his text of the page and its opposite:



(197)

The raw appearance of the sketch as well as the telegraphic, barely legible text that follows denote their immediacy, which proves to be revealingly problematic.


To start with, although it is difficult to get the precise number of dots on the left-hand page the number approximates the double. Even if "Twain" wished to represent one distinct dot for each "distinct repetition," the total number of clearly delineated specks reaches beyond the stated figure. The persona either lied about his count or the reproduction of his original production is blatantly unfaithful. Given "Twain"'s definite textual precision and the obvious approximation of the illustration, the point is that even vouched for by the author himself, a reproduction may not be faithful to the intended message.

As for the text on the opposite page (supposed to follow the chronology of "Twain"'s trip and to be found, if not immediately after the echo anecdote, at least to follow it in its vicinity), it is not found in *The Innocents Abroad* at all. We are thus given access to notes that were discarded by the author but that still appear in the body of his text. As such, this text originally forbidden to the reader remains, but in the form of a picture which has lost its ideological value and has become a mere illustration. What matters here is the discourse *on*, not *in* the text. —

In the end the echo transcribed by “Twain” makes up: ““Ha!———ha!———ha!———ha!———ha! Ha! H-a-a-a-a!”” (196), which is both a meaningless sound made up of a most basic vocal utterance and the conventional expression of laughter. The humorous outcome of this meta-artistic experiment is carried further on the opposite page of the notebook, which may be interpreted as the caption of the sketch. Its opening phrase, “Picture by Titian in the Cathedral” presents “Twain”’s ultra minimalist drawing as if it were the copy of a painting by the Italian master. This makes the persona the equivalent of the droves of talented contemporary painters who successfully replicate the masters. He included the picture of the former a few pages previously: “Wherever you find a Raphael, a Rubens, a Michelangelo, a Carracci, or a Da Vinci [...] you find artists copying them, and the copies are always the handsomest. Maybe the originals were handsome when they were new, but they are not now.” (191)

Adorned with what looks like two columns of an indefinite classical order (a full one on the right hand side and a faded one on the left), the left-hand page of his notebook actually looks like a classical, monumental work of architectural art rendered illegible by time. The page, then, may be said to give an iconic representation of the cathedral mentioned in the text. Similarly, the right-hand column happens to overlap the two pages of the notebook and becomes the middle, main supporting pillar of “Twain”’s iconic work, sustained by three columns, the left-hand and the right-hand ones having virtually disappeared but still being detectable to a careful eye. The notebook reproduces the appearance of the book that the reader is holding at the same time:

“Twain”’s *mise en abyme* is thus given the shape/appearance of a diptych, which bestows on it a most respected artistic aura reminiscent of that enjoyed by the old masterpieces displayed in the cathedrals and churches of Europe. At the same time it ridicules the pretention of the prevalent critical discourse that seeks to arouse admiration for a work bearing the same characteristics, regardless of any intrinsic aesthetic quality.



The text that follows (“subject forgotten *illegible*/of a date — Priest said History of it was very curious It was painted in the dark—”) further illustrates “Twain”’s thesis, for the painting that “it” refers to is either by Titian or by some unnamed artist. The impossibility of determining the identity of the author relativizes the importance of the issue, since not only have most old paintings virtually disappeared because of the ravages of time, but also because even their original quality may be doubted. One may indeed only guess at the probability of painting a masterpiece in the dark... Given the promising hilarious start, the rest of the text proves frustrating, for it leaves the anecdote unfinished and skips to an anticlimactic allusion to a train departure. Given the textual analogy between “Twain”’s sketch and the unknown classical work alluded to by the monk, the latter’s comment might as well apply to the dotted page, which is the very type of result that one might get by fumbling with a pencil at night in a sketchbook. Just as all critical comments on any faded painting are written in a predictable style and become interchangeable, a doodle drawn by an amateur looks like any darkened masterpiece. The subsequent trivial allusion to the train contrasts with the flowery discourse of art criticism, which ends up absorbing the actual object of its study. It also reveals “Twain” as a down-to-earth dilettante, for whom the classics are merely one ingredient among others in his tourist trip.

He appears as a consumer of artistic products aware of a damning lack of culture which prevents him from appreciating the fundamental qualities of a work whose subtleties will remain inaccessible. To him, such arcane knowledge is a privilege afforded to creators only:

I am willing to believe that the eye of the practiced artist can rest upon The Last Supper and renew a lustre where only a hint of it is left, supply a tint that has faded away, restore an expression that is gone [...] But *I* can not work this miracle. (193)


“Twain,” then, does not consider himself as an artist, which is hardly surprising considering his hasty sketch, but which also indirectly raises the question of his status as the author of the present text. His flash of modesty (true or false) makes up yet another ironic jibe against critics, whom he puts in the same position of ignorance.

3. Later travel books

The Innocents Abroad was followed by the publication of other travel books, notably *A Tramp Abroad*, which relates “Twain”’s going back to the same places some twelve years later, having seemingly undergone an aesthetic sea change: “When I wrote about the Old Masters before, I said the copies were better than the originals. That was a mistake of large dimensions. The Old Masters were still unpleasing to me, but they were truly divine contrasted with the copies.” (Twain 2002: 268) Having taken painting lessons in Heidelberg, the traveler in *A Tramp Abroad* now pretends to claim artistic standing and lapses into the jargon of the critics he so vehemently used to criticize. His apparently earnest ekphrasis of a painting of a hair trunk in Venice turns out to compose a parody of empty critical discourse, alternating the lofty and the ridiculous:

The Trunk is bound or bordered with leather all around where the lid joins the main body. Many critics consider this leather too cold in tone; but I consider this its highest merit, since it was evidently made so to emphasize by contrast the impassioned fervor of the hasp. The highlights in this part of the work are cleverly managed, the *motif* is admirably subordinated to the ground tints, and the *technique* is very fine. [...] The details are finely worked out; the repose proper to hair in a recumbent and inactive attitude is charmingly expressed. There is a feeling about this part of the work which lifts it to the highest altitudes of art; the sense of sordid realism vanishes away,—one recognizes that there is *soul* here. (272 -273)

Such jargon is ironically lent credence by the writer's pretentious claim to artistry, given his supposedly successful pictorial training in Heidelberg, and sustained by the proud display of his own creation:



The unmistakably amateurish quality of “Twain”'s sketch of the original Lion of St Mark makes it blatantly inadequate, whether as a mimetic representation or the expression of pictorial genius. His pseudo-artistic achievements definitely disqualify him both as a painter and as the enlightened critic he pretends to be. His praise of the Old Masters, then, proves totally ironic and confirms his original negative judgment.

It is easy to perceive the sarcasm at the persona's expense when his hubris prompts him to put his pathetic pictorial creations on a par with those of the virtuosos of the past. Yet the irony becomes all the more biting when he convincingly points to stylistic analogies in the course of a discussion with an artist in Venice:

“I have been in the Doge's Palace and I saw several acres of very bad drawing, very bad perspective, and very incorrect proportions. Paul Veronese's dogs do not resemble dogs; all the horses look like bladders on legs; one man had a *right* leg on the left side of his body; [...] there are three men in the foreground who are over thirty feet high, if one may judge by the size of a kneeling little boy in the centre of the foreground; and

according to the same scale, the Pope is 7 feet high and the Doge is a shriveled dwarf of 4 feet.”

The artist said, —

“Yes, the Old Masters often drew badly; they did not care much for truth and exactness in minor details.” (269)

The flaws readily recognized in the masters (“bad drawing, bad perspective, bad proportions” [269]) obviously apply to “Twain” himself, thereby proleptically depriving beholders/readers of stable aesthetic guidelines to condemn his own creations. His clever discourse comically transforms him into a latter-day Veronese or Da Vinci, whom he equals in their technical imperfections.

4. Conclusion

By equating his sketch of the echo in *The Innocents Abroad* with a generic masterpiece and ironically demonstrating his (non)artistic abilities in *A Tramp Abroad*, “Twain” does not merely provide an entertaining illustration of his thesis. The combination of his pathetic pictorial creations and his subversive candid remarks contributes to the construction of a lowbrow aesthetic scheme that aims at underlying the vanity of ascribing any scientific value to critical discourse. In its humorous way, it also obliquely underlines the social implications of any approach to art, for the comic effect created and denoted by the end result of the echo (“Ha!——ha!——ha!——ha!—ha!—ha! Ha! H-a-a-a-a-a!” [Twain 2003:196]) is utterly devoid of sophistication—and seemingly groundless. Whether in real life or in the artistic realm, the original sound, uttered by an unsophisticated yet lovely country girl, becomes an expression of pure vitality. Free from any witticism or artifice, it is pitted against the ludicrousness of the refined society that will worship any faded “Old Master,” backed by empty jargon.

“Twain”’s instinctive mistrust of high art and of a cultured approach to it is evocative of an American innocence which, while acknowledging the existence of history and its impact on the present, tends to minimize its contemporary relevance. Revealingly, it does so mostly by associating such claim to sophistication with a decaying Europe, typifying a relative denial of the past.

References

- Genette, G. 1996 (1972). *Figures III*. Paris: Seuil.
- Melton, J.A. 2002. *Mark Twain, Travel Books, and Tourism: The Tide of a Great Popular Movement*. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press.
- Obenzinger, H. 1999. *American Palestine: Melville, Twain, and the Holy Land Mania*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Twain, M. 2003 (1869). *The Innocents Abroad*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Twain, M. 2002 (1880). *A Tramp Abroad*. New York: Dover Publications.

Notes on the author

Frédéric Dumas is an assistant professor of American literature at Stendhal University-Grenoble, France. He has published a book on Nelson Algren (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001) and many articles on American literature in French, Serbian, Slovenian, Indian and American scholarly publications. He is currently working on a monograph on Mark Twain's aesthetics.

UNPRINCIPLED SENTIMENT AND THE NOVEL

ALEXANDRU DRAGOȘ IVANA

University of Bucharest

***Abstract:** The paper aims to demonstrate how the notion of *sensus communis* is ironically dismantled and seen as idiosyncratic through the lens of the refined sensibility advocated by Harley, the protagonist of Henry Mackenzie's novel, *The Man of Feeling* (1771), who mingles joy and grief when facing public action. His excessive charity and sympathy appear as an endeavour to reshape manners, a project which fails because Harley can only deplore the socio-economic practices of his time. Harley's sentimentalism is best expressed by tears. His benevolence runs parallel with the sceptical view of the world that prevents him from acting virtuously. Filtered through the history of ideas, sentimentalism is deemed in this paper as self-regarding emotion and 'outraged' morality.*

***Keywords:** sentimentalism, charity, sympathy, unprincipled sentiment, public action.*

1. Introduction

Associated with the term 'sentimentalism', a coinage of the eighteenth century, 'sensibility' referred primarily to reason, intellect and mental perception. Spawning a wide range of meanings and connotations in the late eighteenth century, such as 'shallow', 'excessive', 'insincere', the word 'sentimental' simply overlapped with 'sensibility' to such an extent that no clear distinction could be made between them. A community of feeling was thus possible by analogy with a community of sense (*sensus communis*). If *experience* is their common denominator, then we can understand why 'sensible' also acquired the meaning of physical perception. "Human experience, which is constantly contradicting theory, is the great test of truth", aphorises Samuel Johnson (Parker 2003:8), when the intellect endeavours to pursue true knowledge. If John Locke was highly suspicious of confident opinions formulated in the process of gaining true knowledge, the sentimentalists asserted the "cultural rightness" of the observer's private judgements (Motooka 1998:20). It was David Hume's Pyrrhonian scepticism that paved the way for the subsequent confusion of the two terms. According to

Hume, the mind cannot attain to certain knowledge whereas morality is deep-seated in sentiment, which gives birth to an empirically unverified moral truth. Furthermore, in his *A Treatise of Human Nature*, sentiment – synonymous with passion – turns into an “ideological strategy” (Mullan 2002:23) which imposes a model of social relations based on *sympathy* understood as an interaction of sentiments able to create social harmony in a disinterested manner. Hume summarises this point as follows:

Twill be easy to explain the passion of *pity*, from the preceding reasoning concerning *sympathy*. We have a lively idea of everything related to us. All human creatures are related to us by resemblance. Their persons, therefore, their *interests*, their *passions*, their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the *original one*; since a lively idea is easily converted into an *impression*. If this be true in general, it must be more so of affliction and sorrow. These have always a stronger and more lasting influence than any pleasure of enjoyment. (Hume 2003: 262; emphasis added)

Partially echoing the Latitudinarian divines’ precepts of benevolence, charity and good action, furthered by Shaftesbury under the form of innate moral good, Hume’s notion of sympathy elevates sentiment, if not passions, to the rank of virtue, by “complete and immediate communication” (Mullan, 2002:30). It has nothing to do with the Mandevillian self-interest, which produces public benefits. Viewed in this manner, sentimental benevolence is labelled in the second half of the century as “moral refinement” or “Delicacy”. *The Universal Magazine* writes in 1778 that

it must be allowed that Delicacy of Sentiment... adds greatly to the happiness of mankind, by diffusing an universal benevolence. It teaches men to feel for others as for themselves; it disposes us to rejoice with the happy, and by partaking to increase their pleasure...It excites a pleasing sensation in our own breast, which if its duration be considered, may be places among the highest gratifications of sense. (in Ellis 1996:5)

Easily and ambiguously defined, the sentimental praised as virtue brings into question the dilemma “enclosed self – outgoing sympathy” (Golden, 1966:viii). Based on weak thought, since, in Hume’s terms, reason is the slave of the passions, the sentimental self, able to produce this type of sympathy for the sake of social order, unalterable communication and harmony, becomes virtuous as long as it is only the projection of an ideal, as long as it remains just a feeling, not a *principle*, to paraphrase Henry Mackenzie. The harsh discrepancy between feeling and understanding, between private feeling, socio-

economic conventions and public action is part of the critique addressed by sentimental novels. Mackenzie's *The Man of Feeling* (1771) is a case in point.

2. The effect of unprincipled sentiment and excessive sympathy

Starting from the above-mentioned premises, the present paper – an improved version of an article entitled “‘The Sentimental Tribute of a Tear’: Self-Regarding Emotion, Wrong Sympathy, and Sentimental Irony in Henry Mackenzie’s *The Man of Feeling*”, published in *University of Bucharest Review*, vol. X, no. 2/2008, which resulted from my research conducted within the CNCSIS Project PN II IDEI, no. 1980 called *The Cultural Institution of Literature* – tries to demonstrate that Mackenzie’s novel, apart from being a paragon of sentimentalism *qua* genre, highlights the social and philosophical implications of the term ‘sentimental’ and critiques, at the same time, Hume’s coherent social model, whose applicability to “a world of feeling” is both risible and impossible. *The Man of Feeling* is, in John Mullan’s words, “the terminal formula of the sentimental novel because, with all its talk of virtue, it cannot reflect at all on the problems of conduct, the practices of any existing society” (Mullan 2002:118-9).

A member of the Edinburgh elite, lawyer by trade, editor and writer for two popular periodicals, *The Mirror* (1779-80) and *The Lounger* (1785-87), Henry Mackenzie was “both personally and professionally concerned with social morality” (Benedict 1994:117). Dividing society into sentimental (private feeling) and pragmatic individuals (public action), he desperately, and idealistically, wanted to see them as complementary. As a lawyer, therefore as a practical man in real life, he gave birth to an epitome of fictional sensitive virtue which found no correspondent in everyday life and society. In other words, “the practical man”, comments Mullan, “produced the impractical model” (Mullan 2002:118). Mullan also informs us that

the gap between the social identity that Mackenzie styled for himself and the exemplary Man of Feeling that he created was recorded retrospectively by Henry Cockburn, a fellow Edinburgh lawyer: ‘Strangers used to fancy that he must be a pensive sentimental Harley (i.e. the hero of the novel); whereas he was far better – a hard headed practical man, as full of worldly wisdom as most of his fictitious characters are devoid of it; and this without in the least impairing the affectionate softness of his heart. (D. Craig qtd. in Mullan 2002:118)

Despite his benevolent sentimentalism, Harley is an impractical model because his exceedingly refined sensibility is at loggerheads with civic and conventional background. He becomes a Quixote whose sentimental “weapon”, i.e. tears, has no real target in the physical world. Far from being didactic, the novel displays sympathy in the wrong way, if we follow Hume’s model, and pathetic emotion as self-regarding and, after all, as virtue replacing judgement. The focal point of Mackenzie’s novel is precisely the “distrust of sentimental literary values, especially the formula that feeling guarantees virtue” (Benedict, 1994:118). It deconstructs Hume’s idea of communicable passions in that Harley is seized with a storm of feelings that annihilate *logos*: “There were a thousand sentiments; - but they gushed so impetuously on his heart, that he could not utter a syllable” (Mackenzie 2001:78).

In her seminal book entitled *The Age of Reasons*, Wendy Motooka analyses the pejorative sense of ‘sentimentalism’, since the moral truth cannot be empirically accessible. If so, “the fact that it must go empirically unverified, allowing plausible alternatives to flourish and multiply”, gives rise to sentimentalism’s tendency “to ground itself by locating superior sensibility in particular communities” (Motooka 1998:21). Such a particular community (of sense) is depicted and produced in *The Man of Feeling* and set against the background of a sentimental individual who claims that this community is characterised by moral uniformity. In this respect, the passions lead to “fundamental sociability found in every encounter with others” (Mullan 2002:29). The refined sensibility advocated by Harley mingles, in the words of Hume, joy and grief when facing public action. His sympathy appears as an endeavour to reshape manners, a project which fails because Harley can only deplore the socio-economic customs of his time. His benevolence runs parallel with the sceptical view of society and the world which prevents him from acting virtuously. Hence, the idea of sentimental irony translated by pathetic tears. Harley’s self remains secluded and veiled by *unprincipled* emotions which trigger the physiological act of crying because the hero “confuses self-regard with the regard for and of nature” (Benedict 1994:120). It is in this way that tears exacted by a spectacle of virtue in distress was “an acknowledgement at once of man’s inherent goodness and of the impossibility of his ever being able to demonstrate his goodness effectively” (Brissenden 1974:29). Harley’s “inherent goodness” does not lead to public actions, as it should do, but remains only a sentimental discursive practice that makes him sensible in the proper sense of the word: since reason cannot give any boost to motivation, according

to Hume, it can at least capture, empirically again, the way of the world. Reason is practically obliterated yet discursively useful. On the other hand, the “ambiguities of sentimental irony” (Benedict 1994:118) illustrated by Mackenzie’s novel can be clarified if we refer to passions as passive and non-stimulating in Harley’s case, for moral judgments, which are the product of feeling rather than judgement, are supposed to guide man’s action in order to achieve his potentiality and “telos”, as Alasdair MacIntyre (1984:52) argues. Here is a reasonable Harley, “a child in the drama of the world” (Mackenzie, 2001:14) who moans the corrupted, hypocritical and Mandevillian world he lives in:

The immense riches acquired by individuals have erected a standard of ambition, *destructive of private morals*, and of public virtue [...] The frivolous and the interested (might a satirist say) are the characteristic features of the age; they are visible even in the essays of our philosophers [...] And the *manly tone of reason* is exchanged for perpetual efforts at sneer and ridicule. This I hold to be an alarming crisis in the corruption of a state; when not only is virtue declined, and vice prevailing, but when the praises of virtue are forgotten, and the infamy of vice unfelt. (Mackenzie, 2001:62; emphasis added)

This quotation raises two major ambiguities related to ideology and gender, both triggered by sentimentalism as thinking through feeling. It speaks volumes about the sensibility of manhood, as depicted in novels written between 1760 and 1770. On the one hand, the “destruction of private morals, and of public virtue” actually filtered by Mackenzie through Mandeville’s private vices and public benefits in order to justify the allegedly meritocratic and commercial society of the time alludes to the impossibility of sympathy to manifest itself in “a state” or in society. These bad attributes are not endemic, but expanded all throughout the world, which rejects the idea of “wrong sympathy” viewed as “the spirit of faction” leading to opposing or warring groups/societies adopting “partisan companies” (Mullan 2002:27). This is a “feeling” experienced by the whole world which is inimical to Harley’s type of sympathy, but which

gives it scope and reason for its most grandiloquent gestures [...] The world is not society; indeed, with respect to the attempts by philosophers and essayists in the eighteenth century to describe social relations, it is imagined as non-‘society’. ‘The World, I know, is selfish and looks for Virtues by which something may be gain’d to itself’, wrote Mackenzie in a letter to Elisabeth Rose in 1771. The formula of his

novels can be seen as one by which the 'World' is distanced from any association with the actual society in which he lived and advanced himself. (Mullan 2002:122)

On the other hand, the manly tone of reason is softened in such a piece of writing. Sentimental fiction belongs to middle-class female readers who have a passionate heart, so the cliché goes. However, as Stephen Bending and Stephen Bygrave claim in the Introduction to *The Man of Feeling* (2001:xiii), "the sentimental novel addressed the question of masculine representation in an age in which the heroic was gone". Harley's effeminate self may stand for another variant of sentimental irony and wrong sympathy:

In culture at large, to 'civilize' is also to 'feminize', and while this was on the one hand to be welcomed, on the other it ran the risk of leaving those males who constituted civilization effeminate and weak. So there is a paradox, in that while empire relies upon a traditional heroic masculinity, what it produces may be a feminized masculinity no longer capable of sustaining that empire". (Bending and Bygrave 2001:xiii).

For instance, the Ghost, one of the two narrators of Harley's story, mourns the sharp difference between the past "roar of mirth" (Mackenzie 2001:8) illustrated by Ben Silton, the baronet of Silton Hall who embodies a glorious, uncorrupted England, and the effeminate present in which the baronet's place is "occupied "by my young lady's favourite lap-dog covered with cambric handkerchief" and in which Harley was a species of "bashful animals" (Mackenzie 2001:8). Despite that, his secluded self is not autistic because his suffering needs an audience. If there is a private world of feeling, "the sensibility which for Harley is a touchstone of authenticity, that sensibility cannot be wholly divorced from the social world in which it is experienced" (Bending and Bygrave 2001:xviii).

The novel is actually "a bunch of papers lacking art, but having something of nature" (Mackenzie 2001:4-5). The Ghost, "an oddish man", informs us that Harley's "heart, uncorrupted by its ways, was ever warm in the cause of virtue and his friends" (Mackenzie 2001:4). Going to London to claim his inheritance, he meets several social types, including a beggar, a cardsharp and a misanthropist, and rescues a starving prostitute to her agonizing father. He also visits Bedlam, a madhouse full of patients seized with imaginative excess. He is a sentimental *picaro* looking for sentimental adventures. Viewed from this perspective, the novel – apart from presenting sentimentalism as a "project for the depiction of virtue" (Mullan 2002:122) – addresses an audience

familiar with successive frames, fragmentariness, the discovered manuscript or the trope of physiognomy.

Declaring that “in short, man is an animal equally selfish and vain” (Mackenzie 2001:32), the misanthropist underlines two facets of his state of mind: on the one hand, affliction, since he rejects the corrupted world and, on the other, dissatisfaction to which he wants to put an end. If misanthropy can be/is a mode of perception, “an alter ego of feeling” (Mullan 2002:121), then the novel’s aim is to point out that sensibility is unattainable because it is unworldly compared to misanthropy. To be sensible means to sympathise without any selfish advantage, according to Hume. Paradoxically, the novel creates an ambiguity translated as superior sensibility/refined sentiment and as inapplicability of these capacities. Harley indulges himself into what I call *autonomous hedonism*, being totally ignorant of the socio-economic context in which he is steeped. Harley’s reforming policy is promoted as self-regard, wrongly understood as sympathy for “he sees the world as himself and loves it accordingly” (Benedict 1994:122). For example, his skill in physiognomy leads him to think that an elderly gentleman is virtuous and benevolent simply because he gives alms to an obtrusive beggar. However, his aunt’s words uttered when he was a child, “all’s not gold that glisters” (Mackenzie 2001:34) echo in his mind when he learns that at an inn the stranger fleeces him at cards. In superficially reading society, Harley “exemplifies the naiveté and solipsism of sentimentalism” (Benedict 1994:123), which mistakes self-regard for sympathy. Hesitating to reward a parasitic, deceitful fortune-teller who, instead of telling his own misfortunes, began to prophesy happiness to others, “virtue held back his arm: – but a milder from a younger sister of virtue’s, not so severe as virtue, nor so serious as pity, smiled upon him: His fingers lost their compression” (Mackenzie 2001:18). Harley’s sentimental benevolence defeats virtue and turns itself into physical weakness, since he ignores the sad but real truth the fortune-teller tells: “every one is anxious to hear what they wish to believe” (Mackenzie 2001:18).

Coming back home without any inheritance and in love with Miss Walton, whose “beneficence was unbounded” and whose ‘humanity was a feeling, not a principle (Mackenzie 2001:13), Harley dies of moral and social disgust, fever and frustrated love. Unable to reveal his love for Miss Walton, he dies because he cannot “socialise the feelings of benevolence” (Benedict 1994:125) as she does. Mackenzie’s character’s faulty political agenda underlines the social and moral consequences of “unprincipled sentiment”

(Benedict 1994:125). His attempt to reform the morals and manners of a state “undergoing an alarming crisis” (Mackenzie, 2001:62) triggered by general corruption is a failure because Harley cannot associate *principled* feeling with social engagement.

3. Conclusion

Harley fails to be what Adam Smith has termed as “impartial spectator”, defined as “that perfect harmony and correspondence of sentiments that constitutes *approbation*” (Smith 1982: 44; emphasis added). Rather than becoming a self-commanded man, he remains a passive agent unable to *interrogate* his passions by considering the figure of the spectator understood as the surrounding world. Harley’s failed project of understanding human nature proves once again Hume’s ineffective sociability based on disinterested feeling and alludes to Smith’s “impartial spectator” that ought to turn the sentimental hero into a *principled* and *controlled* individual entitled to reconcile feeling and understanding, a dichotomy that has been severely critiqued by sentimental literature.

References

- Benedict, B. M. 1994. *Framing Feeling. Sentiment and Style in English Prose Fiction 1745-1800*. New York: AMS Press.
- Bending, S. and S. Bygrave. 2001. Introduction to Henry Mackenzie, *The Man of Feeling*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brissenden, R. F. 1974. *Virtue in Distress. Studies in the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade*. London & Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Ellis, M. 1996. *The Politics of Sensibility. Race, Gender and Commerce in the Sentimental Novel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Golden, M. 1966. *Fielding’s Moral Psychology*. The University of Massachusetts Press.
- Hume, D. 2003 (1740). *A Treatise of Nature*. Mineola, New York: Dover Philosophical Classics.
- MacIntyre, A. 1984. *After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Mackenzie, H. 2001 (1771). *The Man of Feeling*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Motooka, W. 1998. *The Age of Reasons*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Mullan, J. 2002. *Sentiment and Sociability. The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Parker, F. 2003. *Scepticism and Literature. An Essay on Pope, Hume, Sterne, and Johnson*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, A. 1982 (1759). *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Notes on the author

Alexandru Dragoş Ivana is a junior lecturer in the English Department of the University of Bucharest. His main research interests include Enlightenment literature, cultural and literary theory, comparative literature, history of ideas and city studies. He is now completing his PhD dissertation on the reception of *Don Quixote* in eighteenth-century English literature. Ivana has published extensively in reputed Romanian cultural magazines and participated in many national and international conferences. Currently, he is treasurer of ASSOR (Romanian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies) and a founding member of the Centre of Excellence for the Study of Cultural Identity accredited by the University of Bucharest. In January 2006, he obtained a Training Certificate issued by the Directorate General for Interpretation with the European Commission.

VISIONS OF ITALY IN MARY SHELLEY'S SHORT STORIES

ELISABETTA MARINO

University of Rome "Tor Vergata"

Abstract: Mary Shelley arrived in Italy in 1818 and left her beloved "foster country" in 1823. The Italian landscape, its past and present history, its customs, traditions exercised a powerful impact on the writer's imagination, leading to a copious literary production. This paper aims at analyzing Mary Shelley's Italian short stories.

Keywords: Italian Risorgimento, Italy, Mary Shelley, short stories, tyranny,

1. Introduction: Mary Shelley and Italy

Mary Shelley's interest in Italy and in the Italian struggle for freedom and independence dates back to as early as October 1814, when she read in translation the autobiography of the anti-tyrannical dramatist Vittorio Alfieri (Feldman and Scott-Kilvert eds. 1995 [1987]:37), and began to cherish the idea of learning Italian, as she wrote in a letter to Thomas Jefferson Hogg on January 24th 1815, prompting him to act as her teacher (Feldman and Scott-Kilvert eds. 1995 [1987]:57n). Her prolonged residence in Italy, in the time span between 1818 and 1823, followed by her "rambles" from 1840 to 1843 (recorded in *Rambles in Germany and Italy*, published in 1844), further deepened her passion for that country, as well as her involvement in its political turmoil. Mary Shelley became proficient in the language, knowledgeable in Italian culture and literature (including the output of her contemporaries, such as Foscolo and Manzoni); she turned into an expert in previously unbeaten tracks, which led her to Vico Pisano, Spoleto, Terni, Capo Miseno and other unusual and spectacular stops in her singular "Grand Tour". Moreover, similar to Lord Byron, she grew quite familiar with the Carbonarist movement and its insurrections in 1820-21, which, as Nora Crook (2001:76) pointed out, are actually hinted at in *Valperga* (1824), her novel on the historical figure of Castruccio Castracani.

Mary Shelley's admiration for Italy and her support for the Italian patriots can be easily detected in works such as *The Last Man* (1826), a novel

whose final scenes focus on “the ornament of the world, matchless Rome” (Shelley 1994 [1826]:468), and *Rambles in Germany and Italy*, a travelogue in which Mary Shelley launched a heartfelt appeal to her countrymen “to regard with greater attention, and to sympathise in the struggles of a country, the most illustrious and the most unfortunate in the world” (Shelley 1844:xiv). On the other hand, despite the Italian setting of ten out of the twenty-three short stories she wrote between 1819 and 1835 (i.e. “A Tale of the Passions”, “Recollections of Italy”, “The Bride of Modern Italy”, “The Sisters of Albano”, “Ferdinando Eboli: a Tale”, “Transformation”, “The Brother and Sister: an Italian Story”, “The Trial of Love”, “The Heir of Mondolfo”, “Valerius: the Reanimated Roman”), the real significance of Italy in Mary Shelley’s tales has been frequently overlooked by critics. Charles E. Robinson (1976:xv), who first collected and edited the entire corpus in his 1976 volume, *Mary Shelley: Collected Tales and Stories*, pointed out that the author essentially aimed at removing “her characters from the dull and sometimes painful realities of contemporary English life” and, for this reason, she had decided to set her “tales of passionate love and hate” mainly in “idealized places” and distant times, ranging from medieval Italy to Sixteenth-century France. Since her stories were published in prominent and remunerative journals such as *The Keepsake* and *London Magazine*, scholar Maria Schoina (2009:63) connected Mary Shelley’s periodical writing to the “extreme topicality of ‘Italy’” in those days, asserting that “Mary Shelley utilized her ‘adoptive land’ as a resource for literary topics in order to support herself financially”, thus exploiting the “symbolic text of Italy” like many other authors did.

This paper sets out to demonstrate that the visions of Italy in Mary Shelley’s short stories are not to be perceived as mere *digressions* in her literary discourse, tailored to please the taste of a demanding audience, eager to read about a fashionable or romanticized land. Conversely, the tales are perfectly aligned with the rest of the writer’s production concerning Italy, and therefore feature the same, above-mentioned characteristics, despite the reveries about the glorious weather and the picturesque landscapes the writer seems to frequently indulge in. After setting the ground for the analysis through “Recollections of Italy”, a story that well portrays Mary Shelley’s attitude towards Italy and the Italians, this paper will show how the writer’s reflections on the current political situation are dealt with in her short-story narratives.

2. "Recollections of Italy"

In "Recollections of Italy" a dull and confrontational Londoner engages in an argument with a fellow citizen, Edmund Malville, over the country the latter loves to such an extent that he would even like to be buried there: Italy. While the Londoner expresses his deep disappointment at "the bad taste of the gardens [...] the suffocating scirocco; the dusty roads" (Robinson ed. 1976:25), Malville cannot refrain from praising the charms of Venice, Naples, Rome (just to name a few of the sites he mentions), and the "courteous and civilized" (Robinson ed. 1976:28) manners of their inhabitants. What is noteworthy in the story is Malville/Mary's challenging description of the English in Italy. Far from flattering the readers of the *London Magazine*, where the story was first published in 1824, the writer seems to ridicule the foreign travellers in order to urge her audience to reconsider their often superficial and biased attitude towards the country:

"Shall I tell you", continued Malville, with a smile, "how you passed your time in Italy? You traversed the country in your travelling chariot, cursing the postillions and the bad inns. You arrived at a town and went to the best hotel, at which you found many of your countrymen, mere acquaintances in England, but hailed as bosom friends in that strange land. [...] You dined; you went to a conversazione, where you were neither understood nor could understand [...] you found yourself in Paradise at the drawing-room of the English ambassador, and fancied yourself in Grosvenor-Square. (Robinson ed. 1976:27)

The English seem to travel just with their bodies, whereas their minds are trapped in their mother-country. Mary Shelley would later expand on this issue in a review article entitled "The English in Italy" (published in the *Westminster Review*, in 1826), which promotes the picture of the "Anglo-Italian", who understands the foreign language, appreciates the "native talent and simple manners" of the Italians, and is not affected by the widespread disease displayed by many English travellers: the "stay-at-home-iveness" (Bennett and Robinson eds. 1990:343). It is not by chance that Lord Byron is acknowledged by the writer as the prototype of this new figure: his active engagement in the Italian cause should not pass unnoticed, as well as his plea to Europe, in the fourth Canto of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, to undertake actions for a brighter future of Italy: "Mother of Arts! [...] Parent of our religion! [...] Europe, repentant of her parricide, / shall yet redeem thee" (*CHP*, IV, xlvii).

3. The Italian short stories

Mary Shelley's interest in medieval Italy – as in “The Heir of Mondolfo” (mid-1820s), “A Tale of the Passions” (1823), and “The Brother and Sister” (1833) – might be connected with her reading of Sismondi's volume, *History of the Italian Republics in the Middle Ages*, published in 1818. As Nora Crook (2001:75) pointed out, she “assimilated [Sismondi's] presentation of the medieval Italian city states as forerunners of modern republics, a destiny projected into a future united nation”. Mary Shelley was possibly also influenced by her acquaintance with Alessandro Manzoni, who released the first version of his historical novel *I Promessi Sposi* (The Betrothed) in 1827, featuring a story set in the past (in Seventeenth century Lombardy during the oppressive Spanish rule), which actually concealed Manzoni's antagonism to the present Austrian domination in Northern Italy. It should not pass unnoticed that Mary submitted a proposal for the translation of *I Promessi Sposi* into English to John Murray (a well-known publisher). As it is possible to read in a letter addressed to Murray himself (August 20th 1828), the proposal was not accepted: “I was sorry to hear from Mr. Marshall that you decided against the Promessi Sposi” (Jones ed. 1944: 5). Far from being an “idealized time”, therefore, Mary Shelley's Italian Middle Ages appear to be a complex scenario, where hostility, alliances, betrayals and fights between factions are daily staged. Notwithstanding the seemingly romantic title, in “A Tale of the Passions”, for example, the rivalry between Guelphs and Ghibellines is the background for the death of a beautiful and bold heroine, Despina, who sacrifices her life to support the Ghibelline cause and Corradino, against Charles d'Anjou, “King of Naples, the head of the Guelphs in Italy, and then *Vicare* of their republic” (Robinson ed. 1976:5). Allusions to the Italian situation in Mary Shelley's times may be noticed in Despina's anachronistic mention of the “united voice of Italy” (Robinson ed.1976:12), or in her long speech aimed at persuading her enemy to join forces against the French oppressor:

Let him return to Provence, and reign with paltry despotism over the luxurious and servile French; the free-born Italians require another Lord. They are not fit to bow to one whose palace is the change-house of money-lenders, whose generals are usurers, whose courtiers are milliners or monks [...] their king, like them, should be clothed in the armour of valour and simplicity. (Robinson ed. 1976:14)

The Italians' resistance against a tyrannical political power is once again described in "The Sisters of Albano" (1828), a tale probably set during the Napoleonic Wars, according to critic Arnold Schmidt (2001:25-32). In this story, Anina, a young peasant, is taken prisoner while she tries to bring provisions to her lover, a revolutionary besieged, together with other rebels, in his hiding place by the foreign troops, and therefore doomed to starve. What Mary Shelley seems to highlight is the cruelty of the invaders, ready to kill even a child if rules were infringed; in the words of the "cold-hearted" soldier, "[Anina] ought not to disobey orders; mine are so strict, that were she but nine years old, she dies" (Robinson ed.1976:59).

The writer's disdain towards the oppressor is certainly the source of inspiration for "Valerious, the Reanimated Roman" (1819), an unfinished story that, according to Miranda Seymour (2000:229), was prompted by the Austrian Emperor's visit to Rome for the Holy Week celebrations in 1819, while, in Charles Robinson's opinion, the tale can be merely regarded as a good example of the writer's use of "a fantastic element to idealize her narratives even further" (Robinson ed.1976:xv). In a letter to her friend Mrs. Gisborne, on April 9th, Mary describes Emperor Frances II's arrogance, while he wanders about the Eternal City preceded by an officer, "who rudely pushes the people back with a drawn sword"; her "English blood", she adds, "would, I am afraid boil over such insolence" (Feldman and Scott-Kilvert eds. 1995 [1987]:256n). In Mary Shelley's story, Valerious, a Roman consul strangely revived in contemporary Rome, grieves over "fallen Italy" (Robinson ed.1976:333), and the decline and degradation of his native city. After exploring the ruins of what once was the Empress of the world, he decides to take his abode in the Coliseum where, eventually, he hopes to die, in the vain attempt to pour forth his "last awakening call to Romans and to Liberty" (Robinson ed.1976:336). His utmost dejection is only soothed by a British lady, who frequently visits him together with her young son, two characters in which Mary Shelley and little Will-mouse might be recognized. The writer's passionate love for the city and its past, her hope for a future resurrection from its ashes, her admiration for ancient heroes, whose values are still alive and can be transfused into the enslaved Italians' exhausted blood, resonate in the character's comforting words to Valerious:

I worship the spirit of ancient Rome and of those noble heroes, who delivered their country from barbarians [...] Rome is fallen, but she is still venerated [...] When a stranger resides within their bounds, he feels as if he inhabited a sacred temple – sacred although defiled. [...] It seems to me that, if I were overtaken by the greatest

misfortunes, I should be half consoled by the recollection of having dwelt in Rome. (Robinson ed. 1976:340-342)

One may wonder whether even the recurrence of strong-willed and dynamic female characters in Mary Shelley's short-story narratives could be connected with the author's activism for the Italian cause, with her wish to undermine what Alison Chapman and Jane Stabler (2003:6) identified as "the gendered portrait of Italy as 'a woman in distress'", perceived as "a disturbing legacy for many women writers and artists". Apart from the above mentioned Despina, Flora, in "The Brother and Sister", does not hesitate to undertake a long and dangerous journey on foot to rejoin with her lost brother; a similar fate belongs to Adalina, the protagonist of "Ferdinando Eboli, a Tale" (1828), who escapes from her betrothed (an impostor), disguised as a page, and courageously wanders in the Apennines. Viola, in "The Heir of Mondolfo", is another meaningful female character, a country-girl who secretly marries above her class, but eventually triumphs against all odds, thus upsetting social hierarchies and the 'political marriage' policy.

4. Conclusion: two atypical Italian short stories

A few remarks should be made about "The Bride of Modern Italy" (1824) and "The Pole" (1832), two stories that apparently clash with what has been argued so far. In the former, set in a Roman convent, Clorinda is an inconstant and frivolous young girl, who changes saints in her prayers "as [her] lover changes name" (Robinson ed.1976:33). She falls for the charming English friend of her fiancé, only to be humorously deserted by both, and then forced to marry an older man selected by her father. As many critics pointed out (just to mention a few, Seymour 2000:267, and Sunstein 1989:195), "The Bride of Modern Italy" is a satiric tale, aimed at mocking Emilia Viviani, the young Lady P.B. Shelley (the Englishman in the story) fancied, and to whom he had dedicated his *Epipsychidion* (1820), "Verses addressed to the noble and unfortunate Lady, Emilia V---". As for "The Pole", through the analysis of the Shelleys-Clairmont correspondence, critic Bradford Booth demonstrated that the tale was actually written by Claire Clairmont, with only minor corrections by Mary Shelley. After all, the harsh portrayal of the "lazy Italians", "tedious race" of beggars, "teazing for alms" (Robinson ed.1976:348), "unprincipled" (Robinson ed.1976:354) banditti in a "land of assassins and traitors" (Robinson ed.1976:361) would not match the visions of Italy and the Italians Mary Shelley

always displayed in her writings, the same visions that prompted her, in closing her *Journal*, to say, like her character Edmund Malville: “preg[o] dio che mi sia permessa di tornare in Italia e lasciare la Matrigna Inghilterra per sempre, o morire”, “I pray God to allow me to go back to Italy and leave my Stepmother England forever, or die” (Feldman and Scott-Kilvert eds. 1995 [1987]:570).

References

- Bennett, B.T. and C. Robinson (eds.). 1990. *The Mary Shelley Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Booth, B.A. 1938. ‘The Pole: a Story by Claire Clairmont?’ in *ELH*. 5/1, pp. 67-70.
- Byron, G.G. 1854. *Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage*. Philadelphia: Henry Carey Baird.
- Chapman, A. and J. Stabler (eds.). 2003. *Unfolding the South: Nineteenth Century British Women Writers and Artists in Italy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Crook, N. 2001. ‘“Meek and bold”: Mary Shelley’s Support for the Risorgimento’ in *Mary Versus Mary*. L.M. Crisafulli and G. Silvani (eds.). Naples: Liguori Editore, pp. 73-88.
- Feldman, P.R. and D. Scott-Kilvert (eds.). 1995 (1987). *The Journals of Mary Shelley*. London : The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jones, F. (ed.). 1944. *The Letters of Mary W. Shelley, Vol. II*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Robinson, C. (ed.). 1976. *Mary Shelley: Collected Tales and Stories with Original Engravings*. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Seymour, M. 2000. *Mary Shelley*. New York: Grove Press.
- Schmidt, A. 2001. ‘Political Reform and Mary Shelley’s Short Fiction’ in *Atenea*. XXI/1-2, pp. 25-32.
- Schoina, M. 2009. *Romantic ‘Anglo-Italians’, Configurations of Identity in Byron, the Shelleys and the Pisan Circle*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Shelley, M. 1994 (1826). *The Last Man*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shelley, M. 1844. *Rambles in Germany and Italy in 1840, 1842, and 1843*. London: Edward Moxon.
- Sunstein, E.W. 1989. *Mary Shelley: Romance and Reality*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Notes on the author

Elisabetta Marino is a tenured Assistant Professor of English literature at the University of Rome “Tor Vergata”. She has written two monographs, published a translation into Italian with an introduction, and edited three collections of essays. She has published extensively on the English Romantic

writers (especially on Mary Shelley), on Italian American literature, and on Asian American and Asian British literature.

CREATIVITY
AND
VERB CONSTRUCTIONS

CONSTRUCTIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE LEXICAL CONSTRUCTIONAL MODEL *

FRANCISCO RUIZ DE MENDOZA IBÁÑEZ

University of La Rioja

FRANCISCO GONZÁLVEZ-GARCÍA

University of Almeria

***Abstract:** One of the distinguishing features of the Lexical Constructional Model is its emphasis on the cognitive constraints on subsumption, i.e. the integration of lexical or constructional structure from one descriptive level into the next higher level. Here we explore constructional amalgams, which result from level-internal integration processes, and studies how constructional amalgams constrain subsumption processes.*
***Keywords:** amalgams, constraints, constructions, constructional integration, subsumption*

1. Introduction

The present article will be concerned with the notion of construction and the way constructions are integrated into one another in the process of meaning construction.

Our theoretical framework is the *Lexical Constructional Model* (henceforth LCM), as originally propounded by Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2008) and Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza (2009). The LCM is a comprehensive meaning construction model built around four basic conceptual constructs as well as two basic cognitive operations, the latter of which are operational at

* *Center for Research on the Applications of Language (CRAL)*, University of La Rioja. The present research has been financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, grant no. HUM 2007-65755. The second author has additionally received financial support from grants no. HUM2007-62220FILO, FFI2010-19380 as well as the Xunta de Galicia PGDIT-INCITE09 204 155PR.

four representation levels: argument structure (level 1), implicational (level 2), illocutionary (level 3) and discursive (level 4).

The basic conceptual constructs are cognitive models of four kinds: (i) *low-level non-situational cognitive models*, which roughly correspond to argument structure lexical predicates (e.g. *run, kill, give*); (ii) *high-level non-situational cognitive models* (e.g. notions such as ‘process’, ‘result’, ‘action’), which are at the core of level-1 argument structure constructions, but are also operational, when used in logical (e.g. ‘action-result’, ‘condition-consequence’, ‘evidence-conclusion’), temporal (e.g. ‘precedence’, ‘simultaneity’) and conceptual connections (e.g. ‘similarity’, ‘contrast’, ‘conditioning’) at the discourse level by creating conditions for discourse coherence; (iii) *low-level situational cognitive models* (e.g. ‘taking a taxi’, ‘going to the dentist’, ‘making a hotel reservation’), which make up the conceptual structure of level 2 of the model; and, finally, (iv) *high-level situational cognitive models* (e.g. ‘asking’, ‘offering’, ‘apologizing’), which constitute the conceptual material for level 3 activity.

The cognitive operations are *conceptual integration* and *cued inferencing*, which are constrained by a number of principles. Cued inferencing is the activation of implicit conceptual material through inferential mechanisms such as completion, metonymy, enrichment, among others (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza 2010). Conceptual integration is the principled combination of conceptual structure either within or across levels. So far the LCM has only explored level-external integration processes through so-called *subsumption* operations, i.e. the incorporation of low-level conceptual structures into higher-level configurations, as a result of which the high-level structure becomes parametrized. For example, the LCM accounts for the principles that license the incorporation into the caused-motion construction of verbal predicates such as *laugh* (*The children laughed him out of the camp*), which do not have a causal element, while other predicates are blocked out (**She described/owned/longed him out of the place*), including some that are causative (e.g. *kill* ‘cause to become dead’ in **They killed him into his tomb/death*, etc.). Part of the answer to this problem is found in the way metaphorical and metonymic processes work in grammar (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007), as will be discussed in some detail in section 4 below. But in the present paper we will especially devote our attention to level-internal conceptual integration processes, which will be referred to as *conceptual amalgams*, and the way they affect subsumption processes.

2. The Lexical Constructional Model: levels of description and representation

The LCM is organized into four descriptive levels. First, the argument structure level (level 1) mainly deals with lexical predicates and argument structure constructions of the kind investigated in Goldberg (1995, 2006), such as the ditransitive (*Peter baked Mary a cake*), caused-motion (*Mary sneezed the napkin off the table*) and resultative (*The blacksmith hammered the metal flat*) constructions, to mention but a few illustrative cases.

Second, there is an implicational level (level 2), which yields conceptual representations that result from the combination of situation-based inferences of two kinds: (i) those that are supported by a metonymic schema (cf. Panther and Thornburg 2004), which correspond to the traditional notion of *implicature* (e.g. 'I stopped a taxi' can be made to stand for 'I stopped a taxi to go to the airport' in the context of the question *How did you get to the airport?*); and (ii) those that arise from the properties of lexical and constructional configurations, which have traditionally been referred to as *presuppositions* (e.g. *I [don't] regret stepping on your toe* presupposes that the speaker actually stepped on the hearer's toe, because of an inherent property of the verbal predicate). Alternatively, level 2 meaning can be accessed directly through highly entrenched (i.e. conventionalized) form-meaning pairings of a non-parametrizable nature. For example, the oft-quoted *What's X Doing Y?* construction (e.g. *What's your cousin doing in our class?*) discussed by Kay and Fillmore (1999) conveys the idea that there is a situation that either concerns or bothers the speaker, which evidently suggests that, according to the subject/speaker, there's something wrong about the cousin being in the class.

Third, the LCM features an illocutionary level (level 3), which accounts for the derivation of speech act meaning through either inferential or constructional mechanisms. Level 3 inferences are obtained through the application of metonymic schemas to high-level situational models that define the conditions for a speech act value to be possible. This kind of activation follows the same rationale as the metonymic activations at level 2 for the generation of low-level implicated meaning. For instance, the sentence *Those books are going to fall on your head*, at level 2, depicts part of a situation, where it is considered to be inevitable that the addressee will be harmed by the books falling on his/her head, which, at level 3, affords access to a more

abstract scenario, according to which people are expected to avoid harmful situations and someone who detects a situation which is potentially harmful for other people is expected to do his or her best to prevent this situation from taking place (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi 2007). At level 3, the resulting value of this operation would be that of a warning, whereas at level 2, we only obtain the implication that the addressee is going to be harmed. In addition to inferential mechanisms, construction mechanisms should also be taken into account. Level 3 meaning can also be accessed directly through constructional mechanisms. Just like their level 2 counterparts, level 3 constructions are non-parametrizable. For example, *Be careful, X*, and *Be careful or X, Mind X, Watch X, Beware X*, etc., are representative possible ways of expressing warnings.

Finally, there is a discourse level (level 4) that makes use of high-level non-situational cognitive models establishing (i) logical connections such as action-result, cause-consequence, condition-consequence, evidence-conclusion, exemplification, etc, (ii) temporal relations such as precedence or simultaneity and (iii) conceptual relations such as similarity, contrast, conditioning, contingency, additioning, excepting, alternation, specification, exemplification, etc. Such discourse relations can also be expressed *via* non-parametrizable constructions, i.e. constructions that contain fixed elements (see next section below). A case in point is, for instance, the *X Let Alone Y* construction discussed by Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1988) (e.g. *Peter won't eat prawns, let alone squid*), which illustrates logical connections analogous to scalar implicatures (i.e. quantity implicatures based on the use of an informationally weak term in an implicational scale^{*}, such as the one illustrated by *some, few, a few* in relation to e.g. *all*; cf. Kay 1997). In other words, this would be an instance of addition with scalar strengthening (for further details on strengthening, the reader is referred to Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez 2003 and Ruiz de Mendoza 2010, *inter alios*). A more complex case obtains in an utterance like *You may be my boss, but that doesn't give you the right to be nasty to my husband*, which involves in principle a contrasting relationship in which the contrast in question is, however, not between what is literally expressed by the two contrasting elements. Rather, the contrast takes place between an implicit assumption that is accessed metonymically on the basis of *be my boss* and the assertion in the second clause. Therefore, *may* does not combine with *be my boss*, but rather with the speaker's assumption that the

* <http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatsAnImplicationalScale.htm>

addressee believes that, because s/he is the speaker's boss, s/he is entitled to behave inappropriately. Thus, *be my boss* is metonymic for this broader assumption. For a more comprehensive account of constructions based on various discourse relations, see Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza (2009).

3. Basic construction types

In constructionist approaches to language there currently appears to be some controversy on the nature and scope of the notion of construction. The notion of construction has been defined as follows:

C is a CONSTRUCTION iff $_{def n}$ is a *form-function* pair, such that some aspect of the form or some aspect of the function is *not strictly predictable* from C's component parts (Goldberg 1998: 205, emphasis added to the original).

Two important considerations emerge from the above quote that need to concern us here: First, constructs such as *Pat faxed Bill the letter* or *Joe bought his way into the exclusive country club* meet the criterial property of idiosyncrasy or non-compositionality stipulated in the above definition. Thus, the fact that Pat succeeded in letting Bill get the letter by fax or that Joe paid so as to become part of an exclusive country club can be attributed to the meanings of the constructions involved rather than the meaning of the components of the construction. Second, in addition to sentence patterns and idiomatic expressions (e.g. *let the cat out of the bag*), single lexical items or even morphemes can be taken to be constructions, since the meaning of e.g. *dog* is not predictable –though nevertheless motivated– from its form and *vice versa*. Moreover, with the emergence of usage-based linguistics, the original definition is now broadened to allow for fully compositional configurations. In the words of Goldberg (2006: 5):

Any linguistic pattern is recognized as a construction as long as some aspect of its form or function is not strictly predictable from its component parts or from other constructions recognized to exist. In addition, patterns are stored as constructions even if they are fully predictable as long as they occur with sufficient frequency (see Ch. 3 for discussion). [emphasis added to the original]

The LCM has taken sides with this broader definition of construction and has identified constructions at its four descriptive levels. It thus distinguishes between argument structure, implicational, illocutionary and

discourse constructions. This distinction, besides providing an important classification criterion for constructions, has allowed LCM proponents to study the way in which constructions from lower levels are integrated into constructions from higher levels. We will briefly refer to such processes under the label of *subsumption* in section 4 below.

Pursuing this line of thinking, in this section we posit a distinction between *parametrizable* and *non-parametrizable* constructions. This distinction, which provides us with an additional classification criterion, will be useful to understand cases of level-internal integration, called constructional *amalgams*, which we propose to incorporate into the LCM. Parametrizable constructions are high-level conceptual configurations with values such as cause, result, transfer, etc., capable of accommodating more specific, low-level structures of the kind provided by lexical predicates. For example, in the caused-motion construction (X CAUSES Y TO MOVE Z), the high-level elements CAUSE and MOVE can be parametrized by the semantic make-up of lexical configurations such as *kick out of*, *push into*, *hit into*, *throw into*, and *send off*, among many others. By contrast, non-parametrizable constructions are idiomatic or non-idiomatic configurations that contain variable and fixed elements, as is the case of the *What's X Doing Y* construction mentioned above. As will be seen in sections 4 and 5 below, parametrizable constructions are only sensitive to subsumption, while non-parametrizable constructions can be the object of both subsumption and amalgamation.

4. Lexical-constructional subsumption

At level 1 of the LCM, constructional integration is the combination of lexical and constructional structure. It occurs through a process called *subsumption* (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007, 2008; Peña 2009; Pérez and Peña 2009). By way of illustration of this process, consider the cases of the incorporation of the non-causative verb *laugh* into the caused-motion construction (cf. Goldberg 1995, 2006), as in *They laughed him out of town*, or the resultative construction, as in *He laughed himself sick*, both of which have a causal ingredient. In Goldberg's constructionist account (Goldberg 1995), the solution to the mismatch between the combination of the non-causal configuration of the lexical item and the causal configuration of the constructions in question is a matter of coercion. According to Michaelis (2003), coercion is the resolution of a conflict between lexical and

constructional *denotata*, in such a way that the conflicting element ends up conforming to the semantico-pragmatic profile of the construction. This in turn confirms the role of constructions as the best and most reliable overall determinants of sentence interpretation. With this scenario in mind, we certainly concur with Michaelis and other constructionist grammarians (e.g. Goldberg 2006, Croft 2001, *inter alios*) that the notion of coercion is indeed useful. However, one of the main drawbacks that could be leveled against the exploitation of this notion is that it does not provide, in our opinion, a fully principled account of why certain lexical items can actually be coerced, while others cannot. In this connection, we believe the LCM provides a more satisfactory solution in terms of two sets of constraints on lexical-constructional subsumption: *internal* and *external* to the process. The former take the form of licensing or blocking factors that depend on lexical class ascription, lexical-constructional compatibility, and either predicate or internal variable conditioning of external variables or arguments. For example, the *lexical class constraint* accounts for the fact that *break* verbs, which are change of state predicates, can be used in the inchoative form (e.g. *The vase broke*), while *destroy* verbs, which are cessation of existence predicates, cannot (e.g. **The city destroyed*), even though both involve doing damage to an object. Lexical-constructional compatibility is a matter of the event structure of the lexical and constructional configuration. A straightforward example is provided by the great difficulty or even the impossibility of integrating some stative predicates into a *be*-imperative construction: **Be tall/crazy/ill*. The imperative construction requires an agent-controller that is not compatible with states that cannot be seen as the result of a covert willful action underlying the *be*-imperative expression. If there is a way to give a resultative interpretation to the adjective of the construction, the integration is feasible: *Be kind/honest/brave*. However, there are some examples that can be regarded as limiting cases. Consider #*Be happy/rich/handsome*. (The sign “#” is used to indicate the acceptability of an utterance only in an adequate supporting context). Generally these examples are odd except in very specific contexts, where it is possible to think of the addressee as acting in such a way that as a result s/he will be happy, rich, handsome, etc.

This observation takes us to the domain of external constraints, which are the result of performing high-level metaphoric and metonymic operations on the lexical items involved in the subsumption process (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007, 2008, 2010; Peña 2009; Baicchi 2010). Thus, whether a

straightforward or a limiting case, the resultative use of the adjective in the *be*-imperative construction can be analyzed as a case of coercion which is licensed by the high-level metonymy RESULT FOR ACTION, initially proposed by Panther and Thornburg (2000), and more extensively explored, from the point of view of its implications for grammar, in Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez (2001). Basically, in its application to the *be*-imperative construction, what this metonymy does is allow the language user to understand an adjectival predicate as resultative rather than as predicative, provided that it is possible to postulate –on the basis of our world knowledge– an underlying action that may lead to the ascription to the addressee of the attribute the adjective denotes. The metonymy may thus be paraphrased as ‘act in such a way that as a result you will be [attribute]’. Obviously, it makes more sense to say ‘act in such a way that as a result you will be kind/honest/brave’ than ‘act in such a way that as a result you will be happy/rich/handsome’ and even more than ‘act in such a way that as a result you will be tall/crazy/ill’.

Let us now go back to the aforementioned examples with *laugh*, i.e. *They laughed him out of town* and *He laughed himself sick*. The verb *laugh* is typically a non-telic activity verb, i.e. a verb denoting an activity that has no inherent goal (e.g. *She laughed and laughed and laughed, over and over again*). When it has an object, the object, which is syntactically introduced by the preposition *at*, is what we can call an *experiential object*, i.e. a person or thing that is the psychological or emotional target of the activity denoted by the verb. An experiential object is to be differentiated from what the LCM terms an *effectual object*, i.e. one that is physically affected by the action denoted by the verb in such a way that it either acquires a new property (e.g. *Superman bent the train track*) or it undergoes a change of state (e.g. *The king burned the scroll*) or of location (e.g. *He shoved the crate out of the way*). In the case of *They laughed him out of town* and *He laughed himself sick*, we have a special use of *laugh*, where the experiential object is presented as if it were an effectual object that undergoes a change of location, in the first example, or a change of state, in the second example. This special treatment of the object, which has been syntactically marked by the absence of the preposition *at* (cf. the impossibility of e.g. **They laughed at him out of town*, **He laughed at himself sick*), is metaphorical, since it arises from the possibility of interpreting experiential objects metaphorically as effectual objects. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2007), who first identified this metaphor, labeled it AN EXPERIENTIAL ACTION IS AN EFFECTUAL ACTION. This metaphor

licenses expressions such as *The captain stared him out of the room*, *She practically smiled him into the ladies' room*, and *The guy shouted me out of the pool in the middle of my swim*. However, it blocks out the subsumption of verbs into the caused-motion and resultative constructions if it is not possible to construe the verb as having some kind of psychological impact on the object: **He defended/described/owned me out of the room*.

So far the LCM has posited the different levels of representation of conceptual structure and has established the way inferential activity and constructional subsumption processes work. On the face of it, this involves a bottom-up approach to meaning construction. However, we would like to suggest that conceptual operations at lower levels may be constrained by operations taking place at higher levels, including the context of situation. For example, in the complex sentence *If you believe me capable of that, then our friendship is over*, the *then* part of level-4 relationship, signaled by the *if-then* (condition-consequence) connectors, somehow determines the selection by the speaker of the level-1 subjective-transitive construction that takes the form NP V NP XPCOMP (i.e. 'you believe me capable of that') (González-García 2009), among other competing complementation strategies (i.e. *you believe me to be capable of that*, *you believe that I'm capable of that*), for the *if* part. What distinguishes the subjective-transitive construction from the other two alternatives is the fact that it expresses a personal, direct, evaluative stance by the speaker towards the state of affairs/event expressed in the clause. The use of construction other than the subjective-transitive would be less adequate for such a harsh consequence as is expressed in *our friendship is over*. In addition, the level-4 construction with *if-then* is typical of threats at level 3 when the *then* part designates a state of affairs that is potentially harmful for the addressee (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi 2007). So, what we have is a threat (level 3) that is achieved by means of a level-4 condition-consequence configuration, whose consequence part requires a level-1 subjective transitive construction. The complex way in which the different levels of the LCM interact is captured in the figure in Appendix 1.

5. Subsumption at other levels of meaning construction

Consider again the sentence *If you believe me capable of that, then our friendship is over*. The general constructional pattern that it instantiates is the level-4 condition-consequence configuration *If X, then Y*. However, there are

subtle differences in meaning depending on the kind of lower-level material that we subsume into its variables. We have already discussed some of these differences in relation to the subjective-transitive construction, as exemplified by the sequence *you believe me capable of that*. Others have to do with the *realis-irrealis* (or even *counterfactual*) nature of the condition part of the construction (cf. *If you had believed me capable of that, which luckily never happened, our friendship would have been over*) and with the more or less assertive nature of the consequence part (cf. *#If you believe me capable of that, then our friendship may/will be over*). Besides, the *if-then* conditional construction, with all its variants, is but one way of expressing conditional meaning or, more precisely, it is one construction from a set of constructional variants that in turn belong to the more complex constructional family expressing condition-consequence relationships (e.g. *You do that, and you'll be in trouble, Watch out or you'll trip over the steps*; cf. Sweetser and Dancygier 2005). In this section, we will only discuss the *if-then* pattern in a partial way to illustrate subsumption processes beyond level 1 of the LCM.

Let us compare *If you believe me capable of that, then our friendship is over* with the sentence *If you think she's crazy, then you'll have to think I'm crazy too*. At level 4, the *If X, then Y* supplies a general interpretative framework. The construction conveys the idea that, if some event takes place, then there will be associated consequences that will only occur if the event takes place. In its application to the first sentence, the event is one where the speaker accuses the addressee of misjudgment: the speaker believes the addressee is wrong about the speaker's intentions. Basically, this is the same message that is conveyed by the second sentence, where the speaker believes that the addressee is wrong about a third party's behavior. It is the consequence part of the two sentences that differs. In the first sentence, the consequence is a threat that the speaker will put an end to his/her friendship with the addressee. In the second sentence, there is no threat but rather an indirect invitation by the speaker for the addressee to change his/her mind about the third party. This invitation is carried in a very subtle way: the speaker constructs his/her message on the assumption that the addressee would not like to suggest that the speaker is crazy. However, this assumption is not part of the level-4 *If X, then Y* construction. It arises from level-2 and 3 structure that is compatible with the overall conceptual makeup of the consequence part of the level-4 construction. Thus, at level 2, *you'll have to think I'm crazy too* makes use of the non-parametrizable construction *You'll Have to Think Y*. This construction adds to

its obvious level-1 argument-structure meaning, i.e. the idea that the addressee will be compelled to think that some state of affairs is the case, the level-2 conventionalized implication that the Y element depicts a situation which the addressee should have been aware of by him or herself. At level 3, the output from level 2 is further elaborated. Here, *you'll have to think I'm crazy too* acquires a complaint value through cued inferencing. The inference is based on the idea that it is best to avoid having derogatory beliefs about other people (even if ultimately true), especially if our behavior may somehow result in making such beliefs manifest to someone else. The derogatory belief arises from the combination of level-1 and level-2 structure: the addressee should have been aware that the speaker behaves in the same “crazy” manner as the third party. This structure in turn affords metonymic access to a more complex scenario, in which people who are viewed derogatively, if they find out about it, may feel offended or otherwise altered emotionally and have a culturally sanctioned right to make such feelings manifest. This is the complaint value, which is thus the result of a cued inferencing process supported by a metonymic schema (for other such metonymic activations of high-level scenarios, see Ruiz de Mendoza 2007; Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi 2007, *inter alios*). This level-2 and level-3 structure is then incorporated into the “then” component of the level-4 construction. The “if” component, in turn, takes in *you think she's crazy*, which designates a potential derogatory belief on the part of the speaker, i.e. that a third party is crazy or acts in a crazy manner. In the context of this condition, the complaint value of the “then” part takes on a further illocutionary value as a suggestion that the addressee had better change his or her mind about the third party's purported craziness. The rationale behind this value is the speaker's assumption that the addressee would not dare think that the speaker is crazy; if the speaker behaves in a way similar to that of the third party, then it makes no sense to think the third party is crazy, unless one wants to judge the speaker as being crazy, which might be taken as an offence.

As we hope the foregoing discussion has illustrated, constructional subsumption takes place at all four levels of description of the LCM and alternates with cued inferencing to create increasingly more complex meaning representations. In this process, the higher-level constructs guide the specific way in which conceptual integration occurs, while the lower-level constructs contribute their own meaning. Thus, the same level-4 constructional schema may be used to produce different meaning representations, with such clearly distinct illocutionary interpretations as a threat (the case of *If you believe me*

capable of that, then our friendship is over) and an invitation to change one's mind (as evidenced by our analysis of *If you think she's crazy, then you'll have to think I'm crazy too*).

6. Constructional amalgams

Another important aspect that has not yet received attention in the LCM is the issue of the integration of constructions belonging to the same level of description. To illustrate, consider the epistemic modality construction with *may*, as in *The package may arrive before the anticipated date*. The *may* construction, which we will symbolize as *X May Y*, is combined with the intransitive construction (i.e. *the package arrives*), which has previously absorbed through subsumption the lexical predicate *arrive*. In other words, the *X May Y* construction, which is more abstract, incorporates into its two variables the argument and the predicate of the argument structure construction. In this case, 'the package' is built into the *X* variable, and the verbal predicate 'arrive' into the *Y* variable. This incorporation process follows the pattern of conceptual interaction postulated by Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2002), according to which more specific patterns tend to be incorporated into and thus enrich more abstract patterns (see also Peña 2003, 2008, for a detailed study of the notion of schematic enrichment). In the combination of the intransitive and the *X May Y* constructions, which illustrates what we will call herein a *constructional amalgam*, the *X May Y* construction contributes the speaker's subjective stance, which would otherwise be absent from the representation arising out of the initial subsumption process.

This example is a fairly straightforward case of constructional amalgam, where there is hardly any restriction on the integration. Therefore, virtually almost any instantiation of the intransitive construction can be assessed in terms of probability, thus being compatible with the epistemic *X May Y* construction. For current purposes, suffice it to mention the following two exceptions: (i) instances of the intransitive construction implying a high degree of factuality, as in *#Obama may emerge as the successor of Bush in the US Presidency* (said two years after Obama was elected president of the US), and (ii) instances of states of affairs involving universal truths which clash with a probability assessment by the speaker, such as *#Today the sun may rise at noon*. In these two examples, the *X* (i.e. *Obama/the sun*) and *Y* variables (i.e. *emerge as the successor of Bush in the US Presidency/ rise at noon (today)*) of the intransitive

construction cannot be instantiated, because of their incompatibility with the epistemic value of the *X May Y* construction (i.e. the expression of an intermediate degree of probability) (Halliday 1994: 88).

As a more complex case of constructional amalgam, consider sentence (1c), which we will contrast with (1a) and (1b):

- (1) (a) I found the finale of 'Lost' disappointing.
(#but I actually did not see the finale of 'Lost')
(#but in my opinion the finale of 'Lost' at least lived up to my expectations)
(#but I really do not think that the finale of 'Lost' was disappointing at all)
- (b) I found the finale of 'Lost' to be disappointing.
(according to the reviews posted on many blogs, but I personally found it not that bad)
- (c) I found that the finale of 'Lost' was disappointing.
(This is what I gather is the widespread opinion on the show finale, although I personally found it truly superb).

Upon superficial consideration, the three sentences in (1)(a)-(c) would appear to convey the same meaning. However, upon closer inspection, a number of subtle differences can be observed. The first sentence conveys a direct, personal and forceful stance by the speaker on the proposition (the finale of 'Lost' being disappointing). In other words, (1a) implies that the speaker actually saw the finale of this TV show and that s/he is personally convinced that it was disappointing. In contrast, (1b) conveys a mediated, tentative, subjective-within-objective stance on the proposition in question. This sentence could, for instance, be felicitous in a context in which the speaker is acting as the spokesperson voicing the results of a poll carried out among the fans of the series. The stance is mediated, or other-initiated, and as such it may not necessarily coincide with the speaker's opinion on the finale of the series. By virtue of this, it is subjective-within-objective, as the speaker is only voicing what other people think about the show finale. Finally, (1c) conveys an indirect, impersonal and forceful stance. This sentence implies little or no involvement at all on the part of the subject towards the proposition. The speaker is only stating the general opinion that people hold on the series finale. An important corollary emerging from the discussion of these examples is that the higher the degree of syntactico-semantic integration (1a), the higher the degree of involvement by the speaker towards the proposition envisioned in the complement construction (Borkin 1973, González-García 2009).

With this scenario in mind, our contention is that only (1c) qualifies as a case of constructional amalgam for several reasons. First, although all three sentences deal with the same proposition (i.e. the season finale of ‘Lost’ being disappointing), only the third sentence can do without *I found* to convey a complete thought. By contrast, in (1a)-(b), the omission of *I found* would yield a conceptually defective thought. Second, while all three sentences are apparently instances of the general transitive pattern $X V Y$, only (1c) is actually a true instance of this pattern. The reason for this lies in the fact that the Y variable in (1a) and (1b) is an argument complex (i.e. *the finale of ‘Lost’ disappointing*, and *the finale of ‘Lost’ to be disappointing*, respectively), but not a construction, as in the case of the finite “that”-complement construction in (1c). Therefore, an utterance will be considered a case of structural amalgam with the proviso that one of its variables is filled in by a constructional configuration. In the case of (1c), the receptor construction, namely, the transitive construction $X V_{\text{trans}} Y$, instantiated by *I found*, takes in a predicative construction, instantiated by the *that* complement construction (i.e. *that the finale of Lost was disappointing*). On the other hand, (1a) and (1b) are instances of argument structure constructions, namely, the subjective-transitive and subjective-within-objective transitive constructions, respectively (see further González-García 2003, 2006, 2009).

7. Subsumption meets constructional amalgams: the case of $I \textit{ know } X \textit{ must } V_{\textit{cognition}} Y$

Consider the following examples involving cognition verbs again:

- (2) (a) I know you must consider this strange, extraordinary, unaccountable conduct. (<http://www.home.earthlink.net/~bsabatini/Inimitable-Boz/etexts/Lamplighter.html>, WebCorp, accessed on July 19, 2010).
 (b) I know you must find this hard to believe (<http://www.experienceproject.com/stories/Loved-Someone-That-Didnt-Love-Me/3050>, WebCorp, accessed on July 19, 2010).

These examples instantiate what we may refer to as the $I \textit{ know } X \textit{ must } V_{\textit{cognition}} Y$ construction. The constructional status of this configuration is evidenced by the fact that its constitutive elements display a high degree of fixation, which precludes variation regarding the following:

(i) The subject-verb relationship in the matrix clause (*I know*) is restricted to either the first person singular or plural. Thus, a sentence such as, for instance, *He knows you must find this intrusive* is a factual expression that lacks the anticipation by the speaker of an emotional reaction on the part of the addressee. In addition, the verb *know* is hardly exchangeable with other cognition verbs, such as e.g. *understand, believe, think, find, acknowledge*, etc. Two exceptions are *be sure* and *guess*, as in (3)(a)-(b), which can be contrasted with 3(c)-(d):

- (3) (a) I'm sure you must consider me very prosaic.
(<http://traumwerk.stanford.edu:3455/philoformance/356>, Google, accessed on July 19, 2010).
- (b) Well, I guess you must find me beautiful. Or interesting.
(http://www.sexandthecityscripts.com/S01E01_Sex-and-the-City.php, Google, accessed on July 19, 2010).
- (c) #You must believe this true.
- (d) #You must acknowledge him a good scholar.

(ii) The subject and the epistemic modal auxiliary form a fixed combination that cannot be replaced by any other near-equivalent modal expression (e.g. *have to, need to, be to*, etc), as evidenced by the oddity of realizations like *#I know you have/need/are to find this hard to believe*. The status of *I know* as a highly fixed constructional element is further evidenced by the difficulty to use epistemic markers such as *surely* and *certainly* to enhance its overall epistemic value: *#I certainly/surely know you must consider this strange*.

(iii) The cognition verb that is within the scope of *must* can only be one of a restrictive set of verbal predicates, such as *consider, find, think*, etc, which capture the addressee's expected judgment of his/her own emotional reaction on the situation described: *I know you must consider/find/think this all very unfair*.

But what is special about this construction is a singular feature: *I know X must V_{cognition} Y* is a level-2 implicational construction that arises from the level-1 amalgam of the epistemic *X Must Y* construction and the subjective-transitive pattern (V XPCOMP). The amalgam is the result of incorporating the subjective transitive pattern into the Y part of the epistemic construction, all of which is then subsumed into the Y part of a partially parametrized (by *I know*) level-4 specificative construction (see Mairal and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2009: 177)

that can be represented as *I Know Y*. Interestingly enough, this combination of a level-1 amalgam and a level-4 construction has conventionalized the following level-2 non-compositional meaning: the speaker anticipates a plausible positive or negative reaction on the part of the addressee to the content of the speaker's message, as is even more evident from (3)(a)-(b).

- (4) (a) I know you must consider each day a blessing.
(<http://www.topix.com/forum/who/annette-funicello/T9PMISVDL8BG1BK00/> p13, WebCorp, accessed on July 19, 2010).
(b) I know you must find this intrusive
(<http://search.barnesandnoble.com/The-Angel-Inside/Chris-Widener/e/9780739343142>, WebCorp, accessed on July 19, 2010).

In origin, this added constructional value stems from a conversational implicature that has become conventionalized through the frequent use of this linguistic expression in contexts in which the speaker, when faced with a predictable reaction on the part of the addressee, wants to show in an assertive way his/her own awareness of what the situation is like and therefore his/her ability to assess the situation adequately. This conventionalization process has resulted in a level-2 non-parametrizable construction with fixed and variable elements. The reason why the combination of a level-1 amalgam and a level-4 specificative construction has reached a level-2 status is its ability to activate – through a ‘cued inferencing’ process– a low-level situational cognitive model that places the speaker in the relationship with the addressee that we have described above. In fact, this process is supported by a metonymic schema whereby part of a model stands for the whole model, i.e. the expression of the speaker's self-assurance about the addressee's reaction stands for a more complex situation, in which, by anticipating the addressee's reaction, the speaker tries to avoid the consequences of such a reaction on himself/herself.

Besides, the level-1 amalgam places constraints on the conceptual material that is subsumed from level 1 into the variables of its level-2 formulation, i.e. *I know X must V_{cognition} Y*. The constraints, which are internal to the subsumption process between level 1 and 2 elements, can be stated as follows:

- (a) The so-called ‘stimulus’, i.e. the NP realizing the variable between the cognition verb (generally *know*) and the modal *must*, cannot be an expletive (e.g. existential *there*, weather *it*, etc), since an expletive

encodes abstract settings and cannot be construed as a stimulus of the evaluation by the speaker of the situation in question. This is one of the reasons for the impossibility of **I know there/it must find it hard to believe* (cf. *I know you/he/she/they must find it hard to believe*). But even in the related constructional configuration *I know X must Y*, which makes no use of the subjective-transitive pattern, but preserves the speaker's anticipation of the addressee's reaction, as in *I know you must be upset*, the use of an expletive cancels out this idea of anticipation. Thus, *I know there must be a reason* is definitely not an example of this construction, since here the speaker is only trying to reassure others – and perhaps himself too – that someone will be able to explain whatever has happened. In a similar way, the sentence *I know it must be cloudy* only expresses the idea that the speaker is confident on his epistemic assessment about the weather conditions.

(b) The XPCOMP instantiating the Y variable of *I know X must V_{cognition} Y* cannot be a referential NP, on the grounds that it is systematically incompatible with a subjective construal (at both the ideational and the interpersonal levels), i.e. the expression of a direct, personal and forceful stance by the speaker towards the situation depicted by the linguistic expression. The following example illustrates this constraint on the Y variable:

(5) I know you must find me *the woman who is just sitting there right now/the ideal woman.

As the foregoing discussion has shown, subsumption processes are not only constrained by level-external conceptual compatibility issues and by construal factors (i.e. so-called internal and external constraints respectively), but also by other co-occurring conceptual integration processes, such as level-internal constructional amalgams. Our brief study of the *I know X must V_{cognition} Y* construction has further allowed us to explore how elements from a higher descriptive level –as is the case of the discourse level– can lose their higher-level status through a conventionalization process and thus become incorporated into the conceptual makeup of a lower-level configuration.

8. Conclusion

The present paper has discussed relevant aspects of constructional integration within the Lexical Constructional Model. With Goldberg (2006) the

LCM adopts a broad definition of construction as any meaningful linguistic pattern that is recognizable as such by language users, whether its meaning structure is compositional or not. However, the LCM has two distinguishing features in its treatment of constructional activity: (i) the distinction of levels of meaning construction and the distribution of constructional configurations among such levels; (ii) the postulation of cognitive constraints on the integration of lexical and constructional structure and of constructions from lower levels into those belonging to higher levels. We have provided one more axis of constructional characterization, i.e. the sensitiveness of a construction to being parametrized, and we have correlated this property of constructions with the kind of constructional integration process in which they can take part. One of these processes, called *subsumption*, takes place across descriptive levels and is subject to a number of conceptual consistency and cognitive construal constraints that have received a lot of attention in the literature on the LCM. The other integration process, which is for the first time described in the present paper, is level-internal and gives rise to what we have labeled constructional *amalgams*. We have explored how amalgamation works and, through a case study, how constructional amalgams further constrain level-external subsumption processes. The resulting analysis has provided a richer picture of constructional integration within the LCM than has so far been discussed in the literature.

References

- Baicchi, A. 2010. 'Metaphoric motivation in grammatical structure. The case of the caused-motion construction from the perspective of the Lexical-Constructional Model' in *Motivation in Lexicon, Grammar, and Discourse*. G. Radden, Klaus Uwe Panther and Peter Koch (eds.). Amsterdam: John Benjamins; in press.
- Borkin, A. 1973. 'To Be or Not To Be', in *Proceedings of the 9th Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society*. C. Corum, T. Cedric Smith-Stark and A. Weiser (eds.) Chicago: The Chicago Linguistic Society.
- Croft, W. 2001. *Radical Construction Grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fillmore, C., P. Kay and M. C. O'Connor. 1988. 'Regularity and idiomaticity in grammatical constructions: The case of *let alone*', in *Language* 64, pp. 501-538.
- Goldberg, A. E. 1995. *Constructions: A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Goldberg, A. E. 1998. 'Patterns of Experience in Patterns of Language', in *The New Psychology of Language*. M. Tomasello (ed.). Lawrence Erlbaum Publications.
- Goldberg, A. E. 2006. *Constructions at Work: The Nature of Generalization in Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- González-García, F. 2003. 'Reconstructing object complements in English and Spanish', in *Gramática de Construcciones (Contrastes entre el Inglés y el Español)*. M. Martínez (ed.). Huelva: Grupo de Gramática Contrastiva.
- González-García, F. 2006. 'Passives without actives: Evidence from verbless complement constructions in Spanish', in *Constructions* SV1-5/2006, pp. 1-63.
- González-García, F. 2009. 'The family of object-related depictives in English and Spanish: Towards a usage-based, constructionist analysis', in *Language Sciences* 31/5, pp. 663-723.
- Halliday, M.A.K. 1994. *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Kay, P. 1997. *Words and the Grammar of Context*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
- Kay, P. and C. J. Fillmore. 1999. 'Grammatical constructions and linguistic generalizations: The 'What's X doing Y' construction', in *Language* 75, pp. 1-33.
- Mairal, R. and F. J. Ruiz de Mendoza. 2009. 'Levels of description and explanation in meaning construction', in *Deconstructing Constructions*. C. S. Butler and J. Martin (eds.). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Michaelis, L.A. 2003. 'Word meaning, sentence meaning, and syntactic meaning'. In H. Cuyckens, R. Dirven, J. Taylor (eds.) *Cognitive Approaches to Lexical Semantics*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Panther, K.-U. and L. Thornburg. 2000. 'The EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy in English grammar', in *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads. A Cognitive Perspective*. A. Barcelona (ed.). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Panther, K.-U. and L. Thornburg. 2004. 'The role of conceptual metonymy in meaning construction'. <http://www.metaphorik.de/Journal/>.
- Peña Cervel, S. 2003. *Topology and Cognition. What Image-Schemas Reveal about the Metaphorical Language of Emotions*. Munich: Lincom Europa.
- Peña Cervel, S. 2008. 'Dependency systems for image-schematic patterns in a usage-based approach to language', in *Journal of Pragmatics* 40/6, pp. 1041-1066.
- Peña Cervel, S. 2009. 'Constraints on subsumption in the caused-motion construction', in *Language Sciences* 31, pp. 740-765.
- Pérez, L. and S. Peña. 2009. 'Pragmatic and cognitive constraints on lexical-constructional subsumption', in *Atlantis* 31/2, pp. 57-73.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, F. J. 2007. 'High-level cognitive models: in search of a unified framework for inferential and grammatical behavior', in *Perspectives on Metonymy*. K. Kosecki (ed.). Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, F.J. 2010. 'Metonymy and cognitive operations', in *What is Metonymy? An Attempt at Building a Consensus View on the Delimitation of the Notion of Metonymy in Cognitive Linguistics*. R. Benczes, A. Barcelona and F. J. Ruiz de Mendoza (eds.). Amsterdam: John Benjamins; vol. in prep.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, F. J. and L. Pérez. 2001. 'Metonymy and the grammar: motivation, constraints, and interaction', in *Language and Communication* 21, pp. 321-357.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, F. J. and O. Díez. 2002. 'Patterns of conceptual interaction', in R. Dirven and R. Pörings (eds.) *Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

- Ruiz de Mendoza, F. J. and L. Pérez. 2003. 'Cognitive operations and pragmatic implication', in *Metonymy and Pragmatics*. K.-U. Panther and L. Thornburg (eds.). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, F. J. and A. Baicchi. 2007. 'Illocutionary constructions: Cognitive motivation and linguistic realization', in *Explorations in Pragmatics: Linguistic, Cognitive, and Intercultural Aspects*. I. Kecskes and L. Horn (eds.). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, F. J. and R. Mairal. 2007. 'High-level metaphor and metonymy in meaning construction', in *Aspects of Meaning Construction*. G. Radden, K.-M. Köpcke, T. Berg and P. Siemund (eds.). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, F.J. and R. Mairal. 2008. 'Levels of description and constraining factors in meaning construction: An introduction to the *Lexical Constructional Model*'. *Folia Linguistica* 42/2, pp. 355-400.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, F. J. and R. Mairal. 2010. 'Constraints on syntactic alternation: lexical-constructional subsumption in the Lexical-Constructional Model', in *Morphosyntactic Alternations in English. Functional and Cognitive Perspectives*. Pilar Guerrero (ed.). London: Equinox.
- Sweetser, E. and B. Dancygier. 2005. *Mental Spaces in Grammar: Conditional Constructions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Appendix 1




Figure 1. *The overall architecture of the Lexical Constructional Model*
 LT = lexical template; IT= idiomatic template CT = constructional template;
 CS = Conceptual Structure

Notes on the authors

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza is full professor of English Linguistics at the University of La Rioja. He serves as a member of the scientific board of *Cognitive Linguistics*, as chief editor of the *Review of Cognitive Linguistics* (Benjamins) and as co-editor of *Applications of Cognitive Linguistics* (Mouton). He is the current president of the *Spanish Association of Applied Linguistics*.

Francisco González-García is Associate Professor of English Linguistics at the University of Almería. He serves as a member of the editorial board of *Review of Cognitive Linguistics*, as well as of the scientific board of *Atlantis* and *Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses*.

FIGURATIVE USES OF THE CAUSED-MOTION CONSTRUCTION

MARIANA NEAGU

University of Galați

***Abstract:** As figurative uses of the caused-motion construction are not discussed extensively and systematically in the literature, this paper focuses on the following cases: (a) motion involved when the conditions of satisfaction of the predicate are realized, (b) actual motion without motion verbs, (c) figurative motion indicating a change of state, and (d) metaphorical motion with motion verbs*

***Key words:** caused-motion construction, Construction Grammar, high-level metaphor, Lexical Constructional Model (LCM), lexical-constructional subsumption.*

1. Introduction

The term ‘construction’ as used in Construction Grammar constitutes a broadening of the traditional notion. In traditional grammar the term is used in a somewhat loose manner and usually refers to a rather abstract, recurrent configuration of morphosyntactic categories, which is typically smaller than a sentence and larger than a word, such as the infinitive construction, the participle construction, etc.

In construction grammars the notion of construction is of central importance; these theories of language regard constructions as the basic units of grammar. Construction grammarians define ‘construction’ in Saussurean terms, seeing it as a symbolic configuration, a complex sign, a pairing of form and meaning.

One of the assumptions made by Construction Grammarians is that the meaning of a particular construct is the result of the integration of the meanings of lexical items into the meaning of the construction. According to Construction Grammar, syntactic phenomena can never be described adequately without reference to semantics and pragmatics.

2. The Caused-Motion Construction: form and semantics

Goldberg's (1995) influential book on argument structure constructions is one of the main recent studies that embody the cognitively-oriented approach to the notion of construction. In it, Adele Goldberg discusses five types of argument structure constructions: the ditransitive construction, the caused motion construction, the resultative construction, the intransitive motion construction and the conative construction. In Goldberg's (2003) view, constructions are units learnable on the basis of input and general cognitive mechanisms and are expected to vary cross-linguistically:

Crucially, all linguists recognize that a wide range of semi-idiosyncratic constructions exist in every language, constructions that cannot be accounted for by general universal or innate principles or constraints. (Goldberg, 2003: 222)

In English, *the form* of the caused-motion construction is as follows: [SUBJ [V OBJ OBL]] (Goldberg (1995)). The slot of V is occupied by a non-stative verb (or perfective verb according to Langacker's terminology, 1999), and OBL, which stands for 'oblique', is realized by a directional prepositional phrase, as in the following examples, taken from Goldberg (1995: 152)

- (1) They laughed the poor guy out of the room.
- (2) Frank sneezed the tissue off the table.
- (3) Mary urged Bill into the house.
- (4) Sue let the water out of the bathtub.
- (5) Sam helped him into the car.
- (6) They sprayed the paint onto the wall.

The *semantics* associated with the caused-motion construction in English is roughly the following: X CAUSES Y TO MOVE Z, that is, the causer argument causes the theme argument to move along a path indicated by the directional prepositional phrase. Goldberg (1995: 152) claims that "such a construction must be specified in the grammar to account for certain cases in which the semantic interpretation cannot plausibly be attributed to the main verb". Likewise, there are some cases when the semantics of the construction is not inferred from the lexical elements which occur in it.

The semantics 'X CAUSES Y to MOVE Z' exemplified in (7a) below is considered to be the central sense of the caused-motion construction, for the verb entails motion. In the Romanian version of the caused-motion construction

(7b), ‘manner’ is expressed by a subordinate clause, unlike English, which encodes both ‘manner’ and ‘cause’ in the verb.

(7a) The man shouldered Sam to the ground.

(7b) Omul l-a trântit pe Sam la pământ, împingându-l cu umărul.

From the comparison of the English example with its Romanian version, we can conclude that English encodes ‘cause’ and ‘manner’ in the verb and ‘path’ in the prepositional phrase, while Romanian encodes ‘cause’ and ‘motion’ in the first verb and ‘manner’ in the second verb (the non-finite ‘gerunziu’).

This conclusion confirms the view according to which Romance languages (e.g. Romanian) belong to the class of verb-framed languages and English belongs to satellite-framed languages.

3. Related senses associated with the caused-motion construction.

Besides the basic sense of the caused-motion construction, Goldberg (1995: 161-162) discusses four extended categories of related senses:

The first extension differs from the central sense, in that motion is not strictly entailed; only if the conditions of satisfaction of the predicate are met, is motion involved. Examples include verbs that are force dynamic verbs that encode a communicative act and express directives such as persuasion (8), request (9) and invitation (10):

(8) Sally implored Jane into the shop.

In (8) above, Sally imploring Jane into the shop does not necessarily mean that Jane actually moves into the shop. Motion is implied if the conditions of satisfaction designated by the predicate are fulfilled. In example (8), Jane will enter the shop eventually, if the persuasion is satisfied.

(9) Sally asked him into the cottage.

Likewise, if the request in (9) is satisfied, the person will enter the cottage.

(10) Sally invited him into the car.

Similarly, the invitation in (10) is satisfied if the person gets into the car.

The second extension of the central sense is 'X ENABLES Y TO MOVE Z'. This subset includes verbs that encode the removal of a barrier (e.g. *allow, let, free, release*). This subset is exemplified in (11) and (12) below, which contain verbs that express enablement or permission (*allow, let*):

- (11) The gaoler allowed Allen out of prison.
- (12) They let Allen into their hotel room.

The third subset of constructions which derives from the central sense has the following function: 'X PREVENTS Y from MOVING Comp(Z)'. The path argument 'CompZ' codes the complement of the potential motion. This subset, unlike the previous one, can be described in terms of the force-dynamic schema of imposition of a barrier, causing the patient to stay in a location. It includes verbs, such as *lock, keep, and barricade*. Examples include:

- (13) John locked George into a dark cellar.
- (14) The work kept George at the office.
- (15) Her ex-lover barricaded Jessie out of her own home.

Therefore, (13) above entails that John prevented George from moving *out of* the cellar. Likewise, in (14), the work prevented George from moving out of the office, and (15) implies that Jessie's ex-lover prevented her from entering her house.

The fourth subset includes constructions having the meaning 'X HELPS Y to MOVE Z'. This subset implies continuous assistance to move in a certain direction, as illustrated in the following examples:

- (16) Allen helped Helen into the wheel chair.
- (17) The nurse assisted Mr. Brown out of his bed.
- (18) Helen guided Allen through the cold empty streets.
- (19) Helen invited Allen into her quaint sitting room.
- (20) Helen walked Allen to the bus stop.

4. The relation between caused-motion and resultative constructions

In Goldberg's (1995) approach, caused-motion and resultative constructions are treated distinctly, due to the differing meanings of the two constructions. The resultative construction is associated with a particular argument structure configuration and has its own constructional semantics X CAUSES Y TO BECOME Z, independently of the verbs which instantiate it.

The syntactic form of the resultative construction in English can be represented as follows: NP VP NP AP/PP. Consider for instance:

- (21) Pole shot the bear dead.
- (22) Scot hammered the metal flat.
- (23) Amy talked herself hoarse.
- (24) She kicked the door open.
- (25) He cried himself asleep.

The resultative predicate explains the end of the state of the direct object (patient) as a result of the action performed by the subject (agent).

Goldberg believes that caused-motion and resultative constructions are related by a metaphorical mapping:

... resultatives are understood as coding a metaphorical change of location. The necessary metaphor is a general systematic metaphor that involves understanding a change of state in terms of movement to a new location. The mapping involved is simply this:

motion -> change
location -> state. (Goldberg, 1995: 83)

Goldberg's view is questioned by Boas (2003), who revisits the metaphorical extension issue and shows that there is no need for a metaphorical extension analysis of the caused-motion to the resultative construction in order to account for the data:

Metaphorical interpretation does not automatically have to be represented in terms of a metaphorical link between the two constructions ... the metaphorical interpretation can also be arrived at in terms of more general metaphorical mapping principles that hold for the language in general and are able to map linguistic structures from source to target domains across the entire language. On this view, metaphorical extensions fall out naturally. (Boas, 2003: 95)

Regarding the distinction between caused-motion and resultative constructions, Boas (2003) argues that the patient-test proposed by Goldberg is not always relevant, so he does not find it necessary to posit the existence of two distinct constructions. For instance, the cause-motion construction in 'Joe moved the bottle onto the table' does have a patient argument encoded by 'bottle'.

What Boas stresses instead is that the crucial information whether a verb can occur in a given syntactic frame is contained in the verb's lexical semantic information and does not stem from the construction's contributing specific

meanings to the verb. For example, the difference in interpretation between ‘John hit the table’ and ‘John hit the ball across the field’ is due to the distinct conventionalized senses of the verb ‘hit’, i.e. the ‘physical impact’ sense and the so-called ‘sports sense’. Therefore, the sports sense of ‘hit’ is no longer regarded as a product of the fusion of the pure ‘physical force’ sense with the caused motion construction, but as a distinct, related sense of ‘hit’ stored in the lexicon.

In what follows, I shall go deeper into the issue of fusion (the process whereby a verb’s participant roles are integrated with a construction’s argument roles) and then discuss two classes of figurative uses of the caused-motion construction: the first relates to motion without motion verbs and the second refers to figurative motion indicating a change of state.

5. Constraints on the caused-motion construction: the Lexical Constructional Model (LCM) approach

A classical example of an instantiation of the caused-motion construction is (26):

(26) They laughed the poor guy out of the room.

In order to understand how an intransitive, non-motion verb can participate in the caused-motion construction such as the instantiation in (26), we have to understand the way internal and external constraints license lexical-constructional integration or fusion. Jackendoff (1990) uses the term ‘fusion’ to designate the combining of semantic constraints on distinct but coindexed slots within a given lexical entry, while Goldberg (1995: 50) uses it to capture “the simultaneous semantic constraints on the participant roles associated with the verb and the argument roles of the construction”.

Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2008), the founders of the Lexical Constructional Model (LCM), a cognitively-oriented constructionist approach, replace Goldberg’s term of ‘fusion’ by the term ‘lexical constructional subsumption’, which they define as “the principle-regulated fusion of a lexical template into a higher-level constructional pattern”.

In the Lexical Constructional Model (LCM) *lexical templates* are “low-level semantic representations of the syntactically relevant content of predicates which capture lexical structure. *Constructional templates* are “high level or abstract semantic representations of syntactically relevant meaning elements

abstracted away from multiple lower-level representations”. The LCM recognizes a number of constructional types, such as the caused-motion construction, the resultative construction, and the benefactive construction.

The LCM sees lexical constructional integration as a cognitive process that is constrained by a number of internal and external principles. *Internal constraints* refer to the metalinguistic units encoded in a lexical representation, while *external constraints* invoke higher conceptual and cognitive mechanism like high level metaphoric and metonymic operations.

High level metaphor underlies subcategorical conversion processes, such as the change of a verb with a prepositional complement (e.g. *laughed at someone*) into a purely transitive verb (e.g. *laugh someone*). A sentence like *Peter laughed John out of the office* can be understood by analogy with *Peter kicked John out of the office*. The mapping at work is the high level metaphor ‘EXPERIENTIAL ACTION IS EFFECTUAL ACTION’ (i.e. an action that has a direct physical effect on the object). High level metonymy has also been found to motivate categorial and subcategorial conversions processes. For example, the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION motivates the categorial conversion of a noun into a verb (*He hammered the nail into the wall*).

5.1. Real motion without motion verbs

Besides example (26), other instantiations of the caused-motion construction, where motion is expressed, but no motion verb is used are given below:

- (27) Sam frightened Bobby under the bed.
- (28) The students shouted him out of the lecture hall.
- (29) She winked him into her bedroom.

Regarding the verb ‘frighten’, Goldberg (1995: 166) observes that, although it refers to a psychological state, it does not entail the existence of a cognitive decision, as it can apply equally well to rodents, as in ‘Sam frightened/coaxed /lured the mouse out of its hiding place’. As for the verb ‘shout’ in (28), I believe it expresses an activity performed with the *intention* of causing the motion of the theme argument out of the present location. In (29), like in (27), the path of motion is more specific, presumably because the causing event and the pragmatic context determine the entire path of motion.

Besides the high level metaphor ‘EXPERIENTIAL ACTION IS EFFECTUAL ACTION’, Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2008) identify other

high level metaphors that constrain lexical-constructural subsumption. For example, in (30 a), the metaphor COMMUNICATIVE ACTION IS EFFECTUAL ACTION licenses a subcategorical conversion process, whereby the receiver of the message is seen as if directly affected by the action of talking rather than as the goal of the message:

- (30) a. Firefighters coaxed the man down from the roof.
b. She lured him into the room..
c. *Sam convinced/persuaded him into the room.
d. Sam convinced/ persuaded me to go into the room.

Semantically related verbs, such as ‘convince’ and ‘persuade’ (30c), do not appear in the caused-motion construction. Goldberg (1995) finds examples such as ‘Sam convinced /persuaded //instructed/encouraged him into the room’ unacceptable. However, verbs such as ‘coax’ and ‘lure’ do appear (30 a, 30 b). The explanation lies in the existence of a cognitive decision made by the entity denoted by the direct object. This cognitive decision mediates between the causing event and the entailed motion. Example (30d) shows that it is possible to use the verbs ‘convince’ and ‘persuade’ in a caused motion sense, without making direct use of the caused motion construction. This constraint does not apply in cases of figurative motion to which we turn in the next section.

5.2 Figurative motion indicating a change of state

A further interesting issue to discuss is the difference, if any, between the caused motion construction (31a) and the object + infinitive construction (31b):

- (31) a. Sam persuaded me into business.
b. Sam persuaded me to go into business.

While (31a) instantiates a figurative use of the caused-motion construction, (31b) is a realization of the object + infinitive construction. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2010) argue that the former, focusing on the result (the speaker goes into business), contrasts with the latter, which focuses on the process of the speaker doing whatever is necessary to become a business person.

The strongly resultative character of the caused-motion construction, obvious in figurative uses such as ‘He scared me out of my wits’, can be better understood by using high level metaphors.

A high level metaphor which accounts for the adaptation of the lexical meaning of the verb to the constructional meaning is AN ACTIVITY IS AN EFFECTUAL ACCOMPLISHMENT. In (32) this metaphor allows us to interpret the originally intransitive predicate ‘drink’ in terms of a transitive structure of the ‘actor – reflexive object’ kind:

(32) He drank himself into a stupor.

The high level metaphor AN EMOTIONAL STATE IS AN EFFECTUAL ACTION underlies a sentence like (34), where the sensor is treated as an effector and the phenomenon as an effectee:

(33) Peter loved Mary back into life.

5.3. Metaphorical motion with motion verbs

Uses of the caused-motion construction which illustrate the case where there is a caused-motion verb but there is no real motion, i.e. caused-motion is figuratively used to express a change of state, include in the following:

- (34) She drove me into a depression.
- (35) His words shook her out of her bad mood.
- (36) The work pushed him to the brink of insanity.
- (37) The discovery threw her into a state of great excitement.
- (38) A terrible noise pulled him out of his thoughts.
- (39) The news quickly knocked her out of her complacency.

So far we have seen that in the LCM, external constraining factors on the lexical-constructional fusion process are conceptual and cognitive operations (e.g. high level metaphorical mappings) that affect the subsumption process (by entailing aktionsart changes).

In what follows, I shall discuss internal constraints on lexical-constructional subsumption. Internal constraints specify the conditions under which a lexical template may modify its internal configuration.

Internal constraints refer to the semantic properties of lexical and constructional templates and do not affect the aktionsart (i.e. the inherent temporal properties) of the predicate. Very briefly, internal constraints refer to metalinguistic units encoded in a lexical representation. For example, the lexical representation of ‘persuade’ is [do (x) CAUSE [think’ (y, z)], where x, y, z represent the three arguments that have syntactic visibility and ‘think’

represents the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) primitive. ‘Persuade’ may refer to a mental disposition regarding a possible action in the future as in (30d).

The most representative internal constraints are Full Matching, Predicate-Argument Conditioning and Internal Variable Conditioning (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal, 2009). Full Matching relates to the conditions for a lexical template to be regarded as internally compatible with or in need to be adapted to a constructional template. It stipulates that there must be full identification of variables, subevents, and operators between the lexical template and the constructional template. For instance, the predicate ‘break’ can take part in the effectual variety of the transitive construction, because it shares with the construction the relevant elements of structure, i.e. an effectual action that causes a change of state.

Predicate-Argument Conditioning and Internal Variable Conditioning deal with the instantiation conditions of constructional variables.

Predicate-Argument Conditioning refers to cases in which the lexical template can place restrictions on the kind of instantiating element that we can have for a constructional argument. For example, in the caused-motion construction with the structure ‘X-predicate-Y-Z’, where Y is an NP and Z is a PP, after the predicate and PP slots have been filled in, this choice constrains the kind of Y element that we can have. So, in *She drove me into a depression*, the Y element has been realized by a human verb role; we cannot have a non-human element (cf. **She drove the cobblestones into a depression*).

Internal Variable Conditioning arises from the internal configuration of the lexical template instantiating the predicate slot of a constructional template.

The internal predicate variables place constraints on the nature of both the predicate and constructional arguments. A clear example is supplied by the use of the verb ‘skulk’ in ‘He skulked me into a depression’. The lexical template of the predicate ‘skulk’ contains indications of (a) the manner in which the motion is carried out (i.e. furtively, secretly) and the reason why the motion is carried out in such a manner (i.e. because of fear, shame, and/or cowardice). This specific aspect of the meaning of ‘skulk’ (i.e. the fact that it is caused by feelings of fear, shame and/or cowardice) clashes with the choice of an axiologically positive destination, so that we cannot say **He skulked me into a laugh* or **He skulked me into happiness*. Perez and Pena (2009) state that such cases are accounted for by “pragmatic aspects of what constitutes acceptable human behaviour.” (Perez and Pena, 2009)

To conclude, I can say that internal predicate variables capture world knowledge elements and determine what kind of instantiations the Z argument can have.

6. Conclusions

This paper has discussed the following figurative uses of the caused-motion construction:

- a. motion involved only when the conditions of satisfaction of the predicate are realized (section 3, examples 8-20). Such cases include force dynamic verbs like *verba persuadendi*, *verba permitendi*, *verba impediendi*, *verba assistendi* in which the feature [+ CAUSATIVE] is not central, but secondary;
- b. literal, actual motion, without motion verbs (section 5, examples 26-31);
- c. figurative motion indicating a change of state (section 5, examples 32-33);
- d. metaphorical motion with motion verbs (section 5, examples 34-39).

In relation to the arguments of the caused-motion construction, I have noticed that it is not responsible for selecting the causer argument (the X element) in terms of notions such as agent or natural force (examples 36-40). What does count for the selection of the causer argument is the subject's "force-emitting" properties. Regarding the theme argument (the Y element) allowed in the caused-motion construction, it is linguistically realized as a human entity in most cases. The path argument (the Z element) tends to be axiologically negative (and have instantiations as depression, panic, madness, desperation, apathy, rage, terror), when the lexical template of the predicate (the lexical semantic information attached to the verb) contains indications of specific negative aspects (e.g. verbs such as 'skulk', 'scorn', etc). This is accounted for by the internal constraint called 'internal variable conditioning'.

External constraints, such as high level metaphors (e.g. EXPERIENTIAL MOTION IS EFFECTUAL MOTION, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION IS EFFECTUAL ACTION and AN EMOTIONAL STATE IS AN EFFECTUAL ACTION) seem to operate when verbs that are not independently caused-motion verbs (e.g. *laugh*, *coax*, *love*) are coerced into such a verb class.

References

- Boas, H. Ch.. 2003. *A constructional approach to resultatives*. Stanford CSLI publications.
- Goldberg, A. 1995. *Constructions. A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Goldbert, A. 2003. 'Constructions: a new theoretical approach to language' in *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 7(5), pp. 219--224.
- Gonzalvez-Garcia, F. 2001. "'I found myself led into the path of constructions': A brief overview of how construction-based approaches can furnish new ways of understanding English grammar", in *Recent Approaches to English Grammar*. Gonzalez-Romero L., M. Martinez Vazquez, B. Rodriguez Arrizabalaga and P. Ron Vaz. (eds). Huelva: Grupo de Gramatica Contrastiva, pp. 151-182.
- Mairal, R. and P. Faber. 2007. 'Lexical templates within a functional cognitive theory of meaning,' in *Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics* (5), pp. 137- 172.
- Mairal Usón, R. and F. J. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez. 2009. 'Levels of description and explanation in meaning construction' in *Deconstructing Constructions*. Ch. Butler and J. Martín Arista (eds.). Ámsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp. 153-198.
- Perez Hernandez L. and S. Pena Cervel 2009. 'Pragmatic and Cognitive Constraints on Lexical Constructional Subsumption.' in *Atlantis*. 31 (2), pp. 57-73.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, F. and R. Mairal Uson. 2007. 'High level metaphor and metonymy in meaning construction' in *Aspects of Meaning Construction*. Radden, G., K. Kopcke., T. Berg and P. Siemund (eds.). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp. 33-51.
- Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, F. J. and R. Mairal Usón. 2008. 'Levels of description and constraining factors in meaning construction: an introduction to the Lexical Constructional Model.' in *Folia Linguistica* vol. 42(2), pp. 355-400.
- Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, F. J. and R. Mairal Usón. 2010. 'Constraints on syntactic alternation: lexical-constructional subsumption in the Lexical-Constructional Model' in *Morphosyntactic Alternations in English. Functional and Cognitive Perspectives*. P. Guerrero. (ed.). Equinox; forthcoming.

Notes on the author

Mariana Neagu has been an Associate-Professor of English Language and Linguistics in the Department of English at 'Dunărea de Jos' University of Galați, Romania, since 2001. She teaches graduate courses on Phonology, Semantics, Text Typology and Cognitive Linguistics, as well as an MA course on the Translation of Metaphor. Her research interests center on the areas of semantics, cognitivist and constructionist approaches.

VERBS IN RESULTATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

IMOLA-ÁGNES FARKAS

University of Cluj-Napoca

***Abstract:** The aim of the present paper is to analyze the type of verbs English and Romanian resultative constructions can be built on. The paper covers this domain from Vendler's (1967) aspectual classification of verbs to Ramchand's (2008) l-syntax analysis, shedding some light on the basic difference between English and Romanian resultatives.*

***Key words:** accomplishment-type verb, achievement-type verb, activity-type verb, event structure, l-syntax*

1. Introduction

Verbs, as argument-taking elements, show extremely complex sets of properties. As such, native speakers can make subtle judgments concerning the occurrence of verbs with a range of possible combinations of arguments and adjuncts in various syntactic expressions. For instance, speakers of English know which diathesis alternations verbs may participate in. In this sense, they know that verbs such as *spray* and *load* may express their arguments in two different ways, displaying the so-called locative alternation; but they also know that some verbs, like *fill* and *cover*, although apparently closely related to the previous verbs, do not allow both options. In the same way, speakers of English know whether a verb may participate in transitivity alternations found in English. There are verbs, like *break* and *freeze*, which allow both transitive and intransitive uses; this possibility, known as the causative-inchoative alternation, is not available for a verb like *appear*. Furthermore, the middle construction is available only to a certain semantically defined class of verbs: those whose meaning involves the notion of causing a change of state. There are restrictions also in the type of verbs resultative constructions can be built on. The present paper will analyze the difference between the types of verbs licensed in English and Romanian resultative constructions.

The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, I present various approaches to verb classification and explain why I am in favour of

Ramchand's (2008) I-syntax approach. In section 3, I illustrate English and Romanian resultatives, focusing on one of the most important differences between them. Finally, section 4 is one of general conclusions.

2. Approaches to verb classification

Three approaches to verb classification will be presented here. It will hopefully be demonstrated that neither the argument-based classification given in 2.1, nor the aspectual typology presented in 2.2 proves to be the right way of explaining the basic difference between English and Romanian resultative verbs. Instead, Ramchand's (2008) I-syntax approach is adopted and largely discussed in 2.3.

2.1. Argument-based classification

Based on the evidence that certain components of verb meaning determine verb behaviour, Levin (1993:111-276) builds up a system of verbs whose members belong to certain classes on the basis of shared meaning components. Thus, the important theoretical construct is the notion of meaning component, and not the notion of verb class. Class members have in common a range of properties including the possible expression and interpretation of their arguments, as well as the existence of certain morphologically related forms. As far as resultatives are concerned, Levin (1993:101) concludes that a wide range of verbs is found in these constructions, so no specific classes of verbs should be identified. However, there are some clear constraints on these verbs, since, for instance, stative verbs and perception verbs are excluded from this construction.

Resultatives can be grouped according to several criteria related to the syntax and semantics of the matrix verb. As such, there are resultatives built on transitive verbs (1a), intransitively used transitive verbs with non-subcategorized postverbal determiner phrase (henceforth DP)(1b), unaccusative (1c) and unergative verbs (1d):

- (1) a. Mother painted the door white.
- b. The guests drank the teapot empty.
- c. The vase broke into pieces.
- d. The boy shouted the neighbours awake.

Not all of these constructions are possible in Romanian, as illustrated in (2):

- (2) a. Mama a vopsit uşa în alb.
 mother aux paint-pst door in white
 'Mother has painted the door white.'

- b. *Musafiri-i au băut ceainic-ul gol.
 guests-art aux drink-pst teapot-art empty
 ‘The guests have drunk the teapot empty.’
- c. Vaz-a s-a spart in bucăți.
 vase-art refl-aux break-pst in pieces
 ‘The vase has broken into pieces.’
- d. *Băiat-ul a strigat vecini-i treji.
 boy-art aux shout-pst neighbours-art awake-pl. masc
 ‘The boy has shouted the neighbours awake.’

The immediate difference that we notice in the classification of English and Romanian resultative constructions is that in English they can be freely built on all these four types of verbs; whereas in Romanian they can be built only on transitive and unaccusative verbs. In Romanian, as generally in all Romance languages, resultatives are less well represented and they are built around a limited class of verbs. There are no unergative-based resultatives and the class of such structures based on unaccusative verbs is also restricted.

However, this approach does not reflect the real difference between the types of verbs allowed only in English resultatives and the ones allowed both in English and in Romanian. This approach cannot explain why some transitive-based resultatives, like *paint the door red* or *break the window into splinters* do have a direct correspondent in Romanian and why other transitive-based resultatives, like *hammer the metal flat* or *span the sheets dry* do not.

2.2 The aspectual classification of verbs

Rothstein (2004:4-5) argues that lexical aspectual classes are not generalizations over verb meanings, but sets of constraints on how the grammar allows us to individuate events. Telicity and atelicity are properties of VPs and the status of the VP with respect to telicity will depend on the interaction of the meaning of the V with other elements of the VP. It is argued that events are countable entities, they denote sets of events and they are classified into lexical classes depending on the properties of the events in their denotations relative to that particular description. In this sense, lexical aspectual classes are not generalizations over verb meanings, but sets of constraints on how the grammar allows us to individuate events. According to Rothstein (2004:114), ‘states’, ‘activities’, ‘accomplishments’ and ‘achievements’ are properties of verbs,

whereas telicity and atelicity are properties of VPs (a verb cannot be inherently telic or atelic). Thus, a VP like *build a house* is a telic VP, based on an accomplishment verb, whereas *build houses* is an atelic VP, with the same accomplishment verb. In the same way, processes are not inherently telic or atelic, but they are telic or atelic under a particular description. Hence, the same event can be described as *running* (atelic) or *running to the store* (telic).

The roots of this approach are undoubtedly Vendler (1967) and Dowty (1979) on the aspectual classification of verbs into states, activities, accomplishments and achievements, which reflects the properties of the events in their denotation (a fifth class of eventuality has been identified in the literature in the class of the so-called semelfactives, which are instantaneous like achievements, but atelic like activities; therefore, they do not fit neatly into the classification of verbal predicates usually discussed in the literature). In what follows, I shall briefly present these four aspectual classes.

States, like *know*, *love*, *be (curious)* etc., are non-dynamic situations, because we cannot identify stages in their development. The reason why they are excluded from resultatives is that in these constructions the verb must necessarily affect the object, as noted in Simpson (1983:146) and resultatives involve culminations. For an event to have a culmination, it requires that it be non-static, but states are non-dynamic situations. They are static and no developmental structure can be imposed on them, as they do not and cannot have culminations.

Activities, like *run*, *walk in the park*, *laugh* etc., are open-ended processes, which can be analyzed into stages. They denote situations where a change occurs, but without manifesting any inherent ending; it is virtually possible for such events to go on indefinitely. The notion of completion is irrelevant in this case, because activities stop, but do not finish.

Accomplishments, like *eat a sandwich*, *drink a glass of wine*, *build a house*, are changing situations with an intrinsic natural endpoint. They lexicalize the result of the action denoted by the verb; they are activities which move toward a culmination. The notion of completion is essential in these verbs, as they finish or are completed.

Achievements, like *find*, *reach the top*, *notice*, *realize* etc., are near-instantaneous events which are over as soon as they have begun. They are (minimal) changes of state not associated with a preceding activity. Similarly to accomplishments, they have a natural intrinsic endpoint, which is determined by

the description of the eventuality. What is important for my research is that verbs of change-of-state are considered accomplishment or achievement-type verbs.

That activity-type verbs are open-ended processes where a change occurs, but without manifesting any inherent ending (as opposed to accomplishment- and achievement-type verbs, which do have a natural intrinsic endpoint) is also represented in the event structure of these verbs. Activity-type verbs are assigned the simple event structure given in (3a), whereas accomplishment-type verbs are generally assigned a complex event structure involving an abstract *STATE* or *PLACE* event besides the event of action, as illustrated in (3b). Achievement-type verbs are assigned the structure illustrated in (3c):

- (3) a. [x ACT]
 b. [[x act] CAUSE [BECOME [y <STATE/PLACE>]]]
 c. [become [x <STATE/PLACE>]]
 (Rappaport Hovav & Levin 1998:104)

Accomplishment- and achievement-type verbs lexicalize the result of the action denoted by the verb; thus, adding a result predicate to such a (change-of-state) verb would only mean adding a result phrase, which only further specifies the change already lexicalized by the verb. The fact that accomplishment-type verbs, contrary to activity-type verbs allow only such a result predicate is supported exactly by the event structure evidence. In the case of an accomplishment-type verb, like *paint*, where the template associated with it cannot be augmented further, no other achieved state can be added to a sentence with this verb, except result phrases, which would only specify/lexicalize the *STATE* incorporated in the meaning of the verb. With the transitive V *paint* all that the attached sentence-final predicate could express in a resultative configuration is the lexicalization of this painted state, namely a color, but not the lexicalization of a change of state, like *to pieces*. The only case where it is possible to use the result predicate *into pieces* with the V *paint* is when this verb is intransitively used with a non-subcategorized postverbal DP, like in *paint the brush to pieces*.


My approach refuses the purely lexical/aspectual approach and adopts the more recent, l-syntax approach according to which the distinctions between different verb types are built into the syntax. More specifically, we focus on Ramchand's (2008) l-syntax approach. The basic issue is that whereas English freely allows [init, proc], as well as [(init), proc, res] verbs in resultatives (which in the Vendlerian terminology correspond to activity-, respectively

accomplishment- and achievement-type verbs), Romanian mostly allows [(init), proc, res]-based resultatives (accomplishment and achievement-type verbs). This approach is presented in more detail in the following subsection.

2. 3. The I-syntax approach

According to Ramchand (2008:38-42), there is a structural format given for eventive predicates in which telicity is structurally expressed. All VPs are broken down into smaller parts and the distinctions between different verb types are built into the syntax. The structure is built on thematic participants, like INITIATOR/CAUSER, UNDERGOER, RESULTEE, PATH, RESULT-RHEME and three subevental components, like *initP*, *procP* and *resP*. This is illustrated in (4), a structure that applies to all natural languages:

4) vP (*initP*) - causing subevent



Ramchand (2008:107)

According to this approach different lexical verbs project different syntactic structures; that is, the lexical semantics of the verbs is syntactically

represented. The analysis relies on Dowty's (1979) decomposition approach, according to which the semantic representation of sentences is derived by means of aspectual operators, like DO, CAUSE and BECOME. Whereas in Dowty these operators are part of the lexical representation of the verb, in Ramchand it is assumed that decomposition is in the syntax. The event structure and the event participants are directly represented in syntax and their semantics is built up compositionally as opposed to being explicitly stated in the lexical entries of verbs. Within this syntax the information classically seen to reside within lexical items is decomposed into a set of distinct categories with specific syntactic and semantic modes of combination.


The connection to traditional aspectual classes goes as follows: activity-type verbs correspond to either [init, proc] or [proc] verbs, accomplishment-type verbs are [init, proc] verbs with incremental theme or PATH complements and achievement-type verbs are [init, proc, res] or [proc, res] verbs. What is essential to my approach is that activity-type verbs, as opposed to accomplishment and achievement-type verbs do not contain the *resP* in their structure. A note is in order here: some verbs cannot be homogeneously classified into one class or another. Verbs such as *wipe*, *polish* seem to have both an [init, proc] as well as an [init, proc, res] reading, as illustrated in (5)

- (5) a. John wiped the table/scrubbed the floor for fifteen minutes.
b. John wiped the table/scrubbed the floor in fifteen minutes.


In (5a) the verb denotes a set of simple activity events. The verb in this use does not necessarily entail a resulting state in the contacted surface; the emphasis is on the activity of wiping/scrubbing. In (5b) the V denotes a set of complex accomplishment eventualities, each of which consists of an activity eventuality incrementally related to a BECOME event. On this reading, the sentence presents an event with a natural final endpoint.

If we compare an [init, proc]-based adjective phrase (henceforth AP) resultative, illustrated in (6), with an [init, proc, res]-based AP resultative, illustrated in (7), one can see that the basic difference between these two types of constructions is the difference between the type of the matrix verb:

6) vP (*initP*)



Ramchand (2008:127)



Ramchand (2008: 128)

The difference between these two structures is the following: *hammer* is an [init, proc]-type of verb, hence, in resultatives, it allows the *res* functional head to be phonologically silent; whereas *break* is an [init, proc, res]-type of verb, where the idea of change is incorporated in the verb by this functional head and all the added result predicate does is to further specify this change. In Romanian, as, in most Romance languages, there are mostly resultatives of this latter type. We will discuss this in detail in the next section of the paper.

3. Differences between English and Romanian resultative verbs

English allows a large variety of [init, proc] as well as [init, proc, res]-type of verbs in resultative constructions, like *gallop the horse lame*, *dance one's feet sore*, *sing oneself hoarse*, *cry oneself to sleep*, respectively *colour the hair black*, *kill somebody dead*, *burn the toast black*.

As opposed to this, in Romanian there are mostly resultatives based on change-of-state [init, proc, res]-type of verbs, like *a crește* ‘grow’, *a (se) zdrobi* ‘smash’, *a sfărâma* ‘shatter’, *a (se) rupe* ‘tear’, *a (se) sparge* ‘break’, *a fărâmița* ‘crumble’, *a tăia* ‘cut’, *a măcina* ‘grind’, *a vopsi* ‘paint’ etc. This is illustrated in the following:

- (8) a. Ea a măcinat cafeaua pudră.
 she AUX grind-PST coffee-ART powder.
 ‘She has ground the coffee into powder.’
- b. Maria s-a vopsit blondă. GALR (2005: 170)
 Mary REFL-AUX dye-PST blonde-FEM
 ‘Mary has dyed her hair blonde.’

Evidence in favour of the lexical entailment of the result predicate in the meaning of the verb is supported by the definition of the matrix verbs Romanian resultatives can be built on. As such, *a crește* ‘grow’ is defined as *a se mări* ‘to grow’, *a deveni mai mare* ‘to become bigger’ and the possible resultatives with this verb are *apele au crescut mari* ‘waters have grown big’ and *ea a crescut înaltă* ‘she has grown tall’. Although these structures are not considered as redundant as their Italian correspondents, cf. Napoli (1992:72), there is evidence that the sentence-final predicate is lexically entailed in the meaning of the verb. Other examples are the verb *a rupe* ‘tear’, defined as *a face bucăți* ‘to make pieces’ and the corresponding resultative *a rupe ceva în bucăți* ‘tear something into pieces’, respectively the verb *a sparge* ‘break’, defined as *a preface în bucăți/cioburi* ‘to make in pieces/splinters’ and the corresponding resultative *a sparge geamul în cioburi* ‘break the window into splinters’. <http://dexonline.ro/>. Two apparent exceptions, where the main verb is not necessarily a change-of-state [init, proc, res]-type of verb, are *a bate albușul spumă* ‘beat the egg whites until foamy’ and *a fierbe ouăle tari* ‘boil the eggs hard’.

With this approach, I would also like to change the view generally adopted in the literature about the lack of AP resultatives in Romanian. The basic issue is that there are AP resultatives in Romanian, but only when they are built on change-of-state [init, proc, res]-type of verbs.

4. Conclusion

In the present paper, I have focused my attention on verb types licensed in English and Romanian resultative constructions. I have shown that neither

the argument-based classification, nor the aspectual one can shed light on the real difference between the resultative verbs in these two languages. Instead, I have opted for Ramchand's (2008) I-syntax approach. The general conclusion is that, whereas English freely licenses [init, proc] as well as [init, proc, res]-type of verbs in resultative constructions, Romanian mostly licenses change-of-state [init, proc, res] verbs in the correspondent constructions.

References

- Dowty, D. 1979. *Word Meaning and Montague Grammar*. London: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Institutul de Lingvistică. 2005. *Gramatica limbii române GALR*. Vol. II. București: Editura Academiei Române.
- Levin, B. 1993. *English Verb Classes and Alternations*. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Napoli, D. J. 1992. 'Secondary resultative predicates in Italian' in *Journal of Linguistics*. 28, pp. 53-90.
- Ramchand, G. 2008. *Verb Meaning and the Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rappaport Hovav, M. and B. Levin. 1998. 'Building Verb Meanings' in *The Projection of Arguments*. M. Butt and W. Geuder (eds.). Stanford: CSLI Publications.
- Rothstein, S. 2004. *Structuring Events. A Study in the Semantics of Lexical Aspect*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Simpson, J. 1983. 'Resultatives' in *Papers in lexical-functional grammar*. L. Levin; M. Rappaport Hovav and A. Zaenen (eds.). Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club.
- Vendler, Z. 1967. *Linguistics in Philosophy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- <http://dexonline.ro/>

Notes on the author

Imola-Ágnes Farkas is interested in generative grammar and comparative/contrastive syntax, which she has studied at 'Babeș-Bolyai' University, Cluj-Napoca and at the University of Geneva. She is pursuing her PhD thesis on resultative constructions in English and Romanian. She has participated in several conferences in Romania and abroad.

LEXICAL SPECIFICATION AND ARGUMENT STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH AND SERBIAN SOUND EMISSION VERBS

NATAŠA MILIVOJEVIĆ

University of Novi Sad

***Abstract:** The paper addresses the question of what semantic properties lexicalized in verbs determine their syntactic behavior with subjects as (non)-agents in unaccusative motion constructions. Special attention is devoted to English and Serbian verbs of emission (specifically verbs of sound and partly verbs of light emission), regarding their potential to surface as verbs of motion and combine with directional phrases within motion event constructions.*

***Key words:** animacy, argument structure, lexical specification, motion event, sound emission, teleology.*

1. Introduction

The aim of my paper is to analyse English and Serbian in contrast considering the effects of *animacy* in external argument position within motion event constructions, when *verbs of sound emission* combine with *path arguments* in directed motion formal syntactic structures. This will be done considering both *argument structure* and *lexical specification* of the relevant verb class, when verbs of emission surface in these constructions. The class of verbs under investigation here are verbs of sound emission (in further text VSE), initially established as a semantically based verb class in English by Beth Levin (1993:233-238). For the class of Serbian verbs of sound emission see Milivojević 2007 and Arsenijević & Milivojević 2009. The overview of the paper is as follows:

(a) The first part of the paper offers the theoretical background of the analysis. English and Serbian relevant verb classes (VSE) will be established on the levels of lexical and contextual equivalency. The syntactic and semantic potential of VSE to surface in directed motion constructions in English and Serbian will be examined and discussed.

(b) The next section of the paper will compare the specific syntactic and semantic features of these constructions in English in Serbian, paying additional

attention to both external arguments and *animacy effects* as means of formal restrictions on the construction realization and arguments internal to the verb, namely the path arguments. The projected arguments structures to relevant verbs will be analyzed against the initial lexical specifications of the verbs of (sound) emission.

(c) The closing part of the paper puts forth wider theoretical implications of the research regarding the theoretically based semantic V classes, Talmy's language typology, and the practical and empirically confirmed availability of such constructions in specific languages.

2. Theoretical Background

The dominant theoretical background of the investigation is the proposal made by Leonard Talmy on the two-way language typology according to motion expression. Talmy (1975, 1985, 1991, 2000) had proposed that languages fall into two main types, on the basis of where the *path* is represented in a sentence expressing a *motion event* - or, more generally, where the core schema is represented in a sentence expressing a macro-event (allowing for it to consist of at least two micro events or *subevents*). This means that another semantic component, the *co-event* - usually the manner or the cause of the motion - might show up in a particular constituent other than the one occupied by the path. In this two-category typology, if the path is characteristically represented in the main verb or verb root of a sentence, the language is *verb framed*, but if it is characteristically represented in the satellite or in a *P element*, such as prepositional phrase, case inflection, etc. (cf Gehrke (2008) for further elaboration), the language is *satellite* framed. For example:

- | | | | | |
|-----|----|-------------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| (1) | a. | The truck | rumbled | through the gate. (English) |
| | b. | Kamion
truck | je tutnjao
is rumbled | ulicom. (Serbian)
down the street |
| | c. | Je suis entré
I am entered | dans
in | la maison (en boitant)
the house (in limping) |
| | d. | La botela
the bottle | entro a
entered in to | la cueva flotando.
the cave (floating) |

In the examples 1a and 1b, that is in the English sentence as well as in the Serbian one, what the verb lexicalizes is the manner of movement of the *figure* within the given directed motion construction. In 1b and 1c. French and Spanish example respectively, the verbs lexicalizes the *path* (in wider terms the *scale*) of movement of the figure, with the manner modification expressed by the satellite. Or, in more formal terms, the verbs in 1a and 1b *conflate* motion and manner, while verbs in 1c and 1d conflate motion and path.

What is interesting about sentences 1a and 1b is that the verbs surfacing as verbs of movement (or motion) are in fact *verbs of sound emission*. We look here at the emission verb class as it is outlined in Levin (1993: 233-238), and at their Serbian (lexical) equivalents. Verbs of sound emission (VSE) are a subset of verbs of a larger class of emission verbs, along with verbs of light, smell and substance emission. They describe either the emission or production of sound. They are differentiated from each other by the physical properties of the sound that they lexicalize, as well as by its manner of production. Some of these verbs also figure among the verbs of manner of speaking, verbs of sounds made by animals or verbs of impact. They are generally intransitive, but may sometimes appear with an object (especially with *cognates*) and they allow for a certain predefined range of *external arguments* to the verb. English verbs of sound emission are the following:

applaud, babble, bang, beat, beep, bellow, blare, blast, bleat, boom, bubble, burble, burr, buzz, chatter, chime, chink, chirr, chitter, chug, clack, clang, clank, clap, clash, clatter, click, cling, clink, clop, clump, chunk, crack, crackle, crash, creak, crepitate, crunch, cry, ding, dong, dingdong, drone, explode, fizz, fizzle, groan, growl, guggle, gurgle, hiss, hoot, howl, hum, jangle, jingle, knell, knock, lilt, moan, murmur, patter, peal, ping, pink, pipe, plonk, plop, plunk, pop, purr, putter, rap, rasp, rattle, ring, roar, roll, rumble, rustle, scream, screech, shriek, shrill, sing, sizzle, snap, splash, splosh, splutter, sputter, squawk, squeak, squeal, squelch, strike, strum, swish, swash, swoosh, thrum, thud, thump, thunder, tick, ting, tinkle, toll, tootle, trill, trumpet, twang, ululate, vroom, wail, wheeze, whine, whir, whish, whistle, whoop, whoosh, whump, zing. (The class contains 124 verbs.)

The present class is a revised verb class initially established by Levin (1993: 234-237). Certain verbs have been left out due to infrequent use, while some new verbs have been added to the class used as the basis of the present research. The English data were checked against the Wordnet online database for English (available at <http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn>). English verbs which were left out from the original class are : *blat, chir, clomp, plink,*

think. English verbs added to the original verb class through Wordnet are: *chirr, clop, dingdong, drone, guggle, gurgle, splosh, strum, swash, whoop*.

I base my analysis for Serbian on the class of Serbian lexical equivalents of Levin's class and on the corpus of contextualized V lexemes (a sentential corpus), made up of both literary language sentential examples, and sentential examples from the Corpus of Contemporary Serbian. I specifically look at those members of the class which are found with directional phrases and investigate Serbian VPs involving a sound emission component with respect to their capacity to combine with directional phrases and receive motion interpretation. The Serbian verbs of sound emission are:

*apludirati blebetati blejati brbljati brektati brujati bubnuti bučati ciknuti
cviljeti cvoknuti cvokotati cvrčati cvrkutati čangrljati čavrljati čegrtati čučoriti
ćurlikati dahtati dobovati drečati dreknuti drndati eksplodirati fijukati fiskati
frfljati grgotati grmjati grokati grunuti gruvati gudjeti hripati hroptati hrskati
hućati hujati izbrbljati izlupati izviždati ječati jeknuti klepetati klokotati
kloparati klopotati krckati krcnuti krčati kričati kriještati krkljati kucati lupiti
lupnuti meketati mrmoriti odjekivati odzvanjati odzvoniti oriti se otkucati pisnuti
pištati pljeskati pljesnuti pljusnuti pozvoniti praskati prohujati promrmoriti
prošištati prozviždati prožuboriti prštati pucati pucarati puckati pucketati
pucnuti pući rastrubiti režati rikati romoriti soptati stenjati strugati svirati
šištati škljocati škljocnuti škripati šljapati šljapkati štektati štropotati šumjeti
šuškati šuštati tandrkatati treskati tresnuti treštati trubiti tuliti tutnjati urlati
uzdisati vrčati vrisnuti zagrmeti zalupiti se zaštektati zavijati zazvečati zujati
zveckati zvečati zveketati zveknuti zviznuti zviždati zvižducati zvižduknuti zvoniti
zvrndati žagoriti žamoriti žuboriti* (The class contains 134 verbs.)

VSE in English may become *verbs of directed motion*; in such cases, they require a directional phrase as a complement, be it a directional phrase PP or some other XP with a directional (frequently *unaccusative*) interpretation. In this use, they describe the motion of an entity, characterized by the concomitant emission of the sound whose nature is lexicalized in the verb. Contrary to Levin (1993: 234, 236, 237), I claim that verbs of emission other than sound emission may appear with directional phrases in English with both animate and inanimate subjects in external argument position (2a is an example of VSE, while 2b-d are examples of verbs of light emission (VLE)):

- (2)
 - a. The elevator whizzed upward.
 - b. The light flashed into the sky.
 - c. The firefly flickered into the room.
 - d. The paint oozed across the table.

What is more, I claim that there is more freedom along a *structural continuum* of motion expression than is initially proposed in Levin’s projectionalist approach. The same kind of construction variety is present in Serbian as well:

- (3) a. Svitac je svetlucao preko polja.
the firefly is sparkled across the field
- b. Voda je izbijala ispod belog kamena.
water is beat.out under white stone

This kind of explanation also offers empirical evidence against some constructional approaches (see Goldberg and Jackendoff 2004, Culicover and Jackendoff 2005 among others), where it is claimed that directed motion constructions with (sound) emission verbs are “English specific”, also ruling out this type of formal structure with any other emission type verb.

3. Syntactic and Semantic Features

Generally, VSE are intransitive verbs, taking the emitter argument as subject (allowing both animate - human or not - and inanimate subjects, but disallowing abstract nouns in this position). According to Levin, in English these verbs take a very limited range of subjects, since the verbs in a sense describe (or refer to) the intrinsic properties of the sound that they lexicalize. Another generalization I propose as an update on Levin (1993) is that the agents of such verbs must be *teleologically capable* (cf. Folli and Harley 2008) of relevant sound production, rather than be simply animate or volitional. According to Folli and Harley (2008:2), *teleological capability* is the inherent ability of the entity to participate in the eventuality denoted by the predicate, while *animacy* and *agency* are mutually dissociated. What it takes for a non-agentive subject to be teleologically capable is the ability to instigate and/or conduct the emission event on its own, be it a willed or a non-willed action. The relevant notion which distinguishes *agents* from *causers*, for example, is the subject’s *internal teleological capability* of generating the event on its own, from start to finish—not the animacy of the subject. Causers (both animate and inanimate) may trigger the initiation of an event, but do not exercise control over its unfolding, due to their *teleological incapability*. This kind of

formalization actually allows for both animate and inanimate external arguments with VSE in both English and Serbian.

Another important point in our analysis is the definition of the *lexical specification* of the verb. Lexical specification is the internal semantic content of the verb lexeme, which triggers its argument structure realization. In terms of motion events, what is relevant is whether or not a certain verb will project both relevant arguments to the construction: agent and path argument. According to Folli and Harley (2006:24), VSE are the so-called *minus path verbs* (-path Vs), which means that their lexical specification does not normally project a path argument. This can be illustrated by Table1:

	+path	-path
+agent	walk, run, swim	<i>whistle, hiss, sing</i>
-agent	roll, float, slide	shudder, tremble

What the table actually shows is that for a VSE to receive a directed motion interpretation, the lexical specification of the verb has to be changed, or shifted into a lexical specification of the verb of directed motion, such as *walk* or *run*. In other words, when combining with a prepositional path argument, VSE becomes a directed motion verb.

The following English and Serbian examples were taken from English and Serbian online corpora as illustrations of the above mentioned facts, namely The British National Corpus (BNC) (available at <http://corpus.byu.edu/bnc/in>) (4), and the The Corpus of Contemporary Serbian (available at <http://www.korpus.matf.bg.ac.yu/korpus/login.php>) in (5) :

(4) a. As the tramcars *rattled*, *roared* and *clanged* along Norfolk Street, 60 yards or so from our tenement building, and horse-driven carts *rumbled* by, the kids of the street were playing, shouting, yelling --; or wiping snotters away with the sweat. It was after school, 4.30 on a nice afternoon...

b. Outside, the rain *gurgled* in shining gutters.

c. Thick, black rain clouds massed in the sky and, as I fell asleep, rattling raindrops *pattered* against the wooden shutters.

d. A nurse *rustled* into the tiny space. Kate could smell Pears soap and the smell brought back memories of when she had been younger.

(5) a. ...pajtaš iz Italije , prešao pešaka granicu . Ja to nisam znala , odradim lepo svoj posao , a njega zatvore . Sledeći dan *škripe* kočnice iza čoška , Giška izleće iz kola i pravo pred mene ...

'breaks squeal around the corner'

- b. Dok automobil *stenje* u krivinama koje su toliko spiralne da se čak ne bi mogle uporediti ni sa zavrtanjem , kroz maglu koja dočarava visoke planinske vrhove...
'the car gasps through the curves'
- c. Nes je to primio kao još jedan dobar znak . Slušao je trenutak , dva , kako voda *pršti* po kadi , a onda je obukao čistu belu košulju i izvadio novac koji je iz pretinca u kolima prebacio u jedan od svojih kofera...
'water is splashing in the tub'
- d. Za to vreme voz je , dahćući , puštajući naglo paru, *kloparao* visokim nasipom između požutelih kukuruznih polja , između retkih riđih šuma , između talasastih livada...
'the train clatters uphill'

Verbs of light emission (VLE), on the other hand, relate to the emission of light, and some of them (both in English and in Serbian) allow a transitive use with a causative interpretation, as well as locative alternations. I also want to claim here that they may denote either *fictional* or *real* motion (possibly also in combination with directional prepositional phrases to denote pure light emission along a projected scale) both in English (examples are given in 6) and in Serbian (examples are given in 7). The examples below were also extracted from the online corpora mentioned in the previous section of the paper:

- (6) a. If we could have *beamed*, her down like in Star Trek, it would have been all right, but she just couldn't cope with getting on a plane or a boat.
b. With binoculars the chances are obviously much less, but one never knows --; and it is true that in 1885 a supernova *blazed* out in the Andromeda Spiral and almost reached naked-eye visibility.
c. The mass of new, hot rock forcing its way up through the crater floor had both helped to displace the water from the crater, and heated it up to nearly boiling point, so it was a scalding torrent that *flashed* down the valley, travelling at a speed of something like ninety kilometres an hour.
d. His double-headed axe *flickered* in his powerful hands, light as a birch twig.
- (7) a. Kiša je lila pre neko veče, *caklio se* asfalt u Knez - Mihailovoj ulici , kao pokisli golubovi sklanjali su se prolaznici u kafanu Kolarac.
'asphalt was glowing on the street'
b. A nad okeanom *treperi*, i onih dana prepunih sunca , neka snena izmaglica, kao prozirni plašt pare.
'the mist flickers above the ocean'
c. Pođe, pođe, dođe na mesto gde se skreće lepotici. Skrenu. Dođe pred brvnaru. A u brvnari gori veliki oganj i *svetli* kroz prozore.
'the fire is glowing through the windows'

What the English VLE examples in (6) show is that light emission verbs can in fact surface in constructions where they denote directed movement, as in 6a and 6c, or metaphorical motion meaning as in 6b, and finally something like implied movement (either momentary or iterative) as in 6d. The Serbian examples in (7) illustrate the fact that VLE behave similarly to English VLE verbs, allowing for a similar range of motion meanings: implied movement accompanied by light reflection in 7a, 7b and and light emission along the projected path (in other words, the product of the emission, but not the emitter, moves along an unbounded scale) in 7c.

4. Conclusion

What can be concluded from the discussion and the examples so far is that Serbian exhibits a kind of morphosyntactic potential in expressing motion events which is similar to the satellite-framed English. Both verb classes examined so far, namely VSE and VLE in English and in Serbian, will surface in motion constructions, with the manner co-event on the verb, and the path (which in these cases equals the *scale* of motion) expressed by the satellite, with various types of subjects, animate and inanimate alike. In the remainder of the paper, I will illustrate some points of divergence between English and Serbian. Let's take a look at the following set of examples:

- (8)
- | | | | |
|-------------|-----------|------------------|-------------------|
| a. *Peter | yelled | down | the street. |
| b. Jovan | je vikao | niz | ulicu. |
| Jovan | is yelled | down | street |
| c. Metak | je | prozviđao | pored prozora. |
| bullet | is | whistled through | by window |
| d. ??*Metak | je | uzviđao | kroz prozor. |
| bullet | is | whistled. | in through window |

While the English sentence in 8a is ungrammatical, i.e. there is no available motion reading for the VP, the Serbian example is grammatical. Example 8b is in fact ambiguous between two readings, where, in the first one, the animate subject, which is the emitter of the sound, is not moving, while the emitted sound is the *theme* (or the *figure*) of motion, while in the second available reading, both the emitter of the sound and the sound produced are

moving along the path. This is an interesting instance in terms of event structure, showing that Serbian exhibits more freedom in motion event encoding than English does. Examples 8c and 8d show that Serbian sound emission verbs combine more freely with paths implying unbounded scales, than with those with bounded scales (or goals).

The next point in the analysis is illustrated in the following sets of examples:

- (9) a. Peter hammered the metal flat.
b. John slammed the door shut.

The sentences in (9) are the instances of the so-called adjectival resultatives (AP resultatives), or *secondary resultative predicates*. Namely, there is a general correlation between the ability of combining telic, bounded path PPs, with manner of motion verbs and the availability of secondary resultative predicates. Such resultative constructions are generally unavailable in languages that have been classified as verb-framed (cf. Gehrke 2008). Folli and Ramchand (2005:91), for example, note that resultative constructions with adjectival phrases (APs) are grammatical in English (10a) but ungrammatical in Italian (10b).

- (10) a. John broke the vase open.
b. *Gianni ha rotto il vaso aperto.
Gianni has broken the vase open.

The data call for a unified account of the integration of PPs and APs into event structure according to which PPs can be integrated as secondary resultative predicates and thus derive an accomplishment structure under certain conditions. Surprisingly enough, Serbian behaves like verb-framed Italian in this respect. Examples in 11 are instances of such constructions with animate subjects:

- | | | | | | |
|------|-----------|----|---------|-----------------|-----------|
| (11) | a. *Jovan | je | lupio | vrata | otvorena. |
| | Jovan | is | slam | door | open |
| | b. Jovan | je | zalupio | vrata/ vratima. | |
| | Jovan | is | slam.to | door/ with door | |
| | c. Jovan | je | tresnuo | vrata. | |
| | Jovan | is | banged | door | |

d. Jovan	je	zalupio	sušalicu.
Jovan	is	banged.down	phone

There are no constructional Serbian to English equivalents of *AP resultatives* – those sentences will be ruled out as ungrammatical. In terms of semantics and usage, the lack of AP resultatives in Serbian is compensated by prefixes, that is, again by available *P elements*. Gehrke (2008:216) argues that the focus on Talmy’s cross-linguistic variation has to be

shifted away from the restriction on paths expressed on the verb or elsewhere, to the question whether or not an accomplishment structure can be built relying on the integration of a non-verbal predicate into an activity structure.

Given this shift in the analysis, then, Serbian (along with Russian and Czech, according to Gehrke’s data) behaves like a verb-framed language. Furthermore, Beavers et al. (2010) argue that the observed cross-linguistic variation arises primarily from the interaction of motion-independent morphosyntactic and lexical factors. First, while the verb is one of several lexical categories that can encode either manner or path, it is unique among all categories in being the only obligatory element across all clauses that describe motion (since it heads the VP that forms the nucleus of the clause). Second, the semantic component which is not expressed in the verb, if it is not inferrable from context or is unimportant and thus omissible, may (or must) be expressed by some other constituent.

In sum, Talmy’s typology is too coarse-grained to provide a full picture of the way motion events are expressed across different languages. Serbian seems to be more liberal than English in expressing eventualities that involve both motion and sound emission. VP and the directional phrase have somewhat independent argument structures (the agent of one being the theme of the other), but still one line of projection (as only one can have an agent). Verb classes based solely on semantic properties of the verb, excluding the conceptual properties of verb arguments, may not be the best solution to the appropriate description of verb meaning in general, as verbs both incorporate (root meaning) and project (arguments) – some stricter, more formal criteria at syntax-semantics interface may at play.

References

- Arsenijević, B., N. Milivojević. 2009. 'Sound emission and directional phrases in Serbo-Croatian'. Paper presented at SLG 4 & SinFonIJA II (Sarajevo Linguistic Gathering 4 and SinFonIJA 2 Conference), Sarajevo, BiH.
- Beavers, J., B. Levin, S.W. Tham. 2010. 'The Typology of Motion Expressions Revisited' in *Journal of Linguistics* 46, pp. 331-377.
- Folli, R., H. Harley. 2006. 'On the licensing of causatives of directed motion: Waltzing Matilda all over'. In *Studia Linguistica*, 60/ 2, pp. 1-35.
- Folli, R., H. Harley. 2008. 'Teleology and animacy in external arguments' in *Lingua* 188/ 2, pp. 190-202.
- Folli, R., G. Ramchand. 2005. 'Prepositions and Results in Italian and English: an Analysis from Event Decomposition', in *Perspectives on Aspect*. H. Verkyul, H. van Hout and H. de Swartz (eds.). Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 81-105.
- Gehrke, B. 2008. *Ps in Motion: On the Semantics and Syntax of P Elements and Motion Events*. LOT Dissertation Series 184. Utrecht: LOT.
- Goldberg, A., R. Jackendoff. 2004. 'The English Resultative as a Family of Constructions' in *Language* Vol 80/3, pp. 532-568.
- Hay, J., C. Kennedy, B. Levin. 1999. 'Scalar Structure Underlies Telicity in Degree Achievements', in *SALT IX*. Mathews, T. and D. Strolovitch (eds.). Ithaca:CLC Publications, pp. 127-144.
- Levin, B. 1993. *English Verb Classes and Alternations: A Preliminary Investigation*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Milivojević, N. 2007. 'The sound + motion construction in English and Serbian: What happens when headless movement gets loud?' Paper presented at Structures across Cultures Conference (ELLSSAC), Belgrade, Serbia.
- Talmy, L. 1975. 'Semantics and syntax of motion' in *Syntax and Semantics*, vol. 4. J. P. Kimball (ed.). New York: Academic Press, pp. 181-238.
- Talmy, L. 1985. 'Lexicalization patterns: Semantic structure in lexical forms'. in *Language Typology and Syntactic Description Vol. 3: Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon*. T. Shopen (ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-149.
- Talmy, L. 1991. 'Path to realization - via aspect and result' in *Proceedings of BLS 17*, pp. 480-519.
- Talmy, L. 2000. *Toward a Cognitive Semantics: Typology and Process in Concept Structuring*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Notes on the author

Nataša Milivojević is a teaching assistant and PhD student at the Faculty of Philosophy, Department of English, University of Novi Sad. Her interests include contrastive and generative linguistics, formal semantics, in particular event semantics and event structure, syntax-semantics interface and semantic-pragmatic interface. Her authored work, *Meaning at Play with Contrasts of*

Context (Igre značenja i kontrasti konteksta), published in 2008, investigates the principles underlining transfers of meaning. She has mainly worked on the data from Slavic and Germanic languages.

**EPISTEMIC MODALITY:
A CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE COGNITIVE MODELS***

PÉTER PELYVÁS

University of Debrecen

***Abstract:** Cognitive linguistics, with its experience-related background can naturally broaden the view of epistemic modality from the traditional truth-oriented probability judgment to the speaker's assessment of what is going on: a choice between alternative cognitive models. The speaker has to find an appropriate relationship and choose a set of participants from among a number of potential candidates. The paper will analyze linguistic evidence of some processes that may be involved.*

***Key words:** cognitive predicates, epistemic grounding, ICM, 'raising', reference point*

1. Introduction. Formal semantics and modality

When semantics returned to the forefront of linguistic interest around the middle of the 20th century, this was done predominantly on a formal (mainly logical) basis. Apart from external or accidental factors, there was also the theory-internal reason that, following Saussure and later Chomsky, the theoretical linguistics of the time confined its scope of interest to the language system, leaving no room for any serious consideration of the role that language use and the user may have in its formulation.

This applies to a great extent to modality, which was defined entirely in terms of the possible worlds previously found useful in formal logic, although intuition and also more recent studies strongly suggest that it is crucially about relationships among human participants. It is not difficult to see that both natural language and the logical system suffer in this association.

* Work on the present paper was supported by the Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the project OTKA NI 68436 and by the project TÁMOP 4.2.1./B-09/1/KONV-2010-0007.

Formal semanticists often profess their interest in *formal systems*, maintaining that their findings only apply to natural languages to the extent that it conforms to formal languages. There has been little development in this respect in the past decades, although the recent introduction of the notions of *Modal base* and *Ordering source* into formal systems (Giorgi and Pianesi 1997, Tóth 2008) may be a significant move in this direction, since it may be seen as the first steps away from a strictly system-based approach.

Cognitive grammar, to be introduced in the next section, offers more radical solutions to the discrepancies between the two systems referred to above. (Among other things, it resolves the problem of epistemic *must* by postulating a dynamic evolutionary model, based on the speaker's experience (Langacker 1991:240-9), which makes more room for *the actual world* in the system.)

2. The cognitive approach to modality: the grounding predication

Perhaps the most significant property of Langacker's cognitive grammar is that it is admittedly usage-based, a radical break from system linguistics. Modality (called epistemic grounding in this framework) appears as a relationship between the system and its use or users.

The *grounding relationship* is defined as relating (the linguistic expression of) a process or thing (a verb or a noun) to the situation of its use: speaker/hearer knowledge, time and place of utterance, etc. In Langacker's formulation:

An entity is epistemically grounded when its location is specified relative to the speaker and hearer and their spheres of knowledge. For verbs, tense and mood ground an entity epistemically; for nouns, definite/indefinite specifications establish epistemic grounding. Epistemic grounding distinguishes finite verbs and clauses from nonfinite ones, and nominals (noun phrases) from simple nouns. (Langacker 1987:489)

Although we cannot go here into all the necessary detail, it is important to note that the grounding relationship, a product of the reference-point construction and of subjectification, has exceptional semantic (and, consequently, also syntactic) properties. Being a reference point, *the grounding predication* never remains in profile: attention shifts from it to the rest of the predication. In technical terms: the profile determinant is *the grounded head*, cf. Langacker (1991). As suggested in Mortelmans (2002, 2006), Nuyts (2002),

and Pelyvas (2000, 2001a, 2006), this property of the grounding predication, with an extension of Langacker’s original system, can also account for a number of phenomena in the irregular syntactic behaviour of cognitive predicates.

In what follows we will briefly introduce Langacker’s system, indicate possible modifications and extensions in the direction of cognitive predicates and then show how some marked syntactic constructions (e.g. *raising*), possible only or predominantly with cognitive predicates, like *likely* or *know* in the epistemic field, or *order* in the deontic one, can express modality. But this notion of modality is much closer to the *speaker’s choice of a cognitive model* that s/he finds most appropriate for describing a state of affairs (or the modification of this choice), than to the traditional or logical understanding of the term.

2.1. Langacker

Although Langacker’s semantic notion of epistemic grounding as given above is potentially all-inclusive, there is a formal property in his system of grammar that limits the range of possible grounding predications to almost a minimum. The situation is briefly as follows:

- since Tense is a property of the grounding predication (e.g. the modal auxiliary, which is always finite), the complement (grounded head) can never carry it (cannot be finite);
- since the ultimate profile determinant of the clause is the grounded head (cf. the shift of attention associated with reference points described in Section 2 above), this element must profile a process, since the whole clause profiles a process;
- a non-finite verbal form cannot profile a process, since in Langacker’s system it is summarily scanned;
- *the grounded head cannot be finite (cannot have Tense), but cannot be non-finite (summarily scanned)*

This limits the range of possible grounding predications to the English modals (both deontic and epistemic), which characteristically take their complements in the bare infinitival form, which Langacker sees as the only form that is neither finite nor non-finite (the pure verb).

2.2. An extension: Mortelmans, Nuyts, Pelyvas

One problem with Langacker’s system, which we do not have the space

to examine here, is whether the set that his rules select is too large: do English deontic (or, for that matter, dynamic) modals really establish *epistemic* grounding? The problem that directly concerns us here is whether the set is too small, since the semantic definition of the grounding predication would certainly permit the inclusion of the (epistemic) modals in languages where the form they take is clearly non-finite (e.g. German), or cognitive matrix predicates like *likely, think, expect, believe, know*, etc., which take finite subject or object clauses, but are also noted for clearly non-finite complementation in structures called *Raising* or *Exceptional Case Marking* in generative grammar.

Langacker (2004:85), while acknowledging that *'[i]t would ... be quite reasonable to use the term grounding for this wider range of phenomena'*, still chooses to *'understand grounding in the original, narrow sense'*. For a thorough discussion of this problem area, see also Mortelmans (2002, 2006), Nuyts (2002) or Pelyvás (1996, 2000, 2006).

In this paper, I propose to use the term *grounding* in the wider sense referred to above. This is partly because it seems possible to find ways of accommodating the semantic and syntactic side of Langacker's definition, by postulating that

- a non-finite form, being transitional in some sense, need not be summarily scanned;
- a finite form need not be grounded by definition.

Another reason is that Langacker's proposed way out--cognitive predicates *overriding* values of grounding (in the narrow sense) already established in the clause, seems decidedly counterintuitive: the explanation that in (1) the speaker first establishes John as a criminal and then withdraws or overrides it by introducing *likely* seems to lack psychological reality.

- (1) It is likely that John is a criminal.

The most important reason, however, is that it is exactly the inclusion of this set of cognitive predicates into the set of grounding predications that gives us an opportunity to break away from a conception of (epistemic) modality as basically a probability scale or probability judgment by the speaker (which Langacker's system still is). This step provides an opportunity to formulate epistemic modality in terms of the speaker's finding, selecting, modifying or discarding cognitive models that (s)he finds fit or unfit for talking about a situation, and that the most important evidence for this is the 'irregular' syntactic behaviour of cognitive predicates, which brings them in many ways

close to modal auxiliaries, and so makes them susceptible of being grounding predications (cf. Pelyvás 2001b:112-6).

Syntactic evidence is given in what follows.

As is well known, most cognitive predicates behave in ‘irregular’ ways in syntax (‘Raising’, ECM, long-distance movement, etc), which suggests that they are not easy clause members (disjuncts like *probably*) and not clearly matrix predicates, since movement with them can occur across what generative grammar regards as (transparent) clause boundaries. These phenomena find a natural solution if it is assumed that what we really have here is a *grounding predication + grounded head complex*, which is in many ways similar to what traditional grammar sees as a simple clause (but is in cognitive terms the combination of a grounding predication left implicit or expressed by a modal + a grounded head). The different acceptability of (2a) and (2b) clearly indicates a shift of attention from the grounding predication to the grounded head:

- (2) a. *I don’t think that John is a criminal, do I?
b. I don’t think that John is a criminal, is he?

3. Further extension. Epistemic grounding as the formation of an Idealized Cognitive Model

3.1. The Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM)

The basic idea behind this extension is that replacing the notion of the speaker’s probability judgment (of one option) with the speaker’s assessment of a number of options: *his/her choice of an appropriate Idealized Cognitive Model* is easily seen as organic development in the system of cognitive grammar. All conceptualization is essentially subjective, as it essentially consists in the conceptualizer making and revising hypotheses about what is going on, that is the creation of cognitive models. Epistemic modality can be seen as a marked instance of this process, when there may be some factors that force the speaker/conceptualizer to stop and think his position over.

The ICM is best defined as *a situation: its participants and the relationships holding among them, as construed by the conceptualizer*. Besides being highly subjective, it is also a very active process. The effort required can be measured by the ‘work’ required when one sits down to watch a film that has been running for a while (‘tuning in’), or when a psychotic patient tries to process a scene that would be child’s play to almost anyone. The following

excerpt comes from a schizophrenic patient's attempt at describing the scene of a little girl buying ice-cream:

I saw a little girl who was moving a counter for some reason and I don't know what the heck that was about. She was pressing against it okay. In the beginning I saw a white car with a red vinyl top and then this little girl was looking in the store was looking in the trash can or something and then she turned around and she went on she talked to her mother and her father and neither one was listening to her ... (Chaika and Alexander (1986), discussed in terms of ICM formation in Pelyvás 1996: 95-102)

3.2. ICM formation

The complexity of the task may vary considerably in different situations. Sometimes it is easily seen as a simple probability judgment, as no alternative conceptualizations are imminent, as in (3),

(3) John may be an idiot

but in cases where participants and relationships can form a more complex network, the formation of the most likely ICM may be a more complex process, as in (4):

(4) Q: What's that noise?
A: John may be building a ship in the basement.

This answer can be regarded as the addressee's search for a cognitive model that appropriately describes the situation. Some of the options are:

- This may not be true.
- Perhaps John is building sth. else (one participant has changed – the *patient*).
- Perhaps John is repairing/destroying, etc. the ship (the content of the relationship has changed – still agentive)
- Perhaps it is the wind (the nature of the relationship changes radically – no longer agentive)
- Perhaps someone else is building a ship (one participant has changed – the *agent*) ... etc., (e.g. *What's John building/doing? Who is building a ship?*)

3.3. Cognitive predicates

It must be admitted that the English expressions containing only modals

do not seem to provide much room for the linguistic expression of these differences, except perhaps for the possibilities given by passivization and stress or intonation, but it is possible to extend our means of expression by including cognitive predicates. There are marked differences between the examples in (5), similar to the ones that had to remain hidden in (4):

- (5) a. It is likely that John is building a ship in the basement.
- b. John is likely to be building a ship in the basement.
- c. *That John is building a ship in the basement is likely.

(5a) affords ‘global’ entry to the situation, (5b) symbolizes entry through a salient participant of the ICM – *a reference point* (cf. Langacker 1995). Since a reference point is normally taken for granted, *John* is firmly established as a participant in the situation, even though all else may not be very certain.

The ungrammaticality of (5c) is explained by the fact that a finite clause is normally taken to be grounded in immediate reality (*fact*) unless indicated otherwise, but the warning must be given in advance; the structure in (5c) would be grammatical if the matrix predicate were ‘*strange*’.

Are alternative constructions in free variation? It might seem so, if we compare (6a) and (6b):

- (6) a. It is likely that John is a criminal.
- b. John is likely to be a criminal.

But the structure in (6b) is about 13 times more frequent than (6a), in contrast with *unlikely*, where the two are roughly on a par (cf. Pelyvás 2002).

The explanation may take us to epistemic grounding again: *unlikely* appears to be less of a grounding predication than its positive counterpart.

3.4. Raising and the correction of an ICM

One of the main tenets of cognitive grammar is that different grammatical forms are the manifestations of different conceptualizations. And, since there is a symbolic relationship between the two, the nature of the semantic difference motivates (if not determines in the strict mathematical sense) the grammatical form. One case in point is the raising (or Exceptional Case Marking - ECM) construction, which is often associated with the correction of a previously selected ICM. Let us begin with a few well-known examples.

remember

- (7) a I remembered that John was bald.
b I remembered John to be bald.

know

- (8) a I know that John is honest.
b I know John to be honest.
c ?I have known that John is honest.
d I have known John to be honest.

(8b) may express uncertainty. The problem with (8c) is that a kind of incompatibility appears between the Present Perfect form of *know*, which suggests that the situation is now changing, and the fully grounded finite form of the subordinate clause. The effect that a previously established ICM is being changed, because it has now proved incorrect or inappropriate, is particularly strong in (7b) and (8d).

Relying on the data obtained from the examples given in (5) to (8) concerning the nature of the ‘raising’ (ECM) construction, a hypothesis can now be formed that in most (if not) all cases there is a considerable difference in the factuality of the complement between the finite and the Raising (ECM) constructions. In the simplest cases, this means only unreliability of judgment (a probability scale), but in more complicated ones it may mark the speaker’s intention to discard a cognitive model previously seen as appropriate for describing a situation in favour of an other one seen now as more adequate.

The conceptualizer can easily misconstrue a situation (a common source of misunderstanding among humans). When the mistake is understood and corrected, linguistic expression can be given to the correction, and a ‘raising’ construction appears to be a suitable tool for the purpose. It can also be hypothesised that the non-finite form occurring in the subordinate clause of the construction, with its less-than-fully grounded status, is in a symbolic relationship with this conceptual content.

Compare now the sentences in (9):

- (9) a. I saw Steve steal your car, but at the time I thought that he was only borrowing it.
b. I saw Steve stealing your car, but ...
c. *I saw that Steve stole your car, but ...

The difference between (9a and b) on the one hand and (9c) on the other is not in the *grounding* of the whole structure (something that the speaker does at the time of speaking), but in that of the subordinate structure marked in italics. The less than fully grounded non-finite form indicates a (now corrected) problem in conceptualization or ICM formation (*borrowing* vs. *stealing*), something that the conceptualizer does (or rather did) at the time of perception. The event was *not* conceptualized as stealing.

3.5. Other structures marking the correction of an ICM

To find further support and also a higher level of generalization for the hypothesis that the forms appearing in the complement of a cognitive predicate are in a symbolic relationship with its status relative to grounding, we can examine another language. Hungarian almost totally lacks raising, but still seems to have a much wider array of choices in the expression of ICM correction. Consider the possible Hungarian equivalents of the English sentences in (9):

- (10) a. Láttam, hogy Pista *ellopta az autódat,
I-see-Past that Steve steal-Perf.-Past your car
- de akkor azt hittem, hogy csak kölcsönveszi.
but then that I-believe-Past that only he-borrow-Pres.= relative past
- b. ?ellopja
steal-Perf. Present = relative tense
- c. *lopta
steal-Imperf. Past
- d. *lopja
steal-Imperf. Present = relative tense

The unacceptable (10a) combines a finite object clause with the Past Tense, which is to be seen here as *absolute*: it relates the time of the situation to the time of utterance, giving it fully grounded status, in contrast to the *relative tense* appearing in (10b). The Present Tense form of (10b) relates the time of the event ‘only’ to the time of the matrix clause, but even that change will make the sentence only marginally acceptable. The imperfect forms in (10 c and d) only make the situation worse: they appear to strengthen a false link between seeing something and conceptualizing it as stealing at the time of the event.

In (11) the object clause is replaced with a clause of manner, which improves the situation considerably, since the sentence is now *more* about the ingredients of the ICM that were observable to the conceptualizer at the time of conceptualization than about his/her formation of an (incorrect) cognitive model. The status of (11 c and d) do not seem to change:

- (11) a. Láttam, *ahogy* Pista *ellopta* az autódát, de akkor ...
 I-see-Past *how* Steve *steal-Perf.-Past* your car but then...
- b. *ellopja*
steal-Perf. Present = relative tense
- c. **lopta*
steal-Imperf. Past
- d. **lopja*
steal-Imperf. Ppresent = relative tense

In (12) we have a time clause in subordination, which only permits absolute tense. The marginal acceptability of (12b) may be attributable to the fact that the imperfect form, in opposition to its role in (10), an object clause, now marks the incompleteness of the experience, making its conceptualization more difficult. This contrast is similar to the difference between the English sentences in (9a) and (9b):

- (12) a. Láttam, *amikor* Pista *ellopta* az autódát, de akkor ...
 I-see-Past *when* Steve *steal-Perf.-Past* your car but then ...
- b. *?lopta*
steal-Imperf. Past

Finally, structures similar to English ‘raising’ are also possible in Hungarian, even though only (13a) would be more than a very rough equivalent. In (13b) to (13d), the subject NP is easily seen as part of the conceptual content of the matrix clause as well:

- (13) a. Láttam *Pistát* *ellopni* az autódát, de akkor azt hittem ...
 I-see-Past *Steve-Acc* *steal-Inf.* your car but then ...
- b. Láttam *Pistát,* *ahogy* *ellopta* az autódát, de akkor...
 I-see-Past *Steve-Acc* *as/how* *he-steal-Past* your car but then
- c. *ahogy* *ellopja*

as/how he-steal-Present = relative tense

- d. *amikor ellopta*
when he-steal-Past

These sentences bring us back to an observation made in Section 3.3, in connection with the sentence (5b): the matrix object status (even if only transformationally introduced, but cf. Langacker (1995)) establishes the given participant as a reference point, whose correct conceptualization *at least* is to be regarded as certain. The reference point provides a salient point of entry to the situation—other participants or relationships in it may not be quite as certain.

4. Conclusion

Let me now give a brief summary of the constructions that may be regarded as being in a symbolic relationship with a less-than-fully grounded ICM:

- *The 'raising' (reference-point) construction.* The 'raised' NP, serving as a reference point, provides an ideal entry to a situation, also making sure that at least this participant's status is unchallenged in the process of ICM selection. Almost anything else may be subject to change.

- *Absolute vs. relative tense.* Tense is a grounding predication, which is always absolute in English (it relates a situation to the time of utterance). In Hungarian a relative tense also occurs in some constructions, which relates a situation to another situation – *a less than fully grounded* construction: this is only possible with a non-finite form in English. Absolute tense suggests that the original conceptualization is still valid. Only relative tense can convey the meaning that the original conceptualization (now seen as incorrect) has now been changed.

- *The type of clause.* An adverbial clause establishes a far weaker connection from the point of view of conceptualization than an object clause does: the object is a conceptual reification that often requires fully established grounding. The adverbial clause does not have to say *what* I saw: it can afford to concentrate on only some of the participants or relationships observed on the scene, leaving the precise formulation of the ICM till later.

References

- Brisard, F. (ed.) 2002. *Grounding. The epistemic footing of deixis and reference*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Chaika, E., P. Alexander. 1986. 'The Ice Cream Stories: A Study in Normal and Psychotic Narrations' in *Discourse Processes*, Vol. 9/3, pp. 305-328.
- Giorgi, A., F. Pianesi. 1997. *Tense and Aspect. From Semantics to Morphosyntax*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kiefer, F. 2000. *Jelentélmélet*. Budapest: Corvina.
- Langacker, R. W. 1995. 'Raising and Transparency' in *Language* Vol. 71/1, pp. 1-62.
- Langacker, R. W. 1987. *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar I. Theoretical Prerequisites*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, R. W. 1991. *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar II. Descriptive Application*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, R. W. 1999. *Grammar and Conceptualization*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Langacker, R. W. 2004. 'Remarks on nominal grounding' in *Functions of Language* 11/1, pp. 77-113.
- Mortelmans, T. 2002. '“Wieso sollte ich dich küssen, du hässlicher Mensch!” A study of the German modals *sollen* and *müssen* as 'grounding predications' in interrogatives' in *Grounding. The epistemic footing of deixis and reference*. Brisard, F. (ed.). Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 391-432.
- Mortelmans, T. 2006. 'Langacker's 'subjectification' and 'grounding': a more gradual view' in *Paths of subjectivity*. Athanasiadou, A, C. Canakis and B. Cornillie (eds.). Berlin - New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 151-175.
- Nuyts, J. 2002. 'Grounding and the system of epistemic expressions in Dutch: A cognitive-functional view' in *Grounding. The epistemic footing of deixis and reference*. Brisard, F. (ed.). Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 433-466.
- Pelyvás, P. 1996. *Subjectivity in English*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Pelyvás, P. 2000. 'Metaphorical extension of *may* and *must* into the epistemic domain' in *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads*. Barcelona, A. (ed.). Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 233-250.
- Pelyvás, P. 2001a. 'The development of the grounding predication. Epistemic modals and cognitive predicates' in *Pragmatics and the Flexibility of Word Meaning*. Németh T., E. and K. Bibok. (eds.). Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 151-174.
- Pelyvás, P. 2001b. 'On the Development of the Category *Modal*: a Cognitive View' in *Wort und (Kon)text*. Kocsány, P., A. Molnár (eds.). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, pp. 103-130.
- Pelyvás, P. 2002. 'Likely and unlikely as grounding predications' in *Studies in Linguistics* VI. B. Hollósy, and J. Kiss-Gulyás (eds.). Debrecen, pp. 99-120.
- Pelyvás, P. 2003. 'The relationship of conceptual structure and grammatical structure in modals'. in *Communication and Culture. Argumentative, Cognitive and Linguistic Perspectives*. Komlósi, L., P. Houtlosser, and M. Leezenberg, (eds.). Amsterdam: Sic Sat, pp. 101-113.
- Pelyvás, P. 2006. 'Subjectification in (expressions of) epistemic modality and the development of the grounding predication' in *Paths of subjectivity*. Athanasiadou, A, C. Canakis, B. Cornillie (eds.). Berlin - New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 121-150..

Tóth, E. 2008. *Mood Choice in Complement Clauses*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Notes on the author

Péter Pelyvás is Associate Professor of English Linguistics at the Institute of English and American Studies, University of Debrecen. His professional interests include semantics, cognitive grammar, especially modality and the nature of the grounding predication.

METAPHOR, DISCOURSE, CREATIVITY*

ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES

Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

***Abstract:** In the ‘standard’ view of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2002), metaphorical creativity arises from the cognitive processes of extending, elaborating, questioning, and combining conceptual content in the source domain (Lakoff and Turner 1989). I will propose that such cases constitute only a part of our metaphorical creativity. An equally important and common set of cases is comprised by ‘context-induced’ metaphors; five such types will be discussed, which have not been investigated systematically so far, though they seem to form a large part of our metaphorical creativity.*

***Keynotes:** context, context-induced metaphor, metaphor, metaphorical creativity*

1. Introduction

In the ‘standard’ view of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2002), metaphorical creativity arises from the cognitive processes of extending, elaborating, questioning, and combining conceptual content in the source domain (Lakoff and Turner, 1989). I will propose that such cases constitute only a part of metaphorical creativity. An equally important and common set of cases is represented by what I call “context-induced” metaphors. I will discuss five such types: metaphors induced by (1) the immediate linguistic context itself, (2) what we know about the major entities participating in the discourse, (3) the physical setting, (4), the social setting, and (5) the immediate cultural context. Such metaphors have not been systematically investigated so far, though they seem to form a large part of our

* I would like to thank the Institute of Advanced Study and Van Mildert College, Durham University, for their generous support in the preparation of this paper and the wonderful academic, social and personal environment they provided for three months. My special thanks go to Andreas Musolff and David Cowling for the wonderful time we spent on studying metaphors.

I also thank Réka Benczes, my colleague for her help with this paper.

metaphorical creativity. One of the criticisms of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) is that it conceives of metaphors as highly conventional static conceptual structures (the correspondences, or mappings, between a source and a target domain). It would follow from this that such conceptual structures manifest themselves in the form of highly conventional metaphorical linguistic expressions (like the metaphorical meanings in a dictionary) based on such mappings. If correct, this view does not easily lend itself to an account of metaphorical creativity. Clearly, we often come across novel metaphorical expressions in real discourse. If all there is to metaphor were static conceptual structures matched by highly conventional linguistic expressions, it would seem that CMT runs into difficulty in accounting for the many unconventional and novel expressions we find in discourse. I will discuss various types of metaphorical creativity in this paper.

The paper will examine the interrelations among metaphor, discourse, and metaphorical creativity. I will propose (1) that metaphorical creativity in discourse can involve several distinct cases and (2) that conceptualizers rely on a number of contextual factors when they use novel metaphors in discourse.

2. Metaphorical creativity in discourse

Metaphorical creativity in discourse can involve a variety of distinct forms. In my *Metaphor in Culture* (2005), I distinguished two types: creativity that is based on the source domain and creativity that is based on the target domain. “Source-related” creativity can be of two kinds: “source-internal” and “source-external” creativity. Source-internal creativity involves cases that Lakoff and Turner (1989) describe as elaboration and extending, where unused source-internal conceptual materials are utilized to comprehend the target. “Source-external” cases of creativity operate with what I called the “range of the target,” in which a particular target domain receives new, additional source domains in its conceptualization (Kövecses, 2005). The type of creativity in discourse that is based on the target was also described by Kövecses (2005). In it, a particular target, that is conventionally associated with a source, “connects back” to the source, taking further knowledge structures from it. We can call this “target-induced” creativity.

In the remainder of the paper, I will suggest that there is yet another form of metaphorical creativity in discourse – creativity that is induced by the context in which metaphorical conceptualization takes place. This kind of

creativity has not been systematically explored in the cognitive linguistic literature on metaphor.

I will term the creativity that is based on the context of metaphorical conceptualization ‘context-induced’ creativity. This occurs where the emergence of a particular metaphorical expression is due to the influence of some aspect of discourse. In particular, five such contextual aspects, or factors, seem to produce unconventional and novel metaphors: (1) the immediate linguistic context itself, (2) what we know about the major entities participating in the discourse, (3) physical setting, (4) social setting, and (5) the immediate cultural context. There are surely others, but I will limit myself to the discussion of these five.

2.1. The effect of the linguistic context on metaphor use

Let us provisionally think of discourse as being composed of a series of concepts organized in a particular way. The concepts that participate in discourse may give rise to either conventional or unconventional and novel linguistic metaphors. I propose that metaphorical expressions can be selected because of the influence of the immediate linguistic context, that is, the concepts that surround the conceptual slot where we need a word or phrase to express a particular meaning. Jean Aitchison (1987) made an interesting observation that bears on this issue. She noted that in newspaper articles and headlines about (American) football games, the names of the teams may select particular metaphors for defeat and victory. She found such examples as follows in the sports pages of American newspapers: “Cougars *drown* Beavers,” “Cowboys *corral* Buffaloes,” “Air Force *torpedoes* the Navy,” “Clemson *cooks* Rice” (Aitchison, 1987: 143). The metaphors used in these sentences are selected on the basis of the names of football teams. Since beavers live in water, defeat can be metaphorically viewed as drowning; since cowboys corral cattle, the opponent can be corralled; since navy ships can be torpedoed, the opponent can be torpedoed, too; and since rice can be cooked, the same process can be used to describe the defeat of the opponent. The metaphors in the above sentences indicate that the target domain of DEFEAT can be variously expressed as drowning, corralling, etc., the choice depending on the concepts (in this case, corresponding to the names of the teams) that make up the utterances in which the metaphor is embedded.

Defeating an opponent is a form of symbolic control, in the same way as the sports activities themselves are symbolic activities. In general, defeating an

opponent is conceptualized as physically and/or socially controlling an entity (either animate or inanimate). The high-level, schematic conceptual metaphor DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL AND/OR SOCIAL CONTROL is pervasive in English (and also in other languages); metaphorical words for this conceptualization abound: *beat, upset, subdue, knock out, clobber, kill, demolish, conquer, crush, dash, destroy, dust, lick, overcome, overwhelm, ruin, stump, vanquish, thrash, trample, trounce*, and literally hundreds of others. The words all indicate some form of physical or social control. The words *cook* and *torpedo* from Aitchison's examples could be added to this list, although they seem to be somewhat less conventional than the others. Since defeat is conceptualized as physical and social control, it makes sense for the author to use the words *cook* and *torpedo* in the conceptual slot in the neighborhood of the concepts RICE and NAVY, respectively. It makes sense because the frame for RICE involves COOKING and the frame for NAVY can involve the weapon TORPEDO, on the one hand, and because COOKING and TORPEDOING are ways of physically controlling an entity, on the other.

There is, however, more complication we need to be aware of. In the SPORTS COMPETITION frame, or more specifically, the AMERICAN FOOTBALL frame, there are two opponents, there is an activity on the basis of which the winner is decided, and a resulting relationship between the two opponents: one opponent defeating the other. Given these minimal elements in the frame, we can say that one team defeats another and we can choose a word from the list above to express this meaning. We do this on the basis of the metaphor DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL/SOCIAL CONTROL. However, how do the concepts of RICE and NAVY that are used in the source domain of this metaphor end up in the AMERICAN FOOTBALL frame? American football teams are not identical to RICE and NAVY; these are concepts that we primarily associate with very different entities, such as plants and the armed forces, respectively. Football teams are not plants or armed forces. Obviously, they enter the frame, because they are the names of the two football teams. They enter it on the basis of the metonymy NAME FOR THE INSTITUTION (i.e., NAME OF THE TEAM FOR THE TEAM). This metonymy is crucial in understanding the selection of the particular linguistic expressions for defeat. Without the metonymically introduced names for the teams, it would be much less likely for the author to use the terms *cook* and *torpedo*.

The other two words in the set of examples offered by Aitchison, *corral* and *drown*, require similar treatment. We should note, however, that *corralling* and *drowning* are even less conventional cases of talking about defeat than *cook*

and *torpedo* are. What nevertheless makes them perfectly understandable and natural in the context is that the frame for AMERICAN FOOTBALL contains the names Cowboys and Beavers. The words *corral* and *drown* are coherent with these names, on the one hand, and they also fit the DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL/SOCIAL CONTROL metaphor, on the other.

In other words, there seem to be three constraints on the use of such metaphorical expressions in discourse. First, the words used must be consistent with an element of the conceptual frame that occurs in the discourse (such as that for DEFEAT). This would simply ensure that we use literal or metaphorical linguistic expressions for DEFEAT, and not for something else. Second, the linguistic metaphor must be consistent with a high-level, schematic metaphor, conventionally used for that element (such as DEFEAT). In the case above, it would be DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL/ SOCIAL CONTROL. Third, the linguistic metaphors chosen on the basis of such metaphors should (probably *must* would be too strong a word here) be consistent with other more specific elements in the same frame (such as AMERICAN FOOTBALL). Such more specific elements within the AMERICAN FOOTBALL frame would be the names of the teams.

2.2. The effect of knowledge about major entities in the discourse on metaphor use

In other cases, it seems to be our knowledge about the entities participating in the discourse that plays a role in choosing our metaphors in real discourse. Major entities participating in discourse include the speaker (conceptualizer), the hearer (addressee/ conceptualizer), and the entity or process we talk about (topic). I shall discuss two such examples, involving the topic and the speaker/ conceptualizer.

To begin, I will reanalyze an example first discussed in Kövecses (2005). The Hungarian daily *Magyar Nemzet* (Hungarian Nation) carried an article some years ago about some of the political leaders of neighboring countries, who were felt at the time to be antagonistic to Hungary. One of them, the then Slovak president, Meciar, used to be a boxer. This gave a Hungarian journalist a chance to use the following metaphor that is based on this particular property of the former Slovak president:

A pozsonyi exboksizóra akkor viszünk be atlanti pontot érő ütést, ha az ilyen helyzetekben megszokott nyugati módra “öklözünk”: megvető távolságot tartva.
(*Hungarian Nation*, September 13, 1997)

We deal a blow worth an Atlantic point to the ex-boxer of Bratislava if we box in a western style as customary in these circumstances: keeping an aloof distance. (my translation).

Confrontational international politics is commonly conceptualized as war, sports, games, etc. There are many different kinds of war, sports, and games, all of which could potentially be used to talk about confrontational international politics. In all probability, the journalist chose boxing because of his knowledge (shared by many of his readers) about one of the entities that constitute the topic of the discourse.

In using the metaphor CONFRONTATIONAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IS BOXING, the author is relying both on some conventional and unconventional mappings. What is common to the war, sports, and games metaphors is, of course, that they all focus on and highlight the notion of winning in relation to the activity to which they apply. This is their shared “meaning focus” (Kövecses, 2000, 2002) and this is what makes up the conventional part of the metaphor. The boxer corresponding to the politician and the blows exchanged corresponding to the political statements made are explicitly present in the discourse in question. In addition, we also assume that both boxers want to win and that the participating politicians want the same (whatever winning means in politics). However, the manner in which the boxers box and politicians argue is not a part of the conventional framework of the metaphor. “Keeping an aloof distance” probably comes into the discourse as a result of the author thinking about the target domain of politics. In the author’s view, politics regarding Meciar should be conducted in a cool, detached manner. What corresponds to this way of doing politics in boxing is that you box in a way that you keep an aloof distance from your opponent.

In the previous case (Meciar as the topic), the metaphor was selected and elaborated as a result of what the conceptualizer knows about the topic.

It is also possible to find cases where the selection of a metaphor depends on knowledge that the conceptualizer has about himself or herself. What is especially intriguing about such cases is that the author’s (conceptualizer’s) knowledge about him/herself does not need to be conscious. The next example, taken from my previous work (Kövecses, 2005), but reanalyzed here, demonstrates this possibility. As one would expect, one important source of such cases is the area of therapy or psychological counseling. In a therapeutic context, people commonly create novel metaphors as a result of unique and traumatic life experiences. The metaphors that are

created under these circumstances need not be consciously formed. The example that I am going to give comes from an article in the magazine *A & U* (March, 2003) about photographic artist Frank Jump.

Frank Jump photographs old painted mural advertisements in New York City. He has AIDS, but he has outlived his expected life span. His life and his art are intimately connected metaphorically. The conceptual metaphor operative here could be put as follows: SURVIVING AIDS DESPITE PREDICTIONS TO THE CONTRARY IS FOR THE OLD MURAL ADVERTISEMENTS TO SURVIVE THEIR EXPECTED “LIFE SPAN.” At first, Jump was not consciously aware that he was working within the frame of a conceptual metaphor that relies on his condition. In his own words:

In the beginning, I didn't make the connection between the subject matter and my own sero-positivity. I was asked to be part of the Day Without Art exhibition a few years ago and didn't think I was worthy—other artists' work was much more HIV-specific. ... But my mentor said, “Don't you see the connection? You're documenting something that was never intended to live this long. *You* never intended to live this long.” [p. 27; italics in the original]

The mentor made the conceptual metaphor conscious for the artist. I believe something similar is happening in many cases of psychotherapy and counseling.

It is clear that the metaphor SURVIVING AIDS DESPITE PREDICTIONS TO THE CONTRARY IS FOR THE OLD MURAL ADVERTISEMENTS TO SURVIVE THEIR EXPECTED “LIFE SPAN” is anything but a conventional conceptual metaphor. The metaphor is created by Frank Jump as a novel analogy – the unconscious but nevertheless real analogy between surviving one's expected life span as a person who has AIDS and the survival of the mural advertisements that were created to be around on the walls of some buildings in New York City for only a limited amount of time. In this case, (unconscious) self-knowledge leads the conceptualizer to find the appropriate analogy. The analogy is appropriate because the source and the target domains share schematic structural resemblance; namely, an entity existing longer than expected. The resulting metaphor(ical analogy) is novel and creative and it comes about as a result of what the conceptualizer knows about himself.

2.3. The effect of physical setting on metaphor use

The physical setting may also influence the selection and use of particular metaphors in discourse. The physical setting possibly includes,

among other things, the physical *events and their consequences* that make up or are part of the setting, the various aspects of the physical *environment*, and the *perceptual qualities* that characterize the setting. I shall briefly discuss an example for the first two.

The first of these, *physical events and their consequences*, is well demonstrated by a statement made by an American journalist who traveled to New Orleans to do an interview with Fats Domino, the famous American musician and singer, two years after the devastation wreaked by hurricane Katrina, when the city of New Orleans was still struggling with many of the consequences of the hurricane. The journalist comments:

The 2005 hurricane capsized Domino's life, though he's loath to confess any inconvenience or misery outside of missing his social circle ... (*USA TODAY*, 2007, September 21, Section 6B)

The metaphorical statement "The 2005 hurricane *capsized* Domino's life" is based on the general metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY and its more specific version LIFE IS A SEA JOURNEY. The SEA JOURNEY source domain is chosen probably because of the role of the sea in the hurricane. More importantly, it should be noted that the verb *capsize* is used (as opposed to, say, *run aground*), though it is not a conventional linguistic manifestation of either the general JOURNEY or the more specific SEA JOURNEY source domains. I suggest that this verb is selected by the journalist as a result of the (still) visible consequences in New Orleans of the hurricane as a devastating physical event. The physical setting thus possibly triggers extension of an existing conventional conceptual metaphor and causes the speaker/ conceptualizer to choose a metaphorical expression that best fits that setting.

Next, let us consider *environmental conditions* as a part of the physical setting. The physical setting as a potential cause of, or factor in, what metaphors we choose was first studied by Boers (1999). He started from the following general hypothesis: people will make more extensive use of a source domain when that particular source domain becomes more salient for them under certain circumstances. In other words, certain changes in the circumstances of the communicative situation may make people more aware of a particular source domain, and this may result in an increased use of the source domain in metaphorical conceptualization. The specific hypothesis was that the source domain of HEALTH will be especially productive of linguistic expressions in winter, because this is the time when, at least in countries of the northern

hemisphere, people are more aware of their bodies through the more frequent occurrence of illnesses (such as colds, influenza, pneumonia, bronchitis). The particular target domain that was selected for the study was ECONOMY. Thus, according to this hypothesis, we can expect an increase in the relative salience of the ECONOMY IS HEALTH metaphor in the winter period. The salience of the HEALTH domain was assessed in terms of the frequency of health-related metaphorical expressions for economy.

In order to test his hypothesis, Boers counted all the metaphorical expressions that have to do with economy and that are based on the HEALTH source domain in the editorials of all issues of the English weekly magazine *The Economist* over a period of ten years. The study resulted in a sample of over one million words. Here is a selection of some of the metaphorical expressions that he identified: “*healthy companies*,” “*sickly firms*,” “*economic remedy*,” “*symptoms of a corporate disease*,” “*a financial injection*,” “*arthritic markets*,” “*economic recovery*,” and many others. The heavy presence of such and similar expressions shows that economy is commonly talked and thought about in terms of bodily health. The question for the researcher was whether there was any fluctuation in the frequency of use of the HEALTH metaphor from season to season. Boers found that the frequency of the metaphor was systematically highest between the months of December and March in the ten years under investigation. During this period, the frequency of health-related metaphors for economy went up and stayed higher in the winter. This finding supported the hypothesis. When the HEALTH domain becomes more salient for people, they make more extensive use of it than when it is less salient.

We can reinterpret Boers’ findings in the following way. Since the physical setting is part of the communicative situation, it may play a role in selecting particular metaphorical source domains. In the present example, wintertime is more likely to lead to the selection of health-related metaphors than to other metaphors, simply because such metaphors may be higher up in awareness than others, due to the adverse impact of the physical environment on conceptualizers.

2.4. The effect of social setting on metaphor use

When we use metaphors, we use them in a social context. The social context can be extremely variable: it can involve anything from the social relationships that obtain between the participants of the discourse through their gender roles to the various social occasions in which the discourse takes place.

Let us take an example for the last possibility from the American newspaper *USA TODAY*.

As mentioned above, in 2007 the newspaper carried an article about Fats Domino, one of the great living musicians, based in flood-stricken New Orleans. In the article, the journalist describes in part Domino's life after Katrina – the hurricane that destroyed his house and caused a lot of damage to his life and that of many other people in New Orleans. The subtitle of the article reads:

The rock 'n' roll pioneer rebuilds his life—and on the new album 'Goin' Home,' his timeless music. (*USA TODAY*, 2007, September 21, Section 6B)

How can we account for the use of the metaphor “*rebuilds his life*” in this text? We could simply suggest that this is an instance of the LIFE IS A BUILDING conceptual metaphor and that whatever meaning is intended to be conveyed by the expression is most conventionally conveyed by this particular conceptual metaphor and this particular metaphorical expression. But then this may not entirely justify the use of the expression. There are potentially other conceptual metaphors (and corresponding metaphorical expressions) that could also be used to achieve a comparable semantic effect. Two that readily come to mind include the LIFE IS A JOURNEY and the LIFE IS A MACHINE conceptual metaphors. We could also say that x *set out again on his/her path* or that after his/her life broke down, x *got it to work* again or *restarted* it. These and similar metaphors would enable the speaker/ conceptualizer and the hearer to come to the interpretation that the rebuilding idea activates.

However, of the potentially possible choices, it is the LIFE IS A BUILDING metaphor that is selected for the purpose. In all probability this is because, at the time of the interview, Domino was also in the process of rebuilding his house that was destroyed by the hurricane in 2005. If this is correct, it can be suggested that the social situation (rebuilding his house) triggered, or facilitated, the choice of the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A BUILDING. In other words, a real-world instance of a source domain is more likely to lead to the choice of a source concept of which it is an instance than to that of a source domain of which it is not. In this sense, the social setting may play a role in the selection of certain preferred conceptual metaphors, and hence of certain preferred metaphorical expressions in discourse.

In such cases, the emerging general picture seems to be as follows: There is a particular social setting and there is a particular meaning that needs to be activated. If the meaning can be activated by means of a metaphorical

mapping that fits the social setting, speakers/ conceptualizers will prefer to choose that mapping (together with the linguistic expression that is based on the mapping). More simply, if the social setting involves an element that is an instance of an appropriate source domain, speakers are likely to use that source domain.

2.5. The effect of the immediate cultural context on metaphor use

The social setting can be relatively easily distinguished from the cultural context when we have to deal with social roles, social relations, and social power. However, the social setting is less clearly distinguishable from what I call the “cultural context” in many other cases. The situation I wish to describe in this section is probably more cultural than social, in that it lacks such straightforward social elements and characteristics as power, relations, and roles.

Consider the following example, taken from the *San Francisco Chronicle*, in which Bill Whalen, a professor of political science at Stanford and an advisor to Arnold Schwarzenegger, uses metaphorical language about the actor who later became the governor of California:

“Arnold Schwarzenegger is not the second Jesse Ventura or the second Ronald Reagan, but the first Arnold Schwarzenegger,” said Bill Whalen, a Hoover Institution scholar who worked with Schwarzenegger on his successful ballot initiative last year and supports the actor’s campaign for governor.

“He’s a unique commodity – unless there happens to be a whole sea of immigrant body builders who are coming here to run for office. This is ‘Rise of the Machine,’ not ‘Attack of the Clones.’” (*San Francisco Chronicle*, A16, August 17, 2003)

Of interest in this connection are the metaphors *He’s a unique commodity* and particularly *This is ‘Rise of the Machine,’ not ‘Attack of the Clones.’* The first one is based on a completely conventional conceptual metaphor: PEOPLE ARE COMMODITIES, as shown by the very word *commodity* to describe the actor. The other two are highly unconventional and novel. What makes Bill Whalen produce these unconventional metaphors and what allows us to understand them? There are, I suggest, two reasons. First, and more obviously, it is because Arnold Schwarzenegger played in the first of these movies. In other words, what sanctions the use of these metaphorical expressions has to do with the knowledge that the conceptualizer (Whalen) has about the topic of the discourse (Schwarzenegger). Second, and less obviously, but more importantly, he uses the metaphors because these are movies that, at

the time of speaking (i.e., 2003), everyone knew about in California and the US. In other words, they were part and parcel of the immediate cultural context. Significantly, the second movie, *Attack of the Clones*, does not feature Schwarzenegger, but it is the key to understanding the contrast between individual and copy that Whalen is referring to.

Given this knowledge, people can figure out what Whalen intended to say, which was that Schwarzenegger is a unique individual and not one of a series of look-alikes. But figuring this out may not be as easy and straightforward as it seems. After all, the metaphor *Rise of the Machine* does not clearly and explicitly convey the idea that Schwarzenegger is unique in any sense. (As a matter of fact, the mention of machines goes against our intuitions of uniqueness.) However, we get this meaning via two textual props. The first one is a series of statements by Whalen: “Arnold Schwarzenegger is not the second Jesse Ventura or the second Ronald Reagan, but the first Arnold Schwarzenegger” and “He’s a unique commodity – unless there happens to be a whole sea of immigrant body builders who are coming here to run for office.” What seems to be the case here is that the speaker emphasizes the idea of individuality *before* he uses the MACHINE metaphor. But not even this prior emphasis would be sufficient by itself. Imagine that the text stops with the words “...This is ‘Rise of the Machine.’” I think most native speakers would be baffled and have a hard time understanding what Whalen meant to say in this last sentence. Therefore, in order to fully understand the discourse, we badly need the second textual prop, which is: “not ‘*Attack of the Clones*.’” It is against the background of this phrase that we understand what the metaphorical expression *Rise of the Machine* might possibly mean.

In other words, in this case, we have an entirely novel (but contextually motivated) metaphor in the discourse. In order to understand the meaning of this metaphorical phrase we need support from the neighboring linguistic context. In the present example, it is provided in the form of the two contextual props discussed above.

2.6. The combined effect of factors on metaphor use

For the sake of the clarity of analysis, I have tried to show the relevance to the selection of discourse metaphors of each of the factors one by one. But this does not mean that in reality they always occur in an isolated fashion. As a matter of fact, it is reasonable to expect them to co-occur in real discourse. For example, a person’s concerns, or interests, as a factor may combine with

additional knowledge about himself or herself, as well as the topic of the discourse, and the three can, in this way, powerfully influence how the conceptualizer will express himself or herself metaphorically. The next and final example demonstrates this possibility in a fairly clear way.

At the time of working on the present article (January through March, 2008), there was heated debate in Hungarian society about whether the country should adopt a health insurance system, similar to that in the U.S.A., based on competing privately-owned health insurance companies, rather than staying with a single, state-owned and state-regulated system. As part of the debate, many people volunteered their opinion on this issue in a variety of media, the Internet being one of them. As I was following the debate on the Internet, I found an article that can serve, in my view, as a good demonstration of a situation in which one's use of metaphors in a discourse is informed by a combination of factors, not just a single one.

A Hungarian doctor published a substantial essay in one of the Hungarian news networks about the many potential undesirable consequences of the proposed new privatized system. He outlines and introduces what he has to say in his essay in the following way (given first in the Hungarian original):

Dolgozatom a gondolkodási időben született.
Célkitűzése a törvény várható hatásainak elemzése.
Módszereiben az orvosi gondolkodást követi.
A magyar egészségügyet képzeli a beteg helyzetébe.
Kezelőorvosnak a kormányt tekinti, és konzulensként a szakértőket illetve a szerzőt magát kéri fel.
A prognózis meghatározás feltételének tekinti a helyes diagnózist.
Végül röviden megvizsgálja van-e alternatív kezelési lehetőség.

Here's an almost literal translation of the text into English:

This paper was born in the period when people think about the issue.
Its objective is to analyze the expected effects of the law.
In its methods, it follows the way doctors think.
It imagines Hungarian health care as the patient.
It takes the government as the attending physician, and invites experts and the author (of the article) himself to be the consultants.
It considers the correct diagnosis to be the precondition for predicting the prognosis.
Finally it briefly examines if there is an alternative possibility for treatment.

Unless the author of the article deliberately wishes to provide an illustration for the use of metaphors in discourse and/or has read Lakoff and

Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By*, and/or, even less likely, that he has read my *Metaphor in Culture* (and I doubt that either of these is the case), this is a remarkable example of how a combination of contextual factors can influence the way we often speak/write and think metaphorically. The author of the article is a doctor himself/herself, we can assume he has a great deal of interest in his job (he took the trouble of writing the article), and he is writing about Hungarian health care. The first of these is concerned with what I called knowledge about the speaker/conceptualizer; the second corresponds to personal concern, or interest (related to the speaker) (see Kövecses, 2005); and the third involves what was called the topic of the discourse. It seems that the three factors are jointly responsible for the way the author uses metaphors in the discourse (and, given this example, for how he, in addition, actually structures what he says). Needless to say, many other combinations of factors can be imagined and expected to co-occur in and influence real discourse.

3. An extended view of metaphorical creativity

We are now in a position to discuss two important issues regarding metaphorical creativity. First, we can ask what the sources of metaphorical creativity are, and second, we can try to tackle the issue of the role of the communicative situation in metaphorical creativity.

3.1. What are the sources of metaphorical creativity?

The "standard" version of CMT operates with largely uncontextualized or minimally contextualized linguistic examples of hypothesized conceptual metaphors. The conceptual metaphors are seen as constituted by sets of mappings between the source and the target domains. The mappings are assumed to be fairly static conceptual structures. The linguistic metaphors that are motivated by such static correspondences are entrenched, conventional expressions that eventually find their way to good, detailed dictionaries of languages. Dictionaries and the meanings they contain represent what is static and highly conventional about particular languages. In this view it is problematic to account for metaphorical creativity. How does this somewhat simplified and rough characterization of "standard" CMT change in light of the work reported in this paper?

If we look at metaphors from a discourse perspective and if we try to draw conclusions on the basis of what we have found here, we can see three

important sources of metaphorical creativity. The first is the type of creativity that arises from the source domain (in its source-internal and source-external versions), the second derives from the target domain, and the third emerges from the context. Since I have discussed the first two elsewhere (see Kövecses, 2005), I shall deal with the third type only.

The third type of metaphorical creativity is what I call “context-induced” creativity. To the best of my knowledge, apart from some sporadic instances (such as Aitchison, 1987; Koller, 2004; Kövecses, 2005; Semino, 2008; Benczes, to appear), the issue of context-induced metaphorical creativity has not been systematically investigated. A considerable portion of novel metaphorical language seems to derive from such contextual factors as the immediate linguistic context, knowledge about discourse participants, physical setting, and the like. It remains to be seen how robust the phenomenon is and whether it deserves serious further investigation. Based on an informal collection of data from a variety of newspapers, it appears that the context provides a major source of motivation for the use of many novel metaphors. These metaphors are clearly not, in Grady’s (1999) classification, either resemblance or correlation-based cases. They seem to have a unique status, in that they are grounded in the context in which metaphorical conceptualization is taking place.

3.2. The role of context in metaphorical creativity

Many of the examples of unconventional metaphoric language we have seen in this paper could simply not be explained without taking into account a series of contextual factors. Five such factors have been identified, but possibly there are more. My claim is that in addition to the well studied conceptual metaphors and metaphorical analogies used to convey meanings and achieve rhetorical functions in discourse, conceptualizers are also very much aware and take advantage of the various factors that make up the immediate context in which metaphorical conceptualization takes place.


The *linguistic context* is constituted by the various conceptual frames (including temporary mental spaces) and symbolic units (form-meaning pairs, or, simply, words) representing and activating the frames. Metaphorically-used expressions (i.e., metaphoric symbolic units) are placed into this flow of frames and words at appropriate points in the manner explained in the discussion of several of the examples. Thus the most immediate context in which metaphorical expressions are used is the linguistic context; more specifically

and precisely, the frames that immediately precede and provide the slot into which linguistic metaphors can be inserted. This flow of discourse can be imagined as a line of successive (though not necessarily temporally arranged) frames (with the frames commonly nested in more general frames).

The *major entities that participate in the discourse* are the speaker/ conceptualizer, the topic, and the hearer/ conceptualizer. The speaker and the hearer are both also conceptualizers in the sense that both the production and the understanding of discourse requires the activation of literal, metonymic, and metaphoric frames. More importantly for the present purpose, the speaker may have, sometimes detailed, knowledge about him- or herself, the hearer, and the topic. As we have seen, in the case of the speaker, this knowledge need not be conscious. The knowledge the speaker has about these entities may form the basis of the use of both conventional and unconventional metaphors in discourse.

Discourses do not occur in a vacuum. The three types of situations that I have considered in the paper include the *physical environment*, the *social setting*, and the *immediate cultural context*. This means that the speaker and the hearer are communicating about a topic (i.e., producing and reproducing a discourse) in a specific and immediate physical, social, and cultural context. The use of metaphors is affected by less specific and less immediate contexts as well, such as the “broader cultural context” (see Kövecses, 2005), but this larger context was not the focus of this paper. Moreover, as was noted above, each of these contextual factors comes in a variety of distinct forms, and they can shade into each other. Finally, all the factors can affect the use of metaphors in discourse simultaneously, and they can do so in various combinations.

We can imagine the three factors as frames that are nested in one another, such that the physical setting as the outermost frame includes the social frame that includes the cultural frame, where we find the speaker/ conceptualizer, the hearer/ conceptualizer, and the topic, as well as the diagram for the flow of discourse. These contextual factors can trigger, or prime, singly or in combination, the use of conventional or unconventional and novel metaphorical expressions in the discourse. We can represent the joint workings of these factors in the diagram below:



As noted, all the factors can trigger the use of metaphors in discourse. In some cases, the contextual factors will simply lead to the emergence and use of well-worn, conventional metaphorical expressions, but in others, they may produce genuinely novel expressions. We can call this mechanism the “pressure of coherence,” a notion I introduced elsewhere (Kövecses, 2005). The pressure of coherence includes all the mechanisms that lead to the use of particular metaphors in discourse. The core idea is that we try to be coherent, in addition to the body, with most of the other, especially contextual, factors that regulate what we say and think.

4. Conclusion

The paper has examined the interrelations among the notions of metaphor, discourse, and creativity. Several important connections have been found.

First, metaphorical creativity in discourse can involve several distinct cases: (a) the case where a novel source domain is applied or novel elements of the source are applied to a given target domain (source-induced creativity); (b) the case where elements of the target, originally not involved in a set of constitutive mappings, are utilized and found matching counterparts in the source (target-induced creativity); (c) the case where various contextual factors lead to novel metaphors (context-induced creativity).

Second, context plays a crucial role in understanding why we use certain metaphors as we produce discourse. Conceptualizers seem to rely on a number of contextual factors when they use metaphors in discourse. The ones that have been identified in the paper include the immediate linguistic context, the knowledge conceptualizers have about themselves and the topic, the immediate cultural context, the social context, and the physical setting. Since all of these are shared between the speaker and hearer (the conceptualizers), the contextual factors facilitate the development and mutual understanding of the discourse.

Given the evidence in the paper, we can conclude that conceptualizers try and tend to be coherent not only with their bodies (as is the case with correlational metaphors), but also with the various facets of the context in the course of metaphorically conceptualizing the world. The study of these phenomena may lead us to recognize so far unexplored aspects of metaphorical creativity in everyday language and thought, and beyond (see, Kövecses, in press/2010).

References

- Aitchison, J. 1987. *Words in the Mind*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Benczes, R. To appear. 'Setting limits on creativity in the production and use of metaphorical and metonymical compounds' in *Cognitive Approaches to Word Formation*. S. Michel and Al. Onysko (eds.). Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Boers, F. 1999. 'When a bodily source domain becomes prominent' in *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics*. R. Gibbs and G. Steen, (eds.). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 47-56.
- Grady, J. 1999. 'A typology of motivation for conceptual metaphors. Correlations vs. resemblance' in *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics*. R. W. Gibbs and G. J. Steen (eds.). Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. pp. 79-100.
- Koller, V. 2004/2008. *Metaphor and Gender in Business Media Discourse: a Critical Cognitive Study*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
- Kövecses, Z. 2000. 'The scope of metaphor' in *Metaphor and Metonymy at the Crossroads*. A. Barcelona (ed.). Berlin: Gruyter. pp. 79-92.
- Kövecses, Z. 2002/2010. *Metaphor. A Practical Introduction*. (2010. second, revised edition). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kövecses, Z. 2005. *Metaphor in Culture. Universality and Variation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kövecses, Z. 2010. 'A new look at metaphorical creativity' in *Cognitive Linguistics* Vol. 21-4, pp. 663-697.
- Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 1980. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, G. and M. Turner. 1989. *More Than Cool Reason. A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Semino, E. 2008. *Metaphor in Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Notes on the author

Zoltán Kövecses is Professor of Linguistics in the Department of American Studies at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. His main research interests include the conceptualization of emotions, the study of metaphor and idiomaticity, the relationship between language, mind and culture, and American slang and American English. He is also working as a lexicographer, and is the author of a great number of Hungarian-English, English-Hungarian dictionaries, and has also edited several books and journal issues both at home and abroad. He is currently working on the language and conceptualization of emotions, cross-cultural variation in metaphor, and the issue of the relationship between language, mind, and culture from a cognitive linguistic perspective.

CROSS-DISCURSIVE PATTERNS: CAREER METAPHORS IN ENGLISH

ADINA OANA NICOLAE

Petroleum-Gas University, Ploiești

***Abstract:** Proposing a cognitive semantic exploration of the metaphorical representations of careers in English, the article seeks to reveal the conceptual display of metaphorical patterns across a range of distinct discourse areas. Career interviews, business articles focused on career development in the business written press, as well as career opportunities sections on company websites are interrogated for this purpose.*

***Key words:** business discourse, career, conceptual metaphor, ideology, media*

1. Introduction

While the career-focused literature does mention and explore the intricacies of some of the career metaphors in English, it does little to restore and highlight the linguistic-conceptual link underlying the metaphorical dimensions of texts. Inkson's (2007) theoretical and practical examination of career case studies, which excels at anchoring psychology into real life, lacks a sustained interaction with an unremittingly linguistic insight into career descriptions. El Sawad's (2005) attempt to unlock career metaphors zeroes in the conceptual-linguistic interplay, but it is restrained to the career accounts of twenty graduate level employees, obtained through free elicitation. Although the results of Sawad's analysis mark an important step in career studies, they lie within the perimeter of the controlled experiment. The persons' profiles and interview contexts in which the quest for metaphorical career patterns will be herein conducted are destined to parallel the inquiries into the manipulation of career metaphors in English, by adding an unexplored discursal frame to the targeted conceptions of careers.

The research presented in the current study has two main aims: on the one hand, to survey three directions of the written business and economics discourse, seeking to reveal the spectrum of the 'canonical' career metaphor

patterns; on the other hand, to suggest that the selection of metaphors is not accidental in each genre.

The identification of metaphorical patterns is based on Charteris-Black's (2004) and Cameron's (1999) proposals. Thus, the linguistic metaphorical layer, which constitutes the potential activator of the conceptual mappings between the target concept domain and the source domain, is identified on the basis of a set of necessary conditions: first, if reference to a Topic domain is made by a Vehicle term (or terms); second, if there is potentially an incongruity between the domain of the Vehicle term and the Topic domain; third, if it is possible for a receiver (in general, or a particular person), as a member of a particular discourse community, to find a coherent interpretation which makes sense of the incongruity in its discourse context, and which involves some transfer of meaning from the Vehicle domain. These linguistic criteria, taken over from Cameron (1999: 118), are supplemented with a concern for the cognitive role delivered by such linguistically validated metaphorical constructions and with a particular discourse function (cf. Charteris-Black 2004).

The written business and economics discourse area is epitomized by three monitor corpora with different orientations. The first corpus (C1) reunites 10 career-counselling articles (27 334 words), the second (C2) is made up of 10 career interviews (9 627 words), while the third (C3) corpus consists of 10 samples of career statements displayed on company websites (2863 words).

The ten articles in C1, released between 1993 and 2006, originate from *Fortune* or *Fortune International (Europe)*. They all have attention-getting headlines, such as 'So, you want to change your job', 'Is your family wrecking your career? (and vice versa)', 'Offshoring could boost your career' etc.

In C2, the career interviews belong to a regular section of *People Management*, and the ten samples span 2007 to 2010. The interviewees are successful professionals such as managers, consultants, Chief Executive Officers and a welfare officer.

Finally, the companies whose websites have offered career-focused material for C3 are among the Forbes 2008 best managed big companies. Their range includes diverse business areas, such as aerospace and defense, banking, capital goods, restaurants, drinks, chemicals, media, insurance, etc.

2. Common metaphorical patterns

The collection of metaphorical patterns exhibited by all monitor corpora includes most of the conceptual-linguistic patterns considered as key metaphors by Inkson (2007). Their distribution is illustrated in Chart 1.

According to the computed statistics, the most impressive, most frequent and most deeply entrenched is the JOURNEY metaphor. In all three corpora, careers are introduced as a person's movement, coming, going, leaving, heading for a destination, advancing or veering, jumping or rising, etc. The list of V-terms is numerous and varied, covering different types of journey in terms of destination, speed, ground covered, etc.

- (1) 'He *started* his career seven and a half miles from here'
- (2) 'How to succeed without really *rising*'
- (3) 'It was a *turning point* in his life and career'
- (4) 'That makes *moving up* harder.'

Vivid, evocative images convey details about what a certain person's career journey is like and they enable readers to identify themselves instantly with that person's experience. However, despite the diversity of career journey types, this metaphor has the potential to allow the senders and recipients of the message to think productively about their careers. Every journey can be evaluated in terms of its destination or aimlessness, of its speed, its trajectory (upwards, downwards or sideways), of its route (linear, winding, random), of the experience and enjoyment it brings along.




Chart 1. Distribution of key common metaphors across the monitor corpora

One favoured pattern was identified – that of CAREERS AS UPWARD JOURNEYS. This may be because we tend to conceptualize occupations and organizations in terms of status hierarchies. Society’s expectations are folded into the route upwards, and being ‘on track’ is of utmost importance:

- (5) ‘He *started* as a line cook at Red Lobster and *rose to the top* over 30 years.’
- (6) ‘Our employees are always seeking *to reach higher*.’
- (7) ‘There are careerists whose ambition is *to climb the ladder* (even if it’s a stepladder).’

The metaphor’s ideological potential is at work, and it is revealed as such in one of the articles in the corpus where moving around in several ways in the organization is encouraged:

- (8) ‘lateral moves have become the commonest ways to reenergize the troops’
- (9) ‘One GM side-stepper is Johanne Eberhardt’
- (10) ‘Employees can move several ways in an organization.[...] For example, they can move sideways, with no change in salary or title, to a more dynamic department; head for the exit and perhaps a more rewarding career elsewhere; stay put and make peace

while they enhance their skills and explore new horizons; or move down – move what – to a job that may carry less weight but promises more growth.’

Careers as CONTAINERS (11), (12) and as ADVENTURES (13), (14) recast the data in the journey frame: in the corpus, containers are recipients that temporarily accommodate the traveller, and adventures are just a specific type of journey:

(11) ‘Even those in the whirl of success want out sometimes.’

(12) ‘Others who want out of their niches leap even further -- into entrepreneurship.’

(13) ‘Lehane clearly enjoys the challenges of operating in a private company.’

(14) ‘Explore a Lockheed Martin career’

Another metaphorical pattern cross-cutting the corpora is the INHERITANCE metaphor:

(15) ‘The more skills you acquire and use, the more you can earn -- even if you don't jump to the next rung on the corporate ladder.’

The structural factors which affect careers are, as signaled through metaphor, differences in wealth, skills, qualifications, power, race, education, gender. While inheritance is an important aspect in career development, the metaphor is beneficially employed by those who act it out and try to redress the balance through their actions and choices, through a redemptive change. This leads the way to careers as ACTIONS:

(16) ‘a user-friendly book that helps people *make career choices* based on personality types’

This metaphor suggests that careers result not just from social structure and natural human cycles (as the CYCLE metaphor exemplified in (17) implies), but also from deliberate action – people are seen as agents determining their careers through choices, self-expression, taking responsibility, etc.

(17) ‘the support we offer for professional *development*’

In close connection with the agency focal point of the ACTION metaphor is the focal point of two other key conventional metaphors – careers as BUILDINGS (18) and as OBJECTS (19), (20), i.e. the results of an agent's activity in which typical ingredients are hard work, resilience, and creativity.

- (18) ‘spending your evenings and all your other available time building your career.’
 (19) ‘The jobs that have shaped my career.’
 (20) ‘our careers can be in no better hands than our own.’

Nevertheless, careers as GAMES downplay human agency and emphasize spells of luck, chance, opportunities:

- (21) ‘In 2003 I got the chance to move to the Industry and Parliament Trust as chief executive.’
 (22) ‘only if you understand the new rules of the career game.’

Apart from the preponderance of the JOURNEY metaphor in all three corpora, careers as GAMES feature prominently in C3. This may be surprising only if we forget the strategic dimension of career sections on public company websites. Careers are conceptualized as games of luck in which there are chances, opportunities and good luck. The role attributed to the organization is that of the divinity that generously distributes chances and opportunities.

3. Corpus-specific metaphorical patterns

Fourteen other metaphors were scattered through the corpora in an uneven fashion, i.e. without being identifiable in all three corpora. Statistically, the occurrence of such metaphorical patterns is recorded in Table 1. below:

Metaphors	C1 (Career-counselling articles)		C2 (Career Interviews)		C3 (Career Sections on Company Websites)	
FIT	6	2	0	0	5	4
	%		%		%	
EXTREME PHENOMENON	5	1	0	0	0	0
	%		%		%	
ROLES	5	1	2	1	0	0
	%		1	2%	%	
VEHICLE	5	1	0	0	0	0
	%		%		%	
RELATIONS	6	1	4	2	0	0
HIPS	%		%		%	
PERSON	4	1	1	0	0	0
	%		%		%	
HANDICRAF	3	1	0	0	0	0
T	%		%		%	
MACHINE	3	1	0	0	0	0
	%		%		%	
FIRE	1	0	0	0	0	0
	%		%		%	
BATTERY	1	0	0	0	0	0

		%		%		%
STORY	0	0	0	0	2	1
LESSON	0	0	5	2	0	0
RITUAL	0	0	1	0	0	0
LIVING ORGANISM	3	1	4	0	2	1

Table 1. Corpus-specific metaphorical patterns

C1 is the richest in less conventional patterns that provide alternative solutions for readers who want to cope with their careers. People are invited to reconsider their careers in extreme circumstances (and *disaster-proof* their careers (23), or to deal with careers as with LIVING ORGANISMS (24), or FIRE (25), or VEHICLES (26):

- (23) ‘*Disaster-proofing* your career.’
- (24) ‘The move will likely mean career *death*’
- (25) ‘Five ways to *ignite* your career’
- (26) ‘That overseas job could *derail* your career’

In C2, interviewees seem to attach increased value to careers as ROLES (12%) and RELATIONSHIPS (2%) – hence the need for networking and human interaction.

- (27) ‘In my current *role*, I am responsible for 215 staff worldwide in 22 countries.’
- (28) ‘My career advice to others would be to find an industry that you enjoy and *network* within that.’

As all of the interviewees are successful managers, it is understandable that they place a new emphasis on two alternative patterns.

In C3, authors are particularly keen on careers as FIT (29), (30) and LIVING ORGANISMS (10%), (31), in which the metaphorical focus is frequently *growth*:

- (29) ‘We have a range of positions to suit you.’
- (30) ‘Select the profile that fits you best.’
- (31) ‘Our Growth Planning and Performance Excellence processes help you grow in your current role.’

In all the monitor corpora, there are rare or one-shot novel metaphors, which strike the readers as new mindsets in the context of the other conventional metaphors. Consider the corpus samples below:

- (32) 'The 'very hostile' industrial relations at the plant made it 'a real baptism of fire'
(A CAREER IS A RITUAL).
(33) 'That's when my career really began to take off.' (A CAREER IS A VEHICLE)

These new approaches count as refreshing, restructuring, re-orienting resources for people who entertain rigid, fossilized ideas about careers. At the discourse level, the refreshing approach is achieved via counter-discursive metaphorical transfers, projected as destabilizing forces against pro-discursive conventional metaphors (e.g. careers as upward journeys, buildings, cycles, inheritance, etc.)

4. Concluding remarks

By studying the cross-discursive articulation of metaphors from ordinary language to the discourse of business and economics, two main conclusions have been reached. Firstly, the study reveals that there is a selective structuring of discourses by means of the cognitive linguistic resources. Secondly, there is a strategic side to the use and usage of metaphors in real discourse that needs to be acknowledged and further explored.

References

- Cameron, L. 1999. 'Identifying and describing metaphor in spoken discourse data' in *Researching and Applying Metaphor*. L. Cameron and G. Low (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-132.
Charteris-Black, Jonathan. 2004. *Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis*. London: Macmillan.
El-Sawad, A. 2005. 'Becoming a Lifer? Unlocking Career Through Metaphor' in *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 78/1, pp. 23-41.
Inkson, K. 2007. *Understanding Careers. The Metaphors of Working Lives*. London: Sage.

Notes on the author

Adina Oana Nicolae is currently enrolled in a doctoral programme at University of the West, Timișoara, Romania. She is a Lecturer in the

Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Faculty of Letters and Sciences, Petroleum-Gas University, Ploiești, and a member of ESSE, RSEAS, and RaAM. Her research areas include cognitive linguistics, phonetics and phonology, ELT.

THE GRAMMAR OF SKIN IN PRINT ADS

ANNAMARIA KILYENI

“Politehnica” University, Timișoara

***Abstract:** The starting point of the paper is the observation that the focus of countless advertisements promoting beauty products in women's glossy magazines is not so much on the material commodity itself, but on the representation of a body that will fully benefit from the commodities invested in it. The paper is an attempt to show that, through heavy reliance on descriptive vocabulary, mostly in the form of adjectives, these ads implicitly advertise a certain type of feminine body, whose most important component seems to be its skin.*

***Keywords:** print ads, femininity, body, skin, adjectives*

1. Introduction

Due to the very nature of consumer culture, in which the human body is inevitably linked to consumption, product advertising always associates commodities, explicitly or implicitly, with the body. According to Côté and Daigle (1999: 178), the body is present in ads either as the main beneficiary of the advertised commodity (e.g. clothes, medicines, cosmetic products, etc.) or as an agent involved in using a commodity (e.g. cars, household appliances, etc.). My corpus of one hundred and fifty print ads, taken from British women's glossy magazines (mainly *Cosmopolitan*, but also *Glamour* and *Woman and Home*), has nevertheless revealed that the great majority of these ads promote products aimed directly at the body, i.e. cosmetics and food. In addition, it should be emphasized that it is the surface of a woman's body that is the primary target of print ads, and that all efforts directed at bodily management in print ads involve, above all, control of the outer body (cf. Kilyeni 2010). The focus of these ads is not so much on the material commodity itself, as on the representation of a body that will fully benefit from the commodity invested in it. In other words, it is not only products that are advertised, but also a certain type of feminine body whose most important component seems to be its skin. Therefore, in what follows, I shall try to illustrate how feminine skin is represented in discourse and advertised as a prototype, designed in accordance with contemporary gender ideologies.

2. Advertising Skin

The skin is, by far, the organ that receives the most attention in print ads addressed to women. There are tens of advertisements within one single glossy magazine that promise to enhance skin quality and appearance. In a consumer culture that “permits the unashamed display of the human body” (Featherstone 1982: 22), the skin of a woman’s face, underarms, legs and whole body is exposed, both textually and visually, in print ads, being marked with signs of femininity and advertised openly. As we shall see, skin is never “just skin” in advertising; skin always comes along with specific feminine attributes. Below are examples of such attributes that linguistically “stick” to the skin:

- (1) “Discover nature’s secret for *brighter, radiant* skin”; “leaves skin feeling *soft, smooth and refreshed*”; “*brighter, more radiant* complexion” (Aveeno cleanser);
- (2) “*clear, smooth, beautiful* skin can be yours”; “Leaves Your Skin *Smooth, Softer, Healthier-looking!*” (Proactive solution);
- (3) “*silky-smooth* skin” (Clarins Eau Dynamisante);
- (4) “for *brighter, more radiant* skin” (Secrets of Boudoir No.7 foundation);
- (5) “For *soft, smooth, moisturized* skin”; “Nothing’s worse than *dry, tight, lifeless* skin” (E45 body lotion);
- (6) “for a *sun-kissed* look”; “for a *matte* complexion” (L’Oréal moisturizer);
- (7) “for a *mat* yet *glowing* complexion” (Bourjois blush);
- (8) “*smoother, even toned, younger-looking* skin”; “for a *firmer* outlook” (Elizabeth Arden restorative capsules);
- (9) “Result: a *smooth, even* and *radiant* natural complexion from morning till night” (Yves Saint Laurent foundation);
- (10) “keeps skin *moisturized* and *velvety-soft* from morning till night, while building a *natural, sun-kissed* look” (Garnier moisturizer and tanner);
- (11) “Skin feels *silky and soft*, looks flawlessly *perfect* day-into-night” (Maybelline foundation);
- (12) “their skin emerged *twice as smooth, visibly twice as even* and *twice as beautiful*” (Dove body moisturizer);
- (13) “skin is left *purified* and *hydrated*” (Garnier Pure A moisturizer);
- (14) “*Smoother, protected, moisturized* and *brighter*, your skin will look *younger, longer*” (Clarins moisturizer);
- (15) “Noticeably *smooth, firmer looking* skin”; “Your skin feels *firmer*, looks *smoother*” (St.Ives firming body lotion);
- (16) “skin that feels wonderfully *firmer*, every day of the year” (Nivea body moisturizer);
- (17) “for a *natural* look, just pat it onto the area that needs coverage” (Max Factor foundation);
- (18) “*smooth, even* skin instantly”, “*shine-free* skin all day” (Neutrogena shine control gel);
- (19) “for a *flawless* complexion” (Dior foundation).

One can note that the focus of certain advertisements is not on the skin in general, but on a particular aspect of the skin. For instance, certain ads for face products place particular emphasis on skin appearance, which is usually referred to as “complexion” or “look”, while most ads for tanning products focus on skin colour, i.e. its tan: (20) “*healthy, natural-looking tan* that lasts for days (Neutrogena). Similarly, other adverts highlight the brightness of skin, i.e. its glow: (21) “*a natural-looking golden glow*” (Estée Lauder), (22) “*healthy glow*” (Dove), (23) “*Get a sun-kissed glow*” (Olay), (24) “*for a natural, healthy glow*” (Revlon).

In addition, a certain part of the body can provide indexical reference to the skin. This is usually the case in advertisements promoting skin products that are meant for a body part other than the face. For example, in the following ads for deodorants, “underarm” stands for the skin covering that part of the body: (25) “The result: visibly *softer* and *smoother underarms*” (Dove deodorant), and (26) “leaving your *underarms* feeling *smooth* and *silky*” (Ban deodorant). By the same token, “leg”, “heel” and “elbow” can also replace “skin”, as in the following ads for Gillette razors and Vaseline body lotion, respectively: (27) “Reveal your *Goddess Smooth legs*”, (28) “*Dry skin, cracked heels and rough elbows* are a sure sign that your skin’s natural renewal process has been disrupted”. It is worth noting that, sometimes, not only particular body parts are used to refer to the skin, but the addressee herself, a woman, a complex human being, also functions as a metonym for skin. Consider, for instance, the way in which the pronoun “you” is used in the next two adverts, both as a deictic pronoun referring to an individual female addressee and as an index for the skin: the Aussie ad for hair removal gel promises (29) “no hair, just *silky, smooth you*”, while the Dove ad for soap explains that (30) “This works with this to give *you* a *healthy glow*”.

Irrespective of their direct or indirect reference to skin, all the ads above point to the copywriters’ heavy reliance on descriptive vocabulary, mostly in the form of adjectives. The use of adjectives has long been seen as the most distinctive feature of advertising, due to the nature of this particular part of speech to express an attribute of something, and to its subsequent informative and persuasive potential (with special emphasis on the latter). As already noted by Leech back in 1966, “advertising language is marked by a wealth of adjective vocabulary” (1966: 151). Many other scholars have since stressed the pronounced preference for adjectives in advertising, due to their potential to add value to the advertised products, and have focused, to a lesser or greater extent,

on the various ways in which adjectives fulfill their role of ascribing some positive quality to the referent, i.e. the promoted product (cf. Goddard 1998, Dyer 1999, Gieszinger 2001, Brierley 2002, Woods 2006). However, all the examples listed above point to the fact that the referent in our case is not the product, but the skin.

In what follows, mostly following Gieszinger's (2001: 129-154) account of the use of adjectives in print advertisements as a paramount means of describing a product in positive terms, I shall discuss the use of adjectives as an equally important device for the description, and hence, for the promotion of the feminine skin prototype. More precisely, I shall analyse the adjectives that collocate with the noun "skin" from a morphological, semantic, and syntactical point of view.

3. The Use of Adjectives: Morphological Considerations

From a morphological point of view, the adjectives used to describe skin fall into all three word-formation categories: simple adjectives (e.g. *bright, soft, smooth, perfect, firm, matte, even, dry*), derived adjectives (e.g. *healthy, beautiful, natural, hydrated*), and compound adjectives (e.g. *healthier-looking, silky-smooth, shine-free, sun-kissed*).

Within the second category (derived adjectives), the great majority of adjectives are participial adjectives ending in "-ed", such as *refreshed, moisturized, toned, purified, hydrated, and protected*. In my corpus, I have found only one participial adjective derived with the verbal inflectional suffix "-ing": *glowing*. Other suffixes, such as "-ful", "-y", "-al", "-less", combine with nouns to form adjectives, e.g. *beautiful, healthy, silky, natural* and *flawless*.

Regarding compound adjectives, we distinguish three structural patterns: adjective-adjective (e.g. *silky-smooth, velvety-soft*), noun-adjective (e.g. *shine-free, oil-free, Goddess Smooth*), and adjective-present participle (e.g. *healthier-looking, younger-looking, natural-looking*). Additionally, *sun-kissed* is the only compound displaying the isolated noun-past participle pattern. The spelling of the same compound adjective may vary, i.e. the two elements in the compound may be hyphenated, non-hyphenated, or joined together, the first form being the most frequent and the last one, the least frequent and usually incorrect. The most illustrative example is the adjective referring to skin colour (i.e. the tan), found in all three forms (again, ordered according to its frequency of occurrence): *sun-kissed, sun kissed, and *sunkissed*. This is

possible due to the unbounded linguistic flexibility characteristic of advertising discourse, which has actually made linguistic deviation one of the trademarks of the genre (cf. Cook 1992: 139-140). However, it should be pointed out that deviation in adjective formation is not a common occurrence in our corpus.

Concerning the use of a certain degree of comparison for the adjectives describing skin, my corpus confirms, to a certain extent, Gieszinger's (2001: 132-138) remarks on the adjectives describing an advertised commodity. Of the five groups of adjectives established by Gieszinger (base forms, comparatives, superlatives, intensifying adjectives and implicit superlatives), my corpus also reveals a high frequency of base forms (i.e. of the positive degree), such as *firm, smooth, even, soft, bright, natural, matte, beautiful, clear, dry, moisturized, hydrated, toned, glowing*. Their great number can be accounted for by the fact that, if compared to the other degrees of comparison, they create an impression of straightforward, factual description of skin. Physiological research in advertising has shown that people tend to perceive superlatives, but also comparatives, as over-persuasive, which weakens the credibility of the advertising message. As argued on product description by David Ogilvy, the British advertising practitioner with the highest reputation, there is no need to position the advertised product as superior to the competition, since "it convinces nobody" (1983: 82). In other words, there are more chances that people buy a product if the related advertisement focuses more on factual description (which involves the use of base forms), and less on overtly highlighting its superiority to other products (which involves the use of comparatives and superlatives). However, as will be pointed out, comparatives are not avoided when used to describe a woman's skin, primarily because they do not involve competition, i.e. comparatives are not employed to position a product as superior to another and therefore, can be used without restraint.

Contrary to Pârlog's (1995: 145) observation that "the comparative degree is seldom used" in print ads, as well as to the results provided by Gieszinger's (2001: 133) quantitative analysis, which show a significant difference in numbers between base forms and comparatives, I have noticed a pronounced preference for comparative adjectives (needless to say, they are all comparatives of superiority) when it comes to describing a woman's skin (e.g. *smoother, brighter, softer, more radiant, healthier, healthier-looking, younger-looking*, etc.). On the other hand, I do agree on the elliptical nature of the comparatives, as stressed by both scholars: in Pârlog's words, "the second term

of the comparison is absent” (1995: 145); in Gieszinger’s, “the object of comparison cannot be identified” (2001: 137). This allows advertisers to praise their own products as being better than other products, in legally safe terms. However, as far as my corpus is concerned, this explanation cannot account for the high use of comparative adjectives. Although the object of comparison is not explicitly stated, as can be seen in examples (1), (2), (4), (8), (14), (15), (16) and (25), it can nevertheless be easily inferred. There is no doubt that the missing component in the comparison is a woman’s skin prior to consumption, i.e. skin that has not yet experienced the benefits of the new product. I think that it is exactly because the absent component is known that copywriters rely so frequently on comparative adjectives. In print ads for (so-called) skincare products, the use of comparative adjectives to describe skin implicitly points to the following line of thought: your skin is X (where X stands for the adjective in its base form), but “the problem” is that it is not X enough; however, with the help of the product, your skin will be X-er/more X.

Furthermore, I have found that past participial adjectives are less commonly used in the comparative degree and that the adjective *beautiful* seldom occurs in the comparative (when it does, it usually functions predicatively). Considering what I have just stated about the logic of comparative adjectives, I believe that the grammatical structure “more beautiful” is avoided due to its obvious negative implications for the addressees, since it implies that a woman’s skin, and hence the woman herself, is not beautiful enough in a rather direct manner.

One special form of the comparative is also worth mentioning. There are ads where reference to skin quality is not made by means of a comparative of superiority, but of an intensified comparative of equality. Consider the following structure in (16): *twice as smooth*, visibly *twice as even and twice as beautiful*. The comparative of equality, expressed by the structure “as+adjective+as”, functions as any comparative of superiority discussed above, due to the fact that the modifier of degree (i.e. “as”) is intensified by the submodifier “twice”, placed before it (cf. Downing and Locke 2006: 492). However, the adverbial multiplicative numeral “twice” indicates the precise proportion in which the qualities in question will increase.

When it comes to the use of superlative adjectives to describe skin, my corpus reveals that no such forms are found. Instead, copywriters favour implicit superlatives, i.e. adjectives “which express the idea of superiority not in the morphological form of the superlative, but in their denotative meaning”

(Gieszinger 2001: 132). By far the most frequent implicit superlative related to a woman's skin is "flawless", followed by "perfect", as in examples (19) and respectively (11). However, implicit superlatives referring to skin do not abound in print ads for cosmetic products. Again, this observation runs counter Gieszinger's findings on adjectives describing commodities, which show that superlatives and implicit superlatives are more numerous than comparatives (2001: 136). Her research nevertheless indicates a sharp drop in the number of superlatives and implicit superlatives over the years, which she accounts for as being the result of the aforementioned pronounced tendency to avoid comparatives and superlatives in modern advertising.

As for the intensified adjectives, i.e. adjectives that "are premodified by an intensifying adverb" (Gieszinger 2001: 132), such as "very", "highly", "much", "really", "extremely" and "incredibly", I can state that they are almost absent from my corpus. In the few instances where I have spotted such adjectives, the adverb used for intensification is one that makes reference to one's visual ability, i.e. "noticeably", as in (15): *noticeably smooth*. Gieszinger's analysis of product adjectives in print ads also highlights the very low frequency of such forms. However, it should be pointed out that I have found examples of intensified comparatives, such as *wonderfully firmer* in (16), *visibly twice as even* in (12), *visibly softer and smoother* in (25), and even of intensified superlatives, such as *flawlessly perfect* in (11), and *utterly gorgeous* in (31) below. As can be noticed, the structure "flawlessly perfect" is another example of linguistic deviation, since the adverb "flawlessly" is used redundantly. However, this structure is not only completely acceptable in advertising, but it also makes perfect sense, as it both explains and reinforces the meaning of "perfect".

4. The Use of Adjectives: Semantic Considerations

From a semantic point of view, adjectives can be analyzed according to their denotative (or conceptual, cf. Leech 1981) and connotative meanings. Meaning includes both denotation and connotation. While the former is usually described as "the definitional, 'literal', 'obvious', 'commonsense' meaning [...] the dictionary attempts to provide", the latter refers to "the socio-cultural and 'personal' associations (ideological, emotional, etc.)" attached to a linguistic sign (Chandler 2002: 140).

From a denotative point of view, adjectives describing skin may be primarily descriptive or primarily evaluative (cf. Gieszinger 2001: 139). The main

difference between the two is that the former are supposed to provide specific information about the skin, while the latter provide some general assessment of the skin. In line with Gieszinger (2001: 140), who maintains that descriptive adjectives are much more numerous than evaluative adjectives when it comes to product presentation in print ads, one can notice the same trend towards description rather than evaluation when it comes to the linguistic depiction of a woman's skin. The adjectives that are most widely used to describe skin are *smooth, soft, bright, radiant, firm, sun-kissed, matte, even, moisturized* and *hydrated*.

Descriptive adjectives can be grouped into two categories, according to their relation to the two most prominent themes in print ads targeted at women:

- descriptive adjectives that relate to *physical appearance*: *bright, clear, cracked, dry, even, firm, flaky, glowing, golden, lifeless, luminous, matte, oil-free, radiant, rough, shine-free, silky, smooth (Goddess smooth, silky-smooth), soft (velvety-soft), sun-kissed, tight*.

- descriptive adjectives that relate to *health*: *hydrated moisturized, purified, refreshed, toned*.

As can be noticed, most descriptive adjectives relate to physical appearance, while less than a third relate to health - although these, too, implicitly invoke health in the name of physical appearance (cf. Kilyeni 2008: 145) Consider, for instance, the use of "moisturized" and "toned" in examples (5), (8), (10) and (14). Syntactically, they are embedded in a string of two, three or even more adjectives that refer to skin texture or appearance. As a result, their primary reference to health is reduced to a minimum, just to be replaced with a newly acquired reference, which has been "infused" from the neighbouring adjectives and which is thus perceived as prominent. Due to their connotations of beauty, all the adjectives in the string actually become relatively synonymous.

By contrast, evaluative/attitudinal adjectives, such as *beautiful, perfect, gorgeous, natural, natural-looking, flawless, healthy, healthier-looking, younger-looking*, give little or no specific information about skin features. Instead, they specify the advertisers' subjective assessment of and attitude towards a woman's skin (cf. Gieszinger 2001: 139, Downing and Locke 2006: 437).

Contrary to Downing and Locke, who assert that "attitudinal adjectives are usually placed before descriptive ones" (2006: 438), I have noticed that, generally, evaluative adjectives almost always come last in a string of adjectives (i.e. after the descriptive adjectives), as in (2) and (8), or are

syntactically separated from descriptive adjectives, again, the structure that contains them occurring in final position, as in (10), (11) and (14).

Not surprisingly, the either descriptive or evaluative nature of skin-related adjectives also becomes evident due to their collocational patterns, when they occur in predicative position. Thus, as examples (1), (11), (14), (15) and (16) illustrate, descriptive adjectives usually collocate with the verb “to feel”, which highlights their specificity and concreteness, while evaluative adjectives collocate with “to look”, which, in contrast, emphasizes their subjective, impalpable character. As far as the evaluative adjectives are concerned, the same effect is achieved when they function attributively, premodifying the noun “look”, as in (10), or when they occur in compounds with the present participial “looking” (e.g. *healthy-looking*). Moreover, in print ads that focus on a particular characteristic of skin, such as skin colour (i.e. tan) and skin brightness (i.e. glow), only evaluative adjectives are used [cf. (20) – (24)]. This is because it is rather difficult to describe skin tan and glow in objective, precise terms.

A more careful look at the adjectives that I have characterized as descriptive indicates that they also have an evaluative tinge, which means they are not exclusively descriptive. Actually, as will soon become obvious when I bring connotation into discussion, all the descriptive adjectives above include evaluative aspects as well, which are sometimes emphasized by premodifying evaluative adverbs (e.g. “wonderfully”), or by their collocating with “to look”, “look” or “-looking”, which also imply subjectivity (cf. above). For example, adjectives such as *bright*, *clear*, *radiant*, *glowing*, *golden* and *sun-kissed* also express appreciative evaluation, which is not part of their literal (i.e. denotative) meaning. It is the positive connotations that our culture associates with light, in general (as opposed to darkness; cf. Kövecses 2002: 85), that make these adjectives both descriptive and evaluative. We note that “golden” and “sun-kissed” have stronger positive connotations, due to their association with the preciousness of gold, on the one hand, and with the pleasant feeling of warmth (sent by the sun or felt when being kissed), on the other. Similarly, *soft*, *smooth*, *even* and *silky* form another group of primarily descriptive adjectives, whose evaluative nature can be this time accounted for by the positive connotations generally attached to neatness, lack of irregularities and roughness, which, in this particular case, apply to the touch. When these adjectives occur in compounds, such as *Goddess smooth*, *silky-soft* or *velvety soft*, their connotative meaning becomes even more pronounced, due to the premodifying element. For instance, “silky” and “velvety” add more positive connotations, both due to the

highly appreciated characteristics of the two fabrics, silk and velvet, i.e. fine to the touch and naturally shiny, and to their preciousness, as silk and velvet are fabrics of higher quality (luxury fabrics). “Goddess”, on the other hand, triggers positive associations linked to deities in general, such as prestige, superiority and perfection, and to representations of female deities in our culture endowed with great beauty (in sculpture, the feature “pleasant to the touch” is usually an inherent characteristic of beauty due to the material properties of statues).

On the contrary, *flaky*, *rough*, *dry* and *cracked* express pejorative evaluation, because of the negative connotations associated with coarseness to the touch, while in the case of *lifeless* and *tight*, with dullness and rigidity. These are actually the only adjectives in my corpus describing skin in negative terms. It should also be mentioned that they are seldom used, because of the unpleasant associations they evoke.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that, while the concept “light” has positive connotations, as discussed above, too much light is perceived negatively in relation to skin. If *shiny* or *glossy* are adjectives with positive connotations when they refer to hair or lips, they are perceived negatively when they collocate with “skin”. By contrast, adjectives that denote lack of shine, such as *matte/mat*, *shine-free* and *oil-free*, are connoted positively. The adjective *firm* also carries positive connotations when it modifies a noun denoting a part of the human body (including the skin). Needless to say, so do all the adjectives primarily related to skin health, which were mentioned at the beginning of my semantic considerations. This is because, in cognitive linguistic terms, HEALTH IS UP, i.e. it is regarded as positive (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2002).

5. The Use of Adjectives: Syntactical Considerations

The first observation to be made is that, syntactically, adjectives may function attributively and predicatively. In the former case, adjectives premodify the noun in a noun phrase, as in many of the examples in my corpus: *brighter*, *radiant* skin; *clear*, *smooth*, *beautiful* skin; *silky-smooth* skin; *soft*, *smooth*, *moisturized* skin; for a *mat* yet *glowing* complexion; a *natural*, *healthy* glow; visibly *softer* and *smoother* underarms; etc. When adjectives function as predicatives, they are not part of the noun phrase headed by the noun they modify. Predicative adjectives operate either as subject complements, as in: skin feels *silky and soft*; skin looks flawlessly *perfect*; skin feels *firmer*, looks *smooth*, or as object complements, as in: leaves your skin *smooth*, *softer*, *healthier*-

looking; keeps skin *moisturized* and *velvety-soft*. I have noticed that adjectives may also function as detached predicative supplements, which, from a syntactic point of view, are not part of the noun group which they apparently accompany, but such instances are less numerous. One such example is (14): “*Smoother, protected, moisturized* and *brighter*, your skin will look younger, longer”. As this example illustrates, the role of such predicatives is “to add supplementary information to a referent which is already defined” (Downing and Locke 2006: 446).

A characteristic feature of print ads is a linguistic phenomenon called “stacking” (Cowan 2008: 238), which is represented by strings of two, three or four adjectives. Downing and Locke (2006: 438) remark that such strings are common in advertisements, especially in personal classified ads, due to their marked effect. My corpus confirms this phenomenon: indeed, an adjective referring to a woman’s skin almost never occurs in isolation; on the contrary, it is accompanied by one or two more adjectives (sometimes even three more), as can be seen in most of my examples from (1) to (31). The adjectives in such strings are always in a relation of coordination, being connected either *asyndetically* or with the help of the linguistic coordinator “and” [“yet” is also used, as in (7), but only on rare occasions].

The high frequency of strings composed of three adjectives is accounted for by Atkinson’s (1988) “three-part list” – a rhetorical strategy that uses three similar items to summarize a message (e.g. Julius Caesar’s “*Veni, vidi, vici*”, Mark Anthony’s “*Friends, Romans, countrymen*”, and the motto of the French Republic, “*Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*”). In his analysis of political speeches, Atkinson reaches the conclusion that three-part verbal formats are particularly effective persuasive devices, due to the impression of unity and wholeness (similar to the beginning-middle-end story structure) they send out, as well as to their capacity “to strengthen, underline and amplify almost any kind of message” (Atkinson 1988: 60). Following Atkinson, Woods (2006: 29) touches upon the use of the three-part list as a common advertising practice. Indeed, my corpus of print ads for cosmetic products has also revealed many three-part lists [sometimes two within the same ad, as in (2) and (5)]. Examples (1), (2), (3), (5), (8), (9), (11) and (12) are cases in point for the use of adjectives as stacked descriptors of skin.

It is interesting to note that the examples in my corpus display a particular arrangement of the adjectives in such strings. More specifically, the last in the string is usually less specific and less precise than the previous two. For

instance, if we consider examples (2), (8) and (12), we notice that the first two adjectives in the list are descriptive, while the last one is evaluative. Example (11) provides a variation of this pattern, in which the three-part list is somehow interrupted, due to the fact that the two descriptive adjectives occur in collocation with the verb “to feel”, while the evaluative adjective with “to look”: “feels *silky and soft*, looks flawlessly *perfect*”. This strategy is part of a wider advertising trend I have touched upon when discussing evaluative adjectives, which is characterized by the syntactic separation of descriptive and evaluative adjectives. Examples (1) and (5) show that descriptive adjectives related to health can also occur in third position, while the descriptive adjectives related to physical appearance in first and second position.

This particular arrangement confirms Atkinson’s (1988: 57) observation that usually the third item in the three-part list is typically vaguer and more general than the previous two, because it is often difficult to find. In speech, the third term is often an “unimaginative improvisation one resorts to” (Atkinson 1988: 57). In print ads, however, the more general nature of the third item expressed by an evaluative adjective can also be accounted for by another advertising strategy, which also applies for strings of more than three adjectives (i.e. it is not restricted to three-part lists). Namely, it points to a smooth shift from adjectives that highlight the concrete, physical benefits that the advertised product will bring to a woman’s skin (e.g. *smooth, soft, firm, matte*, etc.) to rather imprecise and much more subjective benefits (e.g. *beautiful, healthy-looking, younger-looking*, etc.) that are not confined to skin alone. If both descriptive and evaluative adjectives are directly related to a woman’s skin, the latter involve an implicit transition from the skin to women’s general well-being. In other words, although these adjectives signal an explicit emphasis on the skin, they also implicitly point to the benefits a woman can enjoy as far as her personal well-being and social status are concerned.

In other ads, the same idea is expressed in a more explicit manner. Consider the following example from an ad for Veet hair removal cream: (31) “*Smooth, silky and utterly gorgeous*. These are just some of the words that describe the feeling that Veet gives you”. Not only is the aforementioned idea implied by the use of a three-part list, but it is also reinforced by the double reading of the noun “feeling”. In relation to the descriptives “smooth” and “silky”, the noun refers mainly to the physical sensation of the skin to the touch, while in relation to the evaluative “gorgeous”, to the affective state of mind derived from having skin that feels that way. The advertising message is

obvious. Ads actually suggest that, through consumption, not only does skin become clear, smooth, even, toned, soft, etc., but also beautiful, younger and healthy, and consequently, skin endowed with such attributes contributes to women's well-being, on the one hand, and to a highly positive assessment of women in society, on the other. Another ad states this idea in a very explicit way, right from the headline: (32) "It's all about looking and feeling great!". Nothing can be worse than skin that does not possess such qualities [cf. (5)], as it may ruin a woman's day [cf. (28)].

6. Conclusion

My analysis has shown that adjectives, traditionally perceived as highly valuable linguistic tools in the language of advertising, are used to a rather different end when it comes to print ads in women's glossy magazines (as already stated, most such ads are for cosmetic products): adjectives provide little or no reference to features of the promoted commodities; instead, they are used to describe various parts of the female body, in general, and its skin, in particular.

From a grammatical point of view, it can be noticed that adjectives are used to describe skin mostly in the same way they are used to describe commodities. However, my analysis has highlighted certain peculiarities in their use, from among which we mention: the lack of linguistic deviation in adjective formation, the pronounced preference for adjectives in the comparative degree (which are often intensified by means of an adverb), the absence of superlative adjectives and the very low frequency of implicit superlatives, the collocational patterns of descriptive and evaluative adjectives with the verbs "to feel" and "to look", respectively, and the particular arrangement of adjectives in three-part lists.

My analysis has also led to the conclusion that print ads in women's glossy magazines are more concerned with advertising feminine skin, i.e. skin characterized by certain well-defined attributes, than with advertising products. This demonstrates, once again, that advertising involves much more than mere product promotion and that it is closely linked to contemporary gender ideologies, in general, and consequently, to the promotion of some standard feminine body, in particular. My research has revealed that skin in advertising has nothing to do with anatomy or medicine, i.e. with its being the largest organ of the body's integumentary system. On the contrary, advertising solely focuses on skin as a cultural gendered sign, whose meanings are not found in any dictionary. Every

single ad in my corpus reveals that, in the discourse of advertising, a woman's skin is first and foremost associated with beauty. Skin in advertising is not a mere protective surface covering of the body, but a beautiful surface presentation of the body that enhances well-being.

References

- Atkinson, M. 1988. *Our Masters' Voices: The Language and Body Language of Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Brierley, S. 2002. *The Advertising Handbook*. London: Routledge.
- Chandler, D. 2002. *Semiotics: the Basics*. London: Routledge.
- Cook, G. 1992. *The Discourse of Advertising*. London: Routledge.
- Côté, L., J.L. Daigle. 1999. *Publicité de masse et masse publicitaire: le marché québécois des années 1920 aux années 1960*. Ottawa : Les Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa.
- Cowen, R. 2008. *The Teacher's Grammar of English: A Course Book and Reference Guide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Downing, A., Ph. Locke. 2006. *English Grammar: A University Course*. London: Routledge.
- Dyer, G. 1999. *Advertising as Communication*. London: Routledge.
- Featherstone, M. 1982. 'The Body in Consumer Culture' in *The Body: Social Process and cultural theory*, Featherstone, M., M. Hepworth,, B. Turner (eds). London: Sage.
- Gieszinger, S. 2001. *The History of Advertising Language: the Advertisements in The Times from 1788 to 1996*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Goddard, A. 1998. *The Language of Advertising..* London: Routledge.
- Kilyeni, A. 2008. 'The Concept of Naturalness in Print Ads Targeted at Women' in *TranslationStudies. Retrospective and Prospective Views. 2/2008*. Galați: Galați University Press.
- Kilyeni, A. 2010. 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... Regulated Beauty in Print Ads Targeted at Women' in *Romanian Journal of English Studies*. Timișoara: Editura Universității de Vest.
- Kövecses, Z. 2002. *Metaphor. A Practical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 1980. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Leech, G. 1966. *English in Advertising. A Linguistic Study of Advertising in Great Britain*. London: Longman.
- Leech, G. 1981. *Semantics. The Study of Meaning*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Ogilvy, D. 1983. *Ogilvy on Advertising*. Toronto: John Wiley and Sons.
- Pârlog, H. 1995. 'On the language of English advertisements' in *The Sound of Sounds*. Timișoara: Hestia.
- Woods, N. 2006. *Describing Discourse. A Practical Guide to Discourse Analysis*. London: Hodder Arnold.

Notes on the author

Annamaria Kilyeni is an Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Foreign Languages, “Politehnica” University of Timișoara, Romania, where she teaches Communication Mediation Practice, Translation Practice and EFL. She holds an M.A. degree in Terminology and Translation Studies from the University of the West, Timișoara, Romania, where she is currently finishing her PhD studies in Linguistics. Her research focuses on the analysis of advertising discourse and terminology.

POWER RELATIONS IN ADVERTISING DISCOURSE: 'POLITENESS' ACROSS CULTURES

CLAUDIA ELENA STOIAN

Madrid Universidad Autónoma

***Abstract:** This study presents a small-scale comparison of e-advertisements in four different languages. It analyses the similarities and differences between politeness strategies and systems in the texts and discusses them from a cultural perspective. The findings, not totally consistent with current theory, suggest the influence of socio-political changes and globalisation.*

***Key words:** advertising, culture, discourse analysis, internet, politeness.*

1. Introduction

In this paper, I analyse advertising discourse across several languages: English, Peninsular Spanish, Costa Rican Spanish and Romanian. I am going to look, first, at power relations and politeness strategies following Brown and Levinson's theory (1978) and, then, at politeness systems, as proposed by Scollon and Scollon's model (2000). Having this in mind, my aim is twofold: (1) describe, analyse and compare the similarities and differences of the *linguistic choices* in the four languages in this particular *genre* and (2) see whether these linguistic choices can be accounted for from the point of view of *cultural differences*.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Advertising discourse

Advertisements can be influenced both by social discursive practices of commercial exchange and by intimate kinds of exchange, depending on the intended interaction, as pointed out by Bex (1996: 161). Moreover, since ads directly and consciously aim at people's feelings (Goddard 2002: 73), the advertisers have to be aware, know and deeply understand the audience needs and wishes (Zdrenghia 2000: 7).

A new type of advertising is becoming more and more popular nowadays, i.e. e-advertising. Some researchers consider it more direct and explicit in its persuasion than other advertising media, due to its preference for imperatives and economy grammar reduction strategies (Pop 2006: 189).

2.2. Power relations

Advertising discourse, as suggested by Goddard (2002: 55), is an addressing discourse that needs to be received and expects a reply in return, under the form of confirmation. In order to persuade and incite the reader to action, the writer informs and manipulates at the same time; s/he negotiates meaning, takes particular positions and constructs role relations of power and solidarity with the reader. Usually, power relations are built according to face and are manifested in politeness strategies (Scollon & Scollon 2000: 49). Therefore, the analysis of politeness strategies and systems can reveal the type of power relation built.

2.2.1. Politeness strategies

Brown and Levinson (1978: 61) consider face as something emotionally invested that must be attended to in interaction and can be lost, maintained or enhanced. The interlocutor's positive or negative face can be damaged by face threatening acts. The degree of threat depends on three main variables: social distance and power relationship between participants, and the weight of imposition given by culture (Brown & Levinson 1978: 79). The interlocutor can save face by employing different politeness strategies: *bald-on-record* – no threat minimisation, *positive* – minimisation of threat, *negative* – distance emphasis and avoidance of imposition, and *off-record* – indirect language use (ibid: 94-227).

2.2.2. Politeness systems

The types of face, politeness strategies and variables mentioned can build different politeness systems, as proposed by Scollon and Scollon (2000: 44-47), such as *hierarchical* – participants recognize and respect their different positions, *deference* – participants treat each others as equals, but use a lot of independence strategies out of respect, and *solidarity* – participants are friends and use a high level of involvement.

2.2.3. Politeness classification

Even if Brown and Levinson (1978: 21, 62) consider their model universally valid, they also admit that it can vary from one culture to another. Therefore, it can be suggested that cross-cultural analysis requires awareness of face expectations and politeness preferences (Lorenzo-Dus 2001: 109), cultural values (Vilkki n.d.: 326) or influences of the context of communication (Koike *et al.* 2001: 88). The cultures under discussion in this paper tend to use different politeness strategies. For example, *English culture* has a tendency towards negative politeness, individuality and deference, whereas *Spanish culture* emphasizes positive politeness and solidarity (Lorenzo-Dus 2001: 109). Moreover, both *Latin American* and *Romanian cultures* prefer indirect conventional forms and a high degree of formality and deference (Iglesias Recuero 2007: 26; Pârlog 1994: 49). Nevertheless, there are studies, such as Şerbănescu (2007) or Roventă-Frumușani (2005), that contradict this classification. The present study investigates whether the politeness strategies used in the ads are consistent with their classification.

Furthermore, the choice of politeness reflects and reinforces cultural values. Language is influenced by social appropriate norms and contains universal mechanisms for achieving cooperation. Thus, politeness norms vary across cultures and, at the same time, have international characteristics. The study of politeness strategies and systems can give details about participants, their relation and their culture.

3. Cultural framework

This section provides the background for the analysis of cultural features. Even if there are many dimensions that can show cultural differences, I have chosen the variable of *power distance*, since it seemed more relevant for the present study, as it focuses on power relations. According to Hofstede (2010), this variable affects the behaviour of a culture and represents the extent to which its members expect and accept that power is unequally distributed. He distinguishes two types of power distance cultures: *small power distance*, which minimises inequalities and proposes interdependency between less and more powerful people, and *large power distance*, in which inequalities are both expected and desired (Neuliep 2006: 76). Nonetheless, deviations from the main cultural pattern can occur in certain contexts and situations, since cultures are “dynamic, continuously developing, and evolving” (Neuliep 2006: 45),

being influenced by different factors, such as geographical, historical, religious, economical, social or politic (Șerbănescu 2007: 155).

On the power distance parameter, studies (Hofstede 2010; Neuliep 2006: 77; Șerbănescu 2007: 147) suggest that the cultures under discussion can be classified as follows: *English* and *Costa Rican cultures* are considered *low power distance cultures*, while *Spanish and Romanian cultures* are defined as *high power distance cultures*. The present study investigates whether the ads are consistent with their cultural classification.

4. Data selection and methodology

The corpus of my study consists of four ads taken from Internet travel agencies offering honeymoon packages. They share the following similarities: field (honeymoon holidays), function (persuade the couple to buy the luxury advertised), mode (Internet) and format (contain a picture and a text of around 160 words). The main difference is that they belong to different languages, countries and cultures. These features have been established from the beginning as selection criteria for the corpus of analysis. I started the selection by typing the word *honeymoon* in Google. When the search was complete, I took the results one by one and selected the first that fitted in these criteria. I proceeded in the same way for each language. I excluded international travel agencies and translated ads. After gathering the corpus, I identified the main politeness strategies and systems in order to do a contrastive analysis and see the similarities and differences between the ads. I took into consideration also the variables of power, distance, culture and context of communication.

5. Analysis and findings

The linguistic analyses and their results are presented in relation to the politeness and cultural classifications considered for each ad, showing how the language follows or deviates from the typical pattern. First, I shall present the ad that seems most consistent with the theory, i.e. the English one. Then, I focus on the ads deviating from their classification: the Romanian, Costa Rican and Spanish. For each ad, I include the text and its translation so that the analysis will be clearer and easier to follow.

5.1. The English ad

With some of the most exotic locations in the world and a selection of the finest hotels in the world booking your dream honeymoon with us could not be more simple. Members of a dedicated honeymoons and weddings team, with first hand experience of the resorts, are able to recommend the best hotels to suit your requirements. Many of the resorts also have fantastic honeymoon packages and offers – making the very special even more special – so call one of the team now on 0161 233 0110. To see the very latest and best honeymoon offers, please click here. If you are looking to combine two destinations within your honeymoon - be it an African Safari with an Indian Ocean Island, a journey around the Far East, or perhaps a Caribbean island with an American city -we can tailor make your perfect itinerary. Please see the Experiences section on our website for inspiration. More Details...

The English ad combines *negative politeness strategies* with *positive* ones, having a certain tendency towards the first type. *Negative strategies* are used to minimise the writer's imposition on the reader and are usually expressed by modalization, such as *could*, impersonal structures ('*making the very special even more special*') or plural pronouns ('*we*'). However, *positive strategies* address the reader, *you*, directly and attend his/her wants ('*you are looking to*'). In addition, there are several instances of *bald-on-record strategies*, such as orders ('*call*'), and *off-record strategies* like indirect offers ('*many of the resorts have fantastic honeymoon packages*'). Considering the use and combination of strategies, it seems that the writer imposes his ideas on the reader in an impersonal way, for the reader's benefit. Typically for ads, the advertiser presents a product in such a way, that the client can find him/herself reflected in it and, thus, identify with it.

The distance between interlocutors is reduced; the agency, as an expert acquaintance willing to help, situates itself neither too close nor too far away, in order to make persuasion more effective. Both agency and client are assigned different roles, as if power were negotiated; the agency has the power and knowledge to impose and the ability to recommend and customize, whereas the client has the power to accept or ignore the hints suggested. All in all, the relation between writer and reader is suitable for the purpose of the ad, i.e. to sell.

The politeness system construed is *mixed*; it combines solidarity with independence strategies – involvement is used to impose and deference not to offend, both aiming to persuade the reader. Nevertheless, sometimes the balance tends more towards deference.

To sum up, the resources used in the English ad seem typical of *small power distance cultures*, especially due to the equalitarian relation created among participants.

5.2. The Romanian ad

Spune Da paradisului! După atâta oboseală, stres, după atâtea întrebări care par fără sfârșit: care să fie culoarea rochiei, alb sau ivory?... , locația ar arăta bine decorată cu alb și auriu sau ar merge ceva orange să mai învioreze puțin spiritul? trandafiri sau orhidee?...unde îi pun pe prietenii nașilor?...e inspirată alegerea tortului din frișcă în luna iulie?... atâtea griji, care vor dispărea într-o zi ca un nor vaporos fără nici măcar să vă dați seama foarte bine ce s-a întâmplat! Chiar că meritați o vacanță! Și nu oricare, ci o lună de miere! Prima oprire pe acest drum pe care ați pășit împreună! No Surprises te ajută să alegi de la efectele benefice ale masajului thailandez și ale cremelor din plante exotice, de la atingerea nisipului fin și energia băilor de soare, până la atingerea corpurilor electrizate de muzică în renumitele cluburi de noapte din Ibiza. România sau o insulă îndepărtată din Pacific, totul este posibil! Tu decizi!

(“Say Yes to paradise! After so much fatigue, stress, after so many questions which seem endless: which should the colour of the dress be, white or ivory?... , the location would look nice decorated in white and gold or would something orange be better in order to refresh the spirit a little? roses or orchids?...where do I place the godparents’ friends?...is it the choice of a cream cake in the month of July inspired?...so many worries, which will disappear in one day, like a wispy cloud without even realizing very well what has happened! You really deserve a holiday! And not just any holiday, but a honeymoon! The first stop on this road you have set out on together! No Surprises helps you choose from the healthy effects of the Thai massage and of the creams from exotic plants, from the touch of the fine sand and the energy of the sunbaths, to the touch of bodies electrified by music in Ibiza’s famous night clubs. Romania or a far away island in the Pacific, everything is possible! You decide!”)

The Romanian ad combines *positive* with *negative politeness strategies*, with the exception of the *bald-on-record* instance at the beginning of the text (*spune* ‘say’). This seems, however, minimised, since it seeks the reader’s agreement. *Positive strategies* aim to minimise the threat to the reader’s face and to attend his/her interests by solidarity markers such as *T* forms (*tu* ‘you’), advice (*chiar că meritați o vacanță* ‘you really deserve a holiday’), suggestions (*România sau o insulă îndepărtată din Pacific* ‘Romania or a far away island in the Pacific’), offers (*No Surprises te ajută să alegi* ‘No Surprises helps you choose’) and desire for common ground and agreement (*spune Da* ‘say Yes’). At the same time, the ad contains impersonal structures, mainly nominalisations, such as *după atâta oboseală* (‘after so much fatigue’), which

defocus the agent and respect the reader's freedom. His/her independence is further emphasized by the final remark which points out who is taking the decision (*tu decizi* 'you decide'). Considering that the text is an ad, it seems that the writer adopts a stance of getting involved with the reader, while treating him/her with deference. In this way, the writer sounds both convincing and respectful.

Due to these strategies, the relation between reader and writer is a little ambiguous. On one hand, the writer uses nominalizations and creates a distant and formal relation with the reader, in which neither has any responsibility. S/he also refers to the agency by name, maybe in order to appear authoritative and distant. On the other hand, the writer gets involved with the reader by seeking agreement and attending to his/her interests all through the text. Moreover, s/he directly addresses the reader and develops an interaction similar to a spoken conversation. Bearing this combination in mind, I think the writer gets close enough to the reader to suggest or give advice, and distant enough to sound reliable. As for the power relations between agency and reader, they appear to be built in the same line. Both agency and reader seem to have no power or responsibility, due to the number of impersonal structures used. However, the agency has sufficient power to presume common ground, give advice and help, whereas the reader is assigned sufficient power and responsibility to decide and have the last word. In the ad, the reader is made to feel both attended to and free from imposition even if her/his opinions and choices are controlled, guided and imposed by the writer.

The politeness system built is *mixed*, because it combines deference with solidarity strategies. The writer seems to be formally persuasive since s/he marks deference and gets involved; the reader is altogether given independence, drawn into interaction and controlled.

Thus, the resources in the Romanian ad seem typical of *small power distance cultures*, due to the use of involvement strategies which build an equalitarian relation among participants, and *large power distance cultures*, since the authoritative voice of the agency can lead to inequality.

5.3. The Costa Rican ad

! Costa Rica es el lugar perfecto para los enamorados! Ofrece un exótico ambiente, cautivadoras playas solitarias y una cultura romántica. En "Costa Rican Trails" hemos cuidado cada detalle para esta ocasión especial. Creemos que son los pequeños detalles los que importan, ¡los que crean algo especial! Imagine su luna de miel con una cena a la luz de la velas en medio de un místico bosque, escuchando los ruidos de

los animales silvestres, mirando la puesta del sol en un jacuzzi privado en la colina con una exuberante vista de las aguas del Pacífico, o presenciar una erupción incandescente del volcán en la comodidad de su bungalow privado. Prepárese a relajarse en las aguas termales naturales, ser tratado como la realeza; o a recibir un masaje al lado de una catarata cristalina o relájese simplemente sintiendo la brisa del mar en su piel. Escoja uno de nuestros itinerarios y disfrute la belleza natural de este Jardín del Edén.”

(“Costa Rica is the perfect place for lovers! It offers an exotic atmosphere, captivating solitary beaches and a romantic culture. In “Costa Rica Trails”, we have taken care of each detail for this special occasion. We believe that it's the little details that matter, the ones that make something special! Imagine your honeymoon having dinner by candle lights in the middle of a mystical forest, listening to the noises of wild animals, watching the sunset from a private Jacuzzi on the hill with an exuberant view of the Pacific waters, or witnessing an incandescent eruption of the volcano from the comfort of your private bungalow. Prepare yourself to relax in the natural thermal springs, to be treated like royalty; or to receive a massage next to a crystalline waterfall or just relax feeling the sea breeze on your skin. Choose one of our tours and enjoy the natural beauty of this Garden of Eden.”)

The writer of the ad is usually conventionally indirect since s/he employs *negative* and *off-record politeness strategies*. The indirect suggestion *ser tratado como la realeza* (‘be treated like royalty’) and indirect offer *ofrece un exótico ambiente* (‘it offers an exotic atmosphere’) refer to the destination and to different possible ways of spending one’s honeymoon. The possible imposition they can set on the reader is minimised by their impersonal structures, which build a detached relation between reader and writer. Apart from these strategies, there are instances of *bald-on-record* such as *imagine* (‘imagine’) or *escoja* (‘choose’), which go against the overall indirect tone of the text. There are also a few instances of *positive strategies*, such as *creemos que son los pequeños detalles los que importan* (‘we believe that it's the little details that matter’), used when the writer wants to get involved with the reader and obtain his/her agreement. On the whole, the writer wants to persuade in a covert and indirect manner, by implying meaning, dropping hints and formally addressing the reader.

The relation between writer and reader is distant due to the frequency of impersonal structures and *V*-singular forms and to the lack of reference to both agency and client. Sometimes, the agency comes closer to the reader by expressing its beliefs; however, solidarity is still built from a distant position, since the agency refers to itself by a first person plural pronoun. As for the power relations between participants, the agency is presented as a reliable

expert company that gives advice and indications to the client. Sometimes, by using many imperatives, it even sounds authoritative. The reader has the power to choose whether to take the agency's hints into consideration or ignore them. S/he is formally addressed and so placed in a higher position. The agency, then, tries to persuade the reader by presenting itself as a reliable and expert company taking care of every detail, giving instructions and allowing freedom of imagination and choice.

The politeness system built is one of *deference*; participants share an equal relation of formality and distance, as if they were strangers. However, the agency sometimes situates itself in a higher position by imposing and restraining the reader possibilities.

In general, the resources used in the Costa Rican ad seem typical of *large power distance cultures* due to the distant and formal relation between participants and the agency's authoritative voice. Nevertheless, participants sometimes share power, being equally powerful, which may indicate a *small power distance type of culture*.

5.4. The Spanish ad

DA EL <SI QUIERO> Casarse, ya es en si un precioso problema, verdad? Que mejor excusa para escapar tras la ceremonia que un viaje irrepetible y original, de forma que os quede un recuerdo imborrable en vuestra memoria. A nosotros nos encantará prepararos vuestra Luna de Miel, para que se convierta en La Experiencia de Vuestra Vida. No importa en lo que estéis pensando nosotros os asesoraremos de todas las mejores opciones y posibilidades tras conocer vuestros deseos, por que no es lo mismo combinar Estados Unidos con el Caribe, que convivir una semana con los Toraja, y sin embargo tienen algo en común, el deseo de que sea especial hasta el ultimo segundo. Lee atentamente los ejemplos que ya hemos realizado con éxito, para que te sirva de inspiración, y dejanos saber cual sería tu Luna de Miel perfecta, te sorprenderá las posibilidades que te ofreceremos y disfrutaras de lo que sin duda será la experiencia de vuestra vida.

("SAY "I WILL" Getting married, that is itself a lovely problem, isn't it? What better excuse to escape after the ceremony than an unrepeatable and unusual trip, in order to have an unforgettable memory. We would love to prepare your Honeymoon, so that it becomes The Experience of Your Life. Whatever you have in mind, we will advise you on the best options and possibilities of all after knowing your desires, because it is not the same thing to combine United States with the Caribbean or to spend one week with the Torajas, and yet, they have something in common, the desire to be special until the last second. Read carefully the examples we have already designed successfully to find inspiration, and let us know which your perfect Honeymoon will

be; you'll be surprised by the possibilities we offer you and you will enjoy what undoubtedly will be the experience of your life.”)

The politeness strategies used in this ad are predominantly *positive*. The writer establishes a relation of intimacy and solidarity with the reader by making offers (*nosotros os asesoraremos* ‘we will advise you’) and promises (*disfrutaras* ‘you will enjoy’), seeking agreement (*verdad?* ‘isn’t it?’) and attending the reader’s interests (*os quede un recuerdo imborrable en vuestra memoria* ‘have an unforgettable memory’). On the other hand, *bald-on-record strategies* are used sometimes to give orders, such as *da* (‘say’) or *lee* (‘read’), to the reader. However, in the Spanish culture, imperatives are not considered impolite in close relations; they are used to strengthen social relations and demonstrate familiarity (Lorenzo-Dus 2001: 109). Apart from these strategies, there are some instances of *negative politeness* expressed by impersonal structures, such as *para que se convierta en la Experiencia de Vuestra Vida* (‘so that it becomes the Experience of Your Life’). To sum up, the politeness strategies used indicate that the writer tries to build an intimate relation with the reader, maybe because closeness makes persuasion easier and imposition possible.

The distance between interlocutors is close, as if they were friends or members of the family. The writer builds a relation of intimacy and solidarity with the reader; s/he addresses the reader directly, asks questions, answers, provides solutions, explains his/her own requests and encourages the reader’s participation in the interaction. Considering this, there seems to be no power difference between agency and reader; they appear as equally powerful. The agency is assigned power, by presuming reliability and knowledge, while the reader is made to feel powerful by being consulted and attended in all his/her wishes. Taking into account the genre of the message, I think power is used to manipulate and convince: the reader is made to think that his/her wishes are commands for the agency, when in fact power belongs to the agency, in the form of knowledge and expertise.

The politeness system construed is one of *solidarity*; the power relations are symmetrical, the participants are friends and the predominant strategy type is involvement.

Thus, the features of the Spanish ad seem to be typical of *small power distance cultures*, due to the emphasis laid on equality and solidarity.

5.5. Summary of findings

The results of my linguistic analyses of the ads, summarized in the table below, show several inconsistencies with the theory considered (Lorenzo-Dus 2001; Iglesias Recuero 2007; Pârlog 1994; Hofstede 2010; Neuliep 2006; Șerbănescu 2007).

	<i>ENGLISH</i>	<i>ROMANIAN</i>	<i>C. RICAN</i>	<i>SPANISH</i>
<i>Politeness strategy</i>	negative & positive	negative & positive	conventionalized indirectness	positive
<i>Distance & Power</i>	'middle' expert acquaintance	'middle' expert acquaintance	distant - expert	close - reliable friend
<i>Politeness systems</i>	Mixed	mixed	Deference	solidarity
<i>Culture</i>	Small	large (small)	large (small)	Small

Table 1 – Summary of findings

With reference to *politeness classification*, the *English* and the *Romanian ads* seem not totally consistent with the theory, since they use more positive politeness than expected. The *Spanish* and *Costa Rican ads* appear consistent with their definitions as highly positive and, respectively, mainly indirect.

Regarding *cultural classification*, the *English ad* seems to be consistent with the theory, having features of small power distance cultures, whereas the *Spanish ad* is not at all consistent with its classification, its resources being typical of small power distance cultures. The *Romanian* and *Costa Rican ads* are not totally consistent with their cultural classification either, because they combine features of both small and large power distance cultures, with a tendency towards the latter type.

6. Conclusion

To conclude, the *English ad* seems the only stable example, except for the amount of positive politeness, which can be explained by the fact that the ad may be addressing an international client, considering the international character of English. If representative, the ad suggests the domination of English, since it is not permeable to other cultures. In the case of the other ads, the inconsistencies may be indicative of different cultural changes. *Spanish* and

Romanian cultures may be influenced by recent changes in politics, economy, society and culture and/or the influence of globalisation and English culture. Costa Rican culture might be influenced by Latin America, from the south, and/or United States, from the north. The inconsistencies can also be explained by the context of communication (advertising) and its medium (Internet), whose register is more oral, economical, direct and informal (Pop 2006: 192-195).

References

Ads:

Costa Rican ad: <http://www.costaricantrails.com/espanol/romance/romanc00.html>

English ad: <http://www.onlyexclusivetravel.com/2431/pages/honeymoons.html>

Romanian ad: <http://www.nosurprises.ro/nunta-luna-miere.html>

Spanish ad: <http://www.madoxviajes.com/da-el-si-quiero/index.php>

- Bex, T. 1996. *Variety in Written English: Texts in societies, societies in texts*. London: Routledge.
- Brown, P., S. Levinson. 1978. *Politeness. Some universals in language usage*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Goddard, A. 2002. *Limbajul publicității*. București: Polirom.
- Hofstede, G. 2010. 'Cultural Dimensions' [Online]. Available: <http://www.geerthofstede.com/> [2010, March 30].
- Iglesias R.ecuero, S. 2007. 'Politeness Studies on Peninsular Spanish' in *Research on politeness in the Spanish-speaking world*. E. Placencia and C. Garcia (eds.). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc., pp: 21-34.
- Koike, D. A., R. E. Vann, J. Busquets. 2001. 'Spanish *no, si*: Reactive moves to perceived face-threatening acts, Part II' in *Journal of Pragmatics* 33, pp: 879-899.
- Lorenzo-Dus, N. 2001. 'Compliment responses among British and Spanish university students: A contrastive study' in *Journal of Pragmatics* 33, pp: 107-127.
- Neuliep, J. W. 2006 (1999). *Intercultural Communication* (3rd ed.). London: Sage Publications.
- Pârlog, H. 1994. 'How to save face: A comparative study' in *Analele Universității din Timișoara – Seria Științe Filologice*, XXXII, pp: 49-57.
- Pop, A. 2006. 'E-advertising: Strategic Selection of Structural forms and their Communicative Functions' in *Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai, Philologia*, LI, 4, pp: 189-202.
- Rovența-Frumușani, D. 2005. *Analiza discursului: ipoteze și ipostaze*. București: Tritonic.
- Scollon, R., S. Scollon. 2000. *Intercultural Communication A Discourse Approach*. Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Șerbănescu, A. 2007. *Cum gândesc și cum vorbesc ceilalți: prin labirintul culturilor*. Iași: Polirom.
- Vilki, L. n.d. 'Politeness, Face and Facework: Current Issues' in *A Man of Measure Festschrift in Honour of Fred Karlsson*, pp. 322–332.
- Zdrenghea, M. 2000. 'Advertising as popular culture' in *Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai, Philologia*, XLV, 2, pp: 5-14.

Notes on the author

Claudia Elena Stoian is a graduate in English Philology from the Universidad Autónoma, Madrid. She is currently a PhD. student in the Applied Linguistics Doctoral Programme at the same university. The focus of her doctoral research is discourse analysis of advertising language across cultures.

ON THE DIMINUTIVE IN ENGLISH

ÉVA KOVÁCS

Eszterházy Károly College

***Abstract:** The term 'diminutive' is generally supposed to convey the meaning 'small'. The primary aim of my paper is to show that the diminutive in English doesn't have this single meaning, but instead constitutes a category of meanings which behave in a variety of distinct ways. Nevertheless, they appear to be related to one another, exhibiting fuzziness and family resemblance.*

***Key words:** diminutives, categories, fuzziness, family resemblance*

1. Introduction

The term 'diminutive' used in morphology refers to an affix added to a word to convey the meaning 'small', used literally or metaphorically, such as a quality named, intimacy, affection, endearment or informality. Sometimes it also marks the off-spring of animals, resemblance or imitation. It is the opposite of an augmentative, which indicates large size or high – often excessive – degree. (Quirk et al. 1985:1584, Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1677, Mayor 2009:472 and www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diminutive)

In many languages, diminutives are mainly formed by adding suffixes, which is a productive word formation process. While most languages apply the grammatical diminutive to nouns (common and proper nouns), a few also use it for adjectives and even other parts of speech, such as verbs, adverbs, pronouns or numerals. In English diminutive suffixes are primarily added to common nouns (*booklet*), proper nouns (*Johnny*) and rarely to adjectives (*sickish*), numerals (*tennish*) and verbs (*nibble*).

Besides various suffixes, English diminutives are often formed through clipping, either alone (*Bess* from *Elizabeth*, *Tony* from *Anthony*) or combined with a suffix, e.g. *hanky* (handkerchief), *broolly* (umbrella), *Brittlers* (Britney Spears) and *Bodder* (Bodleian Library), etc. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677-78).

In comparison with many other languages, productive diminutives are not very common in English. Nevertheless, most dialects of English, e.g. Scottish, Australian and New Zealand English feature a fair number of diminutives and some suffixes seem to be generally spreading in present-day informal, colloquial English, such as *-ie/y* in *druggie* (a habitual user of drugs), *prezzie* (present), *-er* in *footer* (football) or *-ers* in *preggers* (pregnant), etc. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677-78).

The primary aim of my paper is to explore how the seemingly distinct meanings of the diminutive are related to one another, and to show in what framework they could be analysed best. By analysing the diminutive in English, I also mean to justify the cognitive approach to categories. It was cognitive linguists, such as Taylor (2003:170-176) and Evans and Green (2006:28-31), who pointed out that categories - human and linguistic - have fuzzy edges and in spite of the fact that members of a category exhibit distinct behaviour, they are related to one another, with some appearing to be more central and others more peripheral.

2. The diachronic, morphological and semantic properties of diminutives in English

Before attempting to give a cognitive analysis of the diminutives in English, it seems to be worthwhile to examine them in terms of their origin and their diachronic development with reference to their productivity and changes in their morphology and semantics.

As far as the origin of diminutives in English is concerned, they are partly of Anglo-Saxon origin, such as *-ock* (*hill - hillock*), *-n/-en* (*maiden*), *-o* (*arvo*), *-a* (*Gazza*), *-er* (*soccer*), *-s(y)* (*Betsy*), *-ers/-ster* (*Britters*), *-ish* (*sickish*) and *-le* (*pebble*), and they are partly borrowings from other languages, such as *-ie/y* (*doggie*), *-ling* (*duckling*), *-kin* (*bumpkin*), *-let* (*piglet*), *-ette* (*kitchenette*), *-rel*, *-erel* (*cockerel*) and *-een* (*velveteen*), etc. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677-78).

First, let us look at the diminutive suffixes of Anglo-Saxon origin. It is noteworthy that some of these are not productive any more and seem to have lost their diminutive sense, while others have a very informal tone. (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677-78, Quirk et al. 1985:1584 and www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diminutive)

In Old English *-ock* used to be a productive suffix forming diminutives. In fact, it was *-oc*, *-uc*, as in *bulluc* BULLOCK (young male cow that cannot breed) and *hassoc* HASSOCK (a small cushion for kneeling on in a church), etc. The number was extended in ME and later, illustrated by *HILLOCK* (a little hill) or *PADDOCK* (a small enclosure or field of grassland, especially for horses). Special Scottish formations are *bittock*, *lassock*, and proper names, such as *Bessock*, *Jamock*. The relatively new *mullock* (related to OE *myl* ~ dust) is used in *Australian E* meaning 'waste material from a mine', dating back to the 19th century (cf. Onions 1966: 622). The suffix, however, seems to have lost its original sense here.

Similarly, *-en* was also a common suffix forming (chiefly) diminutives, especially in names of animals: OE. *-en* =OHG, *-in*, Goth. *ein*, Germ. *-inam*, formally the neuter of *-inaz*, as in *ćicen* CHICKEN (young fowl), late ME *kitoun* KITTEN (young cat) or in *mægden* MAIDEN (girl, young woman). However, the final suffix *-en* got lost in some cases, like *chick* (OE. *ćycen*), *maid* (OE. *mægden*) or *eve* (ME. *even*) (cf. Onions 1966: 331). Interestingly enough, the suffix *-en* was also a marker of the feminine gender in Old English, such as in *biren* (she-bear), *gyden* (goddess) and *vixen* (she-fox), the last of which is the only surviving example in present-day English (cf. Onions 1966:311).

Discussing diminutives, Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1678) also refer to the suffixes *-o*, *-a*, *-er* and *-s*, which occur in informal embellished clippings. The first is particularly common in *AustE*: *arvo* (afternoon), *birdo* (bird-watcher), *smoko* (a short, often informal break), but it is also found more generally in English: *aggro* (aggravation), *ammo* (ammunition), *garbo* (garbage collector), etc. It is used in some *BrE* informal expressions like *billyo* (an intensifier meaning an unimaginably large amount, 'It rained like *billyo*', *lie doggo* (in hiding and keeping quiet), *weirdo* (a strange person), *wacko* (an eccentric or irrational person), *muso* (musician), *thicko* (someone who is very stupid) *lingo* (language) or *medico* (medic). *Fatso* (an insulting word for someone who is fat), *politico* (politician) and *pinko* (an insulting word for a Socialist) have negative connotations. As pointed out by the authors, the use of this suffix has as much to do with rhythm and decoration as with the expression of emotional attitude (2002:1678).

The minor variant *-a* is almost restricted to proper names: *Gazza* (refers to English former footballer Paul Gascoigne), *Macca* (a common British

nickname for somebody whose surname begins with the Gaelic prefix Mac or Mc (meaning 'son of') (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1678).

The *-er* suffix is used in English public school and university slang formations made by adding it to the first syllable of a word, which are sometimes themselves deformed. For example, *bedder* (bedroom), *bed-sitter* (bed-sitting room), *Divvers* (Divinity Honours Moderations), *ekker* (exercise), *footer* (football), *fresher* (freshman), *Radder* (Radcliffe Camera, Oxford), *rugger*, *soccer* (Rugby/Association football), *Taggers* (Torpids (boat races)), *Staggers* (St Stephen's House) and *Adders* (Addison's Walk, Magdalen College, Oxford), etc. (cf. www.wapedia.mobi/en/Oxford_-er_-).

There have been casual or transitory uses, such as *wagger pagger bagger* (waste paper basket) (cf. Onions 1966:323). This change can be seen in *bedder*, which now means 'bedmaker' and is a housekeeper in a college of the University of Cambridge and the University of Durham (cf. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bedder). Terms from Harrow School include *bluer* (blue blazer) and *yarder* (school yard). Other examples are *tucker* (AustralE food), *boner* (blunder, a spectacularly bad or embarrassing mistake) or *brekker*, *breakker* or *brekkers* (breakfast).

As illustrated by *divvers*, *ddders* and *taggers* above, the suffix *-er* often occurs in combinations with *-s*, such as in *preggers* (pregnant), *starkers* (not wearing any clothes, naked), *bonkers* (totally crazy), *champers* (champagne), *Twickers* (The stadium at Twickenham in South West London) or *Wimbers* (the annual lawn tennis championships at Wimbledon).

The *-er* suffix in combination with plural *-s* is also used with personal names, such as in *Beckers* (former England football captain David Beckham) and *Britters* (American singer Britney Spears). *Tollers* is the Oxford nickname of writer J. R. R. Tolkien and *Pragger Wagger* refers to various holders of the title of Prince of Wales.

The plural suffix *-s* is also found alone in a diminutive sense expressing affection in various terms of address, such as in *ducks* (used to speak to someone, especially a woman, in a friendly way), *Pops* or *Moms*.

The suffix *-ish* originating in OE *-isc* = OS, OHG *-isc* was added to adjectives from XIV onwards with the sense 'approaching the quality of ~' 'approximately/somewhat ~', first to adjectives of colour, e.g. *blueish* and *reddish*, etc. but later also to other adjectives, such as *coldish*, *largish*, *sickish*, *stupidish* and *youngish*, etc. The same meaning applies when it is added to numbers: *tennish* 'about ten' (especially for times and ages: 'about ten o'clock,

about ten years old') (cf. Onions 1966:486). The suffix *-ish* also forms denominal adjectives with the meaning 'resembling ~ in some way', often pejoratively, such as *bookish*, *boyish*, *brutish*, *sheepish* and *waspish*, etc. (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677).

When applied to some nouns, the suffix *-le* (OE *-el*) can also have a diminutive sense, such as in *pebble* (OE *papel*) and *thimble* (OE *þimel*). When added to verbs, it sometimes has a diminutive force, such as in *nibble* (XV. probably of Low Dutch origin *nibbeln* ~ take little bites of something) (cf. Onions 1966: 609), or it designates the metaphorical extension of smallness in *squabble*, *quibble* (argue about something unimportant or some small, unimportant details in a petty manner). In some cases the suffix *-le* acquires a frequentative force, chiefly expressive of repeated action or movement, for example, *babble*, *bubble*, *chuckle*, *giggle*, *drizzle*, *scribble*, *tickle*, *twinkle* and *wriggle*, etc. (cf. Onions 1966:520). These verbs designate a process of intermittent quality, sometimes denoting familiarity.

Besides the diminutive suffixes of Anglo-Saxon origin mentioned above, we can also find several foreign ones in English. It shows that when producing new diminutives, English has also borrowed liberally from other languages, such as German, French and Dutch, e.g. *-ie/-y* (*doggy*), *-ling* (*duckling*), *-kin* (*lambkin*), *-kins* (*Laurakins*), *-le/-ule/-ulum* (*particle*, *granule*), *-ette* (*kitchenette*) or *-let* (*piglet*) (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677-78). Similarly to the diminutive suffixes of Anglo-Saxon origin, some of these are also lexicalized and, in many contexts, they do not function as proper diminutives in modern English any more.

The most productive of the diminutive markers in present-day English, especially in Scottish, Australian and New Zealand varieties is *-ie/y*, which originates in hypocoristic Scottish formations, e.g. *birdie*, *brownie* (XVI. G. Douglas), *dearie* (XVII), *doggie*, *Jeanie* and *Willie* (cf. Onions 1966:460). First of all, it is found in numerous hypocoristics (pet names), such as in *Willie*, *Betty*, *Robbie*, *Maggie*, *Richie* and *Susie*, etc, where the diminutive suffix *-ie/y* is added to a contracted form of the pet name. In fact, hypocoristics are often a contracted form of a given name, such as *Benjamin* → *Ben*, *David* → *Dave*, *Franklin* → *Frank* and *Peter* → *Pete*, etc., which represent a shortening, generally to the first syllable.

Although most often applied to the names of children, the *-ie/y* suffix is not uncommon in adult names; the diminutive is used especially by family, friends and close acquaintances: *Anne* → *Annie*, *George* → *Georgie*, *James* →

Jamie, Jim → *Jimmy*, *Robert* → *Rob/Bob* → *Robbie/Bobby*, *William* → *Will/Bill* → *Willie/Billy*. No doubt the most productive name, with a great variety of pet names, is *Elizabeth* → *Bess, Bessie, Bette, Bet, Betty, Beth, Betsy, Eliza, Elise, Elsa, Elsie, Elle, Ella, Lisa, Lisbeth, Lissie, Lily, Libby, Liddy, Lizbeth, Lizzie, Liz, Liza, Lilibet* (cf. www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypocorism). In the case of children, the diminutive forms of names generally connote smallness and/or endearment. However, when used for an adult, their meaning can oscillate between tenderness and condescension. It is noteworthy that in informal English, besides first names, *-ie/y* can also be found in other proper nouns as well, such as *Brummie* (someone from the city of Birmingham) and *Fergie* (Sarah Ferguson, the Princess of York), etc.

Thirdly, the *-ie/y* suffix is commonly used in baby-talk, i.e. the language spoken to or by children, for example, *daddy, mummy, doggie, horsey, kitty, piggy, sweetie, drinky, potty, tummy, blankie, beddy-bye, oopsie-daisy, comfy, goody, easy-peasy* and *teeny*, etc. In both cases the role of the suffix is to mark emotional attachment rather than small size. However, small size may be concomitantly involved in *piggy* or *kitty*. *Pinkie* (mainly AmE and ScotE) means 'little finger', i.e. the smallest on the hand', but the base *pink* itself means 'small' (not finger) (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1677).

In playground words, the diminutive marker *-ie* also occurs with the suffix *-s*, such as in *onesies, twosies, kneesies, jumpsies, walkies, runsies*, and *widesies*, which represent diminutives typically used in children's games. Furthermore, *tootsies* are informal toes. The word is also used as a form of address - children use it or they may be addressed in this way; *undies* refer to underwear informally.

The *-ie* suffix can also be found in many other informal clippings in which the first syllable takes the suffix with some change in its form: *Aussie* (someone from Australia), *bicky* (biscuit), *broolly* (umbrella), *budgie* (budgerigar), *cardie* (cardigan), *chappie* (chap), *chevie* (chevrolet), *footie* (football), *goalie* (goalkeeper), *habbie* (haberdashery), *hanky* (handkerchief), *hubby* (husband), *mozzie* (mosquito), *offie* (off-licence), *prezzie* (present), *prossie* (prostitute), *sandie* (sandwich) and *telly*, etc.

Some colloquial words involve the reduplication of the suffix, e.g. *arty-farty* (pretentiously artistic), *hanky-panky* (sexual activity) and *lovey-dovey* (too romantic), etc. In such cases, just like in recent coinages in which a monosyllabic word takes the suffix, such as *druggie/druggy* (a habitual user of drugs), *giftie* (gift) and *groupie* (a young woman person who seeks emotional

and sexual intimacy with a musician or other celebrity), etc. the suffix *-ie/y* contributes to marking the style as informal, often adding some derogatory connotation.

In addition, in some words, *-ie/y* serves to form a noun from an adjective, often having an informal, familiar overtone. For example, *cutie* (someone who is attractive and nice), *greenie* (a freshly packed hit of marijuana; an environmentalist; a member of a Green Party), *hottie* (someone who is very sexually attractive), *softie/softy* (someone who is easily affected by feelings of pity or sympathy, or who is easily persuaded) and *weirdie* (someone unpleasantly strange or eccentric), etc. The diminutive *-ie* can form a noun even from a verb, e.g. *cookie* (a small flat sweet cake).

The less productive suffix *-ling* is of common Germanic origin. As in Old Norse, it is diminutive in sense, and is used to indicate small or young animals: *codling*, *duckling*, *gosling* and *spiderling*. Consider also formations like *nurseling* (an infant still being nursed), *suckling* (a young mammal that has not been weaned), and the nouns referring to plants, such as *sapling* (a young tree) and *seedling* (a young plant that is grown from a seed). Applied to adult persons, it indicates contempt, just like in OE *hireling* (someone who will work for anyone who will pay them). *Princeling* (a prince judged to be of minor status or importance), *squireling* (a petty squire), *lordling* (a lord regarded as immature or insignificant) and *weakling* (someone who is not physically strong) are new diminutive formations which appeared in the 16th century. Added to an adjective to form nouns, *-ling* denoted, even in OE, a person having this feature implied: e.g. *dēorling* DARLING or *underling* (an insulting word for someone who has a low rank). (cf. Onions 1966:629)

The suffix *-kin* originates in Middle Dutch *-kijn*, *-ken*, Middle Low German *-kin*, Old High German *-chin* (G. *-chen*). First it was found in the 13th c. in personal names, which were adoptions or imitations of diminutive or hypocoristic forms, current in the Low Countries, e.g. *Watekin* 'Little Wat or Walter', *Wilekin* 'little Will'. Formations on common nouns appeared in the 14th c.: *boykin*, *ladykin* and *lambkin*. Some are plain adoptions from Dutch such as *bumpkin* (an awkward, unsophisticated person), *catkin* (flowers found in willows), *napkin* (piece of linen for wiping the lips), *mannikin* (a very small person; a model of a human body, used for teaching art or medicine) and *ramekin* (a small dish in which food for one person can be baked and served). Others are, however, of different origin, e.g. *bodkin* (Celtic, a small pointed

instrument) or archaic, literary *welkin* (OE, *weolcen*~ sky), etc. (cf. Onions 1966:305)

The suffix *-let*, originating in French, has been used since the 14th c. to form diminutives, such as in OF *bracelet* (dim. of *bracel*) (cf. Onions 1966:524). It indicates small size in *booklet*, *flatlet*, *hamlet*, *leaflet*, *millet*, *necklet*, *notelet*, *ringlet*, *tartlet* and *rivulet*, etc. Furthermore, *-let* is also used with a few animal names to denote offspring, such as *auklet*, *eaglet*, *piglet* and *owlet*, etc. This suffix is occasionally found with other meanings, e.g. *eyelet* (a small hole or perforation, usually rimmed with metal, cord, fabric, or leather, used for fastening with a cord or hook), which is probably best glossed as 'resembling ~', though an eyelet is also small. The *-let* of *anklet* (an ornament worn around the ankle), *wristlet* (a band of material worn round the wrist for warmth or support) is, however, probably a different (non-diminutive) suffix. (cf. Onions 1966:524)

The fairly productive suffix *-ette* is also of French origin (OF *-ete*). It formed diminutive nouns being the feminine corresponding to masculine (O)F *-et*. In ME the French *-et* and *ette* were not clearly distinguished and survive in *bullet*, *casket*, *closet*, *gadget*, *hatchet*, *pellet*, *tablet*, *trinket* and *turret*, etc. The spelling *-ette* is preserved in adoptions, dating from the 17th c. onwards, in *kitchenette*, *dinerette*, *statuette*, *novelette* and *maisonette*, in which it marks small size, and also *cigarette* (with specialisation of meaning). In the 19th c., it began to be extended to English nouns, e.g. *lauderette* and especially in names of materials to indicate imitation, as in *flannelette* and *leatherette*, or female sex as in *usherette* and *suffragette* (cf. Onions 1966:329). Nevertheless, *widget* (a small piece of equipment that you do not know the name of) and *ladette* (a young woman who likes to do things that young men typically do) are new formations in informal style.

There are some other suffixes, such as *-rel*, *-erel* or *-een*, which have been used with a diminutive force during the history of English, but many of the resultant words are often no longer morphologically analysable.

-Rel, *-erel*, the ME suffix of diminutive and deprecatory force is also of French origin, found first in animal names as *macquerel* MACKEREL (sea fish) (13th c.), followed by DOGGEREL (comic verse, usually irregular in measure) (14th c.), COCKEREL (a young rooster) (15th c.), and later by SCOUNDREL (a worthless or villainous person). (cf. Onions 1966:753)

The *-een* suffix is recognisable with its 'imitation' meaning in a few words, like *velveteen* and *sateen* (with modification of the word *satın*). It

originates in French *-ine*, as in *ratteen* (a thick twilled woollen fabric)(F. *ratine*) and it is used in names of fabric denoting one inferior to or coarser than that denoted by the original word (cf. Onions 1966:302). Interestingly enough, *-een* also exists as a diminutive suffix in Irish, as in *boneen* ~ ‘young pig’, *colleen* ~ ‘a girl or a young woman’, *boreen* ~ ‘lane’, and *dudeen* ~ ‘short tobacco pipe’, etc. (cf. Onions 1966:302)

3. A cognitive analysis of the diminutive in English

How are all these meanings of the diminutive related and how could they be analysed in a unified framework? The answer to these questions seems to be given by cognitive grammarians, such as Taylor (2003:170) and Evans and Green (2006:29), who pointed out that fuzziness and family resemblance are not just features that apply to human categories, i.e. physical objects like *cups*, *tables* and *birds*, etc., but to linguistic categories as well. Linguistic categories – whether they relate to morphology, syntax or phonology – also appear to exhibit these phenomena. In other words, the members of a category exhibit degrees of family resemblance, with the category borders not clearly defined. Formal approaches to linguistics have tended towards the view that a particular category exhibits uniform behaviour which characterizes the category. In the cognitive view, however, linguistic categories, despite being related, often do not behave in a uniform way. Instead, they reveal themselves to contain members that exhibit quite divergent behaviour, with some category members being more central, prototypical, and others more peripheral.

The discussion above might suggest that present-day English lacks one productive diminutive affix and those which seem to have been borrowed from other languages. It is also true that some of them are lexicalized, and in many contexts, they cannot be really recognised as proper diminutives in modern English. Nevertheless, the different meanings of the diminutive seem to be somehow related.

How could the cognitive approach to linguistic categories be applied to the diminutives? As for the word class of the base word, we can see that with a few exceptions of adjectives, verbs and numerals, the majority of diminutives are added to nouns. With respect to the meanings of nouns, it can be stated that the central sense of the diminutive expresses the small size of a physical entity (*booklet*, *kitchenette*), often offsprings of animals (*duckling*, *piglet*). Besides, the diminutive is also used in numerous cases when smallness is not an issue. In

other words, the diminutive suffixes often mark emotional attachment (affection, endearment) or contribute to marking the informal style, sometimes adding even a derogatory connotation. Used in a type of slang, they indicate appurtenance to a social group, such as family or school, etc., strengthening the feeling of relation and closeness.

As noted by Taylor (2003: 174), the extension of the diminutive to express an attitude of affection is an instance of metonymic/metaphoric transfer. Thinking of entities with a small size can evoke a range of different attitudes. Small things can be regarded with affection or contempt. Human beings have a natural suspicion of large creatures, while small animals and small children can be cuddled and caressed without embarrassment or fear. This might account for the fact that the diminutive is commonly used in hypocoristics such as *Jimmy*, *Annie*, in baby talk, for example, *blankie*, *doggie*, *tummy*, or to denote young animals like *piglet*, *kitten* or *cockerel*. Especially the suffix *-y/ie*, which is undoubtedly the most productive suffix in present-day English, seems to be widespread in informal style, being illustrated by *footie*, *hanky*, *hubby*, *mozzie*, *prezzie* and *sandie*, etc. It also reflects emotional attitude, such as familiarity, intimacy, playfulness and informality. Similarly, the suffixes *-o*, *-a*, and *-er(s)* also occur in informal clippings, e.g. *arvo*, *Macca*, *ekker*, *champers* and *Adders*, etc, the last two being particularly popular in English school and university slang.

The association between small size and affection must be the reason why certain suffixes used to denote diminutive can refer to female animals or persons, such as *vixen* or *usherette*, with females being regarded as more graceful and dainty. The transfer of smallness to affection, intimacy is thus grounded in the co-occurrence of elements within an experiential frame.

If smallness is associated with an attitude of positive emotion, smallness also goes with lack of worth. The experiential base is obvious: superior worth correlates with increased size, decreased size with diminished worth. Hence, the diminutive can express not only affection, but also an attitude of depreciation, contempt thus having a derogatory connotation (Taylor: 2003:174), such as *-ling* in *hireling*, *princeling*, *lordling*, *-rel* in *scoundrel*, *-y/ie* in *prossie*, *druggie/ druggy*, *groupie* or *-o* in *fatso*, *politico*. In its other connotative meaning, the diminutive can also denote imitation, e.g. *-ette* in *leatherette*, or *-een* in *velveteen*, which is, however, a rather marginal usage. The use of the diminutive suffix here may be accounted for by the fact that imitation of a material has less value than the real material. The transfer from the small size to

less value may be the motivation for the meaning of these suffixes. The suffix –*le* in verbs like *squabble*, *quibble*, which mean arguing about something unimportant, also implies the metaphorical extension of smallness into the abstract domain.

The suffix *-ish* added to adjectives, such as *blueish*, *coldish* and numbers, like *tennish* has the meaning ‘approximately/somewhat ~’, i.e. the smaller degree of the quality. In Taylor’s view (2003:174), it is related to the dismissive sense of the diminutive, i.e. things which are small are of little importance. The above examples suggest that the exact value is unimportant, or that the speaker excuses herself/himself for not being precise.

It seems that as we move away from the central sense, diminutive suffixation begins to become less productive. Nevertheless, the affectionate, informal use of the diminutive is highly productive, while the deprecatory and dismissive uses are restricted to a relatively small number of instances.

4. Conclusion

Although the diminutive in English constitutes a category of meanings which behave in a variety of distinct ways, they do appear to be related to one another. The different meanings of the diminutive are motivated by its central, prototypical meaning, i.e. smallness and a metonymy/metaphor with experiential bases in our conceptual system. In other words, the diminutive emerges as a polysemous category, whose various extended meanings, such as affection, endearment, informality, depreciation, contempt, approximation, resemblance and imitation are linked to the central sense, i.e. smallness in physical space. Hence, the category exhibits degrees of family resemblance with a central and some more peripheral members.

References

- Huddleston, R., G. K. Pullum. 2002. *The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Evans, V., M. Green. 2006. *Cognitive Linguistics. An Introduction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Mayor, M. (ed.). 2009. *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
- Onions, C. T. (ed.). 1966. *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press.

Quirk, R., S. Greenbaum, G. Leech, J. Svartvik. 1985. *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.
Taylor, J. R. 2003. *Linguistic Categorization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diminutive> [accessed March 5, 2010]

http://www.wapedia.mobi/en/Oxford_-er [accessed March 5, 2010]

<http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bedder> [accessed March 5, 2010]

<http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypocorism> [accessed March 5, 2010]

Notes on the author

Éva Kovács is Professor of Linguistics in the Department of English Studies, at the Eszterházy Károly College in Eger, Hungary. Her research has been mainly in the area of English phrasal verbs. She is author of a number studies on phrasal verbs, on metaphors in business discourse, anglicisms in present-day German, sense relations and contrastive linguistic analyses, as well as of the book *Exploring English Phrasal Verbs* (Eszterházy Károly College, 2007).

EVALUATIVE MORPHOLOGY AND (MOR)PHONOLOGICAL CHANGES IN DIMINUTIVES OF INDO-EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

RENÁTA GREGOVÁ

P. J. Šafárik University, Košice

***Abstract:** Universal 1926 maintains that front vowels and palatal consonants prevail in diminutives. This sound symbolism was not proved. However, evaluative morphemes seem to trigger (mor)phonological changes in stems, which are not part of evaluative morphology. This paper aims to verify this hypothesis on a sample of Indo-European languages.*

***Key words:** diminutives, evaluative morphology, sound symbolism*

1. Introduction: theoretical and research points of departure

Evaluative morphology deals with the structure and function of diminutive and augmentative affixes, i. e. evaluative morphemes (cf. Scalise 1984).

According to Universal #1926 (originally 1932) as specified in Plank and Filimonova's (2000) *Universals Archive*, which summarizes more than 2000 language universals based on the relevant results of cross-linguistic typological research, diminutives are characterized by high front vowels and augmentatives by high back vowels. Ultan (1978) and Niewenhuis (1985) have extended this observation with the claim that palatal and alveo-palatal (i.e. post-alveolar in the current IPA terminology) consonants prevail in diminutives.

Thus, the cited Universal and several authors indicate that the formal expression of diminutive meaning in languages is to a large extent influenced by sound symbolism.

According to Sieberer (1947), there is some inner psychological connection between the meaning of words and preference for some sounds in words with the given meaning. Sound symbolism – phonetic iconicity – is connected with this idea of an inner psychological relationship between certain

sounds and certain areas of meaning, and supposes that vowels and consonants signal the meaning of words that contain them. It means that segments articulated in the area of the *palatum*, i.e. the hard palate (high front vowels and palatal and/or palatalized consonants), are considered to be the iconic symbols of diminutiveness.

However, previous research in this field has not proved this universal tendency. Bauer (1996), for example, who analyses the data in 50 languages of the world, concludes that there does not appear to be any universal principle of sound symbolism operating in markers of the diminutive and augmentative such that palatal articulation correlates with diminutives and not with augmentatives (Bauer 1996: 201).

Assuming that Universal #1926 did not emerge out of nothing, without any justification, we have decided to take up a cross-linguistic research into phonetic iconicity in evaluative morphology in the languages of Europe.

In our research (Štekauer et al. 2009), evaluative morphemes in 24 European languages were analysed. The following languages were included in the first analysis: Slavonic (West Slavonic – Czech, Polish, Slovak; East Slavonic – Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian; South Slavonic – Bulgarian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian), Germanic (English, German, Swedish, Danish), Romance (French, Italian, Romanian, Portuguese, Spanish, Catalan) and Finno-Ugric languages (Finnish, Hungarian, Estonian).

For the purposes of our analysis, we proposed a core vocabulary of 35 lexical items covering four major word-classes: nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs. The selection of these lexical items was based on Swadesh's glottochronology (1972), which assumes that the core vocabulary of languages is stable and it changes at a constant stable rate. Thus, it can be supposed that the selected words are the part of the lexicon of all or most of the world languages. The data sheets with 35 lexical items were filled out by linguists. Only the most productive pattern for each lexical item was taken into account.

This first stage of our research into phonetic iconicity in evaluative morphemes of European languages has shown that segments indicated as iconic symbols of diminutiveness (high front vowels; palatal and post-alveolar consonants) represent only 3% of all vowels and consonants in evaluative markers in the sample as a whole. In augmentatives, both vowels and consonants seem to be anti-iconic (Štekauer et al. 2009). The research has also shown that there are differences between the individual language families: the iconicity rate is the highest in Romance languages (47% of vowels and 20% of

consonants are iconic) and the lowest in Germanic (no iconic vowels and 17% of iconic consonants) and Finno-Ugric languages (no iconic consonants and only 2% of iconic vowels). In Slavonic languages, 39% of vowels and 7 % of consonants are iconic.

Since the analysis of evaluative markers in the languages of Europe has not validated the Universal #1926, the next step of our research was oriented towards the analysis of diminutive and augmentative morphemes in Indo-European, Austronesian and Niger-Congo language families.

The second, typologically and geographically extended, analysis encompassed the following languages: Indo-European languages – Kashmiri, Slovak, English, Italian, Latvian, Greek, Irish, Persian; Niger-Congo languages – Bafut, Bemba, Luwanga, Kiluba, Xhosa, Jita, Akan, Yoruba; and Austronesian languages – Maori, Toqabaquita, Jarai, Javanese, Melayu Papua, Muna, Tagalog, Matbat.

A detailed analysis of diminutive and augmentative affixes in the sample of languages from the mentioned language families, supported by frequency distribution histograms, indicates that high front vowels are typical of augmentatives rather than diminutives. Diminutive affixes are acoustically realized by central vowels. Similarly, the behaviour of consonants contradicts any universal expectations: alveolar and velar consonants slightly prevail in both augmentatives and diminutives (Gregová, Körtvélyessy, Zimmermann 2010).

However, having analysed evaluative markers in various languages, I have noticed that, in some of them, diminutive affixes seem to cause (mor)phonological changes in word-stems, which are not part of the evaluative morphology. For example, in Slovak, the process of palatalization changes the consonant before the diminutive affix, e.g. *palic-a* ‘stick’ > *palič-k-a* ‘a little stick’. Consequently, I have decided to aim my attention at those (mor)phonological changes in the word-stems of diminutives caused by evaluative affixes.

The material point of departure for my research into the (mor)phonology of diminutives was represented by the data sheets gained originally for the purposes of evaluative morphology. The analysis was carried out on a sample of the following Indo-European languages:

Slavonic branch (11): West Slavonic – Slovak, Czech, Polish; East Slavonic – Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian; South Slavonic – Serbian, Macedonian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Slovenian;

Romance branch (6): French, Italian, Spanish, Catalan, Portuguese, Romanian

Germanic branch (6): German, English, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Afrikaans

Baltic branch (1): Latvian

Celtic branch (1): Irish

Hellenic branch (1): Greek

Indo-Aryan branch (1): Kashmiri

Indo-Iranian branch (1): Persian

The selection of languages included is quite random since it is based predominantly on the availability of the material for analysis. Although some of the branches are represented only by one language, I suppose that the sample can be considered representative for my 'research probe'. My assumption is based on the fact that if the mentioned (mor)phonological changes belong to the phonology/morphophonology of the Indo-European language family as a whole, then they will be observable even in the sample of 28 languages. The more detailed division of languages in terms of branches is useful for practical reasons: it enables a more transparent account of the results obtained, as will be seen later.

The achievements of my present research, aimed at the analysis of the changes in word-stems of diminutives triggered by diminutive affixes, will simultaneously be compared to the results of the previous analysis aimed at segments in evaluative markers.

2. Research results

2.1. Slavonic languages

All eleven Slavonic languages are inflectional and display a high number of various diminutive markers (cf. Štekauer et al. 2009). Although – as already mentioned – diminutive morphemes themselves cannot be evaluated as iconic, they trigger palatalization changes in word-stems. These changes are quite similar in the analysed Slavonic languages and can be interpreted together.

Overall, 29% of evaluative morphemes in Slavonic languages cause such neutralization and alternation processes in word-stems of diminutives that shift the articulation of vowels and consonants closer to the hard palate. The

consonantal changes (Table 1) are much more common than those of vowels (Table 2).

CONSONANTS	
type of change	Example
<i>alternation k/č</i>	Slovak, Czech, Polish ok-o (eye) > DIM oč-k-o
	Ukrainian ruk-a (hand) > DIM ruč-eň-a
<i>alternation h/ž</i>	Czech knih-a (book) > DIM kníž-k-a
<i>alternation k/š</i>	Polish ptak (bird) > DIM ptasz-ek
<i>alternation c/č</i>	Czech měsíc (moon) > DIM měsíč-ek Russian ptic-a (bird) > DIM ptič-k-a Bulgarian slnc-e (sun) > DIM slnč-ic-e
<i>alternation g/ž</i>	Croatian knjig-a (book) > DIM knjiž-ic-a
<i>alternation ch/š</i>	Ukrainian ptach (bird) > DIM ptaš-eň-a
<i>neutralization d/d'</i>	Slovak vod-a (water) > DIM vod'-ičk-a
<i>neutralization l/l'</i>	Slovak mal-ý (little) > DIM mal'-ičk-ý
<i>neutralization t/t'</i>	Czech tát-a (father) > DIM tat'-ínek
<i>neutralization n/n'</i>	Bulgarian grozn-a (ugly) > DIM grozň-ičk-a

Table 1. Consonantal changes in word-stems of Slavonic diminutives triggered by diminutive morphemes

VOWELS	
Type of change	Example
<i>alternation o/e</i>	Belarusian agoň (fire) > DIM ageň-čik
<i>alternation e/i</i>	Czech kâmen (stone) > DIM kamín-ek
<i>alternation a/e</i>	Bulgarian, goljam (big) > DIM golem-ičik

Table 2. *Vocalic changes in word-stems of Slavonic diminutives triggered by diminutive morphemes*

The data for the individual languages also indicate certain differences between the language phyla and the languages analysed. While the (mor)phonological changes caused by the diminutive marker approach almost 40% in West Slavonic languages, there is only a 30% occurrence in East Slavonic phylum and in South Slavonic languages the changes in word-stems occur only in 23.5% of the cases.

As for the differences between the individual languages, vocalic alternations seem to be the most frequent in Czech and Belarusian, and consonantal alternations or/and neutralizations are typical of Slovak and Bulgarian. On the other hand, in Macedonian there is almost no palatalization change of consonants or change of vowels articulation in the stems of words. But all evaluative affixes delimited in Macedonian tend to be iconic – they contain either high front vowel or palatalized consonant (cf. Gregová 2010).

2.2. Romance languages

Compared to the Slavonic languages, in Romance languages diminutives can be formed with a considerably lower range of affixes. Changes in word-stems caused by these evaluative markers are rather miscellaneous. Therefore the six analysed Romance languages have to be treated separately.

In French, diminutive markers do not cause any phonological changes that would lead to the higher occurrence of high front vowels and/or palatal (post-alveolar) consonants in word-stems. In French diminutives, consonant /l/ is usually placed between the word-stem and the diminutive affix (e.g. oeil ‘eye’ > DIM oeil~~l~~-et) or the final consonant of the word-stem is geminated (e.g. maison ‘house’ > DIM maison~~n~~-et).

Typical changes accompanying the process of diminutivization in Italian are the omission of the stem-final vowels o, e, a (connected to gender change), e.g. *animale* (animal) > DIM *animal-in-o*) or the insertion of a consonantal sound between the stem and the diminutive suffix (*fior-e* ‘flower’ > DIM *fiorell-in-o*), and, of course, a shift of stress also takes place.

Although Spanish is a language rich in diminutives, its evaluative markers cause no significant changes in word-stems (e.g. *niñ-o* ‘child’ > DIM *niñ-it-o*, *flor* ‘flower’ > DIM *flor-ecilla*), but as the previous research has shown, 85% of vowels in diminutive morphemes are iconic (the high front vowel prevails, cf. Štekauer et al. 2009).

Romanian is also rich in diminutives and its diminutive suffixes often trigger various changes in word-stems. In my research material, there is a vowel alternation of open central unrounded a into mid central unrounded ă, connected to stress alternation (e.g. *animal* ‘animal’ > DIM *animăl-uț*, *scaun* ‘chair’ > DIM *scăun-el*) as well as a consonant change - the velar plosive [k] turns into the palatal affricate *č* [tʃ] (*copac* ‘tree’ > DIM *copăc-el*).

Catalan diminutive suffixes do not trigger any relevant changes in word-stems. Rarely u is changed into ü that represents [w] between k, g and a front vowel (e.g. *aigua* ‘water’ > DIM *aigü-et-a*) or c [k] is changed into qu which is used to represent its hard (i.e. velar) pronunciation before e (e.g. *bonic* ‘nice’ > DIM *boniqu-et*).

There are no changes in word-stems of diminutives in Portuguese, (e.g. *livr-o* ‘book’ > DIM *livr-inh-o*), but vowels in its diminutive markers *-zinh(o)*, *-zinh(a)*, *-inh(o)*, *inh(a)* - display a 100 % iconicity.

To sum up: although the palatalization of word-stem consonants may occur in Romanian diminutives, diminutive markers in the other analysed Romance languages do not trigger changes that would increase the number of high front vowels and/or palatal (post-alveolar) consonants. But, in some of them (Spanish, Portuguese), diminutive markers are themselves iconic, at least in terms of the vowels they contain (cf. Štekauer et al. 2009).

2.3. Germanic languages

The process of diminutivization is less frequent in Germanic languages than in Romance languages. Similarly to Romance languages, changes in word-stems are rather miscellaneous and have to be analysed separately.

In German, the diminutive morpheme *-lein* occurring in my research material causes the fronted pronunciation of vowels in stems, i.e. the so-called

Umlaut (e.g. Buch ‘book’ > DIM Büch-*lein*, Hammer ‘hammer’ > DIM Hämmer-*lein*).

The rare diminutive suffixes in English cause no palatalization changes in word-stems (e.g. bird > DIM bird-*ie*), but 85 % of the vowels in these evaluative suffixes are iconic (Stekauer et al. 2009).

Diminutive forms in Danish, Swedish and Norwegian are very rare, too. They trigger no relevant changes in word-stems, although some of the vowels included in the diminutive markers can be evaluated as iconic (e.g. *Danish* fugl ‘bird’ > DIM *pip*-fugl, *Swedish* liten ‘small’ > DIM *pytte*-liten, *Norwegian* barn ‘child’ > DIM *små*-barn).

The evaluative affixes in Afrikaans do not cause any changes in word-stems of diminutives, but vowels in diminutive morphemes are totally iconic (diminutive markers contain [i:] – a high front vowel: e. g. vader ‘father’ > DIM vader-*tjie*, tree ‘tree’ > DIM tree-*tjie*).

To sum up, there are no (mor)phonological changes in the Germanic languages caused by diminutive morphemes, except in the German language, where diminutivization by the suffix *-lein* leads to the fronted pronunciation of vowels in word-stems, the so-called *Umlaut*, which is a characteristic feature of German phonology.

2.4. Baltic language

Latvian is rich in diminutive markers. There are 26 of them, falling into 6 types in the vocabulary sample analysed. In 17% of the cases, these suffixes cause a change of the stem-final k, which is velar, into c, that, when followed by the i from the affix, is pronounced as palatal (e.g. rok-a ‘hand’ > DIM roc-*in*-a). Moreover, iconic vowels dominate in Latvian evaluative markers.

2.5. Celtic language

In Irish, my only representative of the Celtic language branch, the diminutive morpheme *-in* contains an iconic vowel. Furthermore, this diminutive morpheme triggers such changes in word-stems that lead to the higher occurrence of high front vowels and palatal (or post-alveolar) consonants, i.e. iconic segments: the vowel /i/ is inserted in the stem (e.g. casúr ‘hammer’ > DIM casúir-*in*, mór ‘big’ > DIM móir-*in*); the pronunciation of some consonants is shifted closer to the hard palate (e.g. grian ‘sun’ > DIM griain-ín [griæin^hn], [n^h] being post-alveolar).

2.6. Hellenic language

Modern Greek is rich in diminutive markers, but they do not trigger significant changes in the word-stems of diminutives.

2.7. Indo-Aryan language

In Kashmiri, there are no morphological diminutive forms.

2.8. Indo-Iranian language

In Persian, evaluative markers do not cause any relevant changes in the word-stems of diminutives.

3. Conclusion

According to Universal #1926 from Plank and Filimonova's Universals Archive, and Ultan's (1978) and Niewenhuis's (1985) theories, high front vowels and palatal and/or post-alveolar consonants (i.e. segments articulated in the area of the hard palate) are the iconic symbols of diminutiveness.

However, the previous research, aimed at the analysis of diminutive markers in the Indo-European, Niger-Congo and Austronesian languages, has not proved the universal nature of this iconic tendency.

The various analyses also indicate substantial differences in the character of diminutive markers of the languages belonging to one language family (cf. Štekauer et al. 2009, Panocová 2009, Gregová, 2010). The dominance of high front vowels and palatal (or palatalized) consonants in diminutive affixes seems to be language specific and not language universal. This idea supports the areal nature of phonetic symbolism, as already mentioned by Niewenhuis (1985).

But the cited analyses have revealed that though there are no palatalization tendencies in the evaluative markers of some languages, those markers trigger various (mor)phonological changes in the word-stems of diminutives which are not the part of the evaluative morphology.

Thus my current research was aimed at the analysis of the influence of diminutive affixes on word-stems. The research was carried out on a sample of diminutives from 28 Indo-European languages falling into 8 language branches.

The research results are as follows:

a/ the assumption about the dominant occurrence of high front vowels and/or palatal consonants in word-stems of diminutives as a result of the

diminutive marker influence was not proved in the sample of 28 Indo-European languages;

b/ when evaluating the individual branches of the Indo-European languages (especially those represented by more than one language), one can hardly speak about a substantial change in the features of sounds occurring in the word-stems of diminutives, caused by the diminutive affixes: only 29% of the word-stems in the Slavonic diminutives display (mor)phonological changes, with an increased rate of high front vowels and/or palatal (post-alveolar) consonants; these changes are sporadic in Romance and Germanic diminutives;

c/ when evaluating the individual languages, it is clear that, in some of them, diminutive suffixes trigger neutralization and alternation changes in word-stems that increase the occurrence of the segments considered as the iconic symbols of diminutiveness (e.g. German, Latvian).

The comparison of the results of a previous research into phonetic iconicity in evaluative morphology (Štekauer et al. 2009) with the present results of my research into the ‘phonetic iconicity of segments in word-stems’ as a consequence of diminutive marker influence indicates that languages either tend to have diminutive affixes with iconic segments (e.g. Macedonian, Spanish) or diminutive markers are not iconic, but they cause changes in word-stems that shift the articulation of vowels and/or consonants closer to the palatum (e.g. German, Slovak).

In order to prove or disprove the validity of Universal #1926, the diminutive (word-stem + evaluative affix) should be taken into consideration as a whole. It seems that any other type of analysis – either the analysis of the evaluative affix, or the analysis of the word-stem – is only partial and it does not reflect the phonological and morphological regularities of the given language in its complexity.

Moreover, the cited Universal claims which type of segments prevail in diminutives, but it does not specify whether high front vowels and/ or palatal (and post-alveolar) consonants exist in the diminutive markers or whether they occur in the word-stems as the result of neutralization and alternation processes triggered by the evaluative morphemes.

In a follow-up research, it will be necessary to extend the sample of languages analysed, as well as the number of lexical items included; this may bring about more relevant results.

References

- Bauer, L. 1996. 'No Phonetic Iconicity in Evaluative Morphology' in *Studia Linguistica* 50. A Journal of General Linguistics .Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 189-206.
- Gregová, R. 2010. 'Evaluative Morphology and (Mor)phonological Changes in Diminutives of Slavonic Languages' in: *Sučasni doslidžennja z inozemnoji filolohiji*. Vypusk 8: zbirnyk naukovych prac. Užhorod: Užhorodskij nacional'nyj universytet (to appear).
- Gregová, R., L. Körtvélyessy, J. Zimmermann. 2010. 'Phonetic Iconicity in the Evaluative Morphology of a sample of Indo-European, Niger-Congo and Austronesian Languages' in *Word Structure*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (to appear).
- Nieuwenhuis, P. 1985. *Diminutives*. PhD. Dissertation. University of Edinburgh.
- Panocová, R. 2009. 'On Sound Symbolism in Evaluative Morphology of East Slavonic Languages' in: *Sučasni doslidžennja z inozemnoji filolohiji*. Vypusk 7: zbirnyk naukovych prac. Užhorod: Užhorodskij nacional'nyj universytet, pp. 324 – 328.
- Plank, F., E. Filimonova, 2000. *The Universals Archive*. <http://ling.uni-konstanz.de/pages/proj/sprachbau.htm>. Originally published in *Sprachtypologie und Universalienforschung* 53. pp. 109-123; updated by Frans Plank and Thomas Mayer, Aug. 2006.
- Scalise S. 1984. *Generative Morphology*. Dordrecht: Foris.
- Sieberer, A. 1947. Primäre oder sekundäre Lautbedeutsamkeit? *Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. Hist. Kl., Anzeiger, LXXXIV*, pp. 35 – 52.
- Swadesh, M. 1972. 'What is glottochronology?' in *The origin and diversification of languages*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 271–284.
- Štekauer, P., R. Gregová, Z. Kolaříková, L. Körtvélyessy, R. Panocová, 2009. 'On phonetic iconicity in evaluative morphology. Languages of Europe' in *Culture, Language and Literature Across Border Regions*. Krosno, pp. 123-132.
- Ultan, R. 1978. 'Size-sound symbolism' in *Universals of Human Language*. Stanford: vol. 2, p. 525-568.
<http://www.phonetics.ucla.edu/vowels/chapter14/germ.html>

Notes on the author

Renáta Gregová is an assistant lecturer in the Department of British and U.S. Studies, Faculty of Arts, P. J. Šafárik University, Košice, Slovakia. The author's research interest is in comparative phonetics, phonology and morphonology.